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THE TREATY OF BERLIN AND THE CONVENTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

THIRD EDITION.

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

This pamphlet was written in July, 1878, when the Treaty of Berlin was being proclaimed throughout Europe as a signal English triumph, and the English plenipotentiaries who negotiated it were still receiving the most enthusiastic expressions of the gratitude of their countrymen. It would have been excusable enough if a writer devoted to the Conservative cause should at such a moment have taken somewhat too sanguine a view of the advantages achieved and, with every desire to describe the provisions of the Treaty in the soberest and most matter-of-fact language, should now and then have allowed his pen to be carried away by the prevalent contagious enthusiasm. There is not, however, in republishing this pamphlet, the slightest need to offer such an excuse for any one sentence. There is no one statement in the pamphlet, which is reprinted without alteration, that now, two years and a half after the conclusion of the Treaty, we have the slightest occasion to modify, except the last paragraph which describes the proud position occupied by England then and preserved by her until the resignation of the Conservative Government, but from which she has now fallen into even a greater depth of discredit and dishonour than that from which Lord Beaconsfield raised her when he succeeded Mr. Gladstone in 1874. In every point affecting English interests, this Treaty of Berlin (of which Sir William Vernon Harcourt said in October, 1878, that it had not lasted forty days) has been carried out, and the only provisions which remain unexecuted are either of very minor importance or, from their character, require much time for their permanent arrangement.

It is indeed now almost a work of supererogation to vindicate the Treaty of Berlin, for nobody now ventures to attack it. The members of the Government who, up to the time of the General Election, could find no invectives too strong to apply to the Treaty and its authors, now speak of it with an enthusiasm which, like that of converts generally, borders upon excess. The same men who denounced the Treaty as the "Dunciad of Diplomacy"—whatever may have been meant by that phrase—who described it as "the Russian Charter of Conquest in the East," as a settlement of Europe in the negotiation of which the voice of England had been given not in favour of freedom, but against freedom, as the outcome of two attempts —the defence of Turkey and the reform of Turkey, both of which had failed because both were impossible—now declare that they never condemned the Treaty and have always had the highest opinion of its value. Mr. Gladstone, last Lord Mayor's day, after observing that, with respect to the Eastern Question, he and his colleagues had found themselves able to adopt the declaration and work for a purpose which had been identically declared on the part of the Government which they had succeeded, went on to say: "The late Prime Minister no longer than two years ago declared, and justly declared, that the Treaty of Berlin which had been recently concluded was a

Treaty that, if fully executed, promised to confer great benefits upon Europe." Mr. Gladstone may be taken to speak for the whole Cabinet, and the later and revised opinions of other Ministers on the subject are not of much importance. But, satisfactory as this recognition of the merits of the Treaty of Berlin by those who but a short time ago denounced it so bitterly must be deemed, it will be useful to preface the republication of this pamphlet by a brief statement showing how far it has been carried into execution, what are the stipulations which remain unaccomplished, and what is the relative importance as well to this country as to the Sultan and people of Turkey of the two categories of provisions—the fulfilled and the unfulfilled.

This examination will show that although the Treaty has not been fully executed, all its fundamental dispositions have been carried out, and that the provisions which have still to be put in force are already in a fair way of accomplishment, or are of but comparatively small significance. The first twelve articles of the Treaty are devoted to the constitution of the autonomous and tributary Principality of Bulgaria. Every provision intended for the benefit of the Bulgarians has been carried into execution, and the only stipulations which remain to be enforced are some which safeguard the interests of the Porte, and substitute Bulgaria for the Porte in respect to some engagements of the latter towards neighbouring States and private individuals. The Russians, who, it was said by the critics of the Treaty, would never leave the principality, have long since withdrawn. The constitution has been duly elaborated and promulgated. The National Assembly has already sat two or three sessions, and two or three Ministerial crises have been recorded. A German Prince who will look to Berlin and not to St. Petersburg for guidance sits upon the throne, and the Bulgarians enjoy the full measure of enfranchisement which the Treaty designed that they should possess. On the other hand, the amount of the tribute the Principality is to pay the Porte and the share of the Ottoman debt it is to assume have not yet been settled, the ancient fortresses which should have been razed at the expense of the principality still stand, although in a ruinous condition, and the Principality has as yet shown no desire to give effect to the article which imposes upon it the obligations of the Porte to the Rustchuk-Varna Railway Company, and the engagements of the Porte to Austria-Hungary and the company for the working of the railways of European Turkey in respect to their completion and connection. No doubt it is desirable that these provisions of the Treaty should be carried into effect, but the delay is hardly surprising. The questions they raise are not to be dealt with in a rough-and-ready fashion, and there can be little doubt that they will be settled in the spirit of the Treaty before very long.

Articles 13 and 21 constitute the province of Eastern Roumelia—that is to say, a portion of the territory cut off from the "big Bulgaria" of the Treaty of San Stefano and restored to the Sultan. Eastern Roumelia has been endowed with the administrative autonomy stipulated in its favour, and every article in the Treaty relating to it has received complete execution. If the Sultan has not erected fortresses on the sea and land frontiers of the province and properly garrisoned them, he

has not violated the fifteenth Article of the Treaty but has only failed up to the present time to avail himself of the rights it has given him. We need say nothing about Article 22, which prescribes the evacuation of Turkish territory and of Roumania ; it has long been fulfilled.

Article 23 begins with an engagement by the Porte to apply, with such modifications as may be equitable, the organic law of 1868 in the island of Crete. This undertaking the Porte has thoroughly fulfilled, and the Cretans, with the exception, of course, of those who listen to the agents of the Greek Government, are perfectly satisfied. The article goes on to prescribe that analogous laws adapted to local requirements shall be introduced into the other parts of European Turkey for which a particular organization has not been provided by the Treaty. The Porte undertakes to establish special commissions to elaborate the details of these new laws, which, however, are to be submitted to the judgment of the European Commission for Eastern Roumelia before they are promulgated. Drafts of such laws—for the most part not revisions of Turkish plans, but more or less ambitious schemes elaborated by the Eastern Roumelian Commission, in which England was represented by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice—are now under the consideration of the Turkish Government. We earnestly hope it may find it safe and expedient to promulgate these laws, and thus endow all its European provinces with local self-government; but it can hardly be imputed to the Turkish Government as a crime, even by the most virulent of its enemies, if it should find it necessary to suggest some revision of these constitutions.

By Article 24 the Powers reserve to themselves liberty to offer their mediation to Turkey and Greece in the event of the Governments of those countries being unable to come to an understanding with respect to the rectification of the frontier suggested in the thirteenth protocol of the Congress. It cannot be said that this liberty has not been amply used. There is no engagement in the Treaty to enforce upon Turkey the cessions of territory necessary to establish the proposed frontier, and in the protocol, to which reference is made, the use of coercive measures is emphatically repudiated; but since the present Government came into office a very strenuous attempt has been made to coerce Turkey into a cession of territory far larger than that contemplated by the thirteenth protocol; and as the whole course of the negotiations has been grossly misrepresented by Liberal speakers and writers, it may be useful to state shortly what has really been done. The ink with which the Treaty of Berlin was written was hardly dry when the Greek Government appealed to the Powers to urge upon the Porte to enter immediately into negotiations for fixing the new frontier, contending that the Porte, by signing the Treaty, had formally recognized the principle of cession, and that the only question to be determined was one of delimitation. This interpretation of the Treaty was not accepted by the Powers, but they urged the Turkish Government to enter into negotiations with Greece upon the subject, and eventually, after a great many difficulties, Turkish and Greek Commissioners met at Prevesa in February, 1879. Nothing came of the meetings of the Commissioners, for the Greeks asked the line

of the protocol as they read it, and the Turks offered much less than any reading of it would give to Greece. Negotiations between the Governments of Turkey and Greece were renewed in the autumn at Constantinople, but they also came to nothing, as the Greek representatives insisted that the Turks should accept as the basis of negotiations the frontier suggested in the thirteenth protocol, and the Turkish plenipotentiaries declined to treat that frontier as anything more than a suggestion, deserving, of course, respectful attention, but in no way prescribing that particular line. They, however, indicated a line which would have given Greece not only the whole of the Gulf of Volo, but all the southern part of Epirus, as one which the Porte might possibly accept. The next important step in the business was a proposal made by the French Government in December, 1879, to draw the frontier line by agreement between the Powers, and suggesting a particular line which could hardly be made clear without a sketch map, but which M. Waddington thus summed up:—"In a word, we should propose to follow in Epirus the southern limit of the basin of the Kalamas and in Thessaly the northern limit of the valley of the Peneus." This line would have left Janina to Turkey. The English Government thought the proposed line too great a deviation to the damage of Turkey from the line of the protocol, and further considered that it would be better to appoint an International Special Commission to study the question upon the spot. To this latter suggestion, the French Government and the Governments of the other signatory Powers ultimately agreed, and the English Government had addressed the Turkish Government upon the subject, and was awaiting its reply when the General Election occurred. What happened subsequently, what communications Lord Granville on taking the seals of office addressed to the French Government or received from it, we have not been told. The papers published by the present Government begin with the instructions to Lord Odo Russell to support the French proposal in the Berlin Conference, and to pay the greatest attention to the representative of Greece in that capital. Of the genesis of the conference, of the exchange of views which preceded the adoption of this French proposal, which gives to Greece far more than M. Waddington proposed to give her in December or M. Freycinet in April, we have not a word of information. Whether Lord Granville, as is generally supposed, incited M. de Freycinet to renew the original scheme of settling the question without any examination of the ground, and urged him to propose a frontier more advantageous to Greece than the one M. Waddington had originally proposed, or whether M. de Freycinet himself renewed the negotiations, we are not told, and the matter is not perhaps of much importance. The so-called arbitration of the Conference of Berlin has entirely failed, and every sign now points to a recurrence to that International Boundary Commission to investigate the question on the spot which Lord Salisbury proposed.

The occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by Austria in accordance with the 25th Article has been duly accomplished. Perhaps there was no article of the Treaty more distasteful to Mr. Gladstone in the days when it was his cue to denounce the Treaty, and perhaps no one provision of the Treaty has had a more speedy beneficial effect, apart altogether from the wider political consequences which are discussed

in the body of this pamphlet. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, the English member of the Eastern Roumelian Commission, speaking at Glasgow a short time since, said that so long as these provinces were under Turkish rule no man could go there for fear of his life, but people could now go from one end of them to the other in as perfect safety as it was possible to travel from London to Glasgow, which is a great deal more than can be said about any part of Greece. Articles 26 to 33 recognize the independence of Montenegro, mark out its frontiers, and formulate the conditions of its independent existence. The great difficulty in the execution of these articles has been the settlement of the frontier question, which now seems at last to be at hand. The Treaty of Berlin modified materially the limits of Montenegro as constituted by the Treaty of San Stefano. It gave back to Turkey several districts inhabited by Mussulmans, and it fixed a frontier which, according to the information at the disposal of the Plenipotentiaries, whilst gratifying the aspirations of the Montenegrins for an extension of territory, inflicted no injury on the populations with whom the Montenegrins had been constantly at feud. It was soon found, however, that there was an intense reluctance on the part of any of the nationalities affected to exchange the sovereignty of the Sultan for the yoke of the Prince of Montenegro; and so serious was this opposition that Mehemet Ali Pasha, who was sent by the Sultan to make arrangements for carrying out the Treaty, was murdered by the people—a fact which is entirely ignored by the Radicals who complain of the bad faith of the Sultan. How difficult the matter really was is shown by the fact that all the Powers recognized it, and ultimately agreed to the compromise or exchange which has made the name of Dulcigno notorious. This arrangement, by which Dulcigno was substituted for a portion of the territory which the Treaty of Berlin gave to Montenegro, was accepted by the Powers, by Montenegro, and by the Porte, but the people immediately concerned had not been asked their assent and refused to give it, and those people immediately concerned were not merely the inhabitants of Dulcigno, as the Government advocates try to make out, but their neighbours. The cession of Dulcigno affected wider interests than those of the inhabitants of the little town. It has taken place at last, but the difficulties which the Turkish Government has had to overcome refute the aspersions which it suits even members of the English Government to cast upon its good faith. It had to send to the scene of action the very best man at its disposition and a very large force of troops; and all the energy of Dervisch Pasha and all the military strength at his command could only give possession of Dulcigno to the Montenegrins after a struggle in which, even according to the story of Sir Charles Dilke, who had the singular bad taste, to use no harsher word, to make a joke over the small number of deaths, some eight to thirteen Albanians were killed.

It pleases Ministerial speakers and writers to attribute some part in this achievement to the Naval Demonstration, but it is perfectly certain that the whole credit, such as there may be, of the transaction belongs to Dervisch Pasha. Although there are still some difficulties in the matter of the frontiers of Montenegro, they cannot be very serious, and

when they are settled there cannot be any very great difficulty in determining the fraction of the Ottoman public debt which Montenegro will have to pay in consideration of its increase of territory.

Articles 34 to 42 deal with the position of Servia. The only stipulation to be found in them which has not yet been executed beyond the determination of the part of the Ottoman public debt which Servia is to bear, is that which refers to the substitution of Servia for the Porte with respect to the engagements which the latter had entered into with Austria-Hungary and the Company for the working of the railways in European Turkey. The recent course of events in the principality may be taken to promise that all difficulties in this respect will soon be removed.

Articles 43 to 51 are devoted to Roumania. They recognize its independence, stipulate for civil and religious liberty, for the new delimitation of territory consequent upon the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia, and the acquisition of the Dobroudscha and the substitution of Roumania for the Porte in the ceded territory in all rights and obligations in respect of public works. All these articles have been executed. It may be said, indeed, and with justice, that the injunctions of the Treaty with respect to religious liberty and equality have not been thoroughly fulfilled. But the Government has apparently satisfied the Powers that it has gone as far as is at present possible in this direction, and they have all of them formally recognized the independence of Roumania. This observation applies also to Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro. The amount of religious liberty given even by the law in each of these States falls short of the provisions of the Treaty ; but the Powers have apparently satisfied themselves that it is as much as can for the present be expected from peoples still so ignorant and bigoted. Articles 52 to 57 deal with the question of the navigation of the Danube and of the authority to control it. Although some difficulties have arisen in the arrangement of these matters, they may be considered as practically settled. The contest, such as it is, does not concern the foreign countries which are interested in the free navigation of the stream, but turns upon the jealousies of the riverain States.

Articles 58, 59, and 60, which modify materially the territorial and other relations between Russia and Turkey in Asia as they were established by the Treaty of San Stefano, have been executed. On the other hand, Article 61, which records the promise of the Porte to realize without delay the necessary ameliorations and reforms in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds, remains practically unfulfilled. The truth is that the Porte has not the means to give this protection, and will never have the means whilst its whole energies are occupied in resisting claims preferred or countenanced by some of the Great Powers which it could not yield without signing its death warrant. That the Porte is really unable to deal with the Kurds, as it could wish to do, is shown by the recent exploits of these barbarians in Persia ; and who can wonder at its incapacity to control them, when it is remembered that hardly a year and a half have elapsed since the Russian army withdrew

from Turkish territory, and that no opportunity has yet been afforded it even to make an earnest attempt to get out of its financial difficulties? Article 62 begins with a bold general proclamation of civil and religious liberty and equality throughout the Ottoman Empire, and ends with several stipulations of little general interest. Only those who believe that the character of a people can be changed in a day will complain that this promise of the Sultan, which was not dictated by the Powers, but inserted in the Treaty at his own request, has not been yet fulfilled. Nothing need be said about the 63rd, and really last Article of the Treaty, which maintains those dispositions of the Treaties of Paris and London not modified in the preceding Articles.

We have now shown the absolute correctness of the statement, that the Treaty has been carried out in its main provisions, and that the small number of Articles which have not yet been executed are in part about to be put in force, and in part of very slight importance. It remains only to complete this retrospect by a few observations upon the Convention of Constantinople. The Convention of Constantinople contains three engagements. The first is a promise on the part of England to help the Sultan by force of arms in the event of any attempt on the part of Russia to seize any portion of his territories in Asia as they should be fixed by the definitive Treaty of Peace (the Treaty of Berlin). Russia has not threatened the Sultan's Asiatic territories, and there has consequently been no occasion to test the virtue of this stipulation. On the other hand, the Sultan, in order to give England the necessary means to fulfil her engagement to help him, cedes her the island of Cyprus, which she is to occupy and administer, and he further pledges himself to introduce the reforms which may be necessary for the good administration and protection of his Christian and other subjects residing in the territories to which the English guarantee extends. The island of Cyprus has been handed over to England; and short as is the time that it has been under English rule, the condition of the people has been vastly improved. The Government has won their confidence, their industries are developing under the securities for life, property, and justice, they now enjoy, and with the development of the prosperity of the island all fear that it will become a charge upon the imperial revenue has disappeared. The reforms which the Sultan promised to introduce into the government of Asia have not yet been realized. It would have been matter for wonderment if they had been. It is quite true that such reforms as those the adoption of which Lord Salisbury pressed upon the Porte would ultimately have largely increased its revenues as well as have vastly benefited the people. But they would have cost money in the first instance, and the Porte has not for the last two or three years had money enough to pay even its most common and ordinary expenses. There is no reason, however, to doubt that these reforms will ultimately be carried into execution. The rights which the Convention gives the English Government cannot be barred by any delays, and if it should be found that the Porte continues unable to reform the administration of its Asiatic territories, England is quite strong enough to undertake a work which would yield her both glory and profit.

December, 1880.

THE TREATY OF BERLIN

AND THE

CONVENTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

The Treaty of Berlin, even whilst its provisions were still but imperfectly known, was welcomed by the country and accepted by Europe as a signal achievement of English diplomacy and a triumphant assertion of English power. The publication of the text of the Treaty and of the protocols of the Congress, the explanations and elucidations given by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, the weakness of the objections urged by the principal mouthpieces of the Opposition, have confirmed and strengthened the original impression. It not infrequently happens that the feeling of satisfaction produced by the announcement of some great Public Act is materially modified after the lapse of a few days; the glamour which had worked so strongly passes away, and cooler consideration, and the discussion of questions of detail, seriously change the general opinion. But in the case of the Treaty of Berlin, the second thoughts of England and Europe are the same as their first thoughts. The Treaty grows in public estimation the more carefully its clauses are scrutinised; and the more thoroughly and keenly it is discussed, the greater appear the services rendered to England and Europe by Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury.

To properly appreciate the Treaty of Berlin—into which we must read the Convention of Constantinople, negotiated professedly and with full notice to Russia as a supplement and corrective to the settlement it was hoped to conclude in the Congress—we must closely compare the clauses of the provisional Treaty of San Stefano with those of the definitive Treaty of Berlin, and contrast the relative positions of England and Russia on the 3rd of March and the 13th of July, 1878. Nothing could, under the circumstances, have saved Turkey from the disasters the measure of which is given in the Treaty of San Stefano, but a notice to Russia that England would treat war upon Turkey as war against herself; and that declaration was impossible because the majority of the English people were not disposed to go to war on behalf of Turkey, and did not perceive that it was necessary to go to war for the protection of English interests. It was only when the nation saw how prejudicially the Russian schemes for the spoliation of Turkey, as disclosed in the Treaty of San Stefano, did affect English interests that it showed its readiness to accept the risks and sacrifices of war.

Opponents of the Government like Mr. Gladstone seek to mix up

with the more recent proceedings the earlier stages of the insurrection in Turkey, and, relying upon the short memory of the public, they attempt to show that if England had been willing the peace of the East might have been assured at any time before the Russian declaration of war. It is, however, a fact which no man who honestly reads the voluminous correspondence which has been published in this and other countries will for a moment deny, that there never was a time in which any action of England which did not sacrifice her honour and her interests could have secured peace. The policy of the English Government was throughout clear and open, and throughout it was the policy of the majority of the nation. The failure of the Turkish rulers to fulfil the engagements for the good government of their Christian subjects made in the Treaty of Paris was so patent that the English Government could not contend that Europe had not the right to insist upon considerable reforms; and, on the other hand, it saw too clearly to what the policy of Russia tended, to accept any part in the various arrangements suggested by the Russian Government, and endorsed by Germany and Austria, for nominally satisfying the discontented Christians, but really for disintegrating the Turkish Empire. If we examine the whole series of these proposals from the Berlin Memorandum—of which Mr. Gladstone still speaks so enthusiastically as if its acceptance would have made the Christians of European Turkey happy, although its crude and impossible proposals only directly referred to Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and the Russian suggestion for an occupation of Bosnia and Bulgaria (that is, Bulgaria in the Russian sense of the word), in order to secure the triumph of Servia in its most unjustifiable insurrection—we shall find that whilst in every case they involved a breach of the Treaty obligations of this country, and a gross violation of honour and good faith, they none of them offered the slightest prospect of a permanent restoration of peace, or the sure establishment of good government in European Turkey. When the Government did see a chance, not of patching up the difficulty, but of securing such guarantees for the good government of Turkey as were consistent with the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, it eagerly availed itself of the opportunity, and the protocols of the Constantinople Conference show how zealously it laboured to obtain that result.

When the Turks rejected the advice which the Powers offered them, and practically left it to Russia to choose between the confession of defeat or proceed to war, the English Government again attempted to avert hostilities, but in vain. Russia was resolved upon war, and entered upon it against the solemn protest of England—who could not, deserted by France and Austria, take upon herself the burdens of the Tripartite Treaty of the 15th of April, 1856, which guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, and treated any infraction of the Treaty of Paris as a *casus belli*. Indeed, it may be doubted whether, general as was the indignation against Russia, a declaration of war would not have been highly unpopular. The feelings excited by the exaggerated stories of the Bulgarian outrages had not died out, and the sense of the danger to English intersets involved in the triumph of Russia was as yet hardly operative. When the

Government set out, in the well-known despatch of the 6th of May, those especial English interests any imperilment of which might, it said, lead to the participation of England in the contest, there was a general sense of satisfaction which the somewhat grudging declaration of Russia that she would not assail these interests did not diminish. As the war proceeded, the valour and endurance, the temperance, and the general good conduct of the Turkish soldiers won much sympathy for the nation; whilst the brutal conduct of the Bulgarians, and the evidence furnished of their real prosperity, and of the practically liberal Government under which they had lived, destroyed a great deal of the sympathy with Russia, which up to that time had obtained in some, perhaps small, but certainly influential classes. But these changes of sentiment did not affect the national policy. It was only when the Russians were triumphant along the whole line, when they had made themselves masters of Kars, Erzeroum, and Adrianople, and were almost within a day's march of Constantinople, that Englishmen generally felt that in the fight between the Russians and the Turks grave interests of their own were involved, and the Government, anticipating the wishes of the nation, called Parliament together and sent the Fleet into the Sea of Marmora.

It would be incorrect to say that this action of the English Government, and the declaration of public feeling by which it was supported, had no influence upon the policy of Russia and no part in fashioning the Treaty of San Stefano. Although Count Schouvaloff, so early as June, 1877, whilst Russia had made little progress towards the overthrow of Turkey, and after he had communicated to his Government the views of England with reference to the arrangements which regulate the navigation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, declared to Lord Derby that those arrangements were conceived in a spirit of hostility to Russia, and that if peace should not be made before the Russian army crossed the Balkans she must ask a revision of a system which she regarded as established against her, the Treaty of San Stefano only touched the question of the Straits to deny, somewhat flippantly and needlessly, the authority of the Sultan in the matter, and left the real question unaffected. But the Russian Government was not yet persuaded that England was in earnest. It still trusted to Mr. Gladstone and the epicene coterie which worked with and about him, and the Treaty of San Stefano represents the belief of the Czar and his Ministers that so long as the particular interests which the English Government had specified were not formally assailed they were safe in cutting their pound of flesh from their prostrate foe.

The Treaty of San Stefano put the whole of European Turkey and a large part of Asiatic Turkey under the heel of Russia, and that was the chief purpose of the Russian negotiators. In the various stipulations for the Bulgaria, the Servia, and the Montenegro which the Treaty constituted, there is not to be found a single provision for securing the religious or civil liberty of the populations dealt with; in the arrangements for the provinces nominally left under the authority of the Porte, and in the clauses establishing the new relationship between the Porte and Russia, only one intent is observable—namely, to enable Russia to interfere as often and as much as it might suit her, and to compel the

Porte not only to tolerate but to ask for that interference. In a word, the Treaty of San Stefano was a partition of Turkey made in the exclusive interests of Russia, dangerous, in the words of Lord Beaconsfield, to European independence, and injurious to the interests of the British Empire.

The first article of the Treaty gave to Montenegro large districts of Turkish territory, to which the principality had neither a legal nor even a sentimental claim—districts inhabited to some extent by Mussulmans, to a larger extent by Christians, who have always been at feud with the races of the Black Mountain. No stipulation was made for the protection of these people; they were handed over to the tender mercies of the Montenegrins absolutely without reserve, the only safeguard left them being the stipulation that a European Commission should fix in detail the boundaries settled by the Treaty in broad outline. The boundaries of Servia, to which, again, an extravagant addition of territory was given, were not left to a European Commission—the exception in the case of Montenegro was due to the necessity of consulting Austrian opinion. They were to be settled by a Turco-Servian Commission, assisted by a Russian Commissioner—to be settled, that is to say, as Russia might please. No provision was made for religious or civil liberty in the New or the Old Servia; but a Turco-Servian Commission, assisted again by a Russian Commission, was charged with the determination of all questions of real estate in which Mussulman interests were concerned—in other words, with the expropriation of Mussulman landowners at such a price as the Servian Government might determine.

Article 5 recognized the independence of Roumania and its right to an indemnity, but, following the precedent set with regard to Montenegro and Servia, did not take the slightest security for religious or civil liberty in the principality, although the Russian negotiators contemplated the cession to Roumania of a large district of Turkey inhabited almost exclusively by Mussulmans.

Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 constituted an autonomous tributary principality of Bulgaria, "with a Christian Government and a national militia." Their general effect was thus forcibly described by Lord Salisbury in his well-known circular of the 1st April:—

"By the articles erecting the New Bulgaria a strong Sclav State will be created under the auspices and control of Russia, possessing important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas. It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominant Sclav majority a considerable mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it not only in nationality but in political tendency and in religious allegiance. The provisions by which this new State is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its adminstration framed by a Russian Commissary, and the first working of its institutions commenced under the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political system of which in future it is to form a part." But it may be convenient to enter into a little closer

examination of their provisions. In the first article the delimitation of the new province practically severed not only Bosnia and the Herzegovina, but Albania, Thessaly, and Epirus from the rest of the Empire. It really reduced Turkey in Europe to a strip of territory round about the capital and a small outlying district—Constantinople and a garden—and left this open at any time to Russian occupation. The provinces nominally left Turkey were cut off from her, and the Sultan was left to defend Constantinople with such resources as he might draw from Asia or Africa. Further, large districts were included in this Bulgaria, in which Greeks or Turks comprised the great majority of the population, and no other provision was made for the protection of their interests against the Bulgarians, who were the *protégés* of the Russian Government, than a vague paragraph to the effect that the organic law of the principality, which was to be drawn up by an assembly of Bulgarian notables, under the superintendence of a Russian Commissioner, should take proper account of their rights and interests. We may imagine what account would be taken of Greek or Turkish interests by a Bulgarian Parliament with a Russian Lord High Commissioner. It was further provided that the establishment of the new system in Bulgaria, and the superintendence of its working, should be entrusted for two years to a Russian Commissioner, who was to be aided in his task by a Russian army of occupation of fifty thousand men, to be maintained at the expense of the Bulgarians. In fact, the administration of Bulgaria was completely handed over to Russia for two years ; for the stipulation that if after the expiration of the first year after the introduction of the new system, should an agreement be come to between the Porte, Russia, and the Cabinets of Europe, they might, if they thought it necessary, associate special delegates with the Russian Commissioner, must have been inserted in the Treaty with the conviction that nothing could come of it. Turco-Bulgarian Commissioners, under the superintendence of a Russian Commissioner, were to settle all questions as to the interests of Mussulman owners in real estates ; and nothing beyond the vague reference to the rights of Greeks and Mussulmans in certain localities which we have mentioned was stipulated as to the rights and interests of the non-Bulgarian population. The organic law of Bulgaria under the Treaty of San Stefano might have been, and probably would have been, as intolerant, as wanting in all safeguards of civil and religious liberty, as vexatious in its interference with industry and commerce, as the laws of Servia and Roumania have been up to the present time.

Article 14 dealt with Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which were indeed left to Turkey, but so completely severed from her by the interposition of the autonomous Bulgaria that it would have been a mockery to treat them as parts of the Turkish Empire. But this was not enough for the Russian negotiators ; it was stipulated that the revenues of the provinces until the 1st of March, 1880, should be exclusively applied to indemnify "the families of refugees and inhabitants victims of recent events," as well as to the local needs of the country, and that the sum to be received after that date by the Central Government should be fixed by an agreement between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey—that is to say, that Turkey, im-

poverished and enfeebled by the war, should first at her own cost restore order in these provinces—which she was unable to do whilst she was still independent and unvanquished—and then that the conditions of her sovereignty should be settled by Russia and Austria. Is it possible to conceive a more deliberate design to keep Turkey in perpetual difficulties and provide convenient occasions for her further spoliation ?

Article 15 was the only one which even professed to take into account the interests of the Turkish populations. It provided for the application to Crete of the organic law of 1868, and the introduction of analogous laws into other provinces, but the Porte was bound over to consult the Government of Russia before proclaiming any such new law, and in point of fact surrendered the most important of its sovereign prerogatives to Russia.

Article 19 stipulated for the payment of the enormous indemnity of over two hundred millions sterling which the Russians—a singularly imitative race, improving upon the example of Prussia—imposed upon the Porte, and the Porte, not seeing its way to pay a piastre, accepted without a struggle. As a payment of the larger part of this sum the Russian plenipotentiaries accepted the cession of a part of the Dobrutcha, and of that large part of Armenia which is practically represented to Englishmen by the enumeration of Kars, Ardahan, Bayazid, and Batoum. But with regard to the balance of over forty millions sterling, the mode of payment and guarantee of the same were left to future arrangement—that is to say, Russia continued to have an admitted claim of more than forty millions, for which she might at any time demand immediate payment or sufficient security, which she might at any day compromise by another annexation of territory, and for which she might claim priority over the other creditors of the Porte. To use the words in which Lord Salisbury so well sums up the English objection to this clause : " The mode of payment of this indemnity is left, in vague language, to ulterior negotiations between Russia and the Porte. Payment may be demanded immediately, or it may be left as an unredeemed and unredeemable obligation to weigh down the independence of the Porte for many years. Its discharge may be commuted into a yet larger cession of territory, or it may take the form of special engagements subordinating in all things the policy of Turkey to that of Russia. It is impossible not to recognize in this provision an instrument of formidable efficacy for the coercion of the Ottoman Government if the necessity for employing it should arise."

Of the remaining stipulations of the Treaty only two need be mentioned—a provision protecting the monks of Mount Athos, of *Russian origin* (nothing is said of those belonging to other nationalities), and a very curious article relative to the Straits, which seems to have been dictated by mingled anxiety to do something in the question, and fear of provoking the other Powers. It declared that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles shall remain open in time of war as in time of peace to the merchant vessels of neutral States arriving from or bound to Russian ports, and that, consequently, the Sublime Porte engaged never thenceforth to establish at the ports of the Black Sea

and the Sea of Azof a fictitious blockade at variance with the spirit of the Declaration of Paris. The European conventions which regulate the opening and closing of the Straits make no mention of merchant vessels, and the chief effect of this clause, beyond the assumption it expressed of the right of Russia to determine the question without consulting the other Powers, was to pass a condemnation upon the blockades declared by the Turkish Government in the Black Sea.

The intention and effect of the Treaty of San Stefano were at once seen by the English Government, and a most serious question presented itself for an immediate answer to Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues. Were they to accept an arrangement which practically established nothing but disorder, tempered by the Russian knout, in European Turkey, which constituted a standing menace to Constantinople and a serious danger to our Indian Empire ; or were they, although alone, and conscious that they could not reckon upon the alliance of any European Power, to come forward as the guardians of public law, and at the risk of war declare that they could not assent to the bargain between Russia and Turkey, and would, if need were, resist it with the whole might of Great Britain ? They chose the course which wisdom as much as honour counselled. They took their stand in the first place—and it should be remembered that throughout the struggle which followed they kept that position—upon the invalidity and worthlessness of any arrangements between Russia and Turkey affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 which had not received the sanction of the Powers signatories of those treaties. They insisted that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of San Stefano were subjects to be discussed in the Congress which Austria had proposed, and all the Powers, Russia included, accepted, and that no alterations in the condition of things established by former treaties could be acknowledged as valid until they had received the assent of such a Congress. Russia refused to accept these conditions, and the English Government prepared to enforce them. The Reserves were called out. The Navy was put into a most formidable condition. Two Army corps were made ready for immediate embarkation, and Indian troops were called to Malta. The clear and emphatic language of Lord Salisbury showed that England was not to be trifled with, that she would insist upon the submission of the whole Treaty of San Stefano to the Congress, if Congress there was to be, and would insist, too, upon material alterations in the provisions of the Treaty. The Russian Government saw that the English people supported their Government, and after an obstinate struggle it yielded. The Memorandum signed on the 30th May recorded the complete surrender of Russia on the question of public law, and formulated the general agreement between England and Russia, but for the conclusion of which it would have been idle to send representatives to a Congress, which is an assembly which comes together, not to determine questions after debate, but to put into shape and solemn forms the rough drafts of agreement its members bring with them. Of course the English Government could not propose to "annihilate all the results of the war," or to re-shape the Treaty of San Stefano entirely after its own wishes; but for those concessions to Russia which were evitable it made com-

pensating provision in a special agreement with Turkey, and the Treaty of Berlin, with its complement, the Convention of Constantinople, vindicates the public law of Europe, strengthens and secures the interests of England, and assures, as far as can be, peace and freedom to the peoples of the East. Russia submitted to the public law of Europe ; she gave back to Turkey a large part of her conquests, and renounced to Europe the special privileges she had obtained for herself; and she did this without having lost a battle, and even before any army had been drawn up against her. The Treaty of San Stefano, a compact between Russia and Turkey, is set aside by the Treaty of Berlin, a contract between the European Powers. Religious and civil liberty are secured to the Mussulmans as well as to the Christians of Turkey, and an era of peace and prosperity is, so far as human judgment can discern, about to open for the rich and much-suffering countries which own the sway of the Sultan.

Ample proof of these assertions will be found in an analysis of the clauses of the Treaty of Berlin. The Berlin act does not deal with the different questions it solves in the same order as that of San Stefano did. It begins with the most important question, the one on the settlement of which the success of the negotiations depended —the constitution of Bulgaria, and in the first article it supplements the provision that Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary principality with the words, "under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan." The second article deals with the delimitation of the new principality, and here occurs the first great rent in the Russian scheme. The Bulgaria of San Stefano extended from Widdin to Salonica, from Mangalia to Mount Grammos. It completely cut off, as we have pointed out, the seat of government in Turkey from the outlying provinces. It handed over large populations of Greeks and Mussulmans to Sclav rule, it strangled the small districts left to the Turks about Constantinople in its embraces. It contained 50,000 square miles and a population of four millions. Its definitive frontiers were to be traced by a Russo-Turkish Commission before the evacuation of Roumelia by the Russian army. The Bulgaria constituted by the Treaty of Berlin embraces an area of but 20,000 square miles, and a population of about a million and a half. It is thrust back more than a hundred miles from the Ægean, it loses the valuable port of Bourgas on the Euxine, the only safe port in that sea, and is separated from Turkey by the Balkans—a line of defence which is left to the Turks, and which they may make impregnable. It should be added that the exact frontier is to be set out by a European Commission, and that this Commission is especially to consider the necessity for the Sultan to be able to defend the Balkan frontier. This restriction of Bulgaria in the country north of the Balkans restores the connection of the Turkish territory and places Constantinople in a position of comparative security. Article 5 lays down the bases of the public law or constitution of Bulgaria, which is to be elaborated by the notables before the election of the prince, and secures the fullest liberty and equality to all religions. This public law is to be completed within nine months, and from that day Bulgaria is to enter into the full enjoyment of its autonomy. The

Russian Commissioner, who, by the Treaty of San Stefano, was to remain two years to superintend the working of the new system, is then to retire, and the Russian army of occupation is to leave at the same time. All the questions which were left for settlement at San Stefano by Turco-Bulgarian Commissions superintended by a Russian officer, are handed over to the care of a European Commission. The Russian Commissioner, who is to remain until the elaboration of the organic law, is put under the control of the Powers ; and, finally, Bulgaria is not only to pay an annual tribute, but to bear a portion of the public debt of the Turkish Empire—a matter about which neither Turkish nor Russian plenipotentiaries seem to have troubled themselves at San Stefano.

Bulgaria, thus limited and constituted, ceases to be any danger to Turkey or to Europe The State is too small of itself to do mischief; it is cut off from Russia by Roumania, which certainly will not sympathize with any new aspirations for the Bulgarian idea. The only influence Russia will have in it will be derived from such gratitude as the Bulgarians may feel for the services, if any, she may have rendered them, and that influence, whatever its character, is sufficiently checked and controlled by the European protectorate and guardianship. Of the territory taken from Bulgaria and restored to the Porte, something less than a half has been formed into a province styled Eastern Roumelia, which is to possess administrative autonomy, but remain under the direct political and military authority of the Sultan. The organization of this province is to be elaborated between an European Commission and the Porte, and, whatever the arrangements come to may be, they will form the subject of an imperial firman. The Governor-General is to be a Christian, appointed by the Porte, with the assent of the Powers, for a term of five years. Internal order is to be maintained by a native gendarmerie ; but the Sultan may erect fortifications on the land and sea frontiers and maintain troops in them. The autonomy of this new province, therefore, by no means prejudices the power or authority of the Porte. All that is done is to take some special securities for the good government and religious liberty of districts which, under the circumstances that a large portion, if not the great majority, of the population are Bulgarian, could not safely have been left without some such special protection. Eastern Roumelia, however, remains to all intents and purposes a part of the Turkish State, and the privileged position given it does not lessen the military and financial resources of the Sultan, whilst all ground for further interference with the Porte on the pretence of alleged ill-treatment of the Sclavs is removed.

It has been suggested that Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia will act as Moldavia and Wallachia did after 1856, and worry the signatory Powers into consenting to their union. But there is no analogy between the two cases. Moldavia and Wallachia were two practically independent States, and had been so for many years. Yet their union would never have been achieved but for the support they received from the Emperor of the French, who had some vague notion of establishing French influence in the East by means like these. Eastern Roumelia is, however, a province left, in everything except its administrative

autonomy, under the direct government of the Sultan. It will be practically held by his troops. There will be no opportunity for the intrigues which took place in Wallachia and Moldavia, and there is really no reason to expect that the Roumelians will desire union with Russia.

The 23rd Article substitutes for the 15th Article of the Treaty of San Stefano a general rule for the introduction of new laws, based upon conditions of religious liberty and equality, into all parts of European Turkey, for which no special organization has been provided in the Treaty; but it submits them to the consideration of the European Commission for Eastern Roumelia instead of the Russian Government, a difference the immense importance of which is at once apparent. Article 24 refers to the proposed rectification of the frontier of Greece suggested in the thirteenth protocol of the Congress, and, we may assume, certain to be agreed to with, perhaps, some slight modifications by the Porte, by which the kingdom of Greece would obtain an extension of territory of 5,500 square miles, a sufficient answer in itself to those who, like Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, profess their indignation that the claims of Greece were not sufficiently supported by the Government Article 25 hands over the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary. What is to be the ultimate fate of these provinces is left uncertain, but it is probable enough that they will never pass out of the hands of Austria-Hungary. This provision of the Treaty of Berlin has, perhaps, given rise to more outcry than any other, and yet it is easy to show that a more judicious arrangement could not have been made, even in the interests of the Porte itself. By the Treaty of San Stefano these provinces were cut off from the Porte; it could only reach them through the New Bulgaria, and its right to re-occupy and rule them was practically made conditional upon a renunciation of the whole revenue they yielded. Even suppose that the Congress had—as it might, of course, have done—restored the two provinces to Turkey with no other condition than the establishment of good government, what would have been the position of Turkey? Lord Beaconsfield has said that nothing short of an army of 50,000 of the best troops of Turkey could produce anything like order in these provinces, and his lordship was quite within the mark. For it must be remembered that it is to the inability of Turkey to put down the trumpery disturbances in these provinces which commenced in the spring of 1875 that its whole disasters are due. Instead of dealing energetically with the insurgents, or, as they were at first, mere rioters, the Porte faltered and paltered. That it had not the means of putting a sufficient army in the field cannot be believed now after what it did in the late war, but at all events the Government was then too feeble or too corrupt to act with energy; and when it should have suppressed the disturbances, and introduced such reforms as the English Government advised it to do, it went begging to the three Emperors, and encouraged Montenegro and Servia to go to war, at first unofficially, and then in due form. Were the provinces now placed in the hands of the Porte by a European intervention, they would be hardly worth its having, and the attempt to retain them would tax all its resources. They would add nothing

to the strength of the Empire. The occupation by Austria relieves the Porte of these embarrassments, and gives it the strongest possible guarantee for the peaceable enjoyment of its European possessions. Austria holding the territory between Servia and Montenegro, occupying strong military positions on the frontier of Albania, can keep in check with the greatest ease Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria, or Greece, and can interpose to prevent any aggression on the part of Russia. As Lord Salisbury said in the House of Peers, "Up to the last month, if Russia could only shake the Turkish Empire she was the inevitable heir to its remains, but the arrival of the Austrians at Novibazar will change the whole course of affairs." Russia is effectually checked, and Servia and Montenegro must perforce give up the business of robbery and murder which they have hitherto glossed over with the name of patriotism. For the inhabitants of the provinces themselves no more satisfactory arrangement could have been made. Austrian statesmen are accustomed to the task of governing hostile races with conflicting creeds, and whilst enforcing the obedience of all to the common law, maintaining the liberty given to all without distinction of race or creed. The Mussulmans of Bosnia and the Herzegovina will be as carefully protected in the enjoyment of their property and the exercise of their religion as the Christians, and the way be prepared for the foundation of a state whose example may favourably influence the progress of Servia and Montenegro.

Article 26 recognizes the independence of Montenegro; subsequent articles establish religious liberty and equality in the principality, and define its boundaries. A large slice of the increase of territory given by the Treaty of San Stefano is lopped off, but all the reasonable demands of the Montenegrin people, especially that for access to the sea, are granted. Other clauses bind over Montenegro to act as a civilized community, and impose upon her a share of the debt of the Turkish Empire proportionate to the additional territories she obtains. The independence of Servia is recognized, and an increase of territory less in amount than that given by the Treaty of San Stefano is assured her, for which she will pay a fair proportion of the Ottoman public debt. The most important article relating to Servia is, however, the 35th, in which the stipulation in favour of religious liberty and equality applied to Bulgaria and Montenegro is extended to her—a matter of some importance when we remember that by the existing Servian law Mussulmans are not tolerated in that State, and Jews are treated as little better than pariahs.

Article 43 recognizes the independence of Roumania, but upon conditions. The same full religious liberty and equality are to be established in Roumania as in the other principalities we have mentioned—a reform which could never have been expected from a Roumanian legislature—and Roumania is to cede to Russia a portion of that Bessarabian territory annexed to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris in exchange for the portion of the Dobroutcha which Russia had acquired from Turkey for the purpose of the exchange.

A great deal of indignation has been expressed against this cession of Bessarabia, and much vapouring has been indulged in by politicians who, if they had been in power would have helped Russia to extend her

sway over the whole of Turkey, and who would not have gone to war, even to protect Egypt, about the cowardice of abandoning Roumania to Russia. The real fact is that Roumania has not the slightest claim upon the sympathies of England. Her whole policy has been not only of the most selfish, but the most dishonest, character. Her sovereign and her statesmen entered into a treacherous convention with Russia against Turkey, and, if they have not made the profit they calculated upon, it is not for them to complain to the Governments whose remonstrances they disregarded. If, in the general interests of Europe, or the particular interests of England, there had been any good reason to oppose the retrocession of this part of Bessarabia, the English Government would have done so. But, it being impossible to sympathize with the outcry of the Roumanians, who receive a very fair compensation in the Dobroutcha, and who, it must be remembered, were the first in the pursuance of their grand idea, thanks to the help of the Emperor of the French, to make a *coup de canif* in the Treaty of Paris, and there being no real danger to any important European or English interest in the resumption by Russia of these territories, it would have been absurd to have denied the Czar a satisfaction which his victories rendered a legitimate one.

We pass over for the moment the articles which relate to the cessions of territory made by the Porte in Asia and the correlative engagements of Russia, because they must be considered with especial reference to the Convention of Constantinople, and come to the very important engagements taken by the Porte in the 62nd Article, which distinguish so essentially the Treaty of Berlin and the objects of the English statesmen, who may be described as its draughtsmen, from the Treaty of San Stefano and the purposes of the Russian plenipotentiaries who dictated it. Note is taken of the wish expressed by the Sublime Porte to maintain the principle of religious liberty, and to give it the widest scope. Difference of religion is nowhere in the Ottoman Empire to be a ground for exclusion from the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to the public service, functions, and honours, or the exercise of any professions or industries. All persons are to be admitted to give evidence before the courts, and liberty of public worship is assured to all religions. Some other stipulations, including the protection of the monks of Mount Athos, of whatever countries they may be natives (the Treaty of San Stefano only gave this protection to Russian monks), and a reservation of the rights possessed by France in the matter of the Holy Places, complete this remarkable charter, which the Porte, whatever the intention with which it was proposed, will never be able to depart from. Article 63 maintains the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 in all their provisions not abrogated or modified by this Treaty, and so gets rid of the article of the Treaty of San Stefano dealing with the question of the Straits, and with several Russian pretensions for the support of which some of the clauses of that Treaty might have been urged.

It will be convenient to mention here a provision of the Treaty of San Stefano which is conspicuous in the Treaty of Berlin by its absence. The Treaty of Berlin does not say a word about the pecuniary indemnity claimed by Russia. The question, however, occupied

the attention of the Congress. In the end that assembly pronounced itself incompetent to revise a contract which was no infraction of the Treaty of Paris, and into which the Turks had freely entered, inspired, no doubt, by the philosophy which teaches that if you have not a half-penny in your pocket, and in any case must take the benefit of the Act to-morrow, it matters not what promises to pay you give. But the English plenipotentiaries obtained from the Russian the declaration that Russia would not seek to annex territory in satisfaction of the portion of the indemnity left unpaid, nor contend that it should be preferred to debts guaranteed to other Governments, or to debts in respect to which Turkish revenues had been hypothecated, whilst England declared she could allow the claim no priority of any kind over debts anterior to it in point of date. It follows that the Russian indemnity is practically made a last, instead of a first, charge upon the revenues of the Porte, and that the Czar will not get a penny till the English and French creditors of Turkey have been satisfied. In these circumstances the payment of the first instalment of the indemnity to Russia will, if it should take place, be an event which the whole of Europe might celebrate.

The provisions relating to the cession of territory in Asia, to which we now come, modify in a very important manner the stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano. They give back to Turkey a considerable amount of territory, and they attach conditions of much importance, politically and commercially, to the enjoyment by Russia of the most valuable acquisition she retains. The retrocession of Bayazid and the strip of territory which goes with it secures, as far as may be, freedom of trade between Trebizond and Persia; and the engagement of the Czar to make Batoum "a free port, essentially commercial," removes much of the danger apprehended from these annexations of Russia. Still the acquisitions of Russia in Armenia are undoubtedly full of peril for the tranquillity of Asiatic Turkey, and constitute a menace to English interests in the East. If, therefore, we had nothing to look to but the Treaty of Berlin, we should have to say that, much as the bold and skilful policy of the Government has done to secure the maintenance of Turkey, the good government and well being of of the Turkish populations, and to protect the interests of this country, England was still placed at a considerable disadvantage and exposed to a great danger. The Convention of Constantinople comes in to supplement the Treaty of Berlin; and to put England in a position of greater authority and power, not only in Asiatic Turkey, but in all the neighbouring States, than she ever possessed.

In the Memorandum of the 30th May, which has been the subject of so much silly criticism, the English Government frankly announced its opinion that the duty of protecting the Ottoman Empire from this danger (that resulting from the extension of the Russian frontier), which henceforth would especially devolve upon England, might be performed without inflicting upon Europe the calamities of a new war. The duty was distinctly accepted, and the means of performing it provided by the Anglo-Turkish Convention, which engages England on the one hand, to join the Sultan in defending by force of arms against Russia any portion of the territories left him in Asia by the

definitive treaty of peace, and, on the other, binds the Sultan to introduce the reforms necessary for the good administration and protection of his Christian and other subjects in those territories, and also to hand over the Island of Cyprus to be administered and occupied by England. England thus assumes a protectorate of Asiatic Turkey, not against all dangers and in all circumstances, as is sometimes suggested, but against any further aggressions of Russia ; and as the condition of that engagement obtains the possession of an island which will enable her to efficiently exercise her protectorate, and the promise, the fulfilment of which she will be able to enforce, of such reforms in the administration of the country as render the contingency of her intervention a remote one. If the different populations of Asia Minor and Syria are satisfied with the rule of the Sultan, Russia, even if she had not the fear of England before her eyes, will never venture upon a new war of conquest.

It would be, however, a great blunder as well as a great injustice to Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury to disguise the fact that although the actual terms of the Convention impose comparatively small responsibilities, and charges which at the utmost will be insignificant, England must inevitably assume a great responsibility, as she will exercise a vast power, in these rich and interesting countries which we look to as the first home of the human race. When a nation like England accepts duties she must fulfil them in no perfunctory or listless manner, and the obligation to defend the Asiatic possessions of the Sultan against Russia implies the duty of enforcing good government through the territories to which our guarantee extends. That is, no doubt, a great responsibility, but a nation which shrinks from accepting responsibility is already on the downward slope to humiliation and decay. The responsibility we have accepted is not, however, beyond our powers, and it is, perhaps, the noblest a nation ever undertook. Of course the aim of the British Government was the protection of the national interests, but the method chosen for protecting them, if the most judicious, is also the most generous. We have undertaken to stop the aggressive march of Russia, we have drawn a line beyond which her armies may not advance, we have struck a heavy blow to her prestige in Central Asia, which seemed to have just risen to its highest point, and practically we have dispelled all the fears of an invasion of British India, which have many years troubled the minds of men who can in no way be considered dreamers ; but we achieve all this, not so much by the acquisition of a position of vantage from which best to use our power, as by providing for order and tranquillity in the countries where disorder and discontent alone endanger Turkish rule. The politicians who object to the responsibilities we incur by this Convention will not see that for every responsibility we take we practically get rid of a danger. The occupation of Cyprus and the protectorate of Asiatic Turkey establish our authority in India and our overwhelming influence in the rich countries through which our shortest route to India passes. For any cost or danger we may incur by the Convention we have threefold compensation in the diminution of the dangers of insurrection within India and of attack from without. To those who, like Lord Granville, insist that we do

not add to our strength by increasing our territory, and so adding to the number of our vulnerable points, it is sufficient to reply that the argument is absurd. If it has any force it would urge us to amputate all the outlying members of the Empire in order to intensify our power, and give up every possession of value to get rid of a vulnerable point. But the fact is that this or some analogous measure was absolutely necessary for the defence of the Empire, and the great honour of the Government is that what it has done it has done in a bold and frank but sagacious manner. We have great interests, substantial interests, as Lord Beaconsfield calls them, in the East. Those interests it would be foolish to deny were imperilled by the successes of Russia, which opened up a long vista of anxieties and sacrifices to all patriotic Englishmen. By the Convention of Constantinople we have more than restored the prestige which had been diminished by the victories of Russia; our influence throughout Asia has been affirmed, and we have obtained an outpost which makes us masters, if we care to take them, of not one but of all the roads to India, and we have achieved all this without incurring the ill-will of any one of our allies, or provoking any other jealousy than that which our power and prosperity naturally engender.

The Treaty of Berlin and the Convention of Constantinople have not only protected English interests but extended English power without the cost of a single life, and at an expenditure of, at the most, a few weeks' cost of a first campaign. Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues have forced from Russia, although her soldiers were at the very gates of Constantinople, concessions which would have been reckoned no insufficient return for a successful war.

The position of England never stood higher, her authority in the councils of Europe was never greater, her influence throughout the whole world never more potent, than now; and for these glorious results we must thank the Conservative statesmen who, through unceasing calumny and misrepresentation, have steadily pursued the policy which the interests and the duties of England alike prescribed.

A SPEECH

DELIVERED BY

J. A. ROEBUCK, ESQ., Q.C., M.P.,

In the House of Commons during the Debate on the

MOVEMENT OF INDIAN TROOPS,

May 23rd, 1878.

It is, Sir, with great reluctance that I rise to take part in this debate. It appears to me that the debate itself is most inopportune, and that the mode in which it has been conducted, as well as the origin of it, is exceedingly mischievous. Why is the debate inopportune? Look at the exact state of the country when this matter was brought before Parliament. I do not wish, Sir, to enter into the sort of discussion fitted for other arenas than the House of Commons. I wish to look merely at a political action on the part of the Executive Government; and I ask myself whether that political action is for the benefit of the country or not. What is the state of things? It is said that we are in a state of profound peace. Does anybody believe that? (Hear, hear.) To-morrow—aye! to-morrow—it may be made manifest to the people of this country that we are on the brink of war (hear, hear); and in this state of things, when the whole interests of the country are concerned, when she is standing up for a great principle of European conduct, when she is the representative of the great light of Europe, our country is to be assailed—how? Not by the Great Powers on the Continent who may be opposed to us, but by her own people. (Hear, hear.) Is it not of the utmost possible importance at this moment that our opponents abroad should know and believe that the people of this country are a united people? (Cheers.) But can it be supposed that the Monarch with whose

Government we are now negotiating does not listen to everything that is said in this House, and does not ask himself how the great men on the front Opposition bench can speak as they do if they believe that the people of this country are prepared to defend the interests of Europe in the way in which I think they ought to be defended? Does not everybody know that every word which is uttered here goes by telegraph to St. Petersburg, that it is there weighed not merely by the Monarch of that country, but by his executive Government, and that the one great thing which animates them in their opposition is the notion that we are a divided, and therefore a weak people. (Hear, hear.) I would ask the House and I would ask my country to weigh in the balance the conduct of the two sides of this House. On the one side, we have the Executive Government, and will anybody say that they are not desirous to maintain the true interests of England? (Cheers.) Will anybody say that they are not conversant with all the difficulties of the position in which they are placed—difficulties not only abroad but also at home, and yet, notwithstanding that, they stand firm in their determination to maintain the interests of Europe against an overruling and a despotic Power. (Cheers.) That is the conduct on that side of the House. But what is the conduct on this side? Why, that when the Government are in this difficult position, when the interests of England are at stake, and when every word said here will either strengthen or weaken their power, hon. members on this side come forward with a vague general proposition on some point of technical law which the House of Lords do not dare to call in question. (Cheers.) And for what purpose is that done? The hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Herschell) who preceded me has stated that it has been supposed and said that it has been done for the purposes of faction. If it is not done for the purposes of faction, for what purpose has it been done? (Cheers.) It is said that it has been done for the purpose of maintaining the great principles of the Constitution. What is the real point in debate? because that is the question; where is the danger to this country and to the liberties thereof, or to the power of this House? Why, it is reduced to this:—On that side of the House Ministers, looking at the resources in hand, have asked themselves what they could gain in the way of assistance from the great outlying possession of India, and they have found, as they believe, that in the army of India they have the means, not merely of strengthening themselves, but rather of terrifying their enemies. (Hear, hear.) The Government on that side say that it is the undoubted prerogative of the Crown to move any portion of the army of the Sovereign of this country to whatever place the Sovereign may determine, the kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland only excepted. Now comes the point upon which the great question turns. Gentlemen on this side say, "No, the Crown has not that power without the consent of Parliament." But where is the danger? If the troops are moved and they are now being moved, what would be the result? They must be paid; they could not exist a month without pay. Can they be paid without the assistance of Parliament? ("Hear, hear," from Mr. Gladstone.) Aye! hear, hear. I want to know whether this is not the real question at issue. Is not the

power of the House what it was before? And if it should turn out that Parliament decides not to pay the troops, what would be the consequence? Why, the Government opposite would be driven out of power as chaff before the wind—they could not exist there for a moment. They would not only be reduced to the level of us private people, but they would run great risk of being impeached. (Hear.) But is there any danger on either one side or the other? Do Ministers fear impeachment, or that what they have done will be condemned and punished by the people or by the Parliament of this country, or do they think that hon. members on this side believe that the Government ought to be impeached? It appears to me that when a man has risen to power and exercises sway over the minds of a great portion of his countrymen, he ought gravely and strictly to weigh every step of his conduct, and when in a grave crisis like this such a man comes forward and talks the wild talk he does (cheers) and renders people almost terrified by his vaticination, does he not believe that he is injuriously affecting the mind of a great portion of the people and strengthening the enemies of his country? (Cheers.) You talk about patriotism and you stand up for the rights of the people and the privileges of Parliament, and you talk of the danger of being trampled upon by the Crown. I ask for a moment, is there a man of sane mind in this country who believes in any one of these cries? (Hear, hear.) Does he believe that because 7,000 men have been moved from India to Malta without Her Majesty's Government previously telling Parliament what was about to be done, that the interests or the liberties of the people of this country are in the least danger of being infringed? (Cheers.) Does he believe that the power of this House is less to-day than it was before the troops were moved? No, Sir, he does not believe it. (Cheers.) I will describe what I think ought to have been the conduct of the Opposition at this time. It is the duty of the Opposition to watch the conduct of the Government. When this thing was discovered they ought, in my opinion, to have come down to the Government and said, "We learn that such and such has occurred, and we believe that you have acted in a way that is contrary to the Constitution of this country, and we want you to explain what you have done." The Government would then have said, "We have acted in a great emergency; we think that secrecy is a matter of great importance. There are great difficulties, and everybody must know those difficulties, in moving those troops; and we do not at the present moment wish to discuss this question because we believe that it is for the interest of this country that it should not be discussed." What ought then to have been done? The leaders of the Opposition ought to have said, "We give you credit for what you have said, but mind we shall call you to account. The time will come when Parliament will step in and will ask gravely why you have done this, and if you are not able to give us a satisfactory answer, then we shall move a vote of censure." That would have been straightforward and honest conduct. (Cheers.) But what have you done? Not wishing to call in question the policy of the Government—no, not openly (cheers)—you bring forward an abstract resolution, which if passed would be a censure on the Government, and

you throw difficulties in their way on all points which prevent them from bringing forward a complete defence of their policy—that complete defence which I hope they will make, but which, if they do not make, they will find me as much opposed to them as any right hon. gentleman on the front Opposition bench. (Hear, hear.) When they come to make that defence, they will make it with respect to their policy; they will say, "We thought, and we now think, such and such to be the law; but if we have overstepped the law, these are the grounds which induced us to do so." If those grounds are weak and insufficient, punish the Government, but do not interfere with them at the very moment when the interests and vitality of the country are concerned and at the very moment when there is a crisis in the negotiations which are going on. (Cheers.) While we are debating in this House the envoy of Russia is possibly laying before the Government the things he has to say on the part of his Sovereign, and negotiations are going on of the most delicate description. Yet in this state of things you come down and embarrass and trouble the Government with a resolution of this sort. That is not what honest and patriotic men would do. (Loud cheers.) But this is not a departure from the rules of conduct adopted by the Opposition in this House. During the whole of the Napoleonic wars there was an Opposition in the House of Commons which did precisely the same thing—they hampered the Government, they abused the General, and until the battle of Salamanca, it was the one grand purpose of the Opposition to decry the Duke of Wellington. That is exactly what they are doing now. (Cheers.) It it the same narrow party spirit which guides their conduct. (Cheers.) They feel themselves in the position that they cannot assail the Government directly, that they cannot rush into their camp and say "We will burn your camp over your heads by a vote of censure; but we can trouble you, we can weaken the influence of your country, we can make England less powerful than she is, and we will do it." (Loud cheers.) Does anyone believe that England will suffer from the debate which is now proceeding? (Hear, hear.) I, for one, certainly do not think so; but I can easily imagine what has been passing through the minds of those who support the line of action which has been pursued by the noble marquis who leads the Opposition in this House. They will have argued with themselves in this wise—"Oh, the Government is weak, and therefore we are delighted: the people of England may suffer, but our party will gain." (Cheers.) In the course of this debate I have seen nothing of generous conduct on the part of those who are opposed to the Government. No one has come forward and said plainly, "We think you have done wrong, but the country is under your charge; her interests are under your guardianship, and, instead of attempting to weaken your hands at the present moment, we will assist you to maintain the power of England: but we will call you to account for it afterwards." If this had been done the Opposition would have deserved the approbation and applause of the country; but, not having done it, I say without hesitation that they will receive and have deserved its most severe condemnation. (Loud cheers.)

[PUBLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL UNION, No. XLV.]

SPEECHES

DELIVERED BY

COLONEL LOYD-LINDSAY, V.C.,

MEMBER FOR BERKSHIRE,

AND

FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE,

TO

THE NEWBURY CONSERVATIVE WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION,

JANUARY 29TH, 1880.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT,

ESPECIALLY WITH

REFERENCE TO EASTERN AFFAIRS.

THE members of the Newbury Working Men's Conservative Club held their first anniversary dinner on January 29th, in the Town Hall. Mr. W. G. Mount, President, occupied the chair.

In replying to the toast of "The Army, Navy, and Auxiliary Forces," Colonel LOYD-LINDSAY, M.P., said: There is a saying that good masters make good men, and you may rely upon this, that as long as you are good masters and will vote the Supplies, you will always find men to serve you well and to fight your battles at sea as well as on land. It has recently been my fortune to be associated with that department in the War Office which has the supervision of those very Supplies to which I allude, and I feel that you, as taxpayers of this country, have a right to two things: first, that the money which is voted shall produce for you the good article you require; and, secondly, that the money voted for the Supplies shall be carefully and economically administered. It has been my fortune to be associated with two Secretaries of State for War, and I can truly and conscientiously say that although they were Secretaries at War they were certainly men of peace, and that no member of Her Majesty's Administration had done more, or striven more carefully to carry out those measures that would preserve and ensure the blessings of peace for this country than those who had had the charge of affairs at the War Department. The administration of the funds of that department were, I assure you, watched over and as care-

fully administered as if they were the funds of any private person in this country. If on any occasion we have been tempted to relax to any extent the purse-strings, we have done so in a way which we felt satisfied would meet with the approval of the country, because it has been done to improve and increase in the most considerate and careful manner the comforts and the pay of the private soldiers. During the time of the Conservative Administration a good deal has been done in that direction, and I have no doubt the result will prove beneficial to the soldier, who will be able to return to his home with a certain sum of money saved during the time he has served Her Majesty, probably enabling him to make a home for himself, and to set an example of those habits of thrift which we are so anxious to see practised among the civil population of this country. The army has done its duty ably and well abroad, in recent times as formerly, and has carried out an important part of the Administration of Her Majesty's Government with as great moderation as possible.

The Right Hon. J. R. Mowbray, M.P., proposed "Her Majesty's Government."

Viscount Barrington, M.P., returned thanks, and proposed "The Health of the County Members."

Colonel Loyd-Lindsay, in responding to the toast, said: The time draws near when the country will have to give its opinion on the foreign policy of the Government, especially with reference to Eastern affairs, which have been chiefly challenged by the Opposition, and I will ask you to look at this question rather more comprehensively than our Liberal opponents would desire you to do. The well-known and consistently-held policy of Russia, to extend her dominion to the Balkan Peninsula and Constantinople, and to take exclusive naval possession of the Black Sea, which had, as a practical policy, been laid aside since the Crimean War, was brought out into active vigour again by a combination of circumstances which, taken together, appeared to offer the most favourable chances of success. Chief among the circumstances favourable to Russian aggrandisement may be instanced the imbecility of the then Sultan of Turkey, coupled with the general rottenness of his unfortunate Government, and also, I am bound to say, the growing insignificance of England as a governing Power in the affairs of Europe, which had been brought about by the chicken-hearted foreign policy pursued by Mr. Gladstone. He, acting under the extraordinary delusion that the weak and timid are as much considered as the strong and brave, did some strange things while Prime Minister, humbling England in the eyes of the world, by giving up at the demand of Russia in 1871 the chief things for which England fought five-and-twenty years ago. It was five-and-twenty years ago, you may well remember, that Russia was bent on carrying out, under Nicolas, the same policy which she has

since been endeavouring to carry out under Alexander. Then, as now, the Great Powers of Europe thought that it was not consistent with the freedom and liberty of Europe that Russia should so enormously extend her naval and military dominion. England shared that opinion then; England holds that opinion now. England held that opinion so strongly twenty-five years ago, that the then Liberal Ministry, of which Mr. Gladstone was one, plunged the country into war rather than allow Russia to take possession of the Black Sea and the Balkan Peninsula. England succeeded in checking the progress of Russian aggrandizement, but she succeeded at the cost of most tremendous exertions, and expenditure in money and in lives of men, each and all of which might have been averted if the Liberal Ministry of the day had showed the ordinary firmness and decision required of men entrusted with the government of a country. Mr. Muntz, the present Liberal member for Birmingham, and Mr. Bright's colleague, speaking on Saturday last to his constituents, made the following remark. He said, with reference to Eastern affairs, "He would observe that if the Liberal Government had been as determined as they ought to have been in 1854, they might have prevented the fearful war and massacre of 500,000 men in 1877." Now reading this led me to examine what Mr. Muntz said about Eastern affairs at the time to which he alluded—viz., at the commencement of the Crimean war, and I find that he made a speech in the House of Commons on the 19th of July, 1855,* in which he said that "He charged Lord Aberdeen's Administration with want of foresight, candour, determination, preparation, care, and knowledge. They wanted foresight, or they would have seen what the intention of the Emperor of Russia was, for it was evident from what had been stated by our Ambassador that the Emperor intended to make war on Turkey. They wanted candour, or they would have told the Emperor that if he did make war on Turkey, not only would they oppose, but that they would make war against Russia if she crossed the Pruth. Had that been distinctly stated he believed that Russia never would have crossed the Pruth." Mr. Muntz was speaking the opinion of the majority of Englishmen at that time, and he said that if the Liberal Government had shown firmness the war might have been prevented; and subsequent events showed him to have been right, for we now know that under curiously similar circumstances, war has been avoided, and that because the present Conservative Ministers have been firm and distinct in their language, and because that which they said they would do, all the world knew that they would carry out. The trumpet gave no uncertain sound in 1877. Those who heard it prepared themselves for battle. Its notes sounded

* The speech of 1855 was made by Mr. Müntz, the then liberal member for Birmingham—and brother to Mr. Müntz, the present member.

across the Atlantic, and our Canadian fellow-subjects offered their services to their country. It was heard in India, and our brave native soldiers sprang to the front to serve their Queen and Empress. Its sounds were heard in the Palaces of St. Petersburg, and its notes there were not misunderstood. The Prime Minister of England, the Home Secretary, and Lord Salisbury, each and all held the same language, and said that England would go to war if Russia took possession of Constantinople and the Bosphorus. And let me ask, what was done to give weight and emphasis to this determined language? This was done: The Army Reserves were called out. Six thousand Indian troops were brought to the Mediterranean. The Naval and Military services were put into a state of complete preparedness—six millions of money were voted by Parliament, and the British fleet was moved up into the Bosphorus. The effect of the last-mentioned act may best be told in the words of a Russian writer, who, in a remarkable work, recently published, says: "The first bitter disappointment was prepared for Russia by the appearance of the British fleet in the Bosphorus, and by the impression produced by this event at the headquarters of the Grand Duke Nicolas. The 'impossible' had come to pass. The army remained, as if rooted to the spot, outside the gates of the city. For months the Russian soldiers looked wistfully at the mosque of St. Sophia, and dared not stretch out their hands to reach the Jerusalem of Slav Orthodoxy. In the eyes of the Government the fear of intervention from the despised West outweighed the apprehensions of wounding the popular spirit, and neglecting the sacred traditions of the past. Arkasoff and his friends raged furiously, but in vain. They were forced to confess that the cause of Western civilization was not yet defunct, and that the name of England had still some meaning in the world."* Now, the doing of all these things, the object of which was to arrest the Russian aggression, and thus prevent a European war, Mr. Gladstone used the enormous power which he possessed, as ex-Prime Minister, to hinder, to baffle, and (to use his own expression) to counterwork. Not satisfied with all this, he sanctioned the exertions of an emissary from England to stir up and stimulate the war feeling in Russia, at a time when the sober-minded among the Russian people were doing their utmost to secure the adoption of moderate measures. For these political crimes Mr. Gladstone deserves to lose, and has lost, the confidence of the people of England in him as a future Minister of the Crown. Politically he cannot be trusted. I have thus shown how, by firmness, England escaped war in 1877. I will now show you how, by want of firmness, England drifted into war in 1854. I will ask you to note the expression "drifted into war." It is not my

* "Russia Before and After the War." Translated from the German by E. Fairfax Taylor. Published by Longmans and Co., 1880.

expression. It is the expression of Mr. Gladstone's colleague, Lord Aberdeen, who, speaking as Prime Minister in the House of Lords, said, "We are drifting into war." What an expression for a Prime Minister to use! What a contrast to the language of Lord Beaconsfield! But it accurately described the miserable condition of that miserable Government, which sent an army, yet not an army but a number of regiments, to die of want and hunger in the Crimea. "Drifting" is an expression applied to a ship which, without rudder and without sails, floats about at the mercy of winds and waves. That was the condition of the Government in which Mr. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer, when we drifted into war with the greatest military nation of the day. Did that Government deserve impeachment? Well, they narrowly escaped it, and many thought that they deserved it. But they escaped it mainly because the Conservative party, led by Mr. Disraeli in the House of Commons, considered that it would be wrong, and perhaps dangerous to the State, for Her Majesty's Opposition to assail Her Majesty's Government at a time of national danger and difficulty. National danger and difficulty have not prevented Mr. Gladstone from assailing and embarrassing Her Majesty's Government now. He has been restrained by no sense of responsibility and by no feeling of patriotism. But Mr. Gladstone will have to explain this to his Liberal friends at the next election, and those who are Englishmen before they are Liberals will not be easily satisfied. But I return to the Crimean war, and I cannot leave it till I have told you a part of the story of that war. The whole story is too long, and much of it so disgraceful, that you would hardly believe it, were you not aware that the facts were proved before a Committee of the House of Commons. But it is not from Blue-books only that I learn them, but from my own personal experience, as one who was never absent from the Crimea, from the day we landed till the close of the war. Economy, which is in itself a good and great virtue, becomes both wicked and ridiculous when exercised in the curtailment of the necessary food, arms, and clothing of your soldiers. It is ridiculous, because all your previous expenditure is worthless and wasted if proper arms and food are not provided, and that it is wicked to allow soldiers to die of hunger and misery needs no proof. But was it apathy or economy that prevailed in the minds of the Liberal Government when they sent out an army to die of privations in the Crimea? When I remember that Mr. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer, I am inclined to believe that economy, miserable and ridiculous economy, was in the minds of these misnamed Liberal Ministers. Having drifted into war, the Ministers dispersed, and a long period elapsed without even a Cabinet Council being called, as appears from the debates in the House of Commons. But of these matters I have no personal

knowledge, being then three thousand miles away. But I have personal knowledge of this—that out of the small number of regiments sent to the East, a number were sent out without even a rifle to defend themselves with, being armed only with the old and worthless blunderbuss, which had been condemned. Here was Mr. Gladstone's grand system of economy, spending twelve millions of money on the army and not providing the first requisite, namely, arms. You might as well fit up a ship with a cargo of gold and silver, and then send her to sea with ten holes in her keel, as send an army to fight without proper arms. But while the Liberal Government, of which Mr. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer, was drifting into war, you will probably say that they were occupied in making preparations for that war. But it was not so. The evidence before the Committee in the House of Commons shows they did nothing. They did none of those things which Lord Beaconsfield's Government did two years ago. They did not call out the Militia Reserve, and they were nearly impeached for not doing it. They did not call troops from India, and they should have been impeached for not doing it. They did not ask for six millions to put the army and navy in a state of preparation. But when they began to ask for money they did not stop at six millions. They raised money, like gamblers, at any cost. They added enormously to the taxes; they added enormously to the National Debt. They raised forty millions by taxation; they raised forty millions by loan. They raised the income tax in two years to 1s. 4d. in the pound; they put additional duties on malt, sugar, tea, and coffee; and they spent the money thus raised in the most mad and reckless manner. They raised the market against themselves all over the world. They bought things at ten times their proper price, and sent them generally to the wrong place, where they were not wanted. They sent out quinine enough to float a small ship, when the place was already flooded with quinine. They sent out blankets and furs when the thermometer was at eighty. They were always too late, and they were always in a hurry, and consequently they were robbed and pillaged; and, although they spent from eighty to a hundred millions, a vast portion of that great sum was squandered and thrown away. The army was not properly armed, the troops were not fed, not clothed, not housed. These things are matter of history; they are recorded in the proceedings of Parliament, and from those records I quote to you the concluding paragraph of the report of the famous House of Commons' Committee, which, in language of the greatest severity, condemned the Liberal Government of the day. "It appears that the sufferings of the army resulted mainly from the circumstances in which the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken and executed. The Administration which ordered that expedition had no adequate information as to the

amount of force in the Crimea or Sebastopol. They were not acquainted with the strength of the fortresses to be attacked, or with the resources of the country to be invaded. They hoped and expected that the expedition would be immediately successful, and as they did not foresee the probability of a protracted struggle, they made no provision for a winter campaign; what was planned and undertaken without sufficient information was conducted without sufficient care or forethought. This conduct on the part of the Administration was the first and chief cause of the calamities which befell our army. The patience and fortitude of the army demand the admiration and gratitude of the nation on whose behalf they have fought, bled, and suffered. Their heroic valour and equally heroic patience under sufferings and privations have given them claims upon this country which will be long remembered and gratefully acknowledged. Your Committee will now close their report with a hope that every British army may in future display the great qualities which this noble army has displayed, and that none may hereafter be exposed to such sufferings as are recorded in these pages." Gentlemen, I claim to have performed a duty in reminding you of the painful events of that period—it is not the sort of speech I could have wished to have made on a festive occasion, but I felt bound to remind you of the events of our foreign policy, as connected with the Eastern Question, because it is with reference to that policy that the Government is placed on its trial. Let it be tried by all means on that policy. Let the Eastern Question be examined from the beginning down to the present time. Let us see the enormous difficulties which had to be encountered twenty-five years ago, and the equally enormous difficulties which have been encountered now, and let us see how those difficulties have been dealt with by different Administrations. The Liberals drifted you into war—and what a war! The Conservatives have preserved you peace, and "Peace with honour." Do not be laughed out of those words. The rogue always laughs at the honest man till he finds the rope round his own neck. You will put the rope round somebody's neck at the next election I suspect, and then the jokes of the ex-Ministry will not be so entertaining to themselves as they appear to be at present. You have heard of Nero fiddling while Rome was burning. I commend the study of that period of history to the ex-Ministry, with their jokes made at the expense of their country and their country's honour. Peace with honour, and debt reduced during the last six years by a million and a-half, no additional taxes imposed, and the army and navy in complete and thorough efficiency. These are facts Mr. Gladstone connot explain away. Let him explain the disastrous war into which he drifted, the forty millions he raised by taxation, the forty millions on loan, the sixteenpenny income tax, and the discredit which he nearly brought upon

England, saved only by the courage of the army in the field. Gentlemen, when you give your verdict at the next election as to who is to guide the destinies of this great country, think upon these things, and choose men who will maintain our revered institutions at home, and our just influence abroad. The following words of the poet Wordsworth, written with reference to the great war in 1806, will advise you well at the present time :—

"'Tis well ; from this day forward we shall know
That in ourselves our safety must be sought ;
That by our own right hands it must be wrought ;
That we must stand unpropped or be laid low.
We shall exult, if they who rule the land
Be men who hold its many blessings dear,
Wise, upright, valiant ; not a servile band,
Who are to judge of danger which they fear,
And honour which they do not understand."

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THE

FOREIGN POLICY OF ENGLAND.

EXTRACT FROM AN

IMPORTANT SPEECH

DELIVERED BY

MR. JOSEPH COWEN,

RADICAL MEMBER

FOR

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE,

ON SATURDAY, JANUARY 31ST, 1880.

On Saturday, January 31, Mr. Joseph Cowen, M.P., addressed a meeting of his constituents in the Town Hall, Newcastle, on the "Foreign Policy of England." The hall was crowded in every part, not an inch of standing room in any part of the building being obtainable long before the hour for commencing the proceedings. Many of the audience had to stand under great discomfort from shortly after the doors were opened till the end of the meeting, a period of nearly four hours. Mr. Cowen was listened to from beginning to end with close attention, and was continuously and heartily cheered throughout.

The Chairman, in opening the meeting, said the occasion which called them together that night was one of great interest to Newcastle and to the country. Whenever Mr. Cowen expressed his views they were not confined to the limits of the district, but they travelled to wherever Liberal opinions had a home. He was glad to have the opportunity of introducing Mr. Cowen to them that night. It was to be regretted that the opportunity did not occur more frequently; but when they remembered the great strain upon his physique in the discharge of his Parliamentary duties they must make some allowance, and recollect that if he was not with them in the North, he was in London fulfilling his responsibilities in the Imperial House of Parliament. Some few months ago Mr. Cowen had favoured them with his views upon home policy. He then gave them a retrospect of the past and a programme for the future guidance of the Liberal party. It was not of the barren character of Lord Hartington's programme, but it indicated the lines upon which the Liberal party should run. That night Mr. Cowen was to discuss the foreign policy of England. No man was more competent to debate that great question than their

distinguished friend, Mr. Cowen. No question had occupied more public time than our Foreign policy, and he was sure that Mr. Cowen would be able to give a defence of the policy he had upheld that would be generally approved. He had not the least doubt that Mr. Cowen would be able to suggest to the gentlemen who had taken a contrary view the propriety of mending their ways. He had not the least doubt, further, that after having heard a full explanation from Mr. Cowen, the ties which united him to the affections of the Newcastle people, would be cemented instead of weakened.

Mr. Joseph Cowen, M.P., who was received with loud and enthusiastic cheers, said: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have rarely addressed a meeting with more misgivings than I do this one. My hesitation does not arise from any doubt I entertain as to the correctness of the statements I am about to make, of the strength of the argument I purpose sustaining, or of the soundness of the deductions I intend to draw. On all these points I am thoroughly persuaded in my own mind. My reluctance to speaking springs from the conviction I entertain that anything I can say will be valueless, and may be locally mischievous. International problems of great intricacy and importance have come up for settlement since the last General Election. Many of the issues started are old ones, some of them centuries old, but they were not then before the electors. The Liberals, as a body, have assumed towards them an altered attitude. They have abandoned, no doubt for reasons which appeared to them good, the historic policy of the country, if not the traditional principles of the party. There is necessarily difficulty in fixing with precision the position of a complex body in a state of change. But no injustice will, I think, be done to anyone by saying that many Liberals, on foreign questions, have espoused in spirit, if not in substance, the doctrines which were held with such tenacity and expounded with such earnestness by that band of capable men who made the world

their debtors by their labours for Free Trade. I have not been able to become a convert to this new faith. I am not, and never was, an adherent of what is popularly known as the "Manchester School." On this subject there is between myself and some of my friends a distinct divergency, which I have no desire either to minimise or ignore. I am in favour of an European and national, as against an insular and—I use the word in no offensive sense—a parochial policy. There is nothing that I have said on this question that I wish either to modify or retract. There is nothing that I have done which I regret. I may be mistaken—I am not infallible; but I believe that the course of policy I have supported has been the best for England and the best for liberty. I fear my convictions are too strongly fixed to be shaken. I am not either so sanguine or so egotistical as to suppose that anything I can say will turn my friends from the faith they have accepted with so much devotion. Apart from political considerations, party passions, and personal predilections and prejudices, have been imported into the controversy, and in some instances these have been intensified by religious animosities. It is hopeless to reason against such a combination of active and angry sentiments. But the blast that blows loudest is soon overblown; and having lodged an earnest protest in support of my opinions, I am willing to bend to the storm and wait for the sobering effects of experience, and the modifying influence of time, to wear out the asperity of the political jehad which is now being preached against doctrines that, to my mind, have the semblance atleast of truth and justice to sustain them. But if I am to speak I will do so frankly, without reservation or equivocation. In a country where unfortunately speech is so much controlled by, and so much based on, party interest, little favour is shown to the politician who ignores its consideration and ventures upon the dangerous practice of striving to be impartial. If he speak the unbiassed sentiments of his own mind he secures

the opposition of his former supporters, the slanders of his atrabilious opponents, and the sneers, if not the suspicions, of some of his associates. But sincerity of utterance is the only channel of truth, and I believe that my fellow townsmen will listen to declarations of opinion which may involve opposition, and possibly censure of some of them, if these declarations are untainted, as I trust in my case they will be, with either levity or ignorance. I cannot cite a new fact, and no one can adduce a new argument either for or against the policy that this country has recently pursued. The subject has been written about and spoken of so often, and at such length, that every argumentative thread is worn thin and bare. The literature on the interminable theme is a veritable political kaleidoscope in which every form of thought, every shade of opinion, is presented in all shapes of attraction and repulsion. But, if what I say is not new, it will only be in keeping with the speeches of more distinguished persons. We are not philosophers, speculating upon what might be, nor philanthropists dilating upon ought to be, nor poets chanting the dirge of a brilliant but buried past. We are matter-of-fact politicians, talking of the prosaic present. And politics, I fear, are too often controlled more by self-interest than by sentiment. We are not dealing with an ideal State. If we were, the fragmentary and composite Empire of Britain would not realise my Utopia. Greece, whose name has been for centuries a watchword upon earth, whose fame will never fade, from whose history mankind have derived inspiration and guidance, and which still rises upon our intellectual sight like a mountain-top gilded with sunshine, amidst the devastations of a flood—Greece, I say, rather than law-giving, conquering, imperial, splendid, but savage Rome, would be my model. I would have a State in which every man is free, and where every man is fortified against superstition by education, and against oppression by arms; where the arts and graces of Athens, and the martial independence of Sparta, would commingle with the mercantile and industrial enterprise and the naval prowess of Britain; and in which, while influence and authority are won by intellectual strength and moral worth, a proud defiance could be bid to despotism's banded myriads.

But these are the dreams of the idealists. We belong to the real and the active, and not the imaginary world. We are to deal with things as they are, and not as we can sketch them in our fancy. We are the inheritors of a Colonial Empire, the most widespread, scattered, and extensive ever known. It reaches to every region, and has its feelers and its feeders in every corner of the globe. Some of these possessions came to us in a questionable shape, and by means that no one can justify, and that I, at least, have no desire either to palliate or excuse. But the present generation of Englishmen are guiltless of the crime attending their acquisition. Our Colonies cover an area of three millions of square miles, and have a population of fourteen million persons following diverse pursuits, but all animated by one mind, aim, and tradition. In India we have a frontier of twelve thousand miles, an area of one and a-half million square miles, and 240,000,000 of people under our sway. Our insular position frees us from many of the dangers which surround Continental States, but our external empire makes us at the same time one of the most sensitive and assailable of nations. No serious movement can take place in any part of the earth without our feeling its influence. No country ever occupied such a peculiar position as Britain and her daughter empires now hold. It is not egotism to say that, notwithstanding all our shortcomings, power so vast was never wielded with so sincere a desire to use it beneficially. Every tribe we touch acknowledges our supremacy, and looks to us either in conscious fear of weakness, or with brightening hope of participating in our elevation. To secure the existence —to rivet the cohesion of this vast dominion, blest with one of the highest forms of freedom that the world has ever seen, to carry to distant countries and succeeding ages the loftiest form of civilization, is our mission. To abandon the opportunity of usefulness thus conferred, to throw aside the hope of securing equal rights and impartial freedom, to destroy the means of establishing a feeling of fraternity and consciousness of common, material interests amongst so many millions of our fellow-beings, would be a narrow, a niggardly, a short-sighted, and a selfish policy for a great nation to pursue. If we left South Africa, what would be

the result? There are 350,000 British born men and women—our own kith and kin—living there. Without some protection from the Home Government, the homesteads they have erected by years of patient toil, the centres of civilization and of commerce that they have created by their enterprise, would be endangered, if not destroyed. Their assailants would not be the natives of the soil, who are friendly and inoffensive, but savage invaders from the north, who are as much alien and aggressors as the English. If we abandoned India, a like, but more disastrous, result would ensue. The scores of different races and nations into which the population of that country is divided would fly at each other's throats. In the earliest encounters probably the fierce, courageous, unteachable, and intractable Mohammedans, who are forty millions strong, would re-assert their supremacy; but after years of internecine war and social disorder the country would eventually fall a prey to a foreign invader—possibly Russia. The 8,000 miles of railway, the 18,000 miles of telegraph, the canals, and other creations of English capital would be destroyed. The machinery for the administration of justice, and the protection of life and property, which England has created, and which has assured to the common people of India more security and greater personal freedom than they ever enjoyed under former rulers, would be upset. This country would suffer equally with the Indian people; the £128,000,000 of Indian debt, would have to be provided for; civil servants and officers whose careers would be destroyed would require their pensions, and compensation would possibly be demanded by traders who would be ruined by our change of policy. India, England, and the world would all be injured. No Englishman could contemplate such a contingency with approval, or acquiesce in it with satisfaction. Now that we possess it, we are bound to protect and defend India—to hold it against any enemy as stoutly as we would hold Cornwall or Caithness. England is not so many square roods of land, but a nation whose people are united in love of soil and race, by mutual sympathy and tradition, by character and institutions. It is not a fortuitous concourse of individuals merely bound over to keep the peace towards each other, and, for the rest, following their own

selfish objects, and crying outside their own cottage, counting-house, or country, let everything "take its course." Our country is something more than the mere workshop of the world, a manufactory for flashy clothing, and a market for cheap goods. We are pledged to each other as citizens of a great nationality, and by solidarity of life. We owe a duty to ourselves, to our families, and to our country, and also to our generation and to the future. We have grown great, not merely by the extent of our possessions and the fertility of our soil, but by the preservation of our liberties and the energy and enterprise of our people. The present generation is the outcome of centuries of effort. The history of England is woven and interwoven, laced and interlaced with the history of Europe and the world for a thousand years. Wherever liberty has struggled successfully, or wherever it has suffered in vain, there our sympathies have gone. There is nothing in human affairs that can be foreign to us. Wealth almost beyond the dreams of avarice, territorial possessions, and education bring with them heavy responsibilities. Power, to the very last particle of it, is duty. Unto whom much is given, of him much will be required. As we have inherited, so we have to transmit. No one can look slightingly on the results which rest upon our national resolves. But if ever a nation, drunk with the fumes of power and wealth, makes an apotheosis of gold and material pleasure, prefers riches to duty, comfort to courage, selfish enjoyment to heroic effort and sacrifice, it sinks in the respect of others, and loses the first and strongest incentive to human effort. Great work demands great effort, and great effort is the life and soul both of individuals and nations. I contend, therefore, for these two principles—the integrity of the Empire, and the interest, the right, and the duty of England to play her part in the great battle of the world, as did our illustrious ancestors, the forerunners of European freedom. Let me apply these principles to the recent controversies in the East and the action that has been taken by this country. India is one of our most distant, as it is one of our most important dependencies. We hold it more as conquerors than as colonists. There are earnest and obvious reasons why our communication with it should

be rapid, easy and expeditious. Nature, mechanical science, and commercial enterprise have contributed to make the best route to t through the Isthmus which unites the continents of Asia and Africa. The Egyptians, the Phœnicians and the Carthagenians, before the Christian era, travelled to India this way. In the Middle Ages the Danish and Venetian merchants went by the same road. The first envoy whom England ever sent to India also journeyed by this path—Bishop Sherborne, who was deputed by good King Alfred to undertake a mission to the people on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar. As before the Christian era, so to-day —the most direct route to the East is by the Isthmus of Suez and Asia Minor. The canal is the link which unites our Eastern and Western Empires. Through it we not only reach India but our dependencies in the Chinese Seas, our Australian colonies, the Mauritius, and the British settlements on the East Coast of Africa. It is the neck which connects the head with the extremities of our Empire. It has been suggested that if we lost it we could resume our old road by the Cape of Good Hope. It is quite true that this could be done. It is equally true that we might return to pack-horses and stage-waggons as a means of transit, but it is not likely that we shall do so; it would be contrary to the genius of civilisation and the spirit of our times thus to recede. We have got the canal, and in the interests of ourselves and of the world we will hold it free for every one at all hazards. If Russia were to obtain political supremacy on either side of the Bosphorus, she could stop the canal or intercept our way to India by the Euphrates Valley. North of the Danube she is comparatively harmless; but with the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, and the Straits, she would have at her command a position unequalled in the world for commerce and for war. She could barricade the Dardanelles, and behind it she would have two inland seas, which would be at one and the same time harbour, arsenal, dockyard, and naval station. She could there with security and ease equip and arm her ships, and train her sailors, and manœuvre her fleet. In the numberless islands and roadsteads of the Archipelago she would have protection for conducting either offensive or defensive warfare, such as

is to be found in no other part of the globe in equal space. This position is the key to Europe — one of its life arteries. Its occupation by a conquering, ambitious, and despotic power would be a danger to England, to Europe, and to liberty. The aspirations of the Russian peasant are southward. He yearns to be clear of the Boreal regions of snow and solitude, in which he is enveloped for the greater part of the year. As naturally as the sap rises in the vine, so naturally does the desire of the Russian rise to reach more genial regions, and to burst the political and frozen cerements which rob him of life and of development. It is only the force of the iron yoke that makes him a labourer. By choice and by taste, he would be a wanderer, a boatman, a pedlar, or a travelling mechanic. Russia is not a nation like France, or Italy, or Spain ; it is not a dynastic aggregation of States like Austria ; but it is a crushing and devouring political mechanism, which has annihilated full fifty distinct nationalities. It kills every spring of independence ; it intercepts and has covered whole continents with the melancholy monuments of nations. Poland, the Niobe of nations, whose gallant sons have been the knights-errant of liberty the world over, has been all but interred by her in Siberia. Circassia, the cradle of the human race, whose people are the manliest and handsomest in the world, has been converted into a tomb. And she is now seeking to engulph the desert steppes, the briny waters, and the shifting burning sands that lie between the Caucasus, the Caspian, and the Afghan Table Land. The interest, the instinct, and, to some extent, the necessity, of the Russian people, urge them to seek "fresh fields and pastures new," away from their biting north winds, their icy forests, their bleak and limitless plains. The Government, which is Asiatic rule, bastardised by German bureaucracy, with appropriating frenzy has striven to annex territory in all directions ; while the Emperors, animated by an ambition akin to that of "Macedonia's Madman and the Swede," have been dazzled by a dream of universal empire. To find a foothold for their power in the unrivalled natural resources which Turkey affords has been their aim. The defeat of Russia in the

Crimea modified for a time her external and internal policy. To soften the discontent created by the surrender of Sebastopol, liberal legal changes were instituted, and a decree emancipating the serfs was promulgated. The benefits conferred by this instrument are more apparent than real. By it the peasants were relieved from some claims to the landlords, but they were charged with equivalent burdens for the national revenue; and the imperial functionary is often a harder taskmaster than the local lord of the soil. M. Walewski calculated that the emancipation of the serfs doubled the direct taxes of the empire. Repulsed in the south and west, Russia sought an outlet for her stream of conquest in Central Asia. Unnoticed, to a large extent unknown, she has, in that quarter of the globe during recent years, absorbed a territory nearly equal in extent to Continental Europe, and she has now a bristling array of bayonets in threatening proximity to our Indian Empire. Although popular feeling and historical recollection have always favoured a campaign for supplanting the crescent by the cross, there is a small but intelligent and influential party in Russia who are adverse to this tempting and treacherous cry of "To Constantinople!" They contend that if the seat of Government were removed from the banks of the cold and misty Neva to those of the brilliant Bosphorus, the Empire would perish through the effeminacy generated by residence in the sunny and seductive South. Hardy Northmen would be replaced in the councils of the Czar, by the intrigues of Greeks and Bulgars. This would lead to divisions in which the unwieldy dominions would be split in twain through the struggles for supremacy that would ensue between the genuine Slav and the idle mongrels that would flutter round the Court of the new Byzantium. This view has been maintained not only by authors like Gurowski, and by soldiers like Fadeof, but by many Russian Liberals. Three of the most remarkable men that the revolutions in the East sent into Western Europe were Bakunin, whom the Emperor Nicolas, after an interview with him, described as a "noble but dangerous madman;" Alexander Herzen, one of the most fascinating of men, who combined the philosophy of Germany, the politics of

Republican France, and the practical good sense of Englishmen, with the native Russian character; and Mieroslowski, the brilliant and eloquent Polish leader. I have heard all of these gentlemen contend that Europe would not see for many years—probably not for generations—another effort made by Russia to obtain Constantinople. They held this opinion not because they all approved of it—Bakunin certainly did not—but their belief was that the German party in Russia had so realised the hopelessness of a struggle with the Western Powers that they would not resume it. The nervous, hesitating, indolent, but kindly man who is now at the head of the Russian people, has always, until recently, been credited with a settled determination not to renew the enterprise that ended so disastrously for his father. The idea was general that India and China, rather than Turkey, would be threatened by Russian advance. I own that I largely shared that opinion. But events have shown that this was an error, and that the passion for accomplishing what the people of Russia believed to be their manifest destiny was not dead but only slumbered—the leopard had not changed his spots nor the Tartar his skin. The first pronounced intimation of the retention of this old faith was seen in the course pursued by Russia during the Franco-German war. Immediately our friend and ally France was worsted in that disastrous conflict, the Czar intimated that he intended no longer to comply with the clauses of the Treaty of Paris that neutralised the Black Sea. He did not invite the other Powers of Europe, who, along with himself, were parties to that Treaty, to meet and discuss the reasonableness of his request for an alteration, but, with autocratic pride and despotic imperiousness, he proclaimed his determination to look upon that portion of that treaty as null and void. He had observed it as long as France was in a position to unite with England for its maintenance, but when she was temporarily disabled, he seized the opportunity to break an engagement which he had solemnly entered upon. This was the first sign of the change, the effects of which Europe has just witnessed. Russia, in her attacks upon neighbouring States, follows an uniform and unvarying plan. She begins usually by professing an interest in their welfare. At one

time she is moved by sympathy for her brethren in bonds—as if there were no persons in bonds in Russia. At another time she is roused to fervour for her co-religionists, as if there were no persons suffering for their religious opinions within her own borders. She knows how to lure adjoining rulers to destruction by encouraging them in every frivolous expense, every private vice, and every public iniquity, as she did Abdul Aziz and many an unfortunate Asiatic Khan. She can compass the destruction of popular liberty by Jesuitical intrigue, as she did in Poland. She can engage in plots and conspiracies, as she did more recently in Bulgaria. Ignorance, ambition, corruption, are all made in turn to minister to her designs. The cupidity of Turkish pashas, who too often obtained their positions by bribery, and held them by oppression and extortion, and the hopeless confusion into which the Ministers of the Sultan had allowed affairs to drift at Constantinople, formed a favourable field for the work of Russian emissaries. The stereotyped process was followed. There was first complaint, then suggestion, and then the inevitable Conference, and the equally inevitable war. The Turkish people, both Mohammedan and Christian, suffered under solid and serious grievances. They had been oppressed and outraged by a system of administration that was outrageous and indefensible; but they sought redress of their grievances at the hands of their own rulers, and not from a foreign Power. This was shown by the stubborn resistance that was made to the advance of the Austrian troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Hungarians are the truest friends the Turks had in Europe, and if they fought so stoutly to oppose their entrance to their provinces they would have fought with greater resolution against the admission of the troops of any other country. After the war, the Russian diplomatists and generals succeeded in getting a band of trembling palace pashas around them at Adrianople, from whom they abstracted a treaty that unmasked their designs and placed them in a broad and startling light before the world. If there had been any doubt before as to the aim Russia had in commencing the war, there could be none then. Before she started on the campaign the Czar declared —first, that he did not intend to enter Constantinople; second, that

he did not seek territorial acquisition; and third, that his sole object was to ensure the freedom of the oppressed nationalities. He kept the word of promise to the ear, but broke it to the hope. He did not enter Constantinople it is true, but he surrounded it, and his troops would have entered it if the English fleet had not been in the Sea of Marmora, and the English soldiers within call at Malta. He broke the second engagement by annexing Bessarabia and the territory around Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars. By the Treaty of San Stefano he proposed the creation of what he euphemistically described as a "big Bulgaria," in other words, a huge Russian province was to be created, whose borders were to extend to the shores of the Ægean. If the treaty had remained as drawn by Russia, she would have had a port at Kavala in the south, she would have had another in the Adriatic at Antivari, and she would have been left in command of two-thirds of the shores of the Black Sea, from Midia, twenty-five miles north of Constantinople, round to some miles beyond Batoum. There would have been left around Constantinople a few acres of ground, little more than half the size of the county of Durham; then the new Russian State, like a wedge, would intervene; and beyond that there would have been Macedonia, Albania, and the north-western provinces. Turkey, left without frontiers and without fortresses, would have fallen a ready and easy prey to Russia whenever she felt herself strong enough, and Europe was indifferent enough to allow her to resume her crusade. By this treaty, Russia not only took territory in Armenia and Bessarabia, but she proposed also to subject the entire Balkan peninsula to her authority. She kept her third engagement by ignoring the nationality of the Roumanian inhabitants of Bessarabia, separating them from a free and uniting them to a despotic state. She despised the religious and race leanings of the Mohammedans near Batoum, and treated with contempt the nationality of Mohammedans living in the province of Turkey. She in this way either broke or evaded every engagement she made. To have allowed Russia to retain the position she projected for herself at San Stefano would have destroyed the balance of power in Europe, to have put the fate of Asia in her hands, and placed in her grasp the virtual

dictatorship of two continents. The main purpose of international arrangement is to secure the freedom and safety of smaller States, and to enable them to live their own lives while surrounded by Powers which could annihilate them without such protection. The law of nations prevents grasping, greedy Governments crushing weaker ones. If it were not sustained, the marauders of the earth would be let loose to prey upon their poor and feeble neighbours. It is no childish dislike of Russia that leads me to contend for the maintenance of this law and this policy. National enmity is no sound or permanent ground of either duty or policy. It is the defence of England and of Europe, the assertion and maintenance of the principles of free government as against a despotism—England and the Western Powers representing the one, and Russia the other—that leads me to resist the advance of the Muscovites to the Bosphorus. In what way has the recent policy of this country contributed to the defence of the Empire, the maintenance of the way to India, and the upholding of the authority of this country in the councils of Europe? Let us look fairly at the facts as they are, and not as they are painted by rival partisans. To the jaundiced eye everything is yellow. By the fortunes of war—a hypocritical war it is true, but still by the fortunes of war—Russia had Turkey at her mercy. She had fought and she had won. She did not occupy Constantinople, but she commanded it, and to the victors belong the spoil. It is true, as I have just explained, she made certain promises before commencing the conflict, which she either evaded or broke. But that is not remarkable. It would have been more remarkable if she had kept them. The Treaty of San Stefano did not fully express her desires, but it did express the extent to which she believed she could, with safety, go in the presence of the indifference of other Powers, and the assumed incapacity and unwillingness of England to oppose her. The Treaty of Berlin did not fully express what this country wanted, but it did express the extent of the concessions that it was possible to obtain. A comparison of what was dictated by Russia at San Stefano, and what was accepted by her at Berlin, will show the measure of change made mainly at the

instance of this country. The Russian troops have evacuated Turkish territory. This may appear a simple statement, but it is not unimportant. Every effort was made by her to retain possession of the provinces she had conquered. She strove to promote discord between the Mussulman and Christian inhabitants, hoping that that discord could be made a pretext for her remaining. Failing in that, she propounded the Jesuitical plan of a joint occupation of Eastern Roumelia by herself and other Powers. These schemes, however, were baffled; and there is now not a single Cossack trooper west of the Pruth. If the Treaty of San Stefano had stood as it was drawn, Turkey would not only have been dismembered but destroyed. She has now the opportunity of making a fresh start in national life. She can, if her rulers choose, rehabilitate herself in the estimation of Europe and of the world. There is little evidence as yet, I am bound to say, of this disposition. The incorrigible pashas who control her policy seem to have learned nothing and forgotten nothing by the cruel experience of the last three years. The Government is as rotten as the portals of the Porte are worm-eaten. These men have most of the vices of both Eastern and Western peoples, and few of their virtues. There are persons high in the confidence of the Sultan who are as completely under the control of the enemies of their country as Faust was under the control of Mephistopheles. But though the Porte perishes Turkey will remain. The Empire vanished, but France was left. There is, and has been for years, an active and patriotic party in Turkey, who have been striving to adapt their institutions to Western modes of life and to European requirements. The simple programme of this party is the fusion of the various races in the peninsula into an united State, based upon the equality, religious and political, of all. Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha laboured long and earnestly for these principles, and they are now advocated with equal sincerity by Midhat and his supporters. Men of all creeds and all races will be placed on a common level. This programme has the support of Christians and Mohammedans alike. One of the most painful and regretable incidents of this controversy was the disparaging way in which the honest efforts of

these Turkish reformers were spoken of by Liberal politicians n England. Whoever else cared to sneer at the Turkish Constitution, it certainly was no part of the duty of professed advocates of liberal Government to take up their parable against it. It is certainly not impossible to conceive of the establishment of a Government in which both Mohammedans and Christians may be united, and the pernicious influence which now predominates at Constantinople be exorcised from Turkish political life. By the Treaty of San Stefano injustice would not only have been done to the Greeks, but that country would have been condemned to sustain an exhausting conflict for its bare existence. By the extension of a Slav State to the Ægean, Greece would have been denied development. With resources limited and population scanty, she would have been stripped of the elements of growth. She might have been an independent State truly, but so weak that she would have been unable to fulfil the purpose of her foundation. She has now the opportunity of working out her redemption—she is the nucleus, the preparatory agency for the enfranchisement of a Hellenic State. Greece has a lofty mission to fulfil, and, despite present unfavourable signs, I do not despair of seeing her accomplish it. She is something more and better than she was when Byron mournfully described her as "Greece, but living Greece no more." She *does* live; she has sustained a soul almost "within the ribs of death."

> The Spartan blood that in her veins yet throbs at freedom's call :—
> Every stone of old Greece—had it not its hero-tale?
> Where they fought, where they fell, 'twas on every hill and dale.
> The dead are but the hero seed that will spring to life again.

By the Treaty of Berlin, Greece gained but little, but at least she was not by it "cribbed, cabined, and confined" to the narrow limits of her too restricted territory. The idea of most European Liberals has been that Russian aggression could be stayed only by the creation of a belt of free States between the Danube and the Balkans. The different nationalities would be there grouped in distinct organisations, and,

combined, they would be a more effective barrier to Muscovite progress than an effete and receding Empire like Turkey. Many Liberals who agreed with this principle saw difficulties to its practical realization. The inhabitants of this region are chiefly members of the Greek Church. The Czar is the head of that Church, and he holds them in a state of political as well as theological tutelage. Russia has often professed to assist at the birth of a new nation, but she has always managed to keep her thumb upon its throat, so that it could be destroyed if it became troublesome. It was a common saying of the Russian troops in Bulgaria, "We have now got these Bulgar pigs, and we will drive them." Apart, however, from these speculative objections to the project of distinct nationalities—the oft-declared policy of the Czars—when the Emperor Nicholas proposed to Sir Hamilton Seymour that England and Russia should divide between them the possessions of the Sick Man, he said there were many points in his proposed scheme which he was willing to yield to the wishes of England, but there was one point on which he would never yield. Whatever else he consented to, he would never consent to the establishment of a number of small and independent States on the Russian frontier. These would be, he said, nothing but nurseries in which a perpetual crop of Mazzinis and Kossuths would be raised; their opinions would penetrate into his dominions, and endanger the necessary authority of his government. This was then the settled policy of Russia, and has been authoritatively expressed repeatedly since. Bulgaria, as created by the Treaty of San Stefano, would have been little more than a Russian Principality; but by the Treaty of Berlin the Bulgarian people had had afforded to them the opportunity of winning for themselves an independent national life. Some few years ago the Bulgarians were held up in this country as models of Christian meekness. Recently they have been condemned with almost equal vigour, and their character has certainly developed some not very lovable attributes. They profess to be Christians, but they have scarcely acted upon the Christian principle of doing unto others as they would like to be done by. They complained loudly and justly of the oppression they suffered from the Turkish pashas; but now

when they have the power, they have manifested towards their Mussulman neighbours a more arbitrary and tyrannical spirit than these Mussulmans ever showed towards them. But I have no wish to judge them harshly. A nation that has for generations been sunk in ignorance and vice cannot be expected all at once to realize the enlightened magnanimity of philosophers. People who have been trampled on will remember it; those who have been injured will retaliate, and those who have been oppressed will not all at once forget. But the Bulgarians in time will take their place amongst the European family of nations, and shake off some of the oppressive characteristics that have recently distinguished them. The most gratifying and encouraging intelligence that has come from the East of Europe recently is that these independent States had realized their position. They have learned that Russia's interest in their behalf was certainly not disinterested. The Roumanians remember with bitterness that although they came to the assistance of their big neighbours when they were in sad straits before Plevna, their reward has been the loss of one of their most important provinces. The entire tone of feeling throughout these regions is a determination on the part of these States to assert their independence and shake themselves clear of Russian influence and direction. But the most important event that has taken place in Turkey has been the occupation of Bosnia by Austria. This action cannot be justified on the grounds of national right or justice. I certainly have no wish to extenuate or defend it. It is understood that the clause in the Treaty of Berlin, which assured these provinces to Austria, owed its authorship to Prince Bismarck and Count Andrassy. Germany contends that the Danube is a German stream—that as she controls its source so should she command its mouth. German colonists are planted along its banks, and their statesmen are unwilling to allow it to pass under the control of Russia. Austria objects to the creation of an independent Slav State on the west, as she has already on her eastern borders. For these dynastic and State reasons, the occupation, or rather the annexation, of these provinces by Austria has been assured. I am not justifying what has been done, and am dealing only with the

facts as they are. The occupation of Bosnia by Austria renders the advance of Russia to Constantinople all but impossible. Both political and military reasons combine to prevent her achieving her designs on the great city of the East. The case may be put in a sentence. The design of Russia, as revealed by the Treaty of San Stefano, was to obtain a preponderating influence in the Balkan peninsula. The object of England was to prevent her doing this. The result is that Russia is now further from the Bosphorus, and less likely to get there, than she has ever been ; and this has been accomplished chiefly by the action taken by this country. It has been achieved, too, without the loss of a single English life, or without our setting a single regiment in line of battle. Of all the strange things that I have heard during this controversy, the strangest is that Russia has achieved a victory, while England has sustained a defeat. We were told this in varying forms almost daily. I do not think any one else in Europe says so except some English politicians. It is a fact beyond dispute, that the military and aggressive party in Russia are loudly proclaiming that the victories they won, with so much difficulty in the field, have been abstracted from them in the Council Chamber. They were dissatisfied with the mode in which the war was commenced, and for some time conducted, but the advance of the troops to the neighbourhood of Constantinople consoled them for a season. The Treaty of San Stefano, objectionable as it was regarded by England, was considered by the active party in Russia as incomplete and unsatisfactory. Their complaints against it, however, were mollified by the assurance held out to them that it was only temporary. But when even that unsatisfactory Treaty had to be subjected to the revision and alteration of the other European States at Berlin, their discontent assumed an active and threatening attitude. The promulgation of the Treaty of Berlin corresponds with the re-commencement of a period of political assassinations and plots. This reveals popular discontent, while the marching and counter-marching of Russian troops, and the massing of such numbers on the German and Austrian frontiers, reveal the state of feeling which pervades the governing class. It is indisputable that, in the estimation of men familiar with Russian society, the Treaty of Berlin

has shaken the system of government to its foundation ; while the war which Englishmen are so fond of regarding as a triumph for Russia and a disconfiture for this country, is looked upon by Russians as having entailed upon their country a harvest of discontent and disappointment. To balance the territorial advantages gained by other Powers, we have obtained a more assured position in the Levant. I will not enter into the rather pitiful squabble about Cyprus—whether that island is what the poets of the past have painted it, "the blest, the beautiful, the salubrious, the happy, the dream and the desire of man," or as it is drawn by partisan politicians in this country, a fever bed and charnel-house. That it is advantageously situated for guarding the Suez Canal from any danger from the North, and that it affords a favourable starting point for advancing to the East through the Euphrates Valley, will scarcely be denied by any one who has impartially examined the subject. Military and naval men maintain that it can be made not only a watch-tower, but a depôt for arms and a safe naval station. It is only twenty hours from Port Said, nine from Acre, and six from Beyrout. It is near enough to watch and close enough to strike if we required to strike, in defence of our road to the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf. By the Anglo-Turkish Convention, England has taken upon herself heavy responsibilities. But if we had not effected that arrangement, the Sultan, like Shere Ali, despairing of help from England, would have thrown himself—reluctantly, no doubt, but still he would have thrown himself—into the arms of Russia ; and whatever the result of such a bargain would have been to the people, the greedy pashas would have been secured in their pleasures and possessions. We had, therefore, either to accept the position or permit it to pass into the possession of a rival who, with such a leverage in the centre of two continents, could not only have imperilled our Empire in India, but our authority in Europe. We have often entered into treaties with other nations entailing equally onerous obligations. We are bound to defend Greece against Turkey ; Portugal against Spain ; Belgium against France and Germany. We were bound to defend Denmark, and with culpable cowardice we evaded the responsibility. Under a stringent treaty we are bound to maintain

the independence of Sweden and Norway. If Russia should attempt to lease the fisheries in Swedish waters, or the pasturage on Norwegian soil, this country is to be informed of the fact, and any attempt on her part to infringe upon the Scandinavian territory we are under engagement to resist by force of arms. We are parties to other treaties, many of them quite as risky as the one we have recently entered into with Turkey; and few of them offer such prospect of achieving such beneficial results as may spring from the Anglo-Turkish Convention. In Asia Minor there are 700,000 square miles of some of the finest land in the world, washed by three seas, watered by large rivers, and possessing spacious ports and harbours. The soil is capable of producing grain, fruit, and cotton in abundance, while the hills and the valleys abound in copper, lead, iron, and silver. Much of this fair and fruitful region on which the seasons have lavished all their beauty, and nature all its fragrance, is given over to malaria and to wild beasts—is the gathering ground of predatory Kurds, and the camping place of wandering Arabs. The spot from which the first enterprise of man started—the land around which such a wealth of the romance, the poetry, and the mystery fastens, which has influenced the destinies and formed the characters of not one, but many peoples—is now, from causes partly local and partly foreign, doomed to endure a system of rule which is little less than organised anarchy. We send our surplus population across the Atlantic or to the Antipodes. There is no reason why they should not find a field for their labours, and an outlet for their skill, in a luxuriant land, rich with golden grain and an infinite variety of plants, and fruit, and minerals, within a few hours of our own shores. What has hitherto been wanted is security for life and property. Under the protection that might be, that ought to be, and I trust will be, given by this Treaty, these obstacles to colonisation would be removed. English capitalists and the English Government have always refused seriously to consider the project of a railway through the Euphrates Valley, because they declined to risk such large investments in a country over which they had not sufficient control. This treaty

ought to, and I think will, dispense with this difficulty. The railway scheme is described by partizans as Utopian and visionary, but that is a kind of opposition which has grown stale and obsolete. It is not many years ago since the construction of the Suez Canal was, with the approval of English engineers, demonstrated by our townsman, Mr. Robert Stephenson, to be an impossibility, and it was laughed at in the House of Commons by Lord Palmerston as the dream of a crack-brained Frenchman. But the canal is, nevertheless, a great fact. Last year there passed through it between sixteen and seventeen hundred ships with a tonnage of nearly three million tons, and thirteen hundred out of the sixteen were English vessels—a proof of the importance of this water-way to this country. When the scheme of making a railway across the American continent was first promulgated, it was met with characteristic derision, and yet now the line between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, a distance of nearly 2,800 miles, carries thousands of people in the course of a year. Russians in these matters are somewhat bolder and more enterprising than some Englishmen are. By the combined effect of river and railway, canal, and lake, they have nearly united the basins of the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Caspian. They have revived the old project of diverting the course of the Oxus, and by their system of land and water carriage, commencing at Riga and Warsaw, and terminating not far from our Indian frontier, they hope to secure a preponderating influence in Central Asia. The Euphrates Valley Railway would be 1,200 miles long, and the cost of its construction is estimated at £12,000,000—a comparatively small sum, when the amounts invested in railways in this country are considered. I know no more of the future than a prophet, but I think it would be no great venture to hazard the prediction that the railway will be made, and made, too, through English enterprise; that this work will not only act as a breakwater against Northern aggression, and a bulwark for the Indian Empire, but will be made the fulcrum for raising politically and socially an unfortunate people, and making the early seat of arts and refinement, the theatre of some of the most momentous events in history, once more bloom and blossom as the rose. My conten-

tion, in a sentence, is that our external Empire should be maintained and defended, as much in the interests of freedom and civilisation as in the interest of England and its distant dependencies; that we cannot honourably and without danger shrink from the responsibilities that our history and our position as the oldest, and one of the chief free States in the world, entail upon us; that the security of our dominions in the East and the equilibrium of Europe were threatened by the advance of Russia on Constantinople; that the action this country took, although it was open to objection in its details, was necessary, and in the main judicious; that it largely contributed to thwart the dangerous, the aggressive designs of Russia; has protected our present, and made provision for our obtaining an improved way to India may help to secure better government for Turkey; and has strengthened the influence of England in the councils of Europe. It is impossible now to discuss at length the policy pursued in Afghanistan, but I wish to express shortly the views I entertain on the action that has been taken in that country. Our Indian possessions are encircled by the ocean on the south, the south-east, and south-west. On the east they are protected by high ranges of mountains and all but impenetrable forests. These mountains and these forests are occupied by savage tribes, who, although capable of great annoyance, as the Nagas are now, are incapable of inflicting any real political or military injury upon us. On the north and north-west our frontiers are the bases of the Himalaya and the Suleiman Mountains. It is an accepted canon in military science, that a Power which holds the mountains and possesses what in soldiers' parlance is called the "issues of the frontier," has an enormous advantage over the Power which occupies the plains. This is an opinion which will scarcely be contested. These mountains are peopled by fierce, warlike, and turbulent tribes, who have no special love for England, but have just as much dislike to each other. They live partly by pasturage, partly by plunder. They fight for their own hand. The only State that has an organised Government of any strength is Afghanistan. As long as those passes and mountains, and the country generally, were occupied by tribes of this character, no

danger to India was to be anticipated. Partly brigands, partly soldiers, they could annoy us, and levy black-mail on the adjoining inhabitants, yet they could not seriously disturb or threaten our authority. But it is the accepted opinion of men of all parties—statesmen and soldiers alike—that should this strong military position ever pass into channels of a powerful Government, our exposed frontier would lay us open to serious danger For years Afghanistan, if not friendly, has at least been neutral; and there was an understanding between Russia and England that that country should be considered as outside of their mutual interest and influence—that it should be regarded as a neutral territory, both being concerned in upholding its independence and neutrality. The advance of Russia, however, to the East so alarmed the late Ameer that he urged, some years ago, the English Government to enter into closer alliance with him than then existed. He pointed out that Russia was advancing, and did not conceal his fear that, unless he were protected by England, the same fate would overtake him that had overtaken many another Asiatic ruler. Our Government at that time did not share Shere Ali's fears, and refused to comply with the requests that he preferred. He became discontented; and from having a friendly leaning towards England, he now began to lean towards Russia, and to open negotiations with the Russian commanders in the adjacent provinces. When Russia's objects in Turkey were thwarted by this country, she retaliated by striving to set our Indian frontier in a blaze. No one can complain of her doing so; it is what we would have done, probably, in like circumstances. She objected to our fleet being in the Sea of Marmora, and she thought she would disturb us and distract our attention by assuming a threatening attitude in Afghanistan. A Russian Mission was sent. It was received with ostentatious displays of sympathy by the Ameer, and, as far as he was able, he proclaimed that in future he would be the firm friend and ally of Russia, and if not the enemy, at least not the friend of this country. If not in words, the substance of his declaration and his action at the reception of the Russian Mission amounted to this.

Our Government required that, as he had received a Mission from Russia, he should also accept one from England. He refused to do it, and we attempted to force the Mission upon him. It is unnecessary to repeat the facts, which are in the recollection, no doubt, of all present. Shere Ali's refusal led to war, and after a small show of resistance he fled from Cabul, and shortly afterwards died. With his son, who was made his successor, we concluded peace, and entered into a treaty. By that treaty, England got the right of sending agents to certain specified districts in Afghanistan, and also obtained an important frontier. Instead of having the base of the mountains as a border, we had the mountains themselves. By that treaty the country should stand. The frontier secured to us by it should be maintained. A most lamentable, melancholy, and disastrous incident occurred in the autumn —the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his suite. But that ought not to divert us from the settled policy that was developed and expressed by the Treaty of Gandamak. I am in favour of holding the possessions that we have, but we want no more. We have provinces plenty and to spare. Even if we possessed Afghanistan, it would be only a perplexing acquisition; but supposing it were a profitable one, it would be contrary to the wishes and feelings of the Afghans to come under British rule, and I am altogether opposed to enforcing it upon them. The Treaty that Yakoob Khan had entered into embodies the policy of the country, and it should be upheld. I have discussed principles and not personalities. I am not interested either in defending or in decrying any body of men. All I have been concerned for is to state the grounds on which I have been led to support the assertion of what I believe to be Liberal principles and the maintenance of a national policy. It is easy to find fault, and easier still to impute bad motives to your opponents.

> A man must serve his time to every trade
> Save censure. Critics all are ready made.

The shortcomings of the Government are as apparent to me as to the fiercest opponents of their foreign policy. They have often been weak, sometimes vacillating, not unfrequently wrong; but I

wish to judge them as I would like them to judge me, or the party with which I am identified, under like circumstances. They have been beset by a succession of difficulties and dangers, such as never before encompassed an administration in our times. Apart from the inherent intricacies of the questions they have had to deal with, they have had to contend with the rival interests of other Powers, a strong opposition at home, and some divisions in their own party. It is not generosity, it is simply justice, to remember this. We should also recollect that, in dealing with foreign affairs, there are always some matters that cannot be explained. All Ministries are called upon at times to act upon information that they cannot make public.

> What's done we partly may compute,
> But know not what's resisted.

It is possible, even in party warfare, to drive your attacks too far. Unqualified denunciation usually provokes reaction. The Government, which has had the support of large majorities in both Houses of Parliament, is accused of not only being wrong, but of being criminal—not only of being mischievous and mistaken, but of being malevolent and malicious. They are charged with having roamed round the world with incendiary designs, bent upon turning our frontiers into blazing bastions fringed with fire. The accusation is, in my judgment, not only incorrect, but foolish. The indictment I would prefer against them would be of the very opposite character. I think they have acted with tameness and timidity. They have been six years in office, and the first half of that time presented them in their normal and natural character. An entire absence of political legislation, some mild but useful social measures, a free and easy administration were their characteristics. Taking warning by their predecessors, their great effort was to avoid needlessly offending anyone. Events that they could not foresee, circumstances which they could not control, have driven them into warlike action. People are easily misled by a cry, but no man who has examined the facts for himself can contend that the English Government started the conflict in Eastern Europe. Whoever else began it—

whether it was the Russian emissaries or the Turkish people themselves—certainly Lord Derby, who was then the Foreign Minister of this country, did not do so. He pressed the Sultan to settle the dispute with his subjects, and if that could not be done, he urged him, with somewhat cynical indifference, to suppress the insurrection. When that failed, he strove to localise the war. It might be said that England should have obeyed the three Emperors, and signed the ukase which the imperial league issued from Berlin, and that if Turkey refused to comply with their demands she should have been coerced—in other words, that we should have gone to war against her. It is a matter of opinion, but, in the judgment of men familiar with the East, had such a course been pursued, the Turks would have turned their backs to the wall, and, with all the disciplined fanaticism of their race, they would have fought against Christian, and coalesced Europe for their country and their faith. The resistance that was given in Bosnia to the advance of a friendly Hungarian army strengthens this view. But if the Berlin Memorandum was refused, England assented and took part in the Conference of Constantinople. However we may condemn the course taken by the Government on the Eastern difficulties, no man can fairly say that they caused them. The Afghan war, for which they are more directly responsible, was the outcome of the action of Russia in Turkey. We may fairly criticise the policy of the Government, but no one, I think, can say that they sought a cause of quarrel. I do not contend that foreign politics are outside the domain of popular and Parliamentary criticism. On the contrary, I regret that for many years the English people have given so little and such fluctuating heed to foreign questions. But I do say that such delicate topics should not be made the battle field of party. There are two modes of conducting a discussion—one to elicit information, to sustain, to direct and guide the Executive; another to win a party victory out of Government troubles. If the Government of the country is in difficulties abroad, the nation is in difficulties, and it grates as much against my national pride as against my sense of justice to go hunting

for arguments against my political opponents amongst the stiffening corpses of our fellow-countrymen. (Loud and enthusiastic cheers.)

On the above speech the *Pall Mall Gazette* of Feb. 2, 1880, remarks :—

Since south of the Tweed we are all Englishmen, and can mostly understand the language of generosity, patriotism, and good sense, it is not astonishing to read that Mr. Cowen's Radical constituents, after hearing this speech, voted him their unabated confidence, "unanimously and with the greatest enthusiasm." And we have no doubt at all that what he spoke at Newcastle is the true thought and feeling of nearly all his countrymen. Some of them have become confused with the windy noises of denunciation, the tricky rhetoric, the misrepresentations, the half-truths that are worse than we all know what, which have bellowed from Opposition press and platform lately,—that we can scarcely doubt. But turn a man like Mr. Cowen loose for a single month in the most "advanced" constituency thus misled, and we should see at the end of that period what had become of the malignancies that distracted it.

Reference

- Line of march from Herat to Lower and Upper Indus by the Bolan.
- Line of march from Pisheen Valley to Mooltan, via Dera Ghazee Khan.
- Line of march from Herat, via Kandahar, Kabool, & the Khybur to Upper India.
- Line of march from Pisheen Valley to Dera Ismael Khan.

	Eng. Miles
Khiva to Herat via Merve	530
Herat to Kandahar	380
Kandahar to Bolan Pass	180
Kandahar to Kabool	320
Samarcand to Kabool via Balkh	550
Kabool to Khybur Pass	130

Scale of English Miles.

0 50 100 200

64 Long. E. Gr. 68 72 76

IS A

RUSSIAN INVASION OF INDIA FEASIBLE?

BY

MAJOR DAVID, INDIAN ARMY.

WITH MAP.

"If Russia remained encamped on the Caspian, we should not of course leave the valley of the Indus; so long as she held aloof from Merv, we should hold aloof from Herat; but if she deliberately threw down the gauntlet, she must expect it to be taken up: we could not, as the guardians of the interests of India, permit her, on the pretext of curbing the Turcomans, or establishing a trade route through Asia, to take up a position which would compromise the safety of Herat. That city is both politically and strategically the bulwark of India."—'England and Russia in the East,' by Sir H. Rawlinson, p. 383.

LONDON:
EDWARD STANFORD, 55, CHARING CROSS, S.W.

1877.

PREFACE.

THE article in 'The Quarterly' on the military position of Russia in Central Asia, contains this opinion:

"In short, if an invader is ever again to enter Hindostan by land, the road through the Bolan must almost inevitably form his main line of attack. The late General Jacob and Sir Henry Green strongly advocated our taking a position at Quetta beyond the pass."

I contend, that while all the alarmists have been considering what positions should be taken up outside British India, at great risk of political complications, to defend it, they have entirely overlooked the great difficulties an invader would meet with after forcing a passage within its limits.

It is to point out some of these that the following pages have been written. They were not intended for publication, and it is only at the suggestions of friends that this pamphlet has been printed.

C. DAVID.

LONDON, *9th May*, 1877.

IS A RUSSIAN INVASION OF INDIA FEASIBLE?

THE intelligence which has lately reached us from India shows that some steps have been taken to develop a definite frontier policy. A conference with the Afghan Prime Minister was held at Peshawur; Kelat has been brought into political relations with the Indian Foreign Office, and the posting of troops to open the Bolan pass to trade all point out that the position of affairs beyond the British frontier is being narrowly watched.

To make the Indian frontier question plain to the English reader, it is necessary to explain that within the last few years it has, as the 'Saturday Review' in a recent article pointed out, been ruled by two policies, one nicknamed "masterly inactivity," and the other "mischievous activity."

The real end of both is the defence and security of British India against foreign aggression. "Masterly inactivity" would do this by massing troops on our present frontier, having all our resources at hand, and covering the country with a network of railways, waiting for any enemy who had contrived to march an army from Russia to India. "Mischievous activity" would protect

Hindostan by placing garrisons at Quetta and Herat, political agents at Candahar and Quetta, and employing a military and diplomatic "look-out" beyond the British Indian frontier, similar to the outposts and vedettes used by an army in the field to guard it against surprise. The great advocate of this measure was the late General John Jacob, and the most consistent opposers of it Lord Lawrence, and the late Lord Sandhurst.

Without committing ourselves to an expression of opinion, let us examine for ourselves the circumstances of the greatest foreign danger India can ever have to contend against, the presence of an invading army, and the possibility of internal commotion. Let us suppose that the policy of masterly inactivity had been pursued to the withdrawal of every soldier, and the expenditure of not a single rupee beyond the frontier; that Russian influence and Russian arms had pacified Turkistan, subjected Persia, Turkish Arabia, the north-east portion of Syria, and was slowly but gradually maturing its resources and those of its subject populations for the invasion and conquest of British India, and the seizure of the inheritance of the Great Mogul. Let us, we say, imagine the worst to happen that could happen beyond our own proper frontier; and yet, with England's naval strength unimpaired, and Indian finance and Indian loyalty secure, we believe a Russian invasion of India is not feasible.

The Emperor of Russia, in his conversation with Lord A. Loftus, characterised the intentions as-

cribed to Russia of such a scheme as an absurd idea. Mr. Wallace, in his recent work on Russia, bears witness that such ideas as a Russian conquest of India are merely the seductive dreams of a few amateur politicians. He admits that in the event of hostilities, Russia might cause us some annoyance; but our military position in India is incomparably superior, and we could easily repel the attack. Another writer, Mr. Schuyler, in his work on Turkistan, says it is impossible to believe there is any settled intention on the part of the Russian Government of making an attack on India, or even of preparing the way for it; nor is there any desire for its possession. What might happen in case of a war between Russia and England on other questions is indeed hard to say. He points out that the position of Russian affairs in Turkistan is hardly such as to allow her to do this for many years to come, to say nothing of the distances from European Russia, the bad communications and the intervening deserts and mountains between Turkistan and India, which would render such a movement exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Mr. Schuyler further argues that the only danger to India from Russia lies through Persia, and that experience has proved that all invasions of India have come through Afghanistan, and this country can only be approached by Russia through Persia, without the active co-operation of which no plan of invasion could stand the slightest chance of fulfilment.

Captain Burnaby in another work, 'The Ride to Khiva,' says, should Russia be permitted to annex Kashgar, Balkh, and Merv, India would be liable to attack from three points.

Whether all these views are correct, it is impossible to say, as the regions between India and Turkistan have never been thoroughly explored in a military sense, and we have only the experience of tradition and of former invasions, the accounts of which are singularly obscure, to serve as conjectures about the route an army would take, and as one of the factors for calculating the chances of success. As years pass on, and Russia is enabled to open out new and improved communications with the countries on the frontier of Afghanistan, if not with that country itself, the importance of her offensive power as regards India will assume larger proportions; and her proximity will even be one of the most awkward questions Indian statesmen may have to deal with. At some day her system of railways will extend to Tashkend, and perhaps to Balkh, which may be connected by rail or a good road with Kabool. The locomotive must ultimately bridge the gap between the Caucasus, the Persian provinces, and Herat, to meet the British Indian lines through the Bolan pass. With increase in rapidity of communication between the frontiers of Russia and India, it is not too much to expect that in the event of any political European complication, her propinquity will give the former the

means of endeavouring, by illusory hopes or intrigues, to disturb the tranquillity of the Indian populations; and the possible creation at some distant day of an Asiatic Servia on the British Indian frontier, or the espousal of the cause of some native ruler who had a grievance, may tend to threaten and weaken our occupation of the country. The neighbourhood of a great military power within striking distance of the frontier of India must, unless British rule has secured a solid hold of the affections of the people (a very difficult and hopeless task for a race of foreigners), be always a lever to the hopes and aspirations of the multitude. Reflections of the possibility of invasion, of the number of times India has been subdued by an invader, and of some coming change, may continue in men's minds, until, when an attempt to pass the frontier is made, public feeling may perhaps be prepared for the event.

But though the possible invasion of India has been a fertile theme of discussion with some writers, no one, if our memory serves us, has ventured, by calculations of time and distance, to analyse, consistent with the requirements of modern warfare, the conditions required for moving a large army into British India, and how far it would have to travel to reach its possible objective point.

The object of this paper being to show that under the worst that could happen for British interests, invasion, with any chance of success, would, if the

Indian people were even neutral, be a most hopeless task, it is proper here to begin with some inquiry about the approaches to the Indian frontier.

Now, without the north-west frontier of British India, there are, according to the best authorities, only three roads of approach. In considering this question, we assume the northern boundary of India, viz. the Himalayan mountains, to be impassable for an army, as is generally admitted. Two of these three roads diverge from Herat, and the third is through Samarcand and Badukshan. The approach to Herat may be made under favourable circumstances, either from Khiva, passing through Merv, from Persia, or from the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea, passing along the valley of Attrek. Taking Khiva as the point of departure, the advance through Herat would, under the natural conditions of the ground, be the most favourable, passing over an easily practicable route, which was used by Alexander the Great, and later on by Nadir Shah. The same conditions also apply to an advance from Persia, or from the valley of the Attrek to Herat. The road through Samarcand and Badukshan would be the most direct to India, but it presents many engineering difficulties, and is moreover very little known. It will be seen, therefore, that Herat is, as it has always been, an "outwork" of India. Every invader who started for Hindostan marked it as the first step towards the object of his expedition, and from the days of Baber and Ahmed Shah to the

time of our last petty war with Persia, it has always been jealously watched by the masters of the peninsula.

Looking eastward from Herat, the two passes of the Bolan and the Khybur appear the only rifts in the barrier of mountains which, stretching from near Peshawur to the Indian Ocean, separate India from Afghanistan and Beloochistan, and afford from the earliest times the most useful routes for the passage of armies and mercantile caravans. By these great roads English armies passed to Candahar and Kabool, and it may be assumed as a certainty that in turn an army about to invade India must select one if not both of these passes for its communications.

The condition of India, by its being under the military control of a nation possessing the greatest naval power in the world, and the side open to invasion being the farthest distant from the sea, makes an ultimate subjection of the whole peninsula, without the co-operation of a fleet, almost an impossibility. It was Sir Henry Lawrence who, in one of his essays, remarked, that we ought in India to always prepare for the time when a Russian army should be in front of Peshawur, and an American fleet off Bombay. We may, with our improved relations with America, dismiss her from our calculations, and consider the Russian chances alone. An invader of British India, who desired the completest success, would perhaps operate with two

armies, one to penetrate as far as he could into the country, and the other to protect its flank from the approach of any hostile force which England would at once despatch and land from the sea. In a month from the first rumour of the advance of an invading force towards the Indian frontier, or perhaps in less time, a fully equipped force would be sent from England and landed at Kurrachee on the mouth of the Indus, and pushed up to the frontier. It is, therefore, probable an invader, after forcing an entry into the Indian limits, would employ one division of his force to watch the approaches from the sea, or, in other words, to hold the line of the Indus, while he made a forward move to the interior of the country. To do this he would have to adopt what strategists term a double front. On looking at a map of India, it may be noticed that in the event of an army having passed the Khybur and moving to Lahore it would probably be compelled to detain some part of its force to secure the navigation of the Indus, or to capture some point on it; and the further an invader advanced the greater the necessity that his position on the Indus should be secure. An alternative to the above is the supposition of the advance of two invading armies directed respectively on the Khybur and Bolan passes, the first to move by the Punjaub on Delhi, and the second to occupy Scinde and the line of the Indus. In this case an invader must first hold securely Candahar and Kabool before such a plan of operations

could be attempted, while the possession of each of these towns singly gives only access to the gate of India in proximity to it. If, however, as must always be the case, his advance lies from Herat, the position of the Bolan pass to the defenders of India is so important that, as pointed out by the late General Havelock, any invading army moving towards the Khybur or the Indian frontier must, to hope for success, mask or crush any force operating from Scinde or Candahar, through which town the main communication between Herat and the basin of the Indus valley exists. A reference to a map of Afghanistan will show this more clearly than any written narrative. It will show there is no direct road in a straight line between Herat and the Khybur pass. On the contrary the route passes south-east to Candahar, and then turns northward to Kabool, Candahar being the point of junction with the road from Sukkur, through Quetta and the Bolan pass, and the chief city in southern Afghanistan.

A great deal of discussion has taken place amongst some Indian military writers as to the easiest military route into Hindostan, and the one it is most important to defend by a forcible military occupation or the seizure of some proximate political advantage. We recollect one writer describing the Bolan pass as the line of least resistance into India, and expressing his astonishment that the conquerors of Hindostan should not have adopted it. He ad-

vances the theory that, once fairly out of the pass, an enemy can, by crossing the Indus, turn all the Punjaub rivers, which give such a defensive power to that province. An argument of this kind is paradoxical. The route of an invader of India in times past, or in the possible future, depended and will depend partly on the natural advantages of the country, partly and perhaps chiefly on the hope of political aid without or within the Indian frontier. Imagine a railway completed from the Russian possessions in Central Asia to Kabool and Jellalabad, and Afghanistan friendly and dependent, and no insuperable difficulty could, if supplies were forthcoming, supervene in essaying the passes of the Khybur. The promised aid of the ruler of Cashmere on success attending the invader in his first battle, might prompt the adoption of this route. Again, suppose Persia friendly and dependent to Russia, a railway made from the Caucasus to Meshed, and through Candahar to the valley of Shawl, and the ruler of the small state of Kelat, at the head of the Bolan, impatient of British interference, and ready to join a foreign enemy; and it is then possible all considerations would urge the invader to prefer this passage into British India. It will be interesting to place ourselves in the position of an invader at Herat, and to calculate the time and labour he would have to encounter to reach his objective. Imaginary battles would have to be fought, arduous marches accomplished, and titanic

commissariat arrangements completed, requiring marvels of administrative skill in land-transport, before a Russian army could reach the Indus.

Now in former times all the invaders of India have made the Sutlej river their goal. In its neighbourhood have been fought most of the great battles which have decided the fate of Hindostan; and when the Indian railway system is completed, this part of India will be nearer to Bombay than to Calcutta, while the proximity of Sirhind, the natural watershed of Upper India, increases the importance of this line.* Behind the Sutlej lie Phillour, Loodiana, and Ferozepore. The right of this strategical base rests on the southern slopes of the Himalaya, and the left on the arid tracts of Rajpootana. To turn this line is scarcely practicable, and were the places we have mentioned strongly fortified on modern principles, the "quadrilateral" of Italy might perhaps have its counterpart on the Sutlej in the Punjaub.

For the sake of discussion, therefore, we can rightly assume this to be the object of an invader, whose army had captured Herat. Were his forces sufficiently numerous, he would prefer sending an army through the Khybur while another forced the Bolan; and if the reader follows in his imagination the fortunes of a force advancing by each of these roads, he will gain a better comprehension of the difficulties attending an invasion of India than by

* 'Chesney's Indian Polity.'

any geographical description of the features of the country.

Suppose the general commanding an invading army at Herat decides his principal line of operations should be through the Khybur pass. To reach Ferozepore on the Sutlej the distances are as follows:

Herat, viâ Girisht to Kabool	687	miles, or	56 marches.
Kabool to Ferozepore	413	„	52 „
	1200	miles requires	108 days.

If one day's halt be allowed after every seven marches, infantry would occupy a hundred and twenty-three days in travelling the distance, say four months and a half.

But as the Punjaub is intersected by five large rivers, the most favourable season of invasion is when these streams are at their lowest, which is during the first few weeks of January, when the climate in Upper India is very suitable for field operations. The distance of 885 miles from Herat to the Khybur, or fifty-nine days' march, should be accomplished before the last day of the year, and with this object Herat should be quitted in the early part of October. It would be imprudent for an invader of India to rely entirely on Afghan neutrality or amity, and it is probable he would not advance from Herat until he had arranged by negociation or force for garrisoning certain towns to protect the lines of his communication with his base, which, if he had originally moved from Persia,

would be Herat, and, if a railway under his military control connected Samarcand and Kabool, would be Central Asia; or he might move two armies at the same time from both bases respectively, the Persian force moving on the Bolan *viâ* Candahar, the Central Asian force advancing on the Khybur by Samarcand and Kabool. It is possible that the Afghans would temporise with a European invader in possession of Herat, and in command of a large and highly disciplined army, and perhaps join him, in the hope of sharing the spoils of India. With the treachery habitual to the Afghan, they might prove unfaithful to him in the event of reverses. No prudent general, therefore, would move without a convention for the surrender of certain places, which he would fortify and garrison. For an invader moving on India by the Khybur alone, and guarding against the contingency of having his rear threatened from the Bolan, the following garrisons, it is believed, would be necessary.

Herat, 2000 men; Furrah, 1000; Girisht, 1000; Candahar, 10,000; Kelat-i-Ghitzie, 1000; Ghuznee, 1000; Kabool, 4000; Jellallabad, 2000; the Khybur, 8000; total, 30,000 men to protect and keep open the communications of the army of invasion outside the frontier of India.

The Khybur will then have to be forced, and the neutrality of its tribes purchased, or their alliance perhaps bought with promises of the plunder of

Hindostan. On the issue of a great battle between Peshawur and Attock probably depends the power of the invading army passing the Upper Indus, and the alliance or neutrality of some neighbouring power, such as Cashmere, which has been hitherto waiting and watching the struggle.

Attock secured, it is 220 miles from Lahore, and 270 miles from the Sutlej, and supposing it fell into the invader's hands in the early part of January, his probable position, successful hitherto, would stand thus.

He must, if possible, secure the full conquest of the Punjaub before the commencement of the hot season, that is, his armies should reach the line of the Sutlej river before the end of March at the latest, as after this period European armies cannot carry on field operations in the plains of India without much loss and suffering. To do this he had quitted Herat in the beginning of October. A few days are passed in fortifying the positions he has gained near Attock. Had he obtained by his successes and diplomacy the hearty co-operation of Afghanistan and Cashmere, a hasty advance on Lahore might be risked, but caution and the possible lukewarm sympathy of these states, which have been perhaps playing a waiting game, counsel the military occupation of the Upper Indus, of Kohat, and the Huzara before moving southward. Perhaps the frontier tribes eagerly join him, and this may hasten his advance, but if they are in-

tractable and interfere with his convoys through the Khybur, much time may be lost in securing his position north of Attock.

If our premises hold good, it may be assumed his plan of operations is this. In the middle or end of January, he will move from Attock in two or three great columns. The right or south column will skirt the Salt Range, protect that flank, and gain Jellalpore, one of the passages over the river Jhelum. The left or north column will march on Rawul Pindee and Jhelum, where the British army on its return from Afghanistan crossed by a ford in the month of December. The passage of the Jhelum would be contested, and probably decided by great battles fought in its vicinity. These would occur about the end of the month of January, as Jhelum is nine marches from Attock, which the invading armies are supposed to have quitted on the fifteenth of that month. The Chenab and the other rivers in the Punjaub would now be rising, and all haste would be used to reach the fords at Ramnug ur, and Goojerat, and in this neighbourhood, about the last day of January, might occur several general engagements, on the issue of which depends the possession of the country north of Lahore, which would be reached in five or six marches, or about the 7th of February.

Suppose the contest to be continued, and success to attend an invader, the month of February would probably elapse before the British troops evacuated

the Punjaub, which of course they would not do unless they had been over-matched and defeated by superior forces. Part would retire on Mooltan, and part on the strategic base before spoken of behind the Sutlej between Phillour, Loodiana, and Ferozepore. The importance of this quadrilateral, supposing these towns to be strongly fortified, and the Indian populations to remain even neutral in the contest, cannot be overrated. If the invader choose to advance and fight a great battle south of the Sutlej, he could only do so with the certainty that defeat might be possible destruction, as unless provided for by the construction of a great entrenched camp or safe fortified retreat, which would require much time to complete, there would be no secure base nearer than Attock for his army to retreat upon.* It is most probable that an invader after having achieved success as far as the line of the Sutlej, would employ what remained of the season for Indian field operations in securing the conquest and pushing his forces south to Mooltan, and endeavouring to capture that ancient stronghold, so as to join hands with another army which, it may be presumed, he would have moved through the Bolan pass, or the defiles in the mountains west of Dhera Ghazee Khan, if these on trial proved practicable of passage.

Dealing as we have been doing with probable elements of success and failure, we have imagined Asiatic Battles of Dorking, which it is to be hoped

* See Appendix, Note 4.

never will happen, and given the invader the advantages of a friendly alliance with Afghanistan and Cashmere, events, it is to be hoped, difficult of accomplishment. But, in the possible nearer approach of Russia to our Indian frontier with the advance of time, such contingencies cannot be overlooked, and if Russia be ever allowed to seize Herat, or some spot contiguous to Badukshan, it is ridiculous to suppose that the frontier states of India, their people and their rulers, would not begin to consider whether a time might not arrive when their interests might compel them to intrigue with the foreigner. The thing has occurred before, and will occur again. The earlier history of British supremacy in India lay in alliances with native states, and it is just possible an invading power would follow so excellent an example.

To sum up possible accidents of an invasion by the Khybur, to be successful 885 miles of communication have to be protected, a great pass forced or gained, and perhaps five great battles fought before the Punjaub was lost to the defenders of India.

Let us now suppose that the Bolan pass be selected for an invasion from Herat. The distances to be traversed will be as follows:

Herat, viâ Girisht to Candahar ..	300	miles, or	28	marches.
Candahar by the Bolan to Sukkur ..	393	„	34	„
Sukkur to Ferozepore	457	„	36	„
	1150	„	98	„

Allow, as before, a day's halt after a week's march, and the journey for infantry marching will take one hundred and twelve days, or four months within a week. This is, perhaps, a fair calculation, as the Bengal column of the army of the Indus in 1839 accomplished the journey from Dadur, the mouth of the Bolan pass, to Ferozepore in three months.

The task before the army advancing in this direction would be, first, to capture and fortify Candahar if it was not surrendered peacefully; next, to force the Bolan pass, and to occupy Sukkur and northern Scinde before moving up towards Ferozepore. The same difficulties and resistance which would be met with in the passes of the Khybur are not, it is presumed, to be experienced in this direction, though it would be necessary for an invader to endeavour to secure by force or negotiation the co-operation of the state of Khelat and of the frontier tribes, as if he had taken the more northern route into India. On the other hand, the features of the country, though advantageous for some purposes (as a march from Sukkur to Ferozepore turns the successive lines of defence offered by the Punjaub rivers to an invader from the north), present a great natural obstacle in the flat waterless tract just after emerging from the Bolan pass into India, and the notorious unhealthy climate of the valley of the Lower Indus. Probably few localities in India are so prejudicial to the European con-

stitution as Upper Scinde, and an European army could not, without great loss from sickness, be cantoned here after the month of March. The late General Havelock says: "The predatory tribes of the Bolan, or of the ranges of hills between them and Candahar, are not formidable enemies in their defiles, but the difficulties of the descent after passing the Bolan are to a large army, from the want of forage and water, appalling." He also points out there is no insurmountable obstacle to its passage by a large army in small detachments, during the cooler months, but after April the heat becomes too great for any troops to keep the field. Assuming an invader to form a bold resolution, and risk all these difficulties for securing an entry into India by Scinde, he probably would be obliged to post the following garrisons to protect his communications; at Herat, 2000 men; Furrah, 1000; Girisht, 1000; Candahar, 5000; Quetta and Shawl, 4000; Dadur, 2000; Jacobabad, 1000; Upper Scinde and Sukkur, 5000; total, 37,000 men, to secure his road to the Indus.

Under these conditions, quitting Herat on the 1st of October, he would reach Candahar on the 7th of November. Twelve marches distant is the Bolan pass, which, owing to local opposition, it is presumed he could not arrive at until the 25th of November. In 1839 a column of the Bengal army took six days to traverse this gateway of India, and as an invader would undoubtedly meet with re-

sistance, it is believed he could not reach the farthest extremity before the 6th of December. The Bolan is hardly a pass, but a succession of ravines and gorges, having a gradual descent from west to east, and not being inhabited by tribes as fierce or as numerous as those who have guarded from time immemorial the hills of the Khybur, no great difficulty would be experienced by a modern and well-appointed European army in forcing a passage, unless opposed, as most likely would happen, by British troops at Quetta. Dadur, the southern extremity of the Bolan defile, is ten marches from Sukkur, and it is probably here an invader would meet with his first supreme danger or disaster. But the pass is of great length, 66 miles, and in width narrows from 3 miles at the southern extremity to 150 feet at the northern end. If not obstructed in his progress at the narrowest portion of the defile and there repulsed, he is, on debouching from it into Scinde, liable to be attacked and crushed, and to fight in the critical position of his line of retreat being a narrow road; and, supposing him clear out of it with success, he would, in the face of a strong British force, be compelled to advance across the desert before mentioned, and which a British army moving into Afghanistan, unhindered by any opposition, could only cross in detachments with difficulty. When Shah Sooja's army, in 1834, moving into Afghanistan, crossed this tract, numbers died.

Unless, therefore, an invader possessed means of transporting water, forage, and supplies, or of sinking wells, the passage of this tract is well-nigh impossible; and even if he possessed all artificial means for feeding and alleviating the sufferings of his troops, any delay or successful opposition preventing him reaching it until the latter end of the month of March would be sufficient to debar the passage to an European hostile force entirely. In the coolest and most favourable season of the year, he could only hope for success by moving across in small detachments, a more dangerous operation than the passage of a wide river in the face of an enemy.

In all the history of war there could scarcely be a more difficult undertaking, and when an invader, still successful, moved on towards the Indus, his operations would be attended by no little difficulty, as the alluvial valley contains numerous canals, all unbridged, at this season part full, while in the cooler months, the best time for field operations, the effects of the annual inundation of the Indus, now subsiding, would compel his troops to confine their movements to the roads alone. It would probably be the end of the year before a successful advance on Sukkur could be completed, and before Upper Scinde was occupied by a force so situated as to be able to cross and march on Ferozepore, or move up the right bank of the Indus. Time would also be taken in fortifying and securing positions, and negociating with disaffected feudatories, though

in this respect no decided advantage is likely to be gained, as Scinde is isolated from the rest of India, and there are no important and neighbouring native states to afford material political aid. There is, as in the Punjaub, no great state lying on the border to treat with. The principalities of Rajpootana, Bikaneer, Jodpore, and Meywar, are divided from Scinde by a sandy desert, which no large army ever crossed, and they are too distant for purposes of attack or of negociation. No great route from Scinde lies across them to the heart of India, and an invader, after reaching Sukkur, would probably occupy the opposite bank, and direct his progress northward, to Mooltan or Ferozepore.

From Sukkur to Ferozepore is 457 miles, or 36 marches without a halt. It is intersected by canals, the bridges over which, it is supposed, would be destroyed on the approach of an enemy, and the railway torn up, to prevent his making any use of it. Over this route the progress of an invading army would be slow, as all the water-channels would have to be bridged for the passage of guns and stores. The road for the first 140 miles lies 15 to 25 miles off the Indus, and after this it continues within 5 miles of the Sutlej to Ferozepore. Unless, therefore, the invader first secured command of the navigation of the Indus and Sutlej, so as to move up his heavy guns and materials by water, and to protect either of his flanks according to the bank of the river he marched on, it is probable he

would not care to encounter the risk of an advance to the Punjaub between the Indus and the hills, or the Indus and the desert.

Let us assume the most favourable contingencies, and that a naval flotilla carrying his heavy guns and material guarded his flank, and he moved straight north and threatened Mooltan or Ferozepore. To do this he must have brought gunboats with him in his journey from Herat, or built them on the Indus at Sukkur. His columns probably would be obliged to halt every third or fourth day to allow of the flotilla keeping its position, with the obstructions and windings of the stream now at its lowest, and, quitting Roree on the 1st January, his vanguard would reach Ferozepore about the 18th February. But it would be necessary to mask or besiege Mooltan; and an alternative operation is the passage of the Sutlej near Bhawulpore, the investment of Mooltan, and an advance on Lahore, the capital of the Punjaub. Imagine this course to be adopted in preference to a march on Ferozepore. Mooltan is twenty-three marches from Sukkur, and Lahore 215 miles, or fourteen marches, from Mooltan. Giving an invader the benefits of any doubts of success, and most unparalleled good luck in forcing the passage of the Sutlej, and being detained a week before Mooltan, he could not arrive at Lahore until the 21st February, or, allowing for delays, until the latter end of the month.

Some observations on the respective advantages of the two invading routes into India may perhaps be here appropriate. It will be noticed that by the Bolan pass the Indus is 232 miles nearer to Herat than by the Khybur, and the defile is easier to overcome even if defended. But after its successful passage there is the barren tract from Dadur to Jacobabad, almost void of supplies and forage, which a large army could not cross except in detachments. In war an interposing river is sometimes considered to be actually an advantage to an invading army, as the defending one may be scattered along a very long line, whereas the assailant can mass suddenly at one point an overwhelming force against the defenders. But in this instance the passage is by one road, across a waste, and in the face of a well-equipped British army waiting for it at the other end. And even assuming its successful accomplishment, an invader would be compelled to carry or secure a naval flotilla to safely conduct his operations up the Indus valley, and unless he possessed the use of a railway through the Bolan pass, such a feat is impracticable. On the other hand, the operations after the passage of the Khybur involve no urgent and immediate command of the navigation of a great river, the great road to Delhi, which for centuries has been the passage of invaders, is secured; there is nothing but to push forward, no deserts lie across the path, and by this route the successful forcing and possession of the range of

defiles from Jellallabad to the Khybur by an army gives it an "entrée" into the rich, well-cultivated valley of Peshawur, which, from all time, has been, and always will be, a great place of arms for the armies which have conquered Hindostan. The distance from Herat, by either route, to Ferozepore, is very nearly the same, being 1200 miles by the Khybur, and 1150 by the Bolan.

Now about the difficulties of these two routes two equally great authorities differ. Sir Henry Rawlinson, in a recently published work, dismisses the idea of invasion from Kabool as almost chimerical. He says if a foreign army does descend on the Indian frontier, it will be by way of Herat and Candahar, where he avers the roads are open, and not through the sterile and difficult passes between Kabool and Peshawur. If we accept this dictum as correct, we are reduced to watch only the road by the Bolan, where, as has been shown, the late Sir Henry Havelock speaks of "*the difficulties of the desert after passing the Bolan to a large army as appalling;*" and, in face of a well-appointed army, as perhaps impracticable.

We submit that a summary of all which has been said respecting an invasion of India shows the feat to be unfeasible without the military possession or actual co-operation of Afghanistan, and the eventual construction of lines of railway to Kabool from Central Asia, and to Candahar and Quetta from the Caspian. Of the present routes for the

ingress of an army, both are stated to be very difficult, but that of the Khybur, after it has been once gained by force, negotiation or treachery, presents fewer natural obstacles; and who will not admit that the position of the Indus river, covered by mountains and deserts, is very strong?

To enable Russia to do all this, viz. to send two great armies through the Khybur and Bolan respectively, her resources must be gigantic, and her hold of the countries between Afghanistan and her own proper frontier very firm. Still, even with all these advantages, her line of operation would be very long; the passes are many. She would feel the effects of such a campaign and forward movement, and in such a poor country as Afghanistan, she would find a difficulty in feeding large bodies of men. All these difficulties would greatly increase as she prolonged her advance the farther from her line of railways. Various intermediate stations would have to be protected amidst a probable inimical population, stirred as it would probably be by British officers and British gold. With the whole of the Persian seaboard in the hands of England, the aid of Persia to a possible invader of India could be very lukewarm. He would, after leaving the borders of the Caspian or Central Asia, find no great husbanded stores of grain and provisions, (such as are met with in other countries), among the people of Persia and Afghanistan, as these are scanty, and the countries only produce sufficient for their own consumption.

An invader would be obliged to carry with him to the Indus all he wanted, from a load of forage to a pound of meat, grain or gunpowder. And if he, by one of those extraordinary strokes of strategy and administrative success, effected an ingress over the natural barriers of the Indian frontier, we have an excellent military position to meet him, and have nothing to fear from his advance as long as we are secure in the loyalty of the Indian states and people. It is only when India is discontented, or likely, as most probably will be the case, to regard with magnanimous indifference a struggle between two European nations for its possession, that England, for its own interests, may be forced to take up positions beyond the proper Indian frontier for purposes of defence, and abandon the policy of masterly inactivity for a more offensive part in Central Asian affairs.

APPENDIX.

NOTES.

NOTE 1.—*Roads old invaders followed into India.*

Mahmoud of Ghuznee made Balkh his capital; he invaded India nine times, but never came by the Bolan pass.

The Ghoree dynasty who succeeded to the empire conquered the Punjaub and Scinde, but there is no record of their invading route.

Jenghis Khan or Timour neither approached nor returned to Afghanistan by the Bolan pass.

The Emperor Baber passed by the Khybur pass on one occasion. The Emperor Akbar proceeded from Attok to Kabool by the Khybur once or twice, and his troops passed to and fro by other routes, but not by the Bolan.

Nadir Shah before he advanced from Persia into Afghanistan first secured Herat, and then after a considerable period besieged Candahar. He marched by Kabool to Jellallabad intending to proceed through the Khybur, but fearing some opposition, the pass was turned by another route in the mountain range, and he thus obtained an entrance into Hindostan.

NOTE 2.—Havelock's 'War in Afghanistan,' page 323.

"It is related that Timour joined his main force to the right wing of his army at Mooltan, and the vanguard of their united forces accomplished the capture of Bhutneer, by which line through the Western Desert, passing, it may be supposed, by Bhawulpore, they marched on Delhi."

NOTE 3.—On the question of what is the best boundary

for the British Empire in India, in page 235, Von Orlich's 'Travels in India,' an intelligent foreigner, Baron von Hugel, has noted a comparison of the line of the Indus with that of the Sutlej for purposes of defence. The broad tract of the Indian desert extends along the Indus and the Sutlej to Ferozepore, which makes it almost impossible for an army to pass through it. From the end of the desert and arid tract near Ferozepore to the Himalaya, the distance is not much more than 100 miles, and an army stationed behind the Sutlej can more easily move from one place to the other than can be effected by an enemy on the right bank, who cannot turn the position either through the Himalaya or the desert. Whatever may be the frontier of India, the great battle must be fought on the plain of Sirhind, where all the advantages are on the side of the defenders, and where a defeat exposes the invaders to the same destruction which awaits the former in case of their losing a battle on the Indus.

NOTE 4.—The placing of three or four great fortresses in the distance between the end of the desert near Ferozepore and the foot of the Himalayas would, for the reasons explained in note 3, bar the approach of an army from the Punjaub on the heart of India.

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PLAIN WORDS

ON

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PLAIN WORDS ON THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION.

THE POINT OF VIEW.

The policy which has been pursued in Egypt by Mr. Gladstone's Government has been criticised on various grounds, and by men of various ways of thinking. This is natural enough, for in addition to those whose loyalty to their party would have led them under any circumstances to find fault with the Ministry of the day there are, and always will be in England, a number of independent and conscientious men whose zeal for peace blinds them to the occasional necessity of vigorous action. It seems worth while to state, in a few plain words, the justification of our present attitude in Egypt, and the reasons which enable even a consistent advocate of peaceful methods to approve this act of intervention.

If we wish to take in the true aspects and bearings of any political event, the best thing we can do, to begin with, is to make sure that we are looking at it from the right point of view. No one can say whether a policy is good, and serviceable, and honourable, unless he will put himself in the place of those who are directing it, will see for a moment with their eyes, and form his conclusions on the evidence by which they were guided. Any clown has a right to expect this measure of justice from his judges: how much more, then, have our responsible Ministers, with the weight of an empire on their shoulders, with the lives and property of millions under their charge, and with the fear of public opinion and posterity constantly before them! Let us leave it to the unscrupulous and factious enemies of the Government to condemn them without evidence or argument; but at any rate no candid Englishman, whatever may be his ordinary standpoint, will decide without looking, or condemn without hearing.

Now, in order to get to the point of view in this instance we must take into account the whole course of the Egyptian Question,

so far as it has existed for Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet, from the beginning of their term of office to the present day. And it is not enough to ask what has been said and done in this business since the spring of 1880. We must also remember what had taken place before the General Election, when the late Government were in power, and when Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues were practically without a voice in the matter. It is indispensable that we should start from the earlier period, for the policy of every Government is decided in some measure by the Government which preceded it. No Minister, however powerful, can set out with the idea of reversing the acts and pledges of his predecessor. The new men must take the threads from the hands of the old men, and not wantonly snap a single clue unless the country has distinctly told them to do so. Party government would not be endured in England if it were not clearly understood that there was to be an unbroken continuity in regard to the general interests and engagements of the nation. For instance, when the Conservative Administration acquired the Canal shares in 1875, at a cost of something like four millions, Mr. Gladstone took reasonable exception, and mentioned several drawbacks to the bargain which have been illustrated by subsequent experience. But no one ever supposed that when he was placed at the head of affairs, even though the spirit of his foreign policy was in sharp contrast with the spirit of Lord Beaconsfield's policy, he would be able, or would attempt, to repudiate that questionable bargain.

As with one point, so with all. The Liberal Administration inherited the Egyptian policy of the Conservatives, and—so far as there was no imperative need to modify it—has loyally carried it out. The constituencies never explicitly disapproved this policy; and in the absence of disapproval the Government have been bound to assume their approval. This is the only rule by which the business of the country could be effectively performed; and a business-like people does not complain of its rulers for acting in a business-like way.

We must bear in mind, then, that on the accession to power of the Liberal Government in 1880 England possessed 176,602 shares in the Suez Canal, out of a total of 400,000. More than fourth-fifths of the shipping which passed through the Canal was English. Considerably more than one-half of the foreign trade of Egypt was done with Great Britain. English capital and enterprise were embarked in Egypt greatly in excess of those of

any other country. And—most important consideration of all—the Governments of England and France exercised a control over the administration of Egypt, conferred upon them by a decree of the Khedive (November 10, 1879), and operating under the sanction of the other European Powers for the undisputed benefit of the Egyptian people. We regulated their expenditure whilst making their Services more efficient; we took less money from the nation whilst paying more into the Treasury; we increased the welfare of the fellaheen whilst enabling them to meet their just obligations.

This is how the question stood in 1880; and from this point of view we may proceed to inquire how Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet has discharged its responsibilities. It was made answerable for the cause of order, good government, and national prosperity in Egypt. The Khedive highly appreciated our good offices; the taxpayers were already relieved from an intolerable burden; the country had exchanged bankruptcy and oppression for settled order under an International Tribunal. Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues took from their predecessors the conduct of this mission of civilisation. Let us see how the task has been performed.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

No one has denied credit to the late Government for its share in the origination of the Joint Control. In so far as that Control was beneficent and successful, Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet deserves that the fact should be recognised; but on the other hand it must be saddled with full responsibility for whatever vice or flaw may have been inherent in the institution. Now whether the Control was or was not the best instrument which could have been devised in 1879, no long time elapsed before ominous signs of disturbance began to manifest themselves in Egypt. The army was discontented, partly owing to real or imaginary grievances, and partly to secret intrigues. On September 9, 1881, this discontent (which had already displayed itself in a revolt in the preceding January) came to a head; an order from the Minister of War was disobeyed, and a number of regiments, with Colonel Arabi Bey as their spokesman, assembled in a public square at Cairo, and demanded from the Khedive the dismissal of his Ministry. From that moment, as all who knew the country perceived, Egypt was virtually under military domination. The Khedive was powerless in presence of the

overbearing troops; the work of the Control was paralysed by this displacement of authority; and the Europeans began to entertain serious doubts as to their safety. It was clear that Moslem fanaticism was at work to disturb the arrangement which had been so deliberately concluded, not only by the European Powers and by the Sultan, who had deposed the former Khedive at the demand of England and France, but also by the rulers and people of Egypt. Animosity towards the Europeans was one of the chief incitements made use of by the leaders of the revolt; and it may be at once admitted, without the slightest reserve, that if the Egyptian people as a whole could have been shewn to be strongly adverse to the Control, and anxious and able to rule the country for themselves, it would have been incumbent on the Powers—on no Power more incumbent than on England—to apply in their case the great principles of national independence which are now classed amongst the primary rights of humanity.

How, then, did the British Government act in this emergency? As soon as the news of the military demonstration reached England, Mr. Malet, our Consul-General at Cairo, who was absent on leave, was ordered to return to his post, and report fully upon the situation of affairs (September 10). Meanwhile, on the same day, Lord Granville entered into a discussion with the French Government; and both he and M. St. Hilaire dwelt at the outset on the importance of maintaining an attitude of a "pacifying and calming" character in Egypt, and of continuing the joint action of the two Governments on a basis (as the French Minister expressed it) of perfect frankness. But there was already a certain divergence of opinion between London and Paris, arising out of the reluctance of the French Government to sanction any kind of intervention by the Sultan in Egypt, even though this intervention should be limited to the despatch of a Turkish general. The English Government preferred this mode of dealing with the crisis—first because the Khedive had pledged himself to refer the grievances of the army to his sovereign, and next because the step seemed to present less difficulty than any other alternative, but chiefly, and above all, because we are pledged and bound to observe the Sultan's rights so long as he has done nothing to forfeit them.

The crisis at Cairo was somewhat relieved by the convocation of the Chamber of Notables, who, under a prudent Minister

(Cherif Pasha) and a moderate President (Sultan Pasha), leaned to the authority of the Khedive rather than to the influence of the military party—thereby greatly weakening the force of Arabi's contention that he was the champion of popular freedom. But another serious complication now revealed itself at Constantinople. The Sultan had found an opportunity of asserting, perhaps of extending his suzerain rights in Egypt, and he was not likely to neglect it. Proceeding upon the reference made to him by the Khedive, he began to consider with his Ministers the manner in which his intervention might be most advantageously carried into effect. There was even some talk of a despatch of troops; but the objections to this course were found to be no less grave on the part of the Egyptian Ministry than on the part of the two Western Governments. The Porte therefore abandoned the design as a "present intention," but announced (September 20) its resolution to send an emissary to Cairo.

Now, as the Sultan had already stated to Lord Dufferin his opinion that the Egyptian incident was closed, and as affairs in Cairo had for the moment been amicably settled, the English and French Cabinets foresaw that the despatch of a Turkish emissary to Egypt would do more harm than good; and they tried to dissuade the Sultan from taking such a step. The fact is that the two Powers—or at any rate their accredited agents and representatives—had seen good reason to conclude that the Egyptian trouble was created and fostered by external intrigues, and they could not but view with alarm the prospect of direct Turkish intervention in a country to which complete autonomy had been granted by the Sultan and his predecessor on the throne. It was their aim to maintain the *status quo*, by which they understood the autonomy of Egypt, the authority of Tewfik, the security of the Suez Canal, and the administration of the European Control —an institution which had been founded by the desire, or under the sanction of all concerned, including the Sultan, the Khedive, the Khedive's Ministers, and the Notables.

The Sultan, however, was obdurate. On the 3rd of October he sent to Cairo Ali Nizami Pasha and Fuad Bey. The English and French Governments formally expressed to the Porte their regret and surprise at this unnecessary step, and urged the Sultan's Government "to shorten as much as possible the stay of the Turkish Envoys in Egypt." There is a passage in a despatch from Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, dated October 4, which

concisely, and with much significance, states the policy of the English Government in regard to the questions thus far brought into prominence. Lord Granville is placing on record an interview which he had had at the Foreign Office with Musurus Pasha, who called to announce the Sultan's decision as to the mission to the Khedive. The last paragraph of this despatch is in the following terms:—

"In reply to some observations which Musurus Pasha made as to the necessity of the Sultan maintaining his authority as a Sovereign, I told him that I had no hesitation in explaining to him our policy. We were desirous, I said, of acting in cordial co-operation with France on Egyptian questions. Whatever rumours or impressions might exist, we had no desire to take any steps towards an English occupation or annexation of the country; still less did we wish to see it occupied or annexed by any other Power. We were anxious to maintain the present *status quo*, and to uphold the Sultan's rights; but we should object to any attempt to extend those rights, or to use them for the purpose of diminishing the autonomy of Egypt, and interfering in its internal administration."

The Governments were not content with making protests which did not reach the people of Egypt, and had no immediate effect upon the intriguers. The natural sequel of the determination to maintain the *status quo* was the making of a counter-demonstration, of such a kind as to impress upon the Sultan and the malcontents alike the firm intention of England and France to abide by their plighted word. This was no less necessary in the interests of the Egyptian people and Government as against Turkey than it was in the interests of Europe in Egypt. On the 5th of October Lord Granville proposed to M. St. Hilaire that the Agents of the two countries at Cairo should jointly advise the Khedive to receive the Turkish Envoys with respect, but "firmly to oppose any interference on their part in the internal administration of Egypt." This was accordingly done, and three days later Sir E. Malet and M. Sienkiewicz made the following verbal communication to the Khedive and Cherif Pasha:—

"We have received the instructions of our Governments to assist the Government of His Highness the Khedive in maintaining the independence of Egypt, as it is established under the firmans of the Sultan, and we are desired to use our good offices in case of need to restrain any attempt on the part of the Envoys of the Sultan to control the action of the Ministry in its present endeavour to re-establish confidence in the country and discipline in the army."

Meanwhile the Governments were subjected to pressure by their subjects resident in Egypt, who had taken alarm at the disturbance of affairs at Cairo and Alexandria. As early as

September 25, Sir E. Malet had written to inform Lord Granville that there was "a considerable panic" amongst the foreign population of Egypt, "arising not so much from the expectation that the movement would turn against foreigners as from the sense of helplessness on their part if it did." And our Agent recommended on this ground that one of Her Majesty's ships should be stationed at Alexandria during the winter. Lord Granville received this despatch on October 3, and deemed it his duty to carry out the recommendation. He communicated his view to the French Government; and the result was that an English and a French vessel were ordered to proceed to Alexandria without delay, for the express purpose of serving "as refuges in case of disturbances, and in order to prevent any panic arising amongst the foreign population." The Porte demurred to this step, and Lord Granville instructed our Ambassador at Constantinople to say that the withdrawal of the Turkish Envoys from Cairo would imply the termination of the incident, and would be naturally followed by the withdrawal of the ships. There can be no doubt that this naval demonstration on a small scale hastened the departure of the Envoys (October 19); and it is noteworthy that the Egyptian Ministers and the Khedive expressed to Sir E. Malet their great relief at the withdrawal of the Sultan's emissaries, whose visit was stated to have "caused general uneasiness in the country."

It would be difficult for any critic of the English Government to point out a flaw in the action of our Foreign Office during the progress of the events already recorded. A valuable commentary on this action is to be found in certain remarks made by Arabi Bey to Mr. Colvin just a fortnight after the departure of the Turkish Envoys from Cairo. Arabi "disclaimed all hostility to foreigners, saying that what the Egyptians knew of liberty, and much that they had gained of it, was due to foreigners." He declared his object to be "to do away for ever with the arbitrary government of the Turkish Pashas, under which no man knew what the next day had in store for him." If later experience seems to show that Arabi was not very sincere in paying these compliments, yet his words probably reflected with accuracy the opinion of the day in Egypt, so far as the better classes of the population were concerned. But there was still a good deal of misconception in the popular mind with regard to the policy of the English Government; and it was in the hope of effacing this impression that Lord Granville

wrote an important despatch to Sir E. Malet on the 4th of November. Two passages from this document are especially worth notice, as showing how entirely the Government were in harmony with the prevailing tone of English public opinion.

"We have on all occasions pressed upon the Government of the Khedive the adoption of such measures as we deemed likely to raise the people from a state of subjection and oppression to one of ease and security. The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support, and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers-General. . . . It would seem hardly necessary to enlarge upon our desire to maintain Egypt in the enjoyment of the measure of administrative independence which has been secured to her by the Sultan's firmans. The Government of England would run counter to the most cherished traditions of the national history were it to entertain a desire to diminish that liberty or to tamper with the institutions to which it has given birth. It would not be difficult, if it were necessary, to show by reference to recent events that this Government should be safe from the suspicions which, as you inform me, exist in Egypt with regard to our intentions on this head. On the other hand, the tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is, in our conviction, a valuable safeguard against foreign intervention. Were it to be broken, Egypt might, at no very distant future, find herself exposed to danger from rival ambitions. It is, therefore, our aim to maintain this tie as it at present exists."

Such are the ideas which have actuated the policy of the English Government in Egypt, and which, we have every reason to believe, are held as firmly and unequivocally to-day as they were held nine months ago. Let candid men set these words of Lord Granville's against the easy accusations of those who declare that the interests of the bondholders have been the motive power of the Foreign Office and the Cabinet.

It was soon perceived that nothing like a definite solution of the problem had been arrived at. Intriguers were still actively at work; certain of the native papers printed inflammatory articles against the Europeans; and in the course of December the military party brought on a direct conflict between the Chamber of Notables and the Control by pressing for a large addition to the War Budget. The situation of affairs became more serious than ever; and M. Gambetta, who had succeeded M. St. Hilaire in office, invited the English Government to consult with his own as to the course which it might be necessary for the two countries to adopt. At the same time he emphatically declared (to Lord Lyons, December 15) that "any interposition on the part of the Porte was, in his opinion, wholly inadmissible." Lord Granville agreed with M. Gambetta that it was incumbent on England and France to take measures to strengthen the position of

the Khedive and his Government against the military party; and the result of this agreement was the presentation to the Khedive of a Joint Note, declaring that his maintenance on the throne was considered by the two Powers to be "alone able to guarantee for the present and the future good order and general prosperity in Egypt." The Governments did not doubt "that the assurance publicly given of their formal intention in this respect would tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them." This Note was presented on January 8. Three days before its presentation, Arabi Bey had been appointed Under-Secretary of State for War.

It is manifest that the Anglo-French Note distinctly carried forward the policy of the Governments in the Egyptian Question, at all events so far as their formal and explicit pledges were concerned. Though the advance may have been due in some measure to the urgency of M. Gambetta, it was fully justified and indeed necessitated by the rapid aggravation of the state of affairs in Egypt. The Turkish Government having once more protested, Lord Granville wrote to Lord Dufferin a despatch (February 2nd), the substance of which was to be communicated to the Porte, adhering to and confirming the Joint Note, and pointing out that the two Governments were "specially interested" in the threatened international arrangements, "in virtue of the decrees of the Khedive negotiated by and with them alone, . . . but to which the other Powers of Europe have also become parties."

It must be admitted by all who condemn the Government, whether for going too far or for not going far enough, that the gradual advance in their Egyptian policy up to this point had been made by a succession of diplomatically correct steps, taken with constant reference to the best sentiments of the English people, and in scrupulous discharge of the responsibilities which had been thrown on them. Their task had already been arduous; it was now for some months to become more arduous still. There was, as we have seen, a divergence of views on a most important point between the English and French Governments—the latter objecting strongly to the employment of Turkey in quelling the Egyptian disturbance, and the former just as strongly adhering to the plan. As Lord Granville contended in a despatch dated January 30, a Turkish occupation of Egypt would no doubt be a

great evil, but it would not entail political dangers so great as those attending the other suggested plans—those of a sole English, a sole French, and a joint Anglo-French occupation. In this same despatch—a most valuable testimony to the correctness of the attitude taken up by the English Government—Lord Granville submitted for the consideration of the French Government whether it would not be desirable to enter into communication with the other Powers as to the best mode of dealing with a state of things which appeared likely to interfere with the international engagements of Egypt.

This plain suggestion of a Conference was followed by a distinct proposal on February 6, by which time the De Freycinet Ministry had come into power. M. de Freycinet was the third French Minister with whom our Foreign Office had had to confer during the five months in which the crisis had been most acute; and it may be readily understood that their difficulties had been increased by this circumstance. The divergence above mentioned appeared to grow wider with each change in the political situation at Paris Not only did the French Government think Turkish intervention to be the most, whilst the English Government thought it to be the least, objectionable of the possible alternatives, but M. de Freycinet's Cabinet frankly declined a proposal of Lord Granville's to send to Cairo a mission consisting of a Turkish, a French, and an English general, which, as our Foreign Minister thought possible, might have produced a great moral effect in Egypt, even if it did not succeed in finally allaying the disturbance. Nor was this the last of the French reservations. It was France who objected to the co-operation of the Powers in the subsequent despatch of vessels to Alexandria; and at the critical moment, when words needed to be translated into action, France calmly withdrew her ironclads from the Egyptian waters, and left England to bear an undivided responsibility.

The time was now at hand when the Egyptian disturbance was to come to a head, and when the perfect accord of the two countries which M. St. Hilaire had so earnestly recommended was more than ever (from the original French point of view) desirable. Arabi's ambition was restless and overweening. Step by step he had imposed his will on the Khedive. He had procured, by military terrorism, the virtual dismissal of Cherif Pasha's Ministry, the appointment of another in which he himself held office as Minister of War and Marine, and the adoption of a

law hitherto opposed by the Khedive and Cherif, submitting the whole Budget to the Chamber of Notables in violation of existing international engagements. He had obtained his own nomination as pasha, and the promotion of a large number of officers without examination or test of any kind, at a very heavy cost to the strained resources of the country. He and his friends on more than one occasion had spoken publicly of the danger threatening the Europeans in Egypt, and of the necessity of "preparing for self-defence." And at length he threw down his glove of defiance in a manner which left no doubt that he meditated the speedy consummation of his plans. In the month of April a plot was alleged to have been discovered against the life of Arabi Pasha, and within a few days some fifty officers, known to be more or less loyal to the Khedive, were arrested and thrown into prison. They were tried by court-martial, without the benefit of counsel, and forty of them were convicted, and sentenced to be banished for life to the region of the White Nile—a sentence regarded by Egyptians as equivalent to one of death. According to some persons the prisoners were subjected to torture in order to extort confession; but even if it had been so (and it was strenuously denied), the Khedive and his advisers failed to see that the offence had been proved; and in the result Tewfik Pasha commuted the sentence to simple banishment from Egypt. Enraged at this defeat, the Ministry illegally convoked the Chamber of Notables, with the intention, as Sir E. Malet believed, of pronouncing the deposition of the Khedive. But the Chamber stood aloof from the military despotism, and refused to hold a sitting (May 14). In the meantime the President of the Council had called upon the Khedive, demanding that the condemned officers should be struck off the rolls of the army; and on the refusal of the Khedive to alter his decision, Mahmoud Samy "had threatened him, had spoken slightingly of any assistance he could receive from the foreign representatives, and had remarked that if he persisted in his refusal *there would be a general massacre of foreigners*."

This was on May 9; and the Khedive was so much impressed by the menaces of the President that he summoned the representatives of the Powers to his palace, and informed them of what had taken place. The reader will observe that the threatened massacre began at Alexandria just a month later.

It was on the receipt of telegrams from their Agents at Cairo,

reporting this information, that Lord Granville and M. de Freycinet, by a common impulse, telegraphed to each other on the same day a suggestion that an equal number of English and French ironclads should be sent to Alexandria. The representatives of the two Powers concurred in advising their Governments that the after-assurances of the Egyptian Ministry could not be relied upon. Both recommended the despatch of the combined squadron, Sir E. Malet writing that the political advantage of such a step was "so great as to override the danger which it might possibly cause to Europeans in Cairo." The vessels were therefore despatched, and they arrived at Alexandria on the 20th of May.

Now, this point is worthy of close attention, for it is the pivot on which the whole matter turns. If the vessels were rightly and regularly in the waters of Alexandria, all the lamentable events which have followed, from that time to the present, have been inevitable so far as the English Government are involved. There will be little question amongst Englishmen as to the propriety of Admiral Seymour's conduct in the most difficult and responsible position in which he was placed. And he acted not merely with excellent judgment on his own part, but under the constant direction of the Home Government. The despatches which have been printed and presented to Parliament contain a precise record of all that transpired after the ironclads went to Alexandria; and this record is a record of diplomatic ability, of transparent disinterestedness, of administrative efficiency, of spirited action, whereof the nation may be reasonably proud. Lord Granville has stated, in what is certainly one of the most able State papers ever penned (to Lord Dufferin, July 11, 1882), that the Government look upon the action of the fleet as "no more than a matter of simple and legitimate self-defence." Hateful as any act of war unquestionably is—more and more hateful to humanity as the years advance—and dire as the consequences of the rupture are already proved to be, we may rest assured that history will fully endorse the opinion here expressed.

When the joint squadron was sent to Alexandria the Agents at Cairo were instructed to impress upon the Egyptian Government that England and France intervened solely in order to maintain the *status quo*. They were to advise the Khedive to call for the resignation of Mahmoud Samy's Ministry, and at the same time to assure Arabi and his friends that, if they resigned, their persons,

property, and rank would be respected. The President of the Chamber himself, on behalf of the Notables, had already demanded the resignation of the Ministers; but they responded to this demand by pushing forward the military preparations, by encouraging fanatical animosity against the foreigners, and by telling their adherents that the Powers would never send troops, and that the Porte would not dream of interfering. Lord Granville then urged the French Government more emphatically than before to consent to the employment of Turkish troops; but M. de Freycinet's Cabinet declared that nothing could justify such a step. It was at this moment that the Agents at Cairo presented their Note demanding the retirement of the Ministry, and adding that if necessary they would insist on the acceptance of the conditions which were offered to Arabi and his colleagues. Thereupon the latter resigned office; but shortly afterwards the officers of the rebellious regiments, and of the police force at Alexandria, telegraphed to the Khedive refusing to permit the resignation, and declaring that if His Highness did not re-instate Arabi Pasha within twelve hours they would not be answerable for public tranquillity.

It was now manifest—or it is manifest in the light of subsequent events—that the military faction would not be overcome without the use of force. Arabi threw off his mask, and openly endeavoured to secure the deposition of the Khedive. Tewfik Pasha acted with much dignity and courage, resisting even the threat of instant death; but when the soldiers menaced not only himself but his friends, and worked upon his mind through the fears of the Notables and the foreigners, he at last gave way, and recalled Arabi to his service.

The English and French Governments could not, of course, accept this rebuff. They doubled the number of their vessels at Alexandria, and suggested that the Porte should send a ship and a Commissioner, at the same time issuing invitations to the Powers for an immediate Conference. Arabi, meanwhile, was busy in raising earthworks abreast of the English ships; and there is little doubt that he was personally responsible, in greater or less degree, for the massacre of Europeans on the 11th of June. The absolutely intolerable character of the situation was now enforced by the fact that neither the Khedive nor Dervisch Pasha could be answerable for the prevention of further massacres, and that they were constrained to have recourse to

Arabi's influence in order to guarantee the public safety. When in spite of the arrangement thus made, in spite of the presence of the Sultan's Commissioner, in spite of the meeting of the Conference, and in spite of their own repeated promises, the Egyptian army persisted in raising their earthworks and pointing their guns at the English vessels, Sir Beauchamp Seymour had no possible course open to him except that which he actually took on the 11th of July.

The main consideration, however, with which we are at present concerned, and the main consideration which it behoves any critic of Mr. Gladstone's Government to take into account, is whether the policy of England, up to and including the despatch of the fleet, rests on a solid basis of justification. The foregoing pages have set forth the principal facts of the case in a concise and authentic form, and other facts not specifically referred to will be within the recollection of the reader. Let it be borne in mind that England (in conjunction with France) was the accredited guardian of vast international interests in Egypt, that she stood in the van on behalf of civilisation, commerce, and consecrated rights. Let it be borne in mind that the English Government is a Government devoted to the cause of peace and progress, that it has laboured incessantly to solve this problem by peaceful methods, that its existence is staked on its sincerity in this respect, and that it has in no single instance taken an aggressive step outside the pale of the community of nations. Let it be remembered that Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet has faithfully performed a task handed on to it by the late Government, that it has loyally and consistently observed its engagements with France, that it has anxiously sought the counsel and co-operation of the Great Powers (as it was bound to do by solemn Treaty obligations), that it has studiously endeavoured to employ the sovereign power of Turkey in dealing with the affairs of her vassal, and that it has boldly, with a vigour born of conscious rectitude, taken upon itself the performance of a duty none the less imperative because it may be left to perform it single-handed.

The position of the Government resulting from its action in Egypt is described by Lord Granville in his last-quoted despatch, and it is fair to repeat this description in his own words :—

"The record of events in Egypt during the last few months shows that the whole administrative power has fallen into the hands of certain military chiefs, devoid of political experience or knowledge, who with the support of the soldiery have set at naught the constituted authorities, and insisted on

compliance with their demands. Such a condition of affairs cannot fail to be disastrous to the welfare of any civilised country. . . . Her Majesty's Government now see no alternative but a recourse to force to put an end to a state of affairs which has become intolerable. In their opinion it would be most convenient, and most in accordance with the general principles of international law and usage, that the force to be so employed should be that of the sovereign Power. If this method of procedure should prove impracticable in consequence of unwillingness on the part of the Sultan, it will become necessary to devise other measures. Her Majesty's Government continue to hold the view expressed in their Circular of the 11th of February, that any intervention in Egypt should represent the united action and authority of Europe. They have, in fact, no interests or objects in regard to Egypt which are inconsistent with those of Europe in general, nor any interests which are inconsistent with those of the Egyptian people. Their desire is that the navigation of the Suez Canal should be maintained open and unrestricted, that Egypt should be well and quietly governed, free from predominating influence on the part of any single Power, that international engagements shall be observed, and that those British commercial and industrial interests which have been so largely developed in Egypt shall receive due protection, and shall not be exposed to outrage—a principle which is not applicable only in Egypt, but is essential for our national interests in all parts of the world."

CONCLUSIONS.

The criticisms and the reproaches which have been brought against the Government of Mr. Gladstone within the past few weeks have proceeded from two sides—from its friends amongst the party consistently adverse to warlike measures of any kind, and from its open enemies. The Conservative Opposition and the Conservative Press do not, of course, blame the war as war, or the action as evidence of militant activity. Judging from their public expressions, they rather like the war, and they make the usual becoming professions of readiness to extend to the Government a loyal support. But that which they give with the right hand they take away with the left. The support which they have hitherto accorded to Ministers is scarcely appreciable. We should at any rate be better able to appreciate it if it had taken the form of checking undue loquacity in Parliament, which has undoubtedly tended to weaken the hands of the Government in dealing with the Egyptian difficulty. To fair criticism, indeed, no one can reasonably take exception. Fair criticism aids instead of impeding a Government, and promotes instead of hurting the national interests. The speeches of Ministers during the debate on the Vote of Credit, and the statements of the Foreign Secretary and Under-Foreign Secretary on various occasions, have successfully encountered the charges brought against the Government policy in either House of Parliament.

That the Cabinet or the Foreign Office has departed from the

principles on which the Control was originally established, and so mismanaged the relations between England and Egypt as to bring us needlessly into the present embroilment—that the Government have been inconsistent in their conduct, either towards the Egyptians, or towards the Porte, or towards France, or towards the other Powers—that they did not sooner adopt measures of stern repression against Arabi and his party—that they have violated their pledge of disinterestedness by taking sole action during the sitting of the Conference—that they did not foresee the destruction of Alexandria, and send a force to land as soon as the guns had done their work—that they have not long since put an expedition on shore, and swept the Egyptians into the Red Sea—these and twenty other charges, more or less incoherent with each other, have been answered where they were made, and fall to the ground when examined by the light of recorded facts.

But on the other side there are the objections and arguments of those who desire above all things that in our foreign relations we may be governed on the principles of international concord and contract, that we may observe a rule of strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and that the age of war may be superseded by the age of peace and arbitration. There can be no doubt that some of these persons—who are found for the most part in the ranks of the Liberal party—received a great shock when they heard that the Government of Mr. Gladstone had become involved in actual hostilities with the people of another country, and that British ironclads had bombarded the forts of Alexandria. But although a few men of influence in that section of politicians have blamed Ministers from their special point of view, and though the most prominent of them all has deemed it his duty to retire from the Cabinet rather than sanction the policy of his colleagues, it would appear that a large majority of the "internationalists," and many even of those who are specially distinguished as the Peace Party, have been able to see the question as Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville have described it, and have recognised that the action of the Government has been dominated by motives of self-defence. The Egyptian difficulty in its present aspect, as the Premier contended when asking the House of Commons for money, lies outside the general question of non-intervention.

"Circumstances have happened from the direct consequences of which we cannot escape, which we are bound to take into account, and which the

Government have found to be imperatively regulative of their conduct. The question—What have we to do with the internal affairs of Egypt? if it were to be asked at all, ought to have been asked earlier. We have entered into relations with Egypt; we have undertaken some of the most important functions of government in Egypt by international engagements, and it is not free to you with honour, after once entering into such relations, to say that you will regard those engagements as if they had never been contracted, and will fall back upon your doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign country."

This, no doubt, is the gist of the answer which must be made to the uncompromising advocates of peace. They should not forget that England was in Egypt as the guardian, the sole and single guardian, of that very blessing of peace which they prize beyond all others; and if their rejoinder to this be that England ought not to have been placed in that position—for certainly they will not contend that, being a guardian, she ought to have betrayed her trust—then Mr. Gladstone supplies us with the fit and sufficient commentary, that the objection should have been taken earlier. No one who assented to the placing of his country in such a position as that which England has occupied for six years past is entitled to cast one word of reproach upon the Liberal Cabinet.

Of one fallacy which is urged against the Government by their critics—that England is crushing a national movement in Egypt—we ought not to hear another word after the conclusive speech of Sir Charles Dilke on the 26th of July. The industrious part of the Egyptian population, the officials and the merchants, the chief taxpayers and the representatives of the villages in the Chamber of Notables—these are the conductors of the true national movement in Egypt, and not Arabi, "the ordinary military adventurer of the East," whose action has compromised and endangered the best interests of his country. Now, as Sir Charles Dilke says, it is at once the profit and the desire of the Liberal Government to support the Chamber and the National party.

"It is our honourable duty to be true to our own principles of free institutions; but there is a wide difference between such favour towards national feeling and the support of military adventurers, prætorian guards, and pronunciamientos. Our sympathy will be with a liberal-minded ruler, with a liberal-minded Minister by his side, acting in concert with a body of Notables who, on the whole, have shown much patriotism and courage, rather than with a desperate adventurer who during his possession of power used that power only to promote officers in ridiculously undue proportion, to enormously raise their pay at the expense of their fellow-countrymen, to allow of the robbery of the public purse by his personal military supporters, and to arbitrarily imprison, exile, or degrade all who showed any independence of character."

And as for policy, apart from mere sympathy, Sir Charles Dilke adds with much truth :—

"If it is ever legitimate to use the police force of the European Concert, it is legitimate, and indeed inevitable, in the case of Egypt. . . . Radicals as extreme as any, sound upon all English questions, have never supported the doctrine of non-intervention in all circumstances. . . . How can English Radicalism be ever popular or ever strong if it invariably attacks all national action under circumstances in which it would approve the national action of foreign States?"

What England has done is to discharge herself faithfully of a national and international trust; and by the efficient performance of this duty she has drawn upon herself the wanton attack of an ambitious military adventurer. The Ministers who have supported our dignity and honour in the past, and who are prepared to lead us with spirit through the difficulties of the future, need not hesitate to leave their justification to the opinion of the constituencies and to the calm arbitrament of history.

ENGLAND

AND THE

EGYPTIAN CRISIS.

BY

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PREFACE.

THE position of England in regard to the Egyptian question has become one of such vast importance to English interests that it behoves us to seek not only to arrive at what the probable consequences may be as regards England, but to make the whole question so clear that the most uninitiated may be enabled to comprehend that which to many minds at the present time presents a perfect chaos.

We shall therefore endeavour to lay before our readers a clear statement of the exact position which England occupies in this all-absorbing subject, in the hope that the time spent in the perusal of this little work will not be altogether lost, and that they will thereby be enabled to grasp the knotty question which again threatens to disturb the peace of Europe, and which presents innumerable difficulties to the Government of England at this moment, and which ought to secure for it the undivided support of all men who have the welfare of England at heart.

ENGLAND

AND THE

EGYPTIAN CRISIS.

We are writing with the purpose of endeavouring to lay before those of our readers, who perhaps have not had time to study this matter sufficiently, as clearly as possible the exact position of affairs, so that they may be enabled to follow the question through whatever stages it may ultimately assume, with the caution that it is unwise to judge the actions of a Government hastily, because we may not at the moment be able to comprehend all the minute details of such a momentous question as that now before us, inasmuch as there may be difficulties arise and interests become involved at every step which may not be known to the public at large and which it might be injudicious on the part of a Government to disclose until a final settlement of the question be effected.

The position of England in regard to Egypt, then, is, as we shall endeavour to show, one which requires all the tact and experience which can be brought to bear upon it, because of the many interests which are involved besides those of England, and the need that exists for paying deference to the just claims of others, whilst at the same time taking great care that our own shall not suffer thereby.

It is not necessary to comprehend the present state of affairs in Egypt to date our remarks further back than the deposition of the late Khedive, Ismail Pasha, which occurred some four years ago, the cause of his deposition being his efforts to resist the wills of England and France.

This Khedive had through his fearful extravagances plunged the country into an almost inextricable sea of debt, which rendered the State bankrupt to all intents and purposes, and as the greater portion of the money which he had borrowed had been principally obtained from England and France, it was deemed necessary that certain steps should be taken to secure the fulfilment of the obligations which he

had entered into between these two countries for the repayment of the same, and to curtail the enormous expenditure which had placed Egypt in this humiliating position.

It was at this time arranged, with the consent of the European Powers, that France and England should take the management of the finances of the country in hand. They consequently appointed two Commissioners, one English and the other French, who were invested with full power to take under their management the whole of the public revenues of Egypt, and in fact prevent Ismail Pasha from having any power whatever in their disbursement.

The Khedive, of course, was allowed a sufficient sum to support the dignified (we had almost said the undignified) position which he held ; but neither he nor any of his Ministers had any control whatever over the nation's purse. Officers were appointed by the representatives of England and France to collect all moneys due to the State, so that the whole revenues of the country should pass through their hands. Of course, it was an arduous task, and it was necessary that the greatest economy should be used, so that the engagements which had been entered into by the Khedive should be as far as possible met.

Thus it was that the government of the country virtually fell into the hands of the Commissioners, who had to limit the cost of administration, in the shape of fixing the salaries of the officials, the number of the army, and in fact the whole fiscal machinery of the country.

It could not be supposed that Ismail Pasha would look complacently on whilst the government of the country was thus passing out of his grasp, for, although he had his Ministers to consult with and other insignias of his sovereign power, neither he nor they had any voice whatever in the distribution of the finances of the country, and had practically little voice in its government.

As might naturally be supposed, to one who had been accustomed to rule as Ismail Pasha had done, he found the yoke unbearable, and took an early opportunity of trying to regain the freedom which through his own folly he had lost ; but France and England immediately made application to the Sultan of Turkey for his deposition. Abdul Hamid, who was in no wise displeased at this appeal, which acknowledged his suzerainty over Egypt, by the Western Powers, placed the son of Ismail Pasha in the position which his father had recently held ; and it was distinctly laid down at that time that his will must be in all those matters which affected the working, at least, of the financial departments of the country subservient to that of England and France.

This, then, had become the position in which Egypt was placed in regard to the Western Powers. The Khedive, it was understood,

accepted the position which he holds, under that of England and France, being fully aware of the relative positions of these countries to Egypt ; and whilst the government of that country was nominally carried on by the Khedive and his Ministers, it was actually carried on by the joint representatives of the Western Powers.

Had this state of things existed Egypt would undoubtedly have regained in course of time a degree of prosperity which would have enabled her to recover the position she lost through the recklessness of the late Khedive Ismail Pasha.

But what has been the results ? We find that a certain number of the Egyptians who formed the Khedive's Ministry have, either from intrigues which have not yet come to light or from a sense of the burden which had been imposed upon their country through the policy of the late Khedive, rebelled against this authority, and seek to form a Constitution which would again give them control over the nation's purse and throw off the fetters which gall them.

This spirit of rebellion against the established powers culminated some eight months ago in something like open defiance of whatever authority was left in the Khedive's hands, and the Minister of War, Arabi Pasha, became a leading personage in this new phase of things, threatening to upset the *status quo*, which seemed so likely to bring back a return of prosperity to the country, and produced that which at the present time has resulted in anarchy.

It seems plain that this chief, Arabi Pasha, has been playing a deep game for some time previous to the open resistance to authority which he declared and which became so apparent eight months ago ; that it seems almost absurd to suppose that he could have done so without being backed up by some other authority than that of his own and the Ministers who went with him in thus defying the existing authority ; and this doubt—if there could be a doubt about the matter—tended in a great degree to complicate matters and increase the difficulties which the Government of England had to contend against.

As England had no right to take the affairs of Egypt entirely in her own hands, the existing state of affairs in the country, previous to the rebellion of Arabi Pasha, having been decided by an European convention, it was deemed right that we should consult France in the matter, her interests being very great in the maintenance of the *status quo* in Egypt ; and the result of the communication which was then opened up ended for the time being in sending a Joint Note to the Khedive—who still retained, nominally at least, all the power which had been granted him by the European convention—expressing a determination to support him in the position in which he was placed.

That there has been some degree of hesitation in taking effective

measures to curb the power of Arabi Pasha, who is but a military officer of no particular note, seems clear ; but when we consider that when the negotiations with France were first opened up on this question, it must be remembered that M. Gambetta was in office, and his overthrow necessarily led to delay in the negotiations which were being carried on by the two Governments. On the appointment of M. de Freycinet as Prime Minister of France these negotiations were again entered into, but in the mean time the spirit of insubordination was spreading more rapidly and becoming a matter of serious import to the European Powers.

Energetic measures were adopted by the English and French Governments to support the power of the Khedive against that of Arabi Pasha ; but this arrogant adventurer, who is, no doubt, looked upon by some Egyptians in the light of a patriot, has still further pushed his pretensions, and virtually defied the joint powers of France and England, rendering the position of the Khedive one of some peril.

The measures adopted by the Western Powers tended to keep Arabi in cheque to some extent, but did not altogether prevent the spread of the rebellion. Indeed, it became necessary, to protect the interests of the European residents in Egypt, in case of any act of hostility taking place. To show our authority in an unmistakable way, England sent, in conjunction with France, several ships of war to Alexandria, to protect the lives and properties of European subjects, which had become endangered.

This measure has so far succeeded that it has prevented any steps being taken by Arabi Pasha to further increase the difficulties, which surround the question, and has undoubtedly prevented any actual hostile steps, which at the present time would have lead to bloodshed.

It has now been resolved that Turkey, whose Sultan is the nominal suzerain of Egypt, should undertake, at the instance of the Western Powers, the settlement of this question ; and he consequently has despatched Ambassadors to Cairo for that purpose ; and we hope that the question may be settled without bloodshed.

Now, if the reader has gone so far with us, he will be enabled to comprehend the situation at the present time. The consent of the European Powers having been obtained, a portion of our fleet and of that of France is anchored at Alexandria for the purpose of protecting our interests. The Turkish Ambassadors have been despatched by the Sultan to establish, or rather in the hope that they will establish, peace in Egypt without the necessity of appealing to arms, and thereby creating dissensions the end of which it would be impossible to foretell or even conceive.

We presume that all of our readers are aware that, besides the interest which we have mentioned here, England has others which are of more vital importance to her as a nation than all the capital invested in Egyptian securities twentyfold.

Through Egypt lies England's highway to her Indian possessions, and in the eyes of Europe this gives her a preference claim in all matters affecting her interests in this respect. France, holding a secondary interest from her geographical position, seems a fit companion to seek in her endeavour to adjust the affairs of Egypt.

There were three courses open to the British Government to adopt in this question :—the Sultan might have been requested to use his influence in banishing Arabi Pasha from a country where he was inclined to work such mischief; a Conference of the European Powers; or the joint action of England and France alone.

To the first of these measures there were many objections : it would undoubtedly have resulted in Turkish troops being despatched to uphold the sovereignty of the Sultan, and no doubt have raised the prestige of Ottoman power to a dangerous height, and which would in all probability have completely upset the *status quo* which, for the welfare of Egypt, it is so desirable to obtain.

Such a step would very probably have resulted in bloodshed ; and the idea cannot be entertained for a moment that the authorities at Stamboul would send an army into Egypt, at the desire of France and England, for the purpose of quelling the disturbance, without obtaining some substantial reward for their services. Nor can we suppose the Sultan would be too eager to adjust matters to our satisfaction : it is rather more likely that he would endeavour to keep matters in a ferment, in the hope of being able to acquire a greater influence in Egypt.

It is supposed by many that Arabi Pasha is supported, in his attempts to upset the arrangements of the Powers, by some influence apart from that which he has immediately around him, and the source from which that support emanates might be found within the gates of Constantinople. It was, therefore, in deference to the interests which France in common holds with us in this matter that an alliance was sought and obtained ; and during the last six months the utmost harmony has existed between the two nations when each successive step has been taken to quell the insurrection which was brewing, and which has ultimately reached such a degree of importance.

The wisdom of this step taken by our Government must be apparent to all: for had England attempted to take the matter in her own hands—which she certainly was not entitled to do—she would not only have raised the jealous susceptibilities of France, but those of Turkey

and other nations, excepting, perhaps, that of Germany, who, perhaps, would not object to our gaining an ascendancy in Egypt.

So would it have been in the case of France had she sought to settle the matter single-handed. It cannot be supposed for a moment that we should have quietly stood by as onlookers whilst our neighbours were arrogating to themselves the sole right to move in a matter in which our interests were so deeply involved.

It cannot then be matter of astonishment that the English Government did not choose this means of attempting to readjust matters.

There was also a source of danger in summoning a European concert, tending, as it might have done, to re-open many questions which were well the world might never again be troubled with; jealousies might have arisen which would have created angry feelings in the breasts of all parties at the time, and as France and England were both justified, from the position in which they were placed in regard to Egypt, to take the matter in their own hands, it was concluded that a "concert" on this occasion was not deemed necessary.

The step which the Government of this country took in the matter must be regarded as the only one which could have been wisely taken under the circumstances. So far as their action in the matter is concerned, we have no reason to find fault; for, if intervention in Egyptian affairs was necessary at all, and few will say it was not, no better course could have been adopted than that which has been pursued in concert with France. It is due to the pressure of our Government that this concert has relied on Turkish intervention if other measures failed. It is unpleasant that this should have to be resorted to; but public opinion will regard it with much more equanimity than it would the scheme which M. Gambetta would have preferred, and which M. de Freycinet, in deference to or in dread of M. Gambetta's influence, is supposed to prefer. A joint occupation by British and French troops would be exposed to the gravest objections, and would expose the two Powers to serious dangers.

Public opinion in this country will submit to many drawbacks inseparable from a Turkish occupation rather than run the risk of further complications.

The opinion of all right thinking men must be with the Ministry in the policy they have adopted, which will, no doubt, lead to a pacific solution of this knotty problem, and it is necessary that the voice of England should support the Government when such matters are before them.

There are men in England who, notwithstanding the likelihood of the question being settled amicably, yet cry for more energetic

measures on the part of our rulers, forgetting the danger that exists that there might be a fanatical attack upon the Europeans, which might lead to disastrous results, which even the presence of the fleet at Alexandria would find it difficult to quell, at least before much damage might be done, and which would render the peaceful solution of the question impossible.

It must also be borne in mind that the position which England has taken in this matter has been to a great extent thrust upon her, and the determination which Mr. Gladstone has always shown to hold sacred the treaties which the different Ministries have from time to time entered into with other countries left him no other course than that which he has wisely adopted in this instance.

When the present Ministry entered office they found the country committed to a partnership with France in the control of Egypt. Whether such an arrangement was prudent, or has been necessitated by the logic of events, are questions on which there is room for difference of opinion. But it is at least certain that the Government have acted in loyal co-operation with France; that they have clearly defined the objects which they sought to attain in Egypt; and that those objects, and the measures taken to realise them, have hitherto commanded the assent of Europe. The cry for more vigorous action in assertion of British interests is neither more nor less than a survival of Jingoism. It means a repudiation of the right of anybody but ourselves to interfere in Egypt; and the curious circumstance is that it is advocated by the partisans of the Ministry to whom we are indebted for the co-partnership with France. Without this co-partnership the Government would undoubtedly have possessed greater freedom of action at the present crisis. But they have been obliged to accept facts as they found them. It is not by bluster and assertion that the Egyptian problem is to be satisfactorily solved, but by the judicious combination of firmness and diplomatic tact in support of a straightforward policy; and this is what the country may confidently expect.

The work which Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues have now on hand we may feel confident will be settled in a manner which will be likely to produce satisfactory results in the future, and prevent a recurrence of these events which have threatened to disturb the peace of Europe. It was too much the fashion during Lord Beaconsfield's term of office to patch up those matters upon the principle that sufficient for the day is the evil thereof, leaving the question for the moment settled, but in such a way as left an opening for their recurrence at any time; and surely nothing can be more unsatisfactory or more mischievous? When such questions arise, it is well that they should be taken in hand with the determination

that, as far as human foresight may, they shall be settled once for all.

It is of course impossible to guard against intrigue, but it is possible to prevent such adventurers as Arabi Pasha from gaining such a power in a country like Egypt as virtually to undermine all the arrangements which had been made for the welfare of the country, and which has enabled him for some months past not only to defy the Khedive, but to offer insulting proposals to the Powers, whom it was his duty to have treated with respect and honour.

This is but one of the many complicated phases of the spirited foreign policy of the late Government which we have heard so much about, and which would again be thrust upon the country were they returned to power. The insatiable thirst which possesses this body of politicians for minding everybody's business but their own must inevitably result in complications which would for ever keep the public mind in a painful state of tension, paralyse trade, and bring misery and disgrace upon the country.

It has been said that the mission of the Turkish Ambassadors is to secure peace between the Khedive and Arabi Pasha, but such a measure would not prevent a recurrence of the events of the past twelve months. It will be the duty of England and France to insist upon the punishment of this man who has rebelled against his sovereign, and take the necessary steps to prevent him, or any one else, from creating anarchy in the country again.

It is absurd to suppose that this point can be lost sight of by the Western Powers, who are pledged to support the Khedive in the authority which was granted him when placed in power. It would be an insult to the Khedive who, so far as we are informed, has been faithful to the trust reposed in him, and would likewise be humiliating to those who had placed him in the position which he occupies.

It is gratifying to find that at this present stage of the proceedings in relation to Egyptian affairs there is likely to be an early settlement of the question, and that without bloodshed. The statesmanlike measures which have been adopted have produced the desired results; and it is well for us that the matter was placed in the hands of such a statesman as Mr. Gladstone, for it would have been an easy task for those in power to have placed us in the most awkward position in regard to the relationship which exists between us and the other European Powers in this important matter.

Had there been a Tory Government in power, it is not improbable that a joint occupation of Egypt would have taken place, thereby creating jealousies amongst the other Powers, which would have been too likely to lead to results most disastrous. The result of the policy of the present Government is the undisturbed good feeling which has

existed from the beginning of the negotiations with our ally, France, and also that of the other Powers.

Earl Granville reminded the country on May 14th what the declared objects and policy of her Majesty's Government were in regard to Egypt:—"They were the maintenance of the sovereign power of the Sultan, the position of the Khedive, the liberties of the Egyptian people as granted by the firman of the Sultan, the prudent development of her institutions, and the observance of international engagements either on the part of England or England and other Powers." This, so far, has been successfully accomplished, and we confidently hope that in the end we shall witness peace and tranquillity restored to Egypt, and this vexed question settled for many years to come.

That it may be found unnecessary to resort to a conference of the European Powers is to be devoutly hoped, and we are in the belief that such will be the case. And we would also urge upon the Governments of England and France the necessity of putting the necessary pressure upon the Porte to insure the maintenance of the *status quo*.

No one can doubt that if the necessary pressure is brought to bear upon Turkey this can be accomplished. It is in the interest of all the Powers that such should be the result of the present mission to Alexandria, and also that the question should be finally settled.

We are too much accustomed to the dilatory manner in which the Ottoman Government conducts its negotiations to hope that a day or two will end the matter; but the emphatic measures which have been adopted have so far produced good results that the preparations for war which had been pursued by Arabi Pasha for some time past have been put a stop to, and we think there is little likelihood of their being resumed.

The Ambassadors despatched by the Porte are men of known ability, and are undoubtedly men who are quite able to grapple with the question. It will be for us to take care that our interests are not lost sight of in the settlement. This we may safely leave in the hands of such men as Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone.

That a speedy settlement of the question may be arrived at at an early date we sincerely trust. Already Egypt has suffered much from the state of anarchy which has existed for the last six months. Were this state of things to last much longer a period of intense suffering must ensue for the Egyptians; bad enough it is even at the present time when the peasantry are taken from their homes, their fields neglected, and a prospect before them of utter misery for some time to come.

Had more "energetic measures" been taken by England in this matter, that is, we suppose, sending an army to Egypt, and at the

point of the sword compelling the insurgents to lay down their arms and submit to the power of England, or that of England and France, the consequences would have been fearful to contemplate, for there is no doubt that Arabi with his followers would have retired into the interior, compelling the peasantry to take up arms against us, even against their will.

The country would have been laid waste, the utmost misery would have had to be endured by an industrious people who have already felt the beneficial effects of our efforts to place the country on a footing of lasting prosperity. Years would have had to elapse before they could again have enjoyed the amount of peace and contentment which has been secured for them for the last few years.

Can those who thirst for upholding the power of England on all occasions by the sword think for a moment on what the effect of a war would have upon this country without a shudder? Must they not be convinced that the measures which have been adopted by her Majesty's Government have been of a wise and statesmanlike character? and that it is better whilst we can with honour to ourselves, and the due observance of all the duties of a nation which devolve upon us being fulfilled to the letter, bring about a peaceful solution of this difficult problem than rushing headlong into a war in which we might certainly be enabled to prove the might of the British arms—which nobody doubts—but which would plunge the Egyptians, an industrious people, into a sea of trouble, from which it would take years to extricate them?

The working men of England have seldom benefited by these high-handed measures. We can only refer them to the depressed state of this country during the years of Jingoism which we passed through when the late Government were in power, notwithstanding the flourishing state of affairs which they inherited from their predecessors, the *Times* declaring that never had this country enjoyed such a season of prosperity as it had done during Mr. Gladstone's administration. Although it might be very gratifying to those Jingo spirits who are eternally crying about the lost prestige of England under Mr. Gladstone's rule to see England engaged in a "great and glorious war," for the maintenance of British interests, the working men of England, to whom her honour is as dear as the loudest tongued of any of them, will not consent to see the country plunged into difficulties heedlessly, the result of which would be that additional honour might attach to the British arms, but which would leave thousands upon thousands of her children destitute.

Had war been introduced into Egypt at the present time it might have terminated in a Mahometan rising in our Indian possessions. Who can tell? Or who can tell whether this and many other like

features of the question have not been all part and parcel of the considerations which have so far influenced our Ministers? Certainly the many features of a like nature which are involved in the question would be—if it were wanting—a sufficient reply to those whose cry is "more energetic measures."

The Porte, it is generally understood, has agreed to support the Khedive, and if this promise is kept it will result in the banishment of the author of the insurrection. This the English and French Governments are bound in honour to see carried out; no other measure, we believe, will meet the case. Should the Porte refuse to insist upon the removal of this mischievous colonel, Arabi Pasha, it will then become the duty of our Government to see that it is done. We can conceive no other satisfactory solution of the question, and we sincerely trust that the Porte will carry out its pledge so far as to insist that this is effectually carried out.

Now, it has become the fashion by some people in this country, when the slightest complications arise on the political horizon, to cry aloud, with might and main, for war, and nothing else will satisfy the idiotic cry of these people, whose thirst for blood seems to be as great as that of a savage race on the war-trail. The honour of England is fast disappearing, her voice in the council of nations is becoming silent, and we are descending to the position of a third-rate Power: this is their cry; the sword alone must be the only arbiter in all questions affecting the welfare of England.

Now, can it be doubted for one moment that Mr. Gladstone is not as jealous of the honour of Old England as any man who lives within its boundaries? Can it be doubted that this man, whose whole life has been devoted to the advancement and welfare of his country, would shrink from the task of vindicating its honour, were that at stake, or from the responsibilities which a great war would entail, even although those responsibilities have been illadvisedly heaped upon this country by a previous Government? No! When the honour of Old England must be vindicated by the sword, when pacific measures have failed, when the experience of fifty years' arduous labour in his country's cause has failed to establish the honour of England among the nations, then we may rest assured the sword *shall* be drawn, and in no half-hearted way shall the enemies of England feel her power; but firm in the conviction that we are fighting in a just cause, and not merely to satisfy the craving of a few men who are incapable of comprehending what war means, or what its probable consequences may be, we shall fight with that spirit of determination to conquer which has ever characterised the British soldier, and which has ever ended in victory. But we must pray that the Government of

England will not again rush heedlessly into another of those wars which during the last six years have done more harm to England's prestige than years of the most careful statesmanship will regain.

And, although it may be out of place in a little work such as this, yet shall we venture to remind the working classes of this country that England again seems likely to enjoy a turn of prosperity like to that which she enjoyed during the last Liberal Administration, and which was so ruthlessly destroyed when the Tories came into power. Let the working men of England contemplate the commercial aspects of this country at the present time and compare it with that in which it was left by the late Government, and they must be convinced of the necessity of maintaining in power a Government whose sole aim seems to be the welfare of Englishmen, the upholding of England's ancient prestige in the eyes of the nations of the world, and raising her people to such a state of prosperity as will gain them the admiration of the whole civilised world.

In conclusion, we earnestly ask those who returned Mr. Gladstone to power to disregard the voice of his opponents who, whilst leaving behind them such a tangled web which would soon have placed it beyond the power of any statesman to unravel, are now seeking, by every possible means, to hamper him in the task of setting those matters right which their headstrong folly had placed in such a position that only the genius of such a man as Mr. Gladstone could ever place again upon a firm and lasting basis.

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THE EXTERMINATION OF THE TURKISH PEOPLE BY RUSSIA, AND THE TRUE POLICY FOR ENGLAND.

Englishmen! Read the results of the Russian Crusade!

In "The Daily News"—the most pro-Russian of English journals—appeared on February 8th, 1878, the following appalling description of the flight of the Turkish people from the brutal ferocity of the Cossacks and Bulgarians. All this terrible mass of suffering has been directly caused, within the past month, by the weakness of an English minister and the ambition of a Russian despot. The moment that Lord Carnarvon's most unpatriotic and ill-judged speech at the Colonial Office, reached St. Petersburg, the Czar put off the Armistice he had promised on Jan. 3rd, through our Cabinet to Turkey, and, to use his own words, telegraphed to General Radetsky, "continue your victorious advance until the honour of the Russian arms is fully vindicated." How it has been vindicated this extract will show. Since the fall of the Roman Empire Europe has not seen such horrors. The Russian Government and Generals are directly responsible for these awful scenes; for the former deliberately refused to publish a promise of protection to the Moslems, and the latter might, by shooting a few of the Bulgarian banditti, have entirely checked their cruelties. A firm front on our part to Russia—the only course that will ever check her advance—would have saved the lives of thousands:—

ADRIANOPLE, *Jan.* 27.

Seventy miles of utter desolation, seventy long miles strewn with the household effects of many thousand families, seventy weary miles of a continuous, ghastly, sickening panorama of death in every form, and in its most terrible aspect; such is the road from Philippopolis to Hermanli. Here has been enacted a tragedy of such colossal proportions and horrible character that it is quite impossible for anyone who has not witnessed part of it to conceive, in the most moderate degree, the nature of the diabolical drama.

It was here that was assembled the great mass of the Turkish families that fled from the villages at the approach of the Russians. Fugitives from the entire territory from Plevna to Philippopolis were for weeks and even months endeavouring to make their way to Constantinople, the haven safe from the pursuit of the Muscovite. Now, for the first time, do we appreciate, in part, the sufferings of these people, and form some adequate idea of the multitude of Mussulman inhabitants who have fled, panic stricken, before the Russians.

As we rode from Philippopolis the corpses of peasants were to be seen lying in the snow, and some of them had already been exposed to the weather for two or three weeks. Some had blood stains still fresh on their garments. Hundreds of abandoned arabas stood in the road, and choked the ditches alongside. There were traces of bivouacs in the snow, which became more and more frequent as we proceeded, until these side paths were almost literally carpetted with the *débris* of camps, and our route lay between rows of dead animals, broken arabas, piles of rags and cast-off clothing and human bodies, for thirty-five miles of the whole of the first day's ride. Women and infants, children and old men, had fallen in the fields by

the roadside half buried in the snow, or lying in the pools of water. While many of the bodies bore marks of violence and showed ghastly wounds, the great proportion of the women and children were evidently frozen to death, for they lay on the snow as if asleep, with the flush of life still on their faces, and the pink skin of their feet and hands still unblanched. Side by side with these, many corpses of old men, full of dignity even in death, lay stark by the roadside, their white beards clotted with blood, and their helpless hands fallen upon their breasts. From the muddy water of the ditches tiny hands and feet stretched out, and baby faces, half covered with snow, looked out innocently and peacefully, with scarcely a sign of suffering on their features. Frozen at their mothers' breasts, they were thrown down into the snow to lighten the burden of the poor creatures who were struggling along in mortal terror.

The peasants were travelling in miserable arabas without food or shelter, and with half-starved oxen. Miles of these araba trains we passed on the road, human beings and household effects jumbled in promiscuously. Upon the jolting carts bedding and utensils were piled. Women and children upon donkeys, and cattle followed along-side, and behind for miles was a long trail of wretched, weary, half-dead stragglers; old men and women bent double, crawling along with the aid of crutches or sticks; mothers with infants at their breasts, scarcely moving one foot before the other—*all this after long months of flight, constant exposure, continuous dread of marauders, and the hated Muscovites.* Never did I feel so utterly helpless as in the presence of this supreme misery. I watched a mother leading along a sick child of perhaps ten years, a mile or more behind one of these trains. The poor girl could with difficulty balance herself on her naked, half-frozen feet. Night was coming on, and the cold wind that chilled us in our warm clothing blew about the rags from the suffering creature, disclosing emaciated limbs and skeleton body. The mother was in quite as pitiable a condition. A night on the road meant death to both these unfortunates. This was one of a series of similar scenes that were enacted before our eyes.

Does it seem strange that at this time, together with an exhausting sense of hopelessness and complete helplessness that took possession of me, came emotions of keen sympathy with the Turks, both soldiers and peasants, as the weaker and losing party.

The next morning, just as we were going away from Kurucesme the head of a long train of returning Turkish refugee families appeared in the main street of the village. Then followed a scene which is painful in the last degree to describe. The Bulgarians gathered on the side of the street in knots of three or four, and waited calmly until the miserable train had got well into the village, when from every direction the inhabitants pounced upon the exhausted, defenceless Turks, and began to carry off their household effects, and even the cattle from the carts. One poor woman, leading an ass piled up with bedding, and a child on the top, found her property distributed among half-a-dozen stalwart ruffians in a twinkling, and the little infant on the ground in the mud. The old men and women clung to their only treasures, while the Bulgarians dragged them away. Children yelled with fright, and panic reigned, which started the slowly-moving caravan into a quick march. *All this went on before General Gourko was out of sight of the town.*

From this village *to Haskioi* the corpses were more numerous if anything than on the route of the day before. *The village we passed was full of dead Turkish peasants, and on asking the Bulgarians who killed them, they replied with a great deal of effusion and fiendish pride, "We did it. We and our friends did it." In Haskioi there were bodies of Turkish soldiers in the streets* nearly buried under heaps of stones and bricks, who, after being wounded and unable to move away *had been stoned to death by the peasants.*

I inquired of one of the Turkish families where they had come from, and they said that they left Plevna five months ago, and since that time they had been on the road, and for the past few weeks in a great camp, further

on towards Hermanli. For many days they had been entirely without bread or even Indian corn, and had existed solely on the flesh of the cattle that fell on the road. I gave them all the bread I could get hold of, and they ate it like starved creatures, crying for joy. The grandmother, father, and mother, with an infant at the breast, and a small boy of ten years, had not a single shoe between them, and their only baggage consisted of a few old torn bedquilts and a kettle to boil meat in.

At every step beyond Haskioi we met new and more horrifying scenes ; *man and wife lying side by side on the same blanket, with two children curled upon the snow near, all frozen dead; old men with their heads half cut off;* and on each side of the road, broad continuous bivouacs deserted in haste, strewn with household effects. For many miles we had been trampling in the mud, carpets, bedding, and clothing. Now the highway was literally paved with bundles, cushions, blankets, and every imaginable article of household use. Broken arabas, too, began to multiply, and as we approached the little village of Tirali we saw in the distance, on either side of the road, a perfect forest of wheels, reaching to the river on the right, and spreading away up the hill sides on the left. We rode into the midst of the great deserted bivouac, the horses walking on rich carpets and soft draperies, all crushed and trampled in the mud.

The scene was at once so unique in its general aspect, so terribly impressive, so eloquent of suffering and disaster to innocent people, that I hesitate to attempt a description of it. Hundreds of acres were covered with household goods. All along the river bank reached this bivouac, at least three miles in extent, and of varying width. Over this great tract the arabas were standing as closely as they could, with their oxen placed together. The frames of the carts were in most cases broken to pieces. Sick cattle wandered listlessly about among the wheels. Corpses of men, women and children lay about near every araba, and the whole ground was carpeted with clothing, kitchen utensils, books, and bedding. *It was a pitiable sight to see an old, grey-bearded Turk lying with his open Koran beside him, splashed with blood from ghastly gashes in his bared throat. Bundles of rags and clothes nearly all held dead babies. Crowds of Bulgarians swarmed in this great Avenue of Death and Desolation, choosing the best of the carts, and carrying away great loads of copper vessels, which lay about in profusion, and mud-soiled bedding, with no more respect for the dead than for the rags they lay on. These scavengers would drive their carts across the heads of dead women and old men without even a glance of curiosity at the bodies.*

I should say that at least 500 dead non-combatants lay in the bivouac ; certainly no less than 15,000 carts had halted there, large as the number may seem, and at least 75,000 people had deserted the whole of their possessions and had run away, with only what they could carry in their hands. Sickened by the continuation of the ghastly panorama for so many hours, we rode on to Hermanli, not leaving the last of the horribly mutilated corpses until we reached the very edge of the village.

When the Russian cavalry came in sight of the bivouac there were one or two battalions of Turkish infantry stationed there, as rearguard, but they dispersed and retired with little attempt at resistance, but before the attack began in earnest the panic caught in the bivouac and spread like wildfire. The immense band of refugees ran away with the soldiers to the mountains, leaving cattle, carts, and all their movables which they could not seize upon at the moment. The cause of the panic was the appearance of Skobeleff's cavalry in the valley of the Maritza, in front of the bivouac. *The result of it was doubtless the death of thousands upon thousands of Turkish peasants, who are now in the mountains without clothing or food.* Still another result of the fight is the enrichment of all the Bulgarians in the neighbourhood, for the smoke of the first firing had not cleared away when these ever watchful individuals pounced down upon all the cattle the soldiers had not driven off, and carried away hundreds of carts laden with plunder.

This complete catastrophe is bewildering in its dimensions. Of the 75,000 people only a few thousands with their arabas were turned back towards their homes by the Russians. I have told how we met them on the road. The rest escaped with *foolish precipitation following the impulses of unreasonable fear, easily comprehensible under the circumstances.* (Very unreasonable after the example of Haskioi!) Their fate is not yet known, but it may easily be conjectured. The route between Philippopolis and Hermanli should bear for all time the name of the Road of the Dead.

It is discouraging to believe that the scenes I have described may be repeated as we proceed towards Constantinople, for a short time ago long waggon trains of refugees passed through Adrianople on their way towards Stamboul, and filled the street here for weeks, day and night, with a slowly-moving caravan. When asked where they were going, very few of these people could answer. They only knew that they must get away as fast as possible, and they were so distracted with terror that when their araba broke down even in the streets of Adrianople, they left their baggage and hurried away without it. Many of these fugitives have been turned back by the Russian cavalry, and, as I write, the street is filled with arabas still moving along through the cold rain and darkness, most of the women on foot without shoes, everyone completely drenched, half-starved and exhausted. The howling of the storm makes a wild accompaniment to the cries of infants and the screechings of the wheels as they pass. There is no hopes of any succour for these unfortunates. The small fund which remained in the hands of the Committee here charged with the relief of the suffering Turks has, I believe, been all distributed, either in money or in food and clothing, and there is nothing to do but to let these people struggle on to their villages as best they may. It is safe to prophecy that but a small proportion will ever reach their homes in this severe winter weather, and against the tide of the advancing army trains, and once in their villages they have neither food nor money to buy any, if there be any to sell after the Russian army has passed.

There is no better field for the philanthropist than European Turkey at the present time, and as the great needs of the refugees are bread and the common articles of food, the assistance may be direct and easily given.

The following description of the remarkable—and it may fairly be said unprecedented—barbarity on the part of the Russians towards vanquished enemies is quoted from the 'Daily News' of December 26th, 1877, in order that the crowning touch may be given to the already almost complete picture of Russian philanthropy and religion which this war has presented. Coming from such a Russian source as the 'Daily News,' and from such a correspondent, the details here quoted may be considered as thoroughly well authenticated. The tale speaks for itself, and no comments are necessary. It should not however be forgotten that the day after the surrender of Plevna, the Czar was able to review 70,000 Russian and Roumanian troops (according to an official despatch) within three miles of Plevna, where all this misery was then increasing, and that a brigade or even a regiment of Russian soldiers detached from that vast pageant would have effectually separated, in a few hours, the dead from the living wounded. The Russian leaders preferred to delegate the task to twenty Bulgarians, who on this occasion surpassed even the inhuman reputation of their race.

The surrender had been expected for weeks; the actual

prisoners were far fewer than had been anticipated—about 18,000 unwounded men, and perhaps 8,000 wounded and sick. Yet what happens? We read from all quarters that abundance reigned in the Russian camp, while the sufferings and privations of the Turks had been for weeks the theme of every Russian despatch that came from the front. Yet, when the surrender took place, the 'magnanimous and humane' Czar, the 'skilful and provident' Todleben, the 'ambitious and chivalrous' Prince of Roumania, the 'dashing and heroic' Skobeleff, and all the galaxy of brilliant, kind-hearted and philanthropic officers who lead the Russian army in Bulgaria, and who have been so bespattered with adulation by 'The Times' and 'Daily News,' left the wounded for three whole days to perish of cold and starvation, while they, in a circle round the town of Plevna, kept high feast in honour of their victory: and, when they did deign to move, allowed the living to be buried with the dead! Not only this; those that had survived of the valiant defenders of Plevna, who, after resisting during six months, with a courage never surpassed, the assault of an enemy four times their own strength, had at last succumbed only to the horrors of cold and famine, were left by their Christian conquerors to starve where they surrendered.

It may have been good policy on the part of the Russian leaders to display much sensational attention to Osman Pasha, which was duly telegraphed with all embellishments to this country by pro-Russian scribes, but could not even a crust of bread have been found for the heroic Moslem peasantry who formed Osman's army, and had fought so well for their country and their faith.

May not the Turk well reply to those who accuse him of slaying the wounded, that a bayonet stab, given during the fight, and when the passions of the combat are still raging, is a far more merciful way of dealing with the enemy than the death of slow torture which the 'civilised and Christian' Russian meets out to the heroes of Plevna. Dead men cannot fight again, and so many obstinate Turks out of the way is, no doubt, so much removed from the path of Holy Russia. Therefore Osman's army is allowed to perish! The 'Daily News' correspondent wrote:—

PLEVNA, *Dec.* 17.

Plevna is full of horrors, and after the turmoil of the past four months the complete silence now seems strange and oppressive. With all the vivid recollections of the various incidents of the siege, the most active imagination could not picture the thousandth part of the frightful sufferings, the awful misery and wretchedness, that are found within the narrow limits of the town, nor draw the faintest outline of the sickening spectacle, the panorama of ghastly horrors, that is almost unparalleled since the terrible Plagues of past centuries. Human beings lying like sheep in the streets; houses filled with dead; hundreds stretching their hands feebly heavenward for a morsel of bread or a drop of water, and no help that could be commanded to alleviate their suffering or save the wretched creatures from their painful death. Even after constant contact with human suffering death in every

form, I can scarcely bring myself to repeat the story of what has passed in Plevna since the surrender.

Of course, the attendants at the hospitals joined their lot with those who tried to break through the Russian lines. The day and night of the battle passed, and the sufferers received no food or water, and their festering wounds were undressed. *The following morning the Russians entered and took possession, and made the day one of rejoicing, with the visit of the Czar and the Imperial Staff; but this celebration of the event, however short it may have seemed to the victors, was a long season of horrible suffering for the wretched, helpless captives, who stretched their skeleton hands in vain towards heaven, praying for a bit of bread or a drop of water. Neither friend nor foe was there to alleviate their sufferings, or to give the trifle needed to save them from a painful death, and they died by hundreds; and before the morning of the third day the dead crowded the living in every one of those dirty, dimly-lighted rooms* which confined the wounded in a foul and fetid atmosphere of disease and death.

It was only on the morning of the third day after these wretched, tortured creatures had been left to their fate that the Russians began the separation of the living from the dead. The mosques, the largest houses, and many of the small dwellings had been filled with sick and wounded.

The first room entered in one of these charnel-houses contained ninety odd Turks. Of these thirty-seven were dead, and many others on the point of death. Piteous groans came from between rigid lips, and painful cries for water, and some made feeble signs for food. One or two of the strongest raised themselves, and fixed their hideous, sunken eyes with such a beseeching stare on those who had come to free them from the company of the dead, that it would have softened the hardest heart. The small room, dimly lighted by a high window with one pane of glass, was crowded with the forms of thirty or forty ragged, filthy, human beings. Many of these forms were motionless, and scarcely audible groans were heard from one or two who raised with difficulty their bony hands to their lips, to signify their need of food. There were faint whispers of "Some water!" "Some water!" piteous to hear. The dim light was concentrated on the half-naked body of an old man stretched across the entrance, whither he had dragged himself in the last hours of his agony, in hope of succour, or at least of a breath of fresh air; for in the unventilated room the air was thick with putrid odours, which burst out when the door was opened, overpowering strong men, and causing them to turn sick and faint. The old man's hands were clutched in the rigour of painful death on his nude and meagre breast, and his head lay against the very crack of the door, so that it was opened only by rude force, Living and dead were lying together undistinguishable along the walls. behind the door and under the window.

This room is one of fifty where a similar spectacle is presented. The pavement of the mosques is covered with crouching forms, some moving at intervals, others motionless and silent. Here and there the faces of the dead come out in ghastly relief, with a fixed expression of great agony.

Nothing can be done but to drag the dead from among the living, let in the light and air, and give water and nourishment in hope of saving some of those who remain alive. *Small enough was the force of men who set about this painful task, and meagre enough their means.* Three open peasants' ox-carts were all that were available for the removal of the dead, and fifty soldiers to carry the bodies from the rooms to the carts, and bury them in the ditches. As fast as possible bread and water were distributed, and the feeble wretches fought with their last breath for the nourishment. Some propped up against the wall slowly ate until the unmistakeable pallor came over their faces and their eyes were fixed in death. Even the effort of eating the long-needed food was too great for their waning strength. The living clutch at the morsel in the dead man's hand, and struggle for it with all their feeble power, perhaps to fall dead before they can eat the bread.

The three open oxen-carts began the removal of the dead at once, and as I write the work still goes on. The hospitals daily suppiy more freight of this kind than the slow-moving teams can carry away to the ditches outside. The disinfection of the hospitals was promptly effected. As fast as possible, with the small force of men at hand, the rooms were emptied one after another. *After a day or two some of the Bulgarians were compelled to serve in place of the soldiers, and they set themselves about the hated task with a brutality terrible to witness. They drag the bodies down the stairs by the legs, the heads bumping from step to step with sickening thuds, then out into the court through the filthy mud, where they sling them into the cart with the heads or legs hanging over the side,* and so pile up the load with a score of half-naked corpses.

It is horrible to hear the conversation of the men who do this work. *They perhaps bring out a body still warm, the heart still beating, and the flush of life on the cheek. One says,* "*He is still alive,*" *and proposes to leave him without stopping to decide the question. The others cry,* "*Devil take him! He will die before to-morrow, anyway. In with him.*" *And so the living goes in with the dead, and is tumbled into the grave. I have seen this myself,* and the man who has charge of the disinfection of the hospitals and burial of the dead, told me that he doubted not that *such cases occurred several times daily.* When the three carts are full they start away through the streets toward the ditches outside the town. The horrible load jolts and shakes, and now and then a body falls out into the mud and is dragged into the cart again, and thrown down and jammed in solidly to prevent a recurrence of the accident. This heartless proceeding goes on in the public streets, crowded with the men, women, and children of the place—the soldiers, the wounded and the sick ; and after so many days of the same spectacle, no one any longer pays any attention to the transport of the dead. Over a thousand have been already carted away, and from the hospitals come about a hundred daily.

I have given but a slight outline of the scenes that have passed before my eyes since I came here. A long detailed account alone could give anything like an idea of the climax and final act of the drama of Plevna. The town is full of similar pictures. Along the streets are frequently seen one or two wounded who have crawled out from the hospital, and lie dying in the mud. There is no valid excuse for this wilful disregard of human life. *The Russians knew that Plevna must fall, and they expected to find thousands of starving men there, and thousands of badly attended wounded.* The surrender must have been, as it probably was, a surprise, but the day before the expected event was not the time to prepare for it. *There should have been detailed, a month ago, proper officers to prepare everything for the care of the surrendered troops. There can be no excuse for the fact that only three open ox-carts can be found to transport the dead, and only a score of Bulgarians,* who run away at every opportunity, can be detailed to perform the duty of burying the dead. *Out on the plain, near the bridge over the Vid, are bivouacked* 15,000 *or* 20,000 *prisoners, fighting for bread, miserable beyond description, in the cold, with hundreds of unburied dead covering the ground* near the spot where the first attempt was made to break through ; *and day after day passes and their condition does not change.* Plevna is one vast charnel-house, surpassing in horror anything that can be imagined.

The Russians are now virtually masters of Constantinople—the great City of the East ; the key of two Continents, the emporium of Eastern commerce ; on the future high road to our Indian Empire ; the finest position, naval and military, in the world ; the site which the great Constantine, with the prescient eye of genius, chose, 1500 years ago, for the capital of his Empire, and which the Great Napoleon said, if ever possessed by a great military power, would make that power mistress of the world.

How would Lord Palmerston have treated the possession by Russia of the defences of Constantinople—a success achieved by a course of cruelty, force, duplicity and deliberate deception, such as even the treacherous annals of Russia cannot parallel? A clear and firm, but not arrogant, statement would long since have gone forth from our Foreign Office, that the approach of the Russian armies within 50 miles of Constantinople or Gallipoli would be considered as a *casus belli* by England. Such decision Russia would never defy. It is Lord Beaconsfield's vigorous and patriotic policy that the country longs for, and not the milk-and-water vacillation of Lord Derby. The English people have confidence in the Prime Minister, for they recognise in him the Patriot Statesman who has struggled 'to uphold the interests of the country and the honour of the Sovereign' against almost overwhelming difficulties—all the wiles of a great and unscrupulous despotism abroad, factious agitation and ungenerous misrepresentations at home, and above all—against the melancholy incapacity of some of his own colleagues to realize the perils of the situation. Let the Government beware lest the great wave of loyal and patriotic indignation which is now overwhelming, in hopeless confusion, the miserable politicians that have tried to make party capital out of the perils of their country, turn against them with tenfold fury if the interests and the honour of England shall have suffered from their supineness or delay.

There is already the greatest danger that Turkey, who has really been struggling for British interests quite as much as for her own, may now, abandoned and utterly crushed, be driven by our disgraceful apathy into the arms of Russia, than which nothing could be more fatal for England. Another speech like Lord Derby's pitifully weak and humble apology to Russia, in the House of Lords, on February 7th, will encourage that power to proceed in her advance until—the English spirit, at last outraged beyond endurance, and thoroughly aroused—war will be inevitable. Mr. Gladstone and the peace-at-any-price party, with their supporters in the Cabinet, and the organs of Russia—'The Times' and 'Daily News'—will surely, if they have their way, bring about a war, which firmness alone can prevent.

Englishmen trust Lord Beaconsfield, and realize that in his determined policy lies the only security for their imperial interests and for the liberties and the peace of Europe. They will support him against open and secret enemies if he will only lead them with firm and unwavering decision.

Englishmen are determined that Russia shall not, in any form or on any plea, occupy Constantinople

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EUROPE'S ANSWER

TO

LORD HARTINGTON

AND

MR. GLADSTONE.

BY

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EUROPE'S ANSWER

TO

LORD HARTINGTON AND MR. GLADSTONE.

LORD HARTINGTON'S AND MR. GLADSTONE'S INDICTMENT.

"LORD BEACONSFIELD claims that Her Majesty's Ministers have maintained the peace of Europe, which he justly describes as necessary to the welfare of the civilised world, but they did not prevent, even if their policy did not cause, a war in the East of Europe. The ascendency of Europe has been claimed in circulars, but it has been surrendered in secret conventions. In the aggrandisement of Russia, and the destruction of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, the declared objects of their policy have been frustrated. . . ."—Lord Hartington's Manifesto.

"Thus the policy has failed, but the immense responsibilities incurred by this country remain—responsibilities in return for which the acquisition of Cyprus, which adds nothing to the military strength of the nation, affords no adequate compensation. . . . The just in-

fluence of England in the councils of Europe is an object which the Liberal party has pursued with at least as much sincerity, and certainly with more success, than has attended the policy of the present Administration." —Lord Hartington's Manifesto.

"Abroad they have strained if they have not endangered the prerogative by gross misuse, have weakened the Empire by needless wars, unprofitable extensions, and unwise engagements, and have dishonoured it in the eyes of Europe by filching the island of Cyprus from the Porte under a treaty clandestinely concluded in violation of the Treaty of Paris, which formed part of the International Law of Christendom."—Mr. Gladstone's Manifesto.

THE ANSWER OF EUROPE.

Neue Freie Presse, Vienna, April 26th, 1878.—"It has come as we said it would and as it must come. The destruction of Turkey brings death to autocratic Russia. The Empire of the Czar stands before the fearful dilemma of interior convulsions or exterior war, the results of both being unfathomable. The souls of the St. Petersburg rulers tremble to see the fermenting and seething in the interior, and outside lies proudly the British Lion, armed to the teeth, ready for the spring. How differently did the friends of Russia picture to themselves the march of events when the murderous paper weapon of San Stefano came before their eyes.

They counted on Lord Derby's tenacity of official life, on Gladstone's unpatriotic fanaticism; they relied on Bismarck's friendship, and on Andrassy's boundless pliancy. They sang Turkey's death-song, and speculated on Italy's well known political acquisitiveness.

"Six weeks have passed, and how does it stand now? Derby has broken down miserably, Gladstone may hardly show himself in public, Bismarck's offers of brokerage find no clients, Andrassy insists on the Congress, Italy inclines to England's views, and Turkey gives strong signs of life. A dam has been built up against Russian arrogance, and British ironclads are guarding it. Of all the guarantees against which the Muscovite tried to surround his successes, only one remains—the friendship of Germany, and this loses proportionately in value as England's will to undo the Convention of San Stefano is strengthened. The sympathies of the German Emperor for his nephew on the throne of the Romanoffs is notorious. Bismarck's care to preserve the Russian-German friendship is a sad fact, but there is a limit set by the spirit of history which is a spirit of justice to the mightiest Power. The German people, shutting out the thoughts of future dangers in the pride of self-consciousness, will awaken to them when the first English cannon-shot thunders through the world, and it will be made clear to itself why it was antagonistic to the mightiest, the most advanced nation. Dynastic policy may appear naturally to choose Russia against England, but the spirit of the nation will be revenged if it takes part with despotism against freedom, with might against right.

"Even now we should think a feeling of disgust must pervade the German nation against the ally its leading statesman wants to force on it. The streets of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiew, and Warsaw, are dyed with young blood shed by a barbarous police; favourites whose brutal fists destroyed at their own pleasure the noblest sentiments of the human soul, are demonstratively distinguished; solemn verdicts of the tribunals are sneered at and put aside; brave advocates of offended justice are gagged and imprisoned and forced to be silent. In the Russian prisons a horrible climax of treatment awaits the political offender; the rod follows the whip, then the knout and running the gauntlet, as a disciplinary measure, completes the torment. And who is so safe in the Empire of the Czar that a suspicion, a denunciation, the spite of an insufficiently bribed official, may not drag him out of his bed and throw him into prison? What cultivated being in Russia is not a political criminal? To-day he is named Bogoljubau, to-morrow Biodshi, the day after Vera Sassulitch. Political offence, that endless screw of all despotic statecraft, fills the streets, creeps through the houses, lurks in every mind. It is the quarry which is never wanting to give occupation to the third division. For this Government, which disgraces Europe, the German people cannot consent to be guarantee much longer. One would despair of the power of truth if one was forced to believe it. Has the noble French nation only been cast down to prevent its mighty voice being heard when raised to put a stop to barbarism in Europe? Was Austria-Hungary only thrust out of Germany, and its power weakened, in

order to force it to remain quiet whilst its mortal enemy was draining its life blood? Fie on this policy if this should be the only result. Then Europe would be delivered over to Russia in fetters, and Bismarck would be nothing more than what Grillparges called Napoleon, 'the fever (delirium ?) of a sick time.'

"But, fortunately, it is true that great faults do not always have proportionately great miseries in their train. A point will be reached when the compensating activity of the spirit of the universe begins, and justice sends forth her messengers to save humanity from irreparable harm. Such a messenger is England at the present moment. The free nation rises against the enslaved one, the political-trained one against the demoralised, the champions of national self-government stand up against the victims of absolutism. There can be no swaying about of sympathies, no hesitating, no mean weighing of interests. And to make the contrast still clearer, at the very moment when the two opponents are within gunshot of each other, the turbid flood in Russia rushes hissing and whirling along till horror fills the soul of every civilised European. When Chlodvic the Frank went forth to the battle of Zulpich, he saw a fiery sign in the skies, a cross with the words, 'In hoc signo vinces.' Should the Anglo-Russian war be inevitable, then the bloody convulsions which have just taken place in Russia's capitals will have been the fiery sign shown to England at the moment of determination. England goes forth for justice and freedom, and it is written on the horizon, 'In these signs thou shalt con-

quer.' Every nation must feel in its deepest soul the necessity of cheering such a champion."

The *Constitutionel* (Paris, Nov. 1878) says the result of another and attentive reading of Lord Beaconsfield's remarks is that the First Minister of the Crown has confidence in the Treaty of Berlin, and gives an assurance in the name of the British Government that it will be faithfully executed. The writer adds: "The chief of the Opposition has no reason to congratulate himself on the result of the speech regarding its effect on the public mind. Never has a former Minister of the Queen been treated publicly as Mr. Gladstone has been; but it must also be said that never has a man in the position of Mr. Gladstone done, from motives of personal rancour, so much harm to his country and to Europe. A French pen will never trace the name of Gladstone without recalling the fatal policy which that Minister pursued in 1870. In referring to that subject we are much nearer our own matters than might be supposed. It was the Gladstone policy separating itself from the affairs of the Continent which rendered possible the mutilation of France, and with it the destruction of the old balance of power. Russia has continued in the East the work of M. Bismarck in the West. The Treaty of San Stefano is the counterpart of that of Frankfort. If England be reduced to-day to the position of the defensive, and find herself isolated, it is Mr. Gladstone that she must thank for that in a great measure, whatever may be said to the contrary. England does not fear an invasion of India from the north-east by China, from the north by Russia, or from the north-west by Afghan-

istan ; its really vulnerable point is Asia Minor and Persia. Both threatened by a Russian army from the Caucasus, Persia being besides the obliged vassal of Russia, it was to prepare for this danger that the English Government concluded the Convention of Cyprus, which enabled it, in return for the territorial guarantee in favour of the Porte, to take a footing in the Asiatic provinces of the Sultan. The policy of Lord Beaconsfield is no doubt far-seeing and prudent, but it has also its weak side. Proud England, reduced to the position of holding herself constantly on the look-out, will have to impose upon herself serious sacrifices to defend herself against Russia, which will finish by striking her a heavy blow at a certain moment. Although Asia Minor is certainly an excellent basis of defence for India, it is only in Europe that England will find a standpoint for defending Asia Minor, and Lord Beaconsfield has well shown that he appreciates this fact by assuring the independence of the Sultan. Mr. Gladstone thought that he could confine himself within his British island, allow fire to be put to the four corners of Europe, and still remain master of India. Lord Beaconsfield undertakes to defend India in Asia Minor and Stamboul."

The *Cologne Gazette* (Germany) adverts to Lord Beaconsfield's speech at the Guildhall in terms of the highest praise. The *Gazette* remarks that to those who expected a warlike harangue, like that of two years ago, the speech must have brought disappointment. The circumstances are, however, materially changed, and what was in place in 1876 would scarcely be so in 1878. The Prime

Minister manifests no less determination and firmness of resolution than two years ago, but he has couched the expression of that temper in different words. The aim which he set himself in 1876 he has now attained. The Treaty of San Stefano has been torn up, and by the Convention of the 4th of June Lord Beaconsfield has met the Russians with a commanding "Thus far shalt thou go, and no further." His allusions to "subordinates of foreign countries" and "the hair-brained chatter of irresponsible frivolity" were unquestionably called for. The familiar sayings ascribed to Prince Doudahoff Korsahoff no doubt come into this category. "Lord Beaconsfield," the *Cologne Gazette* concludes its article, "may look back with satisfaction upon the past years of his policy. Though he may not have been able to carry out all that he intended, he has beyond question succeeded in preserving the position of England as a great Power without diminution, aye, and in strengthening it. His last great speech at the Guildhall is not only the utterance of a calm and temperate politician who indulges in no delusions regarding the attainableness of the ends of his policy, it is also the serious expression of a firm will, a will which will be supported and enforced in the hour of decision by one of the most powerful nations upon earth."

I may remark, in passing, that the same view is enforced by our American cousins. The following remarks are culled from an influential American paper:—

"As the Suez Canal has restored the commerce of the East with Europe to its ancient route, so the English

occupation of Cyprus will restore Christianity to the centre from which it first radiated to the West. . . . . In a political point of view, a second line of communication with the Indus is of immense importance to Great Britain. In the event of a war with France, the overland communication of England with India might be entirely cut off. Had Russia gained Constantinople (in 1855), the Eastern trade of England by that route would have been at the mercy of two powerful and jealous rivals. It is indispensable to the commercial ascendency of England in the East, and even to the preservation of her Indian colonies, that she should open another route to India more immediately under her own control . . . and we think it highly probable that a railroad will eventually be built from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates. The steam fleets of Victoria will crowd the waters where the golden barge of Cleopatra, with its silken sails, wooed Anthony to love ; the puff of the locomotive will disturb the shades of Daphne and waken the echoes of Taurus and Libanus ; and the iron hands of Manchester will girdle the fallen empire of Semiramis. What Asia Minor needs to restore its ancient fertility and wealth is immunity from war, good stable government, and security for industry and trade. All these benefits will now be made sure by anchoring England within sight of the Asiatic coast. Turkey is henceforth secure against invasion from her hereditary foe. The fortified line of the Balkans would defend European Turkey until English succour should arrive ; and as the permanent ally of Turkey, England would not need to wait for the sanction

of other Powers before sending a fleet into the Black Sea to defend the Turkish possessions in Asia. The simple knowledge of these facts will deter Russia from menacing Turkey as has been her wont from the days of Peter the Great. The English protectorate of Asia Minor has laid the ghost of the 'Eastern Question.' The internal peace of Asia Minor will be secured in part by the nearness of an English force to overawe turbulent sects and tribes; but still more by that improved civil government which England will in part secure by her authority, in part conduct by her trained officials. India witnesses for the ability and the disposition of England to govern alike different races and religions safely and well. Peace and order will establish confidence, and confidence will invite capital and commerce. Over against Cyprus, on the mainland, at the mouth of the Orontes, is Seleucia, the ancient port of Antioch. The port was formed by two massive moles built out into the sea, and connected by a canal with an inner harbour or basin seven hundred yards long by four hundred and fifty yards wide, in which vessels could lie as securely as in the docks of Liverpool. The expense of restoring these works would be about forty thousand pounds. For a million pounds a railroad could be built from Seleucia to Birat, the head of navigation on the Euphrates. The distance is less than one hundred and fifty miles, and the greatest elevation to be overcome is but one thousand five hundred feet. This trunk secured, lines of railroad might be extended into Persia, and eventually down the valley of the Euphrates to Bassora or Grane at the head of the Persian Gulf.

These immense possibilities of commerce are now in the hands of the most civilising Power on the globe, and every Christian heart must rejoice in the supremacy of England in Asia Minor as the gauranty of a new Christian civilisation in the early seat of the Christian faith. The benefits to England of the acquisition of Cyprus are incalculable. Of the material gains just indicated, the larger part will naturally flow into her lap. With Cyprus in connection with Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal, she commands the Mediterranean—is virtually mistress of Constantinople. But far more important is the moral benefit to the English nation. There has been reason of late years to apprehend that the English nation was sinking into that materialistic, economic life, which, in the absence of any high ideal, forebodes the decay of a people through the very prosperity which is its boast. England was in danger of squatting upon her coal-mines till, having dug away the foundations of her thrift, she should tumble in with its crush. In European politics she was fast declining to a second-rate Power. In the wars of 1863 and 1870 no account was taken on the Continent of what England might say or do ; and in 1876 the Berlin Memorandum snubbed England in the most pointed manner. It was believed that England cared only for her material interests, and would not risk them for a principle of honour or of public law.

"Now all this is changed. England is felt and acknowledged to be a leading Power. A Prussian official, for thirty years active in diplomatic affairs, said to me : 'Our great diplomat (Bismarck) is utterly distanced by

the splendid diplomacy of Beaconsfield—his horizon is so much "wider." ' Splendid indeed it is when we consider the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, the raising of India from a dependency to a co-operative power, the subjection of Russia to the law of nations and the faith of treaties, the control of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the opening of Turkey to hopeful regulation, and of Asia to industry, commerce, and a purer Christianity, and the uplifting of England by this high ideal."

Returning again to Europe, the *North German Gazette* says :—"The acquisition of Cyprus will everywhere be regarded with justice as a measure of English policy, adopted with the object of defending England's influence and position in those parts of the East which are claimed as the proper sphere of Great Britain's power and interests. This step on the part of the British Government cannot fail to be greeted with approval when viewed from the standpoints of general civilisation and progress for Asia Minor."—July 1878.

The Italian paper, the *Opinione*, thus writes (Dec. 1878) :—"We have always manifested much sympathy with the Whig party in England, and praised the bold reforms of Mr. Gladstone when he was in power—the separation of Church and State in Ireland, the laws which secure the tenant farmers the value of the improvements made by them in the land, and various other measures which redounded to the honour of the Liberal party and of the ministers who supported them, but we have not

been able to ignore the influence which the Manchester school exercised on the foreign policy of the Cabinet. England seemed to abandon all interest in everything that took place on the Continent. She permitted to be accomplished, while holding herself aloof, the war in Denmark in 1864, the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, and, lastly, the war between Germany and France in 1870. And these, especially the two last, were wars which changed, it may be said, the whole face of Europe without England appearing to care anything about the matter. Lastly came the war in the East. Mr. Gladstone, who was no longer in power, maintained the expediency of coming to an understanding with Russia, and completely abandoning Turkey, which had shown herself incapable of reforming herself. Now, was that course possible ? Was it desirable for the interests of England ? The facts, especially the defence of 1877, have shown that Turkey had more strength than was supposed. And, on the other hand, an understanding with Russia for the reformation of the Turkish provinces in Europe was a most difficult undertaking. Even if successful, England would have, from the force of circumstances, gradually lost her influence in the East. In short, when one announces *à priori* that one will in no case fight, one at once submits to the superiority of the others.

"The Conservative party has followed a policy different from that suggested by Mr. Gladstone, and Parliament has recently given its very decided approbation to the Conservative policy. In the first place,

the policy of Lord Beaconsfield assured the influence of England in Egypt, partly by purchasing a portion of the Suez Canal shares, partly by direct action on the Egyptian Government. Then, after the Treaty of San Stefano, the Conservative Ministers stopped Russia in the course of her military and diplomatic triumphs, and, for the securing of English interests, prepared for war. This attitude of England assured the meeting of the Berlin Congress, and prepared the Treaty of Peace, the important results of which as regards English interests it is impossible to deny. The Treaty of Berlin leaves to Turkey the possibility of defending the Balkans. It withdraws Eastern Roumelia from the Bulgarian domination, and prepares for it a different future. It introduces the Austrian element into Bosnia and Herzegovina as a counterpoise to that of Russia. Turkey acquires a new support from the English Alliance, which secures to her Asia Minor. The possession of Cyprus places England in a better position for dominating the whole coast, and being ready for any event. The results, then, of the English policy have been very considerable, and such as to interest her afresh in the affairs of Europe. This policy had its origin in the war of 1854. It takes up again, and continues, the tradition of the Crimea which was for a moment interrupted. Hence we may see that it has not been due to the Cabinet alone, but evidently also to the direct influence of the Queen, faithful to the maxims of the Prince Consort. And here we may observe *obitu* that this fact comes in confirmation of a theory we have recently had occasion

to support, namely, that in constitutional states the Sovereign exercises an influence together with the Chambers, and that it is his duty to intervene in grave and decisive moments of the national life. The example of England, the model for countries governed by representative institutions should be well noted on this point also.

"But whilst England obtained these results in England and on the coasts of Asia Minor, a menacing condition of things arose against her in India. Our readers know the causes which led to the conflict with the Ameer of Cabul, for they have been explained by us at length on several occasions. It has been said that the Ameer was urged to resistance by Russia, and that is not improbable. It may have seemed opportune to Russia to raise difficulties for the English Government in its Indian possessions, and at the same time to draw its attention from European affairs, and thus to prevent it from reaping to their full extent the advantages hoped from the Berlin Treaty. Be that, however, how it may, the resolute attitude towards Russia instantly assumed by the English Ministry has compelled that power to withdraw its manifest protection from the Ameer, and to cease from opposing English action in Afghanistan. And on the other hand, the war declared against the Ameer, favourably begun, without an instant's delay, and carried on with rapidity and with astonishing vigour, has not left the enemies of England time to mature their projects. The telegraph has told us that the Ameer has fled from Cabul. If further intelligence does not con-

tradict this news, the war may be considered as terminated, and Afghanistan will enter the orbit of the secondary states of India.

"England will, then, in this year 1878 have obtained great results from her policy. She has recovered that position which, for some years past, she has seemed herself to set no value on, but which, however the details of recent events may be appreciated, is indispensable to the interests of civilisation, and we may say of European policy.

The *République Francaise* (M. Gambetta's journal) says:—"Lord Beaconsfield might well ask what the country would have been now if the Liberal party had been in power since 1873 In its hands, he could say, the British Empire would have lost its prestige, Russia would have defied Europe from Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and Asia Minor, like Central Asia, would have been subjected to its domination. Rebellion would have broken out in the heart of the Mussulman populations of India, which the first colonisers of the world would have been obliged to hand over to the first Cossack who presented himself on the Indian frontier. Lord Beaconsfield might have said many things as strong, and not less true than these, but he disdained to enter into a discussion where the advantages would all have been on his side, and preferred to trace in outline the leading features of English policy in the East. He affirmed, in the most elevated language, the intention of the Government to regret every project of annexation in Central Asia, and its firm resolution to

suppress any ferment of insurrection which might be produced on the Anglo-Indian frontiers by Russian intrigue. In a word, the First Minister undertook the solemn engagement to preserve, against any illegitimate attempts, the whole of the provinces of the East over which England has spread the protection of her sword. The peculiarly solemn character of these words, and the applause with which they were greeted, not only at Westminster, but throughout the country, engage England in a path on which she has shown too much hesitation to go forward, but where she cannot now draw back without imperilling her national existence and prejudicing her political probity."

The *Presse*, Vienna, March 1880:—"Europe has every reason to hope that the Earl of Beaconsfield will win his cause in the great trial which is about to take place before the British nation. For the last six years he has borne with a powerful hand the sceptre of the British Empire for his Queen, and he has twice intervened for the good right of all against the dictates of a single Power, and has restored the European concert which seemed annihilated in 1871 by boldly taking up the Russian gauntlet and forcing Russia to submit to the decisions of the other Powers. The purchase of the Suez Canal shares, the Queen's Title Bill, the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, his attitude at the time of the peace of San Stefano, the calling of Indian troops to Malta, his appearance at the Congress, the Treaty with Turkey, the Ultimatum to Shere Ali, and the subjection of South Africa constitute a crown of successes such

as no contemporary statesman, Prince Bismarck excepted, can boast of. It is to be expected that the English people will not withdraw their confidence from a man who has accomplished such things."

The *Tagblatt* (Democratic Viennese paper) says:— "The dissolution of the English Parliament is, under any circumstances, an act of great importance and significance. Coming at such a moment as this, it will be the signal for controversies which must needs excite the deepest interest. . . . Lord Beaconsfield has conducted his policy with energy, and has taken as little heed of the Opposition as does Prince Bismarck when once he has fixed upon his object and the means of attaining it. . . . We have frequently had occasion to comment upon Lord Beaconsfield's policy. He has awakened England's consciousness of her own strength as few Ministers have done before him. He has founded the dogma of British supremacy over the world. We do not believe that this statesman's career is finished. Whether we consider the bellicose elements prevailing in Europe, the relations of Russia with Germany and Austria, the pretensions of Italy, the embarrassed state of Turkey, or the programme of Panslavdom, we are obliged to acknowledge that Lord Beaconsfield will find further opportunity to exercise his policy of intervention. This renders the new elections in England of the very utmost importance for the rest of Europe. . . . It must be admitted that Lord Beaconsfield can be replaced by no other statesman in England, and that his presence in office is a necessity for Europe in order that

when great decisions have to be taken he may be there to defend great interests."

The *National Zeitung* (Liberal organ) says:—"For the rest, one can only admit that Lord Beaconsfield is right in ascribing to the result of the next elections an important influence on the course of events for peace or war. Lord Beaconsfield is one of the most active, dexterous, and powerful statesmen, who seek to counteract the war alliance between France and Russia. His removal from office by an unfavourable majority would be a heavy blow to pacific tendencies in Europe, even though we also regard Lord Beaconsfield as no apostle of peace in so far as he might deem any war of advantage to England. With all his faults, however, Lord Beaconsfield at this moment is the statesman of all in England from whom most is expected in the way of an energetic European policy, nay, is perhaps the only one; and as things appear at present, too, we do not doubt of his success."

The *Télégraphe* (Paris) writes:—"The severe condemnation of his policy of weakness before Prussia, and of effacement before Russia—which proudly tore up the Treaty of Paris, and gave England a slap with its *débris*,—which the English electors pronounced against Mr. Gladstone in 1874, has neither benefited this statesman who was formerly so eminent, or his party, and it is long odds on 1880 having a similar lesson in store for them. . . . England, for the welfare of Europe, for the repose of the world, and the maintenance of peace, ought to hold her

place in the Councils of the Continent, and this truth is so self-evident that we are assisting at the curious spectacle of Liberal, Republican, and even Radical France, regretfully throwing over the English Liberal Party, and giving all its sympathies to its adversaries, thus showing an amount of political intelligence which is of the utmost importance."

The *République Française* says:—"The difference between the two English parties is not sufficiently appreciable to make us hesitate in wishing success to the one whose foreign policy appears to us to fulfil best the imperious exigencies of the European balance of power. The Liberal party has had six years of reflection in which to reconstitute itself, and this long period has not sufficed to impress upon it that a policy of non-intervention and indifference is fatal to the prestige of England and hurtful to the interests of European civilisation. We are well aware that several of its influential members are animated by different ideas, but these are in the minority. Our opinion is, therefore, that by confirming the position, if not absolutely approving the whole foreign policy of the Conservative Cabinet, England will be choosing the wisest course."

ANOTHER INDICTMENT.

"In Africa Her Majesty's Ministers have drifted into a war which they did not sanction, and which they deplore—a war which has brought no honour and no advantage—no return for the blood and treasure which have been spent."—Lord Hartington's Manifesto.

EUROPE'S REPLY.

The *République Française*, February 1879.—"Party spirit is subject to strange aberrations. Just as certain devout prelates, who have private information of their own as to the designs of Providence, ascribe the inclemency of the elements to the pernicious tendencies of modern ideas, so has the Liberal Press in England fallen into the habit of holding Lord Beaconsfield responsible for all the sins of Israel. No railway accident, no collision at sea, occurs nowadays, without the Liberals taking the Cabinet to task for it. It would therefore have been passing strange if the Liberal journals had departed from their invariable habit and refrained from representing Lord Beaconsfield as an accomplice of King Cetewayo. Availing itself of the legitimate emotion caused by the news of the disaster at the Cape, the "Daily News" and its friends overwhelm the Government with the weight of their anger. The Prime Minister is called upon to explain why Lord Chelmsford allowed himself to be surprised in an ambuscade, and if the noble Earl could be supposed to possess that conscience which Mr. Gladstone has ever persistently refused him, he would be told that his sleep would be haunted by the ghosts of the murdered soldiers. 'Macbeth hath murdered sleep.' If the English were defeated, surely it is for Lord Chelmsford to explain why, and the very best explanation will be to beat the Kaffir King as quickly and completely as possible. But it is really too paltry to ascribe that disaster to the policy of the Cabinet. There are no party questions or party interests involved in the matter. The bare fact is that an intelligent

savage defeated the English because they had not taken the measures necessary to attack him in such a way as to ensure his defeat. The Liberals, however, reproach the Government with having undertaken the war. It is of course obvious that if there had been no fighting there would have been no defeat, but the very fact of the disaster is in itself a justification of the necessity of the war. It is because Cetewayo threatened the existence of the English colony of Natal by the organization of a formidable army that he was attacked. No doubt it would have been a more humane policy (one more worthy of the sublime indifference of the Manchester School for national interests) to wait until the Zulu King had completed his preparations to kill Lord Chelmsford and his troops and eat them. Sir Bartle Frere had but two courses open to him, either to attack at once—and he who had seen how thirty thousand men kept order throughout the vast expanse of India had some ground for supposing that fifteen thousand disciplined soldiers could beat forty thousand savages—or else to organize an armed neutrality, the costly proportions of which would have increased from day to day. That was no policy of adventure, but a sound appreciation of the reality of things. The local military authorities are also responsible for the mischief that has occurred, but the principle of the policy pursued is not thereby affected. If a neighbour accumulates a quantity of gunpowder around your dwelling, you are bound, unless you are entirely devoid of the sense of self-preservation, to bring that neighbour to his senses; but that is not the opinion of English Liberals. Had the Government allowed Cetewayo to prosecute unmolested

his warlike undertaking, they would have been accused of negligence. They accuse it now all the same as they have a deliberate purpose, a *parti pris*, of finding fault, and they actually try to turn that disaster to account for electioneering purposes. It is so easy to criticise when others govern, and so hard to govern when others criticise! The English Liberals know that better than anyone else."

A THIRD INDICTMENT.

In Afghanistan they have *created* a war which has destroyed a nation, the strength and independence of which they declared, in common with their predecessors, to be important for the safety of the frontier of India."—Lord Hartington's Manifesto.

"They have loaded India with the costs and dangers of a prolonged and unjustifiable war."—Mr. Gladstone's Address.

EUROPE'S REPLY.

The *Golos* (Russian), Oct. 1878.—"We have the fact that while our own Embassy to Cabul has been perfectly successful, the English Mission has been treated with open hostility by the Ameer. . . . What *we* can lose in these troubles is insignificant, while to England any Indian complication is simply a question of life and death. Russia being thus advantageously placed, she will no doubt profit by her Asiatic opportunities to paralyse England's policy in Europe."

The "*Vedomosti*," St. Petersburg, October 1878, says:—"England, once possessed of Afghanistan, would

be impregnable. With that mountain fortress in English hands, Russia would not only have to abandon all hope of ever driving the English out of India, but might actually find her eastern flank threatened by those who are her worst enemies in the West. Russia's future depends upon the Afghan-English war being turned to account in more quarters than one by her statesmen."

Professor Vambéry writes from Buda-Pesth to the *Sheffield Telegraph*:—"Though I love and admire England, I take little interest in the party politics of your country, save in so far as they affect great foreign affairs. . . . What I am totally at a loss to understand is that reckless and forcible perversion of undisguisable facts, and that unpardonable self-deceit, which the enemies of the present Government are practising to the irreparable detriment of Great Britain. How can a sober-minded man (I don't speak of politicians) pretend that Russia is unable and unwilling to attack India on the north-west frontier in 1879, after having seen in the last year a Russian army gathered for that purpose on the right bank of the Oxus, after having seen the Russians purchasing at high prices all kinds of provisions in Bokhara, after having seen General Kauffman sending a high officer to Bokhara for permission for a free passage through the territory of the Ameer, and, finally, after the official appointment of Generals Abramoff, Lomakine, and Colonel Snohenhelm to command the Russian army destined against India? You will say I speak from hearsay, but I beg your pardon, it is the *Turkestanskiyer Vyedomoskie*, *i.e.* the Russian

official paper which is published in Tashkend, out of which I glean these items of information. And, in the last place, who in the world would doubt the Russian designs upon India after seeing her dishonest meddling in Afghanistan, to which that suspicious and bilious tyrant called Shere Ali fell a victim? Shere Ali would have been certainly backed by Russia if the present English Government had not come forward so valiantly for the defence of England's rights, and if your glorious army had not been so prompt and so successful. . . . Sir, forgive me if I receive in ecstasies the re-awakening of England's energy as the brightest news I could hear. Luther has said "*wer rastet der rostet*," *i.e.* who stands still begins to grow rusty, and you will easily understand that a man who in fifteen years' experience was convinced of the benignant influence of England in Asia, cannot remain indifferent to England's new policy in that most important and interesting part of the world."

The *Freie Presse*, November 1878:—"If we consider that the Khanate of Afghanistan with its thirteen thousand square miles and its four or five millions of Persian, Afghan, and Indian population, has dared to challenge British India, so abundantly provided with inexhaustible resources, we may certainly admit that it is not Shere Ali who commences the war, but that it is Russia who, under the Afghan alliance, intends to fight England, exactly as two years ago she provoked the war against Turkey under the Servo-Montenegrin alliance."

The *Journal des Débats* (Paris), 1879.—"A perusal of the documents submitted by the English Cabinet proves that no responsibility attaches to the Government in regard to the origin of the Afghan war. In fact these papers prove that it is only within the past three years that the policy of the Government of Great Britain in its relations with Afghanistan has been conducted with system and firmness. When under the former Government the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, desired to adopt an energetic attitude, he was constantly hampered by the instructions of the Home Government. The letter of the Duke of Argyll, published within the last few days, fully confirms this view, and its conclusion is the best argument that could be found in favour of the line of policy adopted by Lord Beaconsfield. Later, under Lord Northbrook, the circumstances were reversed. Firmness was then established at London, and indecision at Calcutta. When Lord Lytton was called to the Indian Viceroyalty, accord was immediately re-established, the apprehensions that he manifested were shared in by Lord Beaconsfield, who at once set himself to work to repair the work of his predecessors with the certainty of being energetically supported."

Le Temps (Paris) says:—"One cannot run through the official correspondence which has just been published in the Blue Book, without recognising once more that the fundamental difference between the present English Government and of the one that preceded it, comes from a difference in the manner of regarding Russia. Mr. Gladstone and his friends, even after the Khiva

expedition, even after the Bosnian insurrection, even with the Treaty of San Stefano under their eyes, have never ceased 'in petto' to make common cause with Russia. Their philanthropical and religious pre-occupations, their hatred of the Turk and of the Koran, have constantly rendered them blind or indifferent to the interests of their country and to the equilibrium of Europe. Lord Beaconsfield, on the contrary, has been an Englishman before everything else. He has seen that in this struggle between the Crescent and the Cross, the real question was the grand Muscovite design upon Constantinople. He felt that the Russian Mission at Cabul was an episode in the rivalry of the two Powers, who only dispute Turkey with a view to Asia, and with this conviction he resolutely changed the policy followed up till then with the Ameer of Cabul, and offered him the offensive and defensive alliance which Lord Northbrook had refused, and imposed upon him those English Residents against the sending of whom Lord Northbrook had so energetically protested when Lord Salisbury first spoke to him about it in January 1875. But it was too late: the wilful blindness of the Gladstone Cabinet had wearied Shere Ali, and Afghanistan had entered into the sphere of action of St. Petersburg."

The *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna) says:—"The occupation of Afghanistan is not a purposeless adventure, nor is it undertaken in order to try new military organization. Its aim is to inflict a punishment for the offence suffered by England, and to hold up English authority in

India. The English will take good care to chastise the insolence of the Ameer and punish him the more heavily as he is only an advanced sentry pushed forward by Russia, and as he plays now the part which Servia played in Europe two years ago. The Ameer of Afghanistan is the Prince Milan of Asia—a mere tool in the hands of Russia."

The *Neue Freie Presse*, December 1879, says:—"The struggle between the two Powers which, ten years ago, was thought to be a contingency of the remote future, has already begun. Russia attacks England through Afghanistan in order to weaken her rival, and the savage hordes that surround General Roberts are but the vanguard of Russia. The Afghan war is not only of importance to England but to all Europe, and wherever Russia's aggressive designs are to be apprehended the issue of pending events at Cabul will be awaited with eagerness and anxiety. . . . The connection between the result of the struggle in Afghanistan and the development of Eastern affairs is so close, that without exaggeration it may be said that no State, and least of all Austria, can be indifferent to the next news from Calcutta. . . . We are sufficiently edified by the indefatigable eloquence of Mr. Gladstone as to what would be the foreign policy, particularly as regards Eastern affairs, of the Whigs. The retreat of Lord Beaconsfield and the nomination of a Gladstone-Hartington Ministry would be a victory for Russia of much greater importance than any she won in the Balkan Peninsula. England would be struck off the list of her adversaries

and would resume the position she occupied once before as passive spectator of events on the Continent. In the game of chess that she is playing against Russia, Europe would be losing her Queen."

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CANDAHAR:

OUR RIGHT AND DUTY TO RETAIN IT.

BY

HENRY ANSELM DE COLYAR,

OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW;
AUTHOR OF A "TREATISE ON THE LAW OF GUARANTEES," ETC.

"The conviction of ninety-nine out of every hundred Englishmen in India is that to abandon Candahar will be to make Afghanistan the theatre of Russian intrigue, to expose India to a very real present danger, and to effectually tie the hands of England in the event of European complications."

See 'TIMES,' 21st Feb., 1881.

"If a foreign army ever does descend upon the Indian frontier, it will be by way of Herat and Candahar, where the roads are open and traverse districts that have been called 'the granary of Asia,' and not through the sterile and difficult passes between Cabul and Peshawur."

SIR HENRY RAWLINSON, 20th July, 1868.

LONDON:
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1881.

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NOTICE.

THIS pamphlet is compiled from the various Blue Books relating to Afghanistan and Candahar which have been issued from time to time. It is hoped that it will be of some service to those persons who, though not caring or not having leisure to master the Blue Books, yet desire to become acquainted with the facts bearing upon the question, now agitating the public mind, of whether Candahar ought to be retained or given up.

H. A. DE C.

1, ELM COURT, TEMPLE, E.C.
21*st March*, 1881.

CANDAHAR:

OUR RIGHT AND DUTY TO RETAIN IT.

I.

England's Right to Retain Candahar.

The solution of the above question really involves the consideration of (1) the state of our relations with Afghanistan when the late Government acceded to power; and (2) the Afghan policy of the late Government.

(1) *First*, as to the state of our relations with Afghanistan when the late Government acceded to power.

A great deal of misapprehension exists on this subject, owing to the persistent assertions of certain Liberal and Radical politicians, that it was Lord Lytton who drove Shere Ali into the arms of Russia, and that had Lord Northbrook's policy been adopted by his successor in the Viceroyalty, Shere Ali would have remained what it is asserted that he was when the Liberals were driven from office in 1874, namely, the firm friend and trusty ally of England. Now, to any one who has really studied the Blue Books published in 1878, and

those recently issued, these statements must appear to be either the creations of an excited imagination, or else the products of a mind so completely unhinged by party zeal as to be quite incapable of appreciating the value of evidence, and of arriving at just conclusions therefrom. There is, indeed, another and less satisfactory explanation of the strange inaccuracies to which reference is made, namely, that certain politicians, considering everything to be fair in party warfare, and relying on the fact that the majority of persons are content to receive their information from *third* persons, without obtaining it themselves direct from official sources, deliberately abstain from placing the *whole* unvarnished truth before the public, and dole out only so much of it as suits their purposes. Now it is eminently desirable, whatever may be the cause of the existing misapprehension, that it should be at once removed, so that the people of England may really know how grievously they have been deceived by those in whom they reposed their confidence at the last General Election.

The state of our relations with the Amir of Afghanistan in 1874 is easily ascertainable. The evidence on the subject cannot be objected to, for it is supplied by no less an authority than Shere Ali himself, who stated to the British Government, through our native agent at Cabul, that instead of being satisfied with the treatment he had received during Lord Northbrook's Vice-

royalty, he, on the contrary, complained of the following grievances, dating from 1872 :

1. The communication which he had received from Lord Northbrook in 1874, on behalf of his son, Yakoob Khan, whom he had imprisoned.

2. The decision on the question of the Seistan boundary.

3. The gifts sent by Lord Northbrook direct to the chief of Wakhan, who was a tributary to the Amir.

4. The repeated rejection of his previous request for an alliance and a formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his son, Abdoollah Jan.

With regard to the last-named grievance, namely, the rejection of his repeated requests for alliance, it is important to remember that in 1873 a very favourable opportunity occurred for cementing a lasting friendship between Afghanistan and British India, which was neglected by the Liberal Government. The facts are as follow :

In 1873 Shere Ali became extremely alarmed at the Russian progress in Central Asia, and addressed a communication to Lord Northbrook on the subject, inquiring how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if invaded. Before replying to this message Lord Northbrook telegraphed to London for instructions, and received the following answer from the Duke of Argyll :

"India Office, 26th July, 1873.

"Cabinet thinks you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it; but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."

Now it is by no means astonishing that this resolution of the Liberal Cabinet, which was in due course communicated to Shere Ali, failed to reassure him, and made him that which Lord Cranbrook aptly terms, "frigid, sullen, and discourteous" towards England. To be told that there was no cause for alarm must have greatly surprised Shere Ali when he reflected upon then recent events. He must have wondered what grounds existed for the sanguine opinion thus expressed by the British Government, and must have asked himself whether reliance was still placed on Russian pledges. Khiva, he knew, had just been annexed, though only a few months previously Count Shovaloff gave Her Majesty's Government the "most decided and positive assurances that not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupation of Khiva." He also knew that Samarcand was still retained by Russia, not-

withstanding that its restoration to the Amir of Bokhara had been announced. And he must have observed with dismay that there were no signs of any cessation of Russian aggression, but that, on the contrary, every day diminished the distance between Afghanistan and the invader. It may, however, be said, that the Amir ought to have recovered his equanimity by the comforting assurance of the British Government that "we shall maintain our *settled* policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs." Now it must have somewhat astonished the Amir to learn that we had a "*settled policy*," for he can hardly have forgotten that on the death in 1863 of his father, Dost Mahomed, with whom we had entered into a treaty of friendship and alliance, Sir John Lawrence, the then Viceroy, adopted the somewhat impolitic course of first recognising Shere Ali as Amir, he having been designated for that post by his father, and of afterwards, on civil war breaking out amongst the sons of Dost Mahomed, refusing to lend any *moral* support to Shere Ali in this emergency. This mode of procedure was not, however, attended with complete success; for, unfortunately, it became necessary eventually to acknowledge *two* of the sons of Dost Mahomed as rulers in Afghanistan; and therefore when in 1868 Shere Ali, on the death of his brother, recovered possession of his

kingdom, his recognition by the British Government did not entirely dissipate "that feeling of resentment for the neutral attitude which had been observed towards him in his hour of need."

For all these reasons, therefore, it is by no means surprising that Shere Ali was not satisfied with the response he received from the British Government in 1873, or that afterwards his attitude towards us became most ungracious. This change of feeling on the part of the Amir was manifested in various ways, and notably by his contemptuous rejection of the subsidy lodged to his credit at the Kohat Treasury; by his refusal, in terms positively offensive, to permit any English officer to enter his territories; and by his peremptorily prohibiting Sir D. Forsyth from passing through Cabul on the return of that officer, in the capacity of British Envoy, from Kashgar to India.

Such then, in a few words, was the state of our relations with Afghanistan when the Conservatives returned to office in 1874. And it certainly does demonstrate a very treacherous memory on the part of the Duke of Argyll, or else a somewhat careless reading of the Blue Books, when we find his Grace asserting in the House of Lords, in a speech delivered by him on the 10th of January last, that it was the policy pursued by the late Government, under the Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, which caused Shere Ali to seek refuge in

the arms of Russia. Having now explained what were the relations existing between Great Britain and Afghanistan when the late Government acceded to office in 1874, it will be convenient to pass on to the consideration of—

(2) The Afghan policy of the late Government.

One of the first things which occupied the attention of the late Government was, naturally, the state of our relations with Afghanistan. It was felt by Lord Salisbury that the knowledge we possessed of what was passing at Cabul was extremely scant and imperfect, and that so long as our native Agent at the Court of Shere Ali was the sole channel of information between Afghanistan and British India, all facts would be withheld from us excepting those which the Amir did not care to conceal. Moreover, it was considered that the establishment of a British Agency would be an indication of English solicitude for the safety of our allies, and would so tend to discourage counsels dangerous to the peace of Asia. Accordingly it was determined, if possible, to procure the assent of Shere Ali to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. "I do not," wrote Lord Salisbury in his despatch of the 22nd of January, 1875, "suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people." Lord Northbrook, however, to whom this despatch

was addressed, did not consider the time had arrived for procuring the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan, and was disposed to wait until the occupation of Merv by a Russian force was an accomplished fact. But, as Lord Salisbury pointed out in reply, "if ever the Russians should accomplish the permanent occupation of Merv, the time would possibly have passed by when representations to the Amir could be made with any useful result; for the influence of your Government at Cabul, already enfeebled, would, for such a purpose, have in a great measure disappeared." However, notwithstanding the strong opinion entertained by Lord Salisbury as to the desirability of establishing a British Agency within the dominions of the Amir, he was determined before all things to act "*circumspectly*" in this matter, and avoid giving offence to Shere Ali. Accordingly, after some delay it was determined to take advantage of the accession to the Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton for the despatch of a complimentary special Mission to Cabul. A trusted *Native* officer was therefore, in May 1876, despatched to Cabul, as the bearer of a friendly letter from the new Viceroy, and likewise secretly authorised to use his best endeavours to bring about a favourable opening for the renewal of the discussions, commenced by Lord Mayo at Umballa in 1869 with the Amir himself, and continued in

1873 with the Minister of his Highness, on matters of common interest to the two Governments. The Amir, however, declined the interview with the native officer, and it was not insisted upon. But Lord Lytton took the prudent course of exhorting Shere Ali once more to consider seriously before he rejected our proposals, the consequences to himself of obliging the British Government to look upon him henceforth as a prince who had voluntarily *isolated* his personal interests from its proffered alliance and support. At the same time, in order to convince his Highness of the sincerity of our conduct towards him, Dr. Bellew and other personal friends of the Amir in the service of our Government addressed to the Amir and his Ministers letters, unofficially explaining our sentiments, and the importance of the opportunity then offered to the Afghan Government for materially strengthening its position at home and abroad. After a significant delay of two months the Amir vouchsafed a reply to the communications which had been addressed to him, and suggested the two following alternative propositions—namely, *first*, that an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from the Viceroy at Peshawur; and, *second*, that the British Vakeel at Cabul should proceed to Simla charged with a confidential explanation to the Viceroy of the personal views and sentiments of the Amir on the

subject of his relations with the British Government. The Viceroy at once accepted the second proposal, being hopeful that it would lead to a cordial understanding with Shere Ali, and to an agreement upon a basis for more formal negotiations at some future date. Accordingly, in October 1877, the suggested Conference at Simla took place, when the grievances of which the Amir complained, and which have been already mentioned in a previous page, were specified by the Vakeel, who also stated that "his Highness was resentful to the rebuffs met with by his previous representations to the Government of India, and resolved not to incur any repetition of a result which he deemed offensive to his dignity." Eventually the Vakeel returned to Cabul with instructions to explain to the Amir that the British Government was prepared to sign with his Highness a Treaty of Alliance, and accord a formal recognition to his heir-apparent, *provided* Shere Ali would consent to the location of at most two or three British officers (accredited to his Highness, placed under his protection, and precluded from all interference in the internal affairs of his Government) upon those points of his frontier whence we were unable to obtain intelligence by other means, and which were most exposed to the attacks against which we were asked to defend it. Simultaneously with the return of the Vakeel to

Cabul, a letter was despatched by the Viceroy to Shere Ali inviting him to Delhi as the guest of the British Government at the approaching Imperial assemblage. To this letter of Lord Lytton the Amir never made any answer, but, after considerable delay, he despatched his Minister, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. The Conference commenced in January 1878, and lasted a considerable time. During its progress, it became more and more apparent that Shere Ali was temporising, and that he no longer desired to ally himself with the British Government, whom he evidently distrusted owing to the rebuff he had received from the Liberal Cabinet in 1873. Before, however, the negotiations were in an advanced state, the Afghan Minister died, and so the Conference terminated. That it was never resumed was no fault of the British Government. For it was felt by them that, having regard to the discourteous treatment with which their overtures had been received by the Amir, the wisest and most dignified course to adopt would be, whilst carefully watching the progress of affairs in Afghanistan, so far as the imperfect means of obtaining information admitted, to abstain from all interference in them, in the hope that time would enable his Highness to realise the dangers accruing to himself by the rejection of the

friendly advances of the British Government. That hope was not, indeed, realised; for not only did Shere Ali obstinately maintain his attitude of unfriendly isolation, but eventually welcomed with every appearance of goodwill an Embassy from the Czar, despatched to his Court at a time when there were indications that an interruption of friendly relations between this country and Russia might be imminent. So soon as the Amir had been guilty of what may well be termed this overt act of hostility towards this country, the British Government felt that a policy of inaction could no longer be maintained, and that the reception of a British Mission at Cabul should forthwith be insisted upon. But being still most anxious, if possible, to avoid a rupture with Shere Ali, our most reasonable demand was couched in language both firm and courteous, while in the selection of Sir Neville Chamberlain, whose name and family were held in high esteem by the Amir, as head of the Mission, an additional proof of the conciliatory spirit by which the British Government were actuated was furnished.

Now it may be said, on the one hand, that the Russians were *justified* in sending a Mission to Cabul, and, on the other hand, that Shere Ali, being an independent prince, was within his undoubted rights in receiving it. But, as regards the Russians, a distinct understanding had been

arrived at with them by the British Government that Afghanistan was to be regarded as beyond the sphere of the Czar's influence, and under the *sole* protection of England; whilst, as regards Shere Ali, he had really no claim to be considered as an absolutely independent Sovereign free to act as he pleased, where the interests of British India were concerned, for he had solicited and received material aid from the British Government on various occasions on the understanding that he was to abide by our advice in external affairs; and, moreover, it was owing to our influence at St. Petersburg that Russia had pledged herself not to infringe upon the integrity of his dominions. That Lord Northbrook himself did not regard Shere Ali as an independent prince is pretty evident. For, in his despatch of 7th June, 1875, Lord Northbrook states that when he had reason to suppose that Shere Ali intended to demur to the reasonable request that Ibrahim Khan should pass through Afghanistan with a communication from our Government to the Meer of Wakhan, he *insisted* upon a compliance with our wishes, and should adopt the same course again under similar circumstances. If, therefore, Lord Northbrook considered such conduct on our part justifiable, he can hardly agree with those politicians who maintain, without discussing the propriety of the step, that the British Government

had *no right*, under the circumstances already detailed, to *insist* upon the reception of a British Mission at Cabul.

It is not proposed to give a detailed narrative of the conduct of the Amir subsequent to his reception of the Russian Envoy. It suffices to say that the Mission was not allowed to proceed to Cabul, or even to enter Afghanistan, and that Major Cavagnari was distinctly informed at Ali Musjid by the Afghan official, sent to intercept him, "*that if the Mission advanced it would be opposed by force*," and that, owing to his personal regard for Cavagnari, "*he had restrained his men from firing on us.*" Now it is stated by Mr. Justin McCarthy in his 'History of our own Times' (vol. iv. pp. 495-6), that this treatment received by the members of the British Mission was *magnified* into an insolent rebuff, and that the passion of the English people for the moment became inflamed with the *idea* of an insult to the English flag. It is, however, submitted that it would have been impossible to put any other interpretation on what took place at Ali Musjid, than that Shere Ali was bent on acting the part of an enemy, and that he had *intentionally* insulted us. But even after the Amir had thus thrown aside all friendly appearances and displayed himself in his true colours, the patience and forbearance of the British Government were not entirely exhausted. They

still desired to avert the calamities of war, and instructed the Viceroy to address to Shere Ali a demand, in temperate language, requiring a full and reasonable apology, within a given time, for the affront which he had offered to the British Government, the reception of a permanent British Mission within his territories, and reparation for any injury inflicted by him on the tribes who attended Sir N. Chamberlain and Major Cavagnari, as well as an undertaking not to molest them hereafter. A reply to this ultimatum was requested within a specified time, and as it was not forthcoming, war became inevitable. On the 21st Nov. 1878, Lord Lytton issued a proclamation, in English, Persian, and Urdu, "to the Amir Shere Ali Khan, of Cabul, to his Sirdars and subjects, and to all the people of Afghanistan." That proclamation recapitulated, briefly and clearly, the circumstances which had rendered it necessary, and concluded with the following assurance to the subjects of Shere Ali:—"With the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Government has *still* no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved from all responsibility for the recent acts of the Amir, and *as they have given no offence*, so the British Government, wishing to respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere with them, nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other

person in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Upon the Amir Shere Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India." Now we hear it asserted, over and over again, that the above assurance pledged the British Government, under no circumstances, to annex any part of Afghanistan, and that consequently our permanent occupation of Candahar would be a violation of that pledge. It is, however, submitted that the assurance in question is quite incapable of being so construed. For it merely absolves the people of Afghanistan from all participation in their ruler's hostility, informs them that the British Government has "*still*" no quarrel with them and desires none, that "*as they have given no offence*" it is wished to respect their independence; but does *not* promise that no part of their territory shall be annexed if they *should* in the future quarrel with us, and *should* subsequently give offence. Without giving a detailed account of the first Afghan campaign, it suffices to state that we obtained an easy triumph over our enemy, and that so soon as we were informed of the death of Shere Ali, we willingly consented to the conclusion of a treaty of peace with his son, Yakoob Khan. That treaty was signed at Gandamak on the 26th of May, 1879, and it is interesting and important to observe that it does not *per-*

manently cede to the British Government one inch of territory. For it merely provides, by the 9th Article, that the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi, shall be treated as assigned districts, "*and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom;*" whilst the revenues of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, were to be paid to the Amir. So that it is absolutely true to affirm that the Treaty of Gandamak was no violation of the assurance given by Lord Lytton to the people of Afghanistan at the outset of the campaign, and that it is in strict accordance with the wish expressed by him to respect their independence, and *not willingly* to injure or interfere with them. Now surprise is sometimes expressed that the British Government did not, by the Treaty of Gandamak, stipulate for the temporary surrender of Candahar instead of the districts actually assigned; and it must be admitted that if the retention of Candahar possesses strategic and other advantages *now*, it was not a less desirable place to hold *then*. Those persons, however, who argue in this way forget altogether that when the Treaty of Gandamak was entered into, the British Government entertained good hope that it would *still* be possible to form a strong and friendly Afghanistan; and they knew very well that for this purpose it was eminently desirable that Cabul

and Candahar should remain under the sway of one Ruler. They therefore determined to be satisfied with the cession, not of the *most* desirable places from a military point of view, but with the temporary assignment of certain districts which the Amir could best spare without materially impairing the integrity of his dominions, and which at the same time would give additional security to the frontier of British India. That the British Government had reasonable grounds for believing that Yakoob Khan would be able to form a strong Afghanistan is evident enough, for they felt that the ill-treatment he had received from his father, Shere Ali, had probably endeared him to the people over whom he was to rule; and that having been brought up in the school of adversity, he was the more likely to possess that spirit of self-reliance which a life of Oriental ease and luxury might have extinguished. They also knew that Yakoob Khan was, of all the competitors for the throne vacated by Shere Ali, the most likely to prove a true friend to England. For, over and over again, the British Government had remonstrated with Shere Ali on his inhuman conduct towards his son, Yakoob Khan, and endeavoured to procure his release from the prison where he was so long confined at Cabul. Thus the new Amir, bound to England by the ties of gratitude as well as by those of self-interest, and

secure as the Afghan people knew him to be of the friendship of the British Government, whose prestige was at that moment very great, might well be regarded as capable of forming a strong Afghanistan which would serve as the best possible bulwark against Russian aggression.

The Treaty of Gandamak naturally provided, not merely for the temporary cession of territory, but also for the location of a British Representative at Cabul. And it is only fair to the British Government to state that they did not select Cabul as a place of residence for an Embassy, but that the suggestion came from Yakoob Khan himself. "It had not been our intention," writes Lord Lytton in his despatch of the 7th of January, 1880, "to propose Cabul for the residence of our Representative; but, when the capital was thus expressly selected by the Amir himself, there were many motives for deferring to the choice of his Highness, and there was no tenable ground for opposing it." Further, the Amir expressed, from first to last, no disinclination to receive the Envoy, nor any mistrust of his power to protect him. It was, therefore, but reasonable to suppose that when Shere Ali expressed himself on previous occasions to be unable to protect a British Mission at Cabul, the *will* rather than the *power* to do so was wanting; and that, as Sir John Lawrence stated in 1857, when Dost Mahomed urged the same

excuse, the real motive for refusal was the disinclination of his Highness to let British officers discover the weakness of his rule, or come in contact with disaffected chiefs at his capital. Consequently, it is submitted, that the British Government were not to blame for acting upon the stipulation contained in the Treaty of Gandamak, and despatching Sir L. Cavagnari and his retinue to Cabul. How that gallant officer and the rest of the Mission were, on the 3rd of September, 1879, attacked, whilst in the British Embassy at Cabul, by three native regiments forming the Amir's household troops, and how they fell overcome by numbers after a brave defence, is one of the most lamentable events the history of India has ever had to record. But our indignation at this bloody deed must not warp our judgment, and cause us to blame the late Government for an event which no one for a moment seriously anticipated.

It is quite unnecessary to refer in detail to what took place after the murder of Cavagnari and the other members of the Embassy. That Yakoob Khan, whose complicity in the murder must ever remain somewhat doubtful, eventually resigned, and how Roberts advanced to Cabul with a strong force is well known; and it is likewise matter of common knowledge that the occupation of Cabul revealed the fact that it had become "*a huge arsenal*

and barrack;" and, as General Roberts afterwards stated, "this unmasking of the Amir's considerable war preparations, hitherto carefully concealed from us, is surely *in itself* a sufficient justification of the line of action taken by the Indian Government when it declared war against Afghanistan in 1878." But it is worthy of notice, that the second Afghan campaign having been necessitated not so much by the conduct of the Amir as by the general hostility of his subjects, no pledge to respect their independence was on this occasion made, and it is clear that the original assurance given by Lord Lytton in November 1878, to which reference has already been made, was no longer binding, as it contemplated and required, as a condition for its fulfilment, that the Afghan people should continue to abstain from giving offence. Moreover, the Treaty of Gandamak itself had ceased to be operative, being undoubtedly annulled by the subsequent outbreak of hostilities between the contracting parties. The British Government was thus free to make such arrangements as should seem most calculated to secure the permanent security of British India—and they eventually determined on the separation of Candahar from Cabul. In his despatch of 7th January, 1880, Lord Lytton expresses himself as follows on this subject:—"There can, we conceive, be no doubt of the expediency of separating Candahar from Cabul. The Duranis

of South Afghanistan, who form the predominant class, have no leanings towards the Cabul Government, which has always represented to the mass of the Candahar people an alien and oppressive rule. We propose, therefore, to establish the province of Candahar as an independent and separate state . . . *We consider that it will be necessary to retain a British garrison at or near Candahar.*" In pursuance of the policy here indicated, it was eventually determined to recognise Abdur Rahman, the legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, as Amir of Cabul, and to appoint Sirdar Shere Ali as Wali of Candahar. On the 15th of March, 1880, Sir D. Stewart received the principal inhabitants of Candahar and surrounding villages in Durbar, and informed them that Candahar would for the future stand by itself and not fall again under the authority of a supreme ruler in Cabul. On the other hand, the inhabitants informed Sir D. Stewart that they had all taken an oath on the Koran to the effect that they would at once deliver up to justice any individual whom they might hear of that was an ill-wisher to the British Government, and intending to do mischief to the troops then in garrison. It is therefore evident that before Candahar can be given up by the present Government, they are *morally bound* to ascertain into whose hands it will fall after their departure; for if it be again placed under the dominion of Cabul, as seems more than probable,

the promise given by Sir D. Stewart to the people of Candahar will have been distinctly violated.

We have now reached the period when the late Government ceased to be responsible for the government of India, and when the conduct of affairs passed to their successors in office. And in concluding this brief sketch of the Afghan policy of the late Government, it is confidently submitted that no reasonable person can seriously dispute our *moral right* to retain possession of Candahar; and that, however Radical politicians may reprobate the conduct of the late Government, the impartial verdict of the people of England at the next General Election will be that the policy of "*masterly vigilance*" pursued by Lord Lytton was more suited to the period over which his Viceroyalty extended, than was the policy of "*masterly inactivity*" with which the name of Lord Lawrence is identified. "Our policy of masterly inactivity," says Lord Napier of Magdala in his able Minute of 30th May, 1878, "or rather of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster." Not only, however, was the Afghan policy of the late Government one of "*masterly vigilance*," it was, in every sense of the word, *conciliatory and pacific*. On this subject Sir Lewis Pelly states in a letter addressed by him to

the *Times* on the 21st ult., as follows :—" I declare publicly and on honour, that there was nothing warlike in the instructions of Lord Salisbury. His intention and that of the Viceroy was to find an opportunity for personal communication between their Envoy and the Amir or his Minister, with the view of removing past misapprehensions; and secondly, with the view of assuring the Amir in treaty form that we desired to see his Government and territories strong, prosperous, and in intimate alliance with British India." These words of this distinguished Indian official form the best criticism of the Afghan policy of the late Government, and their strict accuracy is completely established by the various despatches which passed between London and India during Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, and by the communications which were from time to time addressed to Shere Ali by Lord Northbrook's successor.

II.

Ought Candahar to be Retained?

This question should, it is submitted, be determined with reference to the opinions which have been given upon the subject by the eminent military and civil authorities who have been expressly consulted, or who have voluntarily come forward to give information.

First, let us examine the authorities who are said to be favourable to the policy of the present Government.

Lord Ripon.—According to Lord Granville, the present Viceroy is opposed to the retention of Candahar. His opinion has, however, been kept very much in the background by the present Government, and we are left to conjecture what it is as best we may. But according to Sir R. Montgomery (Afghanistan, 1881, No. 2, p. 66), who is in complete accord with the present Government, it is rumoured that Lord Ripon contemplates holding *Pishin*. Now if this rumour be correct, then one can easily understand why it is that Lord Ripon's opinion is concealed by his colleagues, who are prepared to give up Candahar, Pishin, and every other coigne of vantage in Afghanistan obtained by the expenditure of so much blood and treasure.

The Indian Council.—Lord Granville has been obliged to admit that, with the exception of Major Baring, it is extremely doubtful whether any other Member of Council is in favour of Candahar being given up. And, without wishing to speak disrespectfully of Major Baring, it is only fair to say that, owing to his having been but recently appointed to the Indian Council, his opinion is not entitled to the same consideration as it would otherwise have justified.

Sir G. Wolseley.—"I fully concur in the views expressed regarding the desirability of our leaving Candahar, *and retiring upon Pishin.*" (Afghanistan, 1881, No. 2, p. 46.) "Whenever the Russians march upon Herat, we must certainly occupy Candahar, unless we intend to give up India, or to allow it to be taken from us; but the longer we can postpone that occupation the better we shall be able to incur the vast expenditure it will necessarily entail upon us." (*Ibid.* p. 80.) Such being the opinion of this distinguished officer, he can hardly be claimed as favouring the policy of the present Government, since he considers that Pishin ought to be retained if Candahar is to be given up.

Colonel East.—This officer, though opposed to the permanent occupation of Candahar, expresses himself as follows:—"It is not recommended that Candahar should be at once evacuated. This should not be done until Abdur Rahman has shown that he is firmly established in power, and is faithful to the promises he has made to the British Government. Lastly, as regards the frontier line we should occupy, there appears to be no reason why any alterations should be made from that contemplated in the Treaty of Gandamak." (Afghanistan, No. 2, p. 46.)

Sir E. Perry, Sir H. Norman, Sir R. Montgomery, and Major Baring are really the only persons of

eminence consulted on the subject who, according to the Blue Book last published, have given *unqualified* opinions against the retention of Candahar.

Sir D. Stewart.—There has been a great deal of misapprehension as to what is the opinion of this most distinguished officer. It is now clear, however, that he cannot be claimed as a supporter of the policy of the present Government. For though, *on the 18th April*, 1879, he expressed the opinion that we should not occupy Candahar, because "by restricting our advance to Pishin we have a strong and, in most respects, a satisfactory frontier, and in that position we can lay our hands on Candahar at any moment;" yet subsequently he appears to have altered his opinion, and, in a memorandum dated *2nd July*, 1880, he expresses his hearty agreement with a memorandum prepared by General Sir F. Roberts in which the retention of Candahar is strongly advocated.

Before passing to the consideration of the opinions in favour of the retention of Candahar, there is one observation which should be expressed, and it is this: The present Government appear to have made up their minds to withdraw from Candahar *before* they had consulted any authorities upon the subject. In other words, they seem to have formed their own resolution *first*, and *then* asked for advice. It is not, therefore, by any means

surprising to find that they have rejected all advice which did not accord with their preconceived resolution, and have acted only upon those opinions which favoured their view of the matter.

Secondly : Let us examine the authorities favourable to the retention of Candahar.

H.R.H. Duke of Cambridge.—The Commander-in-Chief is very strongly averse to the giving up of Candahar, and considers that the objections of Col. East, which are based upon the possible collapse of the native armies and the breakdown of our transport, are not tenable. He also states that, with Candahar in our possession, we might look on with perfect calmness to Russia's occupying and holding Merv, and that if we now retire, our prestige will receive a vital blow.

General Sir F. Haines.—The Commander-in-Chief in India, in a Minute dated 25th November, 1880, states that Candahar is for every purpose a strategic position of first-class importance, and also expresses his belief that, from a commercial point of view, it will form a desirable acquisition. And in a previous Minute, dated 18th September, 1880, he states as follows :—"I should, with Sir F. Roberts, wish to assert that my views of the propriety of the withdrawal from Cabul and from Gandamak is based on the supposition that Candahar will be held in force. *This is the keystone of the whole military situation.*"

Lord Napier of Magdala.—In a carefully considered Minute, dated the 12th October, 1880, he argues in favour of the retention of Candahar, and states that, if we do not annex it, a few years will see Russia in possession of it, in whose hands it will become an impregnable fortress commanding the road to India with a facility for aggression which may be measured by Ayoob Khan's rapid march to Candahar. "*If we retire now*," writes Lord Napier, "*the memory of the defeat of Burrows will outlive the splendid victory of Roberts and his army.*"

General Sir F. Roberts.—In an able and very lengthy Minute, dated 29th May, 1880, he says that our grasp should never be loosened on Candahar, and that its military occupation is of vital importance.

Major-General Sir H. Rawlinson.—He thus expresses himself in a Minute, dated 25th September, 1880:—"The presence of a British garrison at Candahar, over and above the support it might yield to our foreign policy, would be our best guarantee for the permanence of the Cabul arrangement, and cannot, therefore, be too strongly insisted on as a measure of proper, and only proper, precaution." He also states that of all possible political shortcomings with Afghanistan, the most fatal would be the abandonment of the Candahar railway.

Sir W. Merewether.—He gives an excellent

summary of the arguments in favour of the retention of Candahar, advocates in unqualified terms its permanent occupation, and expresses the opinion that to hold it "*no increase in our army is required, and that any extra expenditure incurred in the administration of the occupied country will be more than covered by the returns on the spot.*"

Major-General Sir H. Green.—In a Minute, dated the 30th December, 1878, he warmly advocates the retention of Candahar as being eminently desirable from a military and political point of view. And he expressly states, as one reason why we ought not to give it up, that "all our experience of Asiatics teaches us that we must be amongst the people whom we wish to influence, and that such influence in Afghanistan can no longer be exerted from Calcutta or from Simla. As an example of this we may take Beloochistan, conterminous since 1843 with our Sind frontier. Forty years ago, nowhere could a country more unfriendly disposed towards us have been found, as was proved in the conduct of its ruler towards our troops during the last Afghan war. Yet, at the present moment, it would be difficult to show a country more loyally disposed towards us."

It is quite unnecessary to continue multiplying authorities in favour of the retention of Candahar. The names of such distinguished men as *Sir. R.*

Temple; of Sir Bartle Frere, who in a masterly Minute, published in the *Times* of 3rd March last, deals with the whole question; of *Colonel Malleson*, who states that Candahar ought to be retained as the citadel which completely guards the one really weak point of our Indian frontier; of *Sir R. Egerton*, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; and of *Professor Vambery*, who considers that Candahar will prove one of the best investments England could make in the interior of Asia, must occur to every one.

In conclusion, it is only necessary to express the hope that the present Government, instead of adhering to rash pledges, given by them when in opposition, and which will be more honoured in the breach than the observance, will now, even at the last moment, give a proof of their patriotism by announcing their intention to retain permanent possession of Candahar—not, indeed, as a menace to Russia, but as a protection to British India.

THE END.

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THE

GOVERNMENT POLICY

WITH RESPECT TO

AFGHANISTAN,

BY

J. D. M.

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MARCH 1880.

THE

GOVERNMENT POLICY

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No part of the Foreign Policy of the Government has been more persistently assailed than its dealings with Afghanistan. We are told that these commenced with a crime and ended with a blunder; that we made an unjustifiable war upon Shere Ali Khan for the purpose of forcing him to receive an embassy, and of securing to ourselves a scientific frontier; that our Ambassador has been murdered, and our frontier is insecure; that we asserted a wish to make Afghanistan friendly and independent, and that we have succeeded in breaking it up into fragments, which are hostile to each other and to ourselves; that our true policy was to preserve the Afghans as a barrier between ourselves and Russia, and that the result of our conduct will be to obliterate Afghanistan, and to bring our own frontier in contact with that of Russia. Finally, we are told that we were warned beforehand of the very dangers and difficulties which have happened, but that we chose wantonly to encounter them by abandoning the old Whig policy which had preserved us in security and peace.

Now I think it will be found that the whole of this argument rests upon the not uncommon fallacy of criticizing the course which has been taken without enquiring into the reasons which made it necessary; of magnifying the undoubted dangers and difficulties which have arisen from adopting that course, and ignoring the still greater dangers and difficulties which

would have arisen from adopting any other course; of assuming that peace and security are the same thing, and that the best way of avoiding a contest with a burglar is to remain quietly in bed while he is breaking open the hall door. My object will be to show that the position of affairs in the end of 1878 left the Government absolutely no alternative except to make war upon the Amir of Afghanistan; that if everything which has occurred could have been foreseen, it would still have been necessary to follow exactly the same course; that if that course has been forced upon us by previous mistakes, those mistakes were committed by Mr. Gladstone's Government; and that the policy which we are told we ought to have followed is simply the old Whig policy, which consists, first in doing nothing until it is too late, and then in doing nothing because it is too late.

The whole reasoning on the other side rests upon a persistent refusal to recognize the Russian element in the case. If this is excluded, the argument against the policy of the Government would be unanswerable. So long as we had only to do with Afghanistan, no human being would wish to establish an Embassy at Cabul; or would care whether the frontier which separated the British Empire in India from five nations of savages was scientific or unscientific. But it became a very different question when we had to consider whether we should allow these millions of savages to be drilled, disciplined, armed and organized by Russia, and whether we should allow the mountain passes on our own borders to be converted into an impregnable outwork of the Muscovite Empire. To that question only one answer is possible, and that is the answer which it received from the Conservative Government. What I want to show is, that that was the question, and the only question. Further, that the crisis which occurred in 1878 was one to which Russian policy had been steadily advancing for three-quarters of a century, which must have come sooner or later, and which, whenever it did come, must have been met, once for all, either by resistance or surrender.

For upwards of a hundred years, Russian ambition has aimed at two objects—Constantinople and India. The former object was almost attained in the spring of 1878, when Russian troops stood before the gates of Constantinople. They themselves admit that it was the resistance of the English Government alone which prevented their entering those gates. What progress they have made towards the second object may be best judged from this simple fact. In the beginning of this century the frontiers of Russia and British India were divided from each other by a distance of 2,000 miles. That distance has now been reduced to 350. The history of this progress is that which is known as the question of Central Asia. No one can offer an intelligent opinion upon Afghan policy who does not understand this history.

Central Asia may be roughly described as that portion of Asia which lies between Afghanistan and Siberia. In the centre of this great tract of country is the Sea of Aral. The larger part of this region is a sandy desert; but two immense rivers which take their rise in the mountains to the north of India, flow into the Sea of Aral, and are bordered by fertile kingdoms. The eastern of these rivers is the Sir Daria or Jaxartes; the westward is the Amu Daria or Oxus. To the right of this region is the Chinese Empire, while Persia and the Caspian Sea stretch away on the left hand to the borders of Russia.

Now it is evident that there are two ways by which Russia can approach India; from the west, in the direction of the Caspian Sea, or from the north, by ascending the rivers which empty themselves into the Sea of Aral. Accordingly a steady process of conquest has been going on in each direction.

The first advances were made on the side of Persia. A war which ended in 1813 gave Russia possession of the greater part of the western coast of the Caspian, and by successive gains from Persia, Circassia, and Turkey, an uninterrupted mass of Russian territory now extends from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Russian troops cannot, however, march round the southern coast of the Caspian, as it is still in the hands of Persia. So another war,

which ended in 1828, gave Russia the exclusive right of maintaining ships of war on the Caspian; and thereby of turning it into a Russian ferry. In 1838 she established a naval arsenal on the Persian island of Ashurada, on the south east corner of the Caspian, and she has since then crossed over to the eastern coast and set up forts at Tchikislar and Krasnovodsk, which are again the starting points for further aggressions. During the last few years an annual expedition has set out in the direction of India, and moved along the northern frontier of Persia, securing its progress as it went by building new forts. This process, however, is subject to the drawback that the country is bare and difficult, and that the Turkomans who inhabit it are numerous and warlike. Accordingly suggestions have recently been thrown out that Persia should be induced to cede to Russia a strip of territory bordering upon the desert. If this arrangement was made, the army of the Caucasus could advance to the very border of Afghanistan without leaving Russian soil.

The advance from the North is more recent and more rapid. It commenced in 1847, and with some short pauses, caused by the Crimean War and the Polish Rebellion, it has continued to the present day. The first step was to connect the Sea of Aral with Siberia by a line of forts. Then the Russians steadily advanced up the eastern river, the Jaxartes, annexing the countries which it watered, and then crossed over to the western river, the Oxus, repeating the same process along its banks. In this way the whole of Khokand and the greater part of Bokhara and Khiva have become absolutely Russian, while the Khans of Bokhara and Khiva, who are still allowed to exist, are simply Russian vassals, and their territory is for all practical purposes at the disposal of the Czar. In this manner, as I have already said, the nearest point of Muscovite dominion is not more than 350 miles from our frontier town of Peshawur, while the intervening region belongs to Bokhara, and is really Russian under another name.

It may be that these proceedings were not commenced with any deliberate view to the conquest of India, but it is quite certain that they will never end till they reach India, or a point

at which further progress is made impossible. Every step in the march has been described by the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg as either temporary or involuntary, but still the march goes on. When Ashurada was occupied, permission was asked to take possession of it for a temporary purpose, but it has never been given up. When the Russians had advanced in 1864 up the Jaxartes as far as Khokand, Prince Gortschakoff sat down and wrote a circular, full of the noblest sentiments of Christian moderation, in which he pointed out that Russia had now reached the limits of her conquests, and that for the future Central Asia was to be at rest. The very next year a fresh attack was made upon Khokand, half of the Khanate was seized at once, and the whole was annexed in 1876. Then came the town of Bokhara, whose capital, Samarcand, was taken in 1868. For two years we were assured by the Russian Emperor himself that his earnest desire was to restore it, but it never has been restored. In 1872, the Khivan expedition was determined on and organized, and in the next year it was carried out. Much anxiety was felt in England at this further advance, which would place Russia in command of the Oxus, which extends up to our very frontier. Repeated denials of any intention to attack Khiva had been offered until the very year before the attack was made. Then a special envoy, Count Schouvaloff, was sent over for the purpose of comforting our Foreign Minister, and keeping Parliament quiet. He was directed to admit the expedition, but to represent it as something of a perfectly insignificant and ephemeral character. It was to consist of 4½ battalions, and "not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupation of Khiva." The expedition of 4½ battalions turned out to be five expeditions, numbering about 13,000 men. The actual treaty ceded to Russia all the territory of Khiva on the right bank of the Oxus, with the exclusive right of navigating that river, while an impossible indemnity and other terms

placed the Khan of Khiva absolutely at the mercy of Russia. No one doubts that both Khiva and Bokhara will follow the fate of Khokand, whenever it becomes convenient to take them. On every occasion the course of events has been exactly the same. Each fresh advance has brought the Russians in contact with a new horde of Turkomans. A Russian subject is killed, or a Russian camel is carried off; and then a fresh expedition is organized which results in fresh decorations to the commanding officer and new accessions of territory to the Czar. It is not necessary to impute any moral blame to the Russians in the matter. The sequence of events may be quite unavoidable. But if it is unavoidable that England and Russia should meet on the frontiers of India, this is all the better reason why we should take care not to be taken at a disadvantage when the inevitable moment arrives.

It is now time to show how this slow but steady march of the Muscovite towards our Indian Empire is mixed up with the recent events in Afghanistan.

About ten years ago the advance of Russia through Central Asia caused much uneasiness in the minds of English statesmen, and it was suggested that a neutral zone should be established, which should permanently separate the two nations. This scheme was found to be impracticable. On the 24th February, 1869, however Prince Gortschakoff instructed the Russian Ambassador in London, to "repeat to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called on to exercise her influence. No intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State enters into his intentions." On the 2nd November, 1869, Prince Gortschakoff himself said to our Ambassador "with respect to the inexpediency of either English or Russian officers going to Afghanistan, that he saw no objection to English officers visiting Cabul, though he agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian agents should not do so." In consequence of this understanding an examination was made of the northern boundary of Afghanistan, and it was agreed between England

and Russia that it should be considered as extending to a specified point on the Oxus. The whole of these negotiations were communicated to the Government of India, and reviewed by them in a despatch dated the 30th June, 1873, which was in turn communicated to the Russian Foreign Office. It stated plainly that "the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference." It then went on to say, "The assurances given by the Russian Government of their determination not to interfere with Afghanistan have been clear and positive throughout the whole course of these negotiations. We unreservedly accept those assurances, and we are satisfied that this frank explanation of the position of the Government of India as regards Afghanistan will not be misinterpreted."

It was obviously of essential importance that we should strongly attach the ruler of Afghanistan to our interests. The first step towards this object was taken by Lord Mayo in 1869.

Shere Ali Khan came to the throne in 1863; and for five years was engaged in a series of conflicts with his brother, in which he was alternately victor and vanquished, a Sovereign and a fugitive. During the whole of these contests Sir John Lawrence, the then Viceroy, maintained an attitude of cold neutrality, recognizing each brother in succession with polite impartiality, as the wheel of fortune revolved, Finally, Shere Ali established his position beyond dispute; and in March, 1869, a conference took place between the Ameer and the new Viceroy, Lord Mayo, at Umballah.

On this occasion Shere Ali appears to have been under no apprehensions from abroad. His only fear was of a renewal of civil war within his own dominions; and he strove earnestly to secure an express treaty binding the Indian Government to assist him unconditionally against such an event. This Lord Mayo refused to do; but he gave him handsome presents of arms and money, with a promise of more; and he wrote him an official letter, in which he announced that the Government of India would view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to

disturb his position as ruler of Cabul, and to rekindle civil war. This was much less than Shere Ali wanted ; but it was a good deal. The frank and genial manner and manly presence of Lord Mayo had an extraordinary effect upon his mind ; and it is admitted on all hands that he went away contented happy, and loyally attached to British interests.

It is remarkable, however, as bearing upon what afterwards happened, that the Duke of Argyll, the then Secretary of State for India, showed much dissatisfaction with Lord Mayo for even the cautious and qualified promises which he had made to the Ameer, and regretted that he had not coupled them with provisoes which would undoubtedly have deprived them of all value in Shere Ali's eyes.

Up to this time India and Afghanistan had been left to themselves, and no cause of difference had sprung up between them. In the very next year, however, the cold shadow of the great northern giant began to fall upon Cabul. From that year the influence of Russia began to make itself felt. In 1870, notwithstanding the express promise of Russia to consider Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of her influence, General Kauffmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan, began to address a series of letters to Shere Ali. In form they were innocent enough. They contained elaborate accounts of the dealings of Russia with her neighbours in Asia, dealings not in themselves very reassuring, coupled with numerous protestations of love and respect for Afghanistan ; while these again were interspersed with gentle hints that the existing state of harmony depended a good deal upon the sentiments which Shere Ali might evidence towards his patronizing correspondent. In short, they might all be summarised in this way, " I am getting everyone round me comfortably under my thumb. Be a good quiet Amir, and perhaps your turn won't come." This was the view Shere Ali took of the correspondence. With Oriental acuteness he read the unwritten words between the lines of his great friend's letters. He forwarded them to the Government of India, and asked anxiously what they meant. He remarked that in one letter Bokhara was spoken of as intervening between Russia and

Afghanistan, while in another letter Bokhara had mysteriously disappeared, and Russia was said to be the neighbour of Afghanistan. He observed that the Governor General took the trouble to inform him that his instructions were to avoid all interference with or annoyance to his neighbours ; but that somehow or other the Russians had managed to wipe out every neighbour with whom they had come in contact. He pointed out the numerous grounds of difference between himself and the Governor-General which might arise, and sought nervously for advice. The Government of India, most unwisely as I think, told him that he ought to be greatly pleased at getting such nice letters, and supplied him with a sort of model form of reply.

Matters went on in this way till 1873, when a fresh wave of excitement passed through Asia in consequence of the expedition to Khiva. Shere Ali was violently alarmed at this fresh stride of Russia. He predicted that Merv would be the next step. That the Turcomans driven out of the Oasis would take refuge in his dominions, and that the Russians would then follow in pursuit of them. Accordingly, on the 24th July, 1873, Lord Northbrook, the then Viceroy, telegraphed to the Duke of Argyll :—

"Amir of Cabul, alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly."

This was the turning point of our relations with Afghanistan. The Amir's alarm was genuine and well founded. His anxiety to throw in his lot with us was hearty and sincere. It was evident that the Viceroy shared in his apprehension, and was willing to remove them. A simple unqualified answer, approving of the proposed assurance, would have saved us the Afghan war. But it was not to be. The glamour of Russian diplomacy was still blinding the eyes of our statesmen. The Duke of Argyll could not understand how a barbarian like Shere Ali could have the inpertinence to be more clear-sighted than himself. The sooner such

self-sufficiency was snubbed the better. So the answer came back :—

"Cabinet thinks you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it; but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."

The plain English of this was, "Shere Ali is a nervous fool. Who is he to set himself up for being wiser than we are? Tell him to be thankful for being as well off as he is."

The result of these directions was, that when the Ameer's envoy, Syad Nur Mahomed, met the Viceroy at Simla, the latter came prepared to pledge himself to as little that was definite as might be.

Now, Shere Ali's position was this: He was bound by a treaty made by his father with the East India Company, by which Dost Mahomed had pledged himself to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the East India Company, but they had entered into no corresponding pledge to him. This, as he had stated to Lord Mayo in 1869, was a one-sided treaty. He foresaw that the time might come when he would find himself presented with a choice between being the friend or enemy of Russia. He was naturally anxious o secure a formal pledge that if he became the enemy of Russia he would be certain of finding a friend in England. But this pledge was exactly what Lord Northbrook was unable or unwilling to give. In the first interview with the Envoy, "His Excellency the Viceroy observed that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked, and failed to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would of course be conditional on the Amir following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression." As the Amir wanted certainty and not probability, this declaration was hardly worth going the whole way to Simla to get. At the next meeting the Viceroy seems to have given the same assurance in a more positive

form. The probability was left out; but the conditions precedent were reiterated and enforced. It was also stated that "the British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent."

Then the Envoy, who seems to have acted with the greatest fairness, put two questions point blank.

"He requested in the first place, that in the event of any aggression in the Ameer's territories, the British Government would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor as an enemy."

"His Excellency said that in diplomatic correspondence such expressions were always avoided as causing needless irritation. In His Excellency's opinion the assurance above given should be sufficient to satisfy the Amir as to the light in which any aggression would be considered by the British Government."

"Next, the Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specially mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Amir."

"To this His Excellency replied that, setting aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that could not be adopted, inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability of such a contingency arising, which the British Government are not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances given by Russia."

In the final letter sent by the Viceroy to Shere Ali this subject was disposed of as follows :—

"I have had some conversations with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is in my opinion one of such importance that it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity."

Did anyone, since the days of Festus, ever hear that the importance of a subject was a reason for putting it aside till a more convenient season?

So the bewildered Envoy returned to Cabul, there to lay before his master "the record of these conversations."

Now, this record undoubtedly displays some very pretty and delicate practice in fencing with words. The thrusts of the Envoy were parried with infinite dexterity. The whole thing was admirably calculated to gratify the Duke of Argyll and to read well in a Blue Book. It was probably much applauded in the India Office, and freely chuckled over at St. Petersburgh. But when we ask how it was likely to serve the interests of the British Empire the answer is rather different.

I think it may be admitted that Lord Northbrook was really prepared on an emergency to do everything for Shere Ali that the Amir had a right to ask. I think it is even probable that he thought he was conveying to Shere Ali an adequate assurance that he was prepared to do so. But he overlooked two things: first, that Shere Ali was in a position to give something, and was entitled to ask something in exchange; secondly, that he would certainly read the words in one sense, while the Viceroy used them in another.

Shere Ali stood between two possible enemies, to either of whom he might be an absolute invaluable friend. Before deciding to which side he should offer his friendship, he was entitled to ascertain which of the two would offer him an ungrudging and absolute friendship in return. Lord Northbrook obviously supposed that the favour was all on his own side, that the Amir was bargaining for future assistance, to which he might affix his own terms. He never contemplated the event which has actually happened, in which the Afghan, by simply placing his territory at the disposal of Russia, might inflict incalculable injury on India. Had he done so, he would probably have hesitated before he dismissed the messenger of peace in the hope of finding him return "at a more suitable opportunity."

In the next place Lord Northbrook displayed a woeful ignorance of Oriental nature. A native will give the most implicit confidence to any English gentleman who speaks to him frankly and plainly. He will take our yea and nay as absolute truth. But when, from the purest desire not to overstate our intentions, we begin to qualify

and limit our answers, he looks upon our qualifications as quibbles and our limitations as lies. He judges others by himself. If Shere Ali had used to the Viceroy the Viceroy's language to himself, he would have meant to get out of his promises whenever it suited himself. And there can be no doubt this was the view he took of the cautious language that was used to his Envoy.

Three year's later, when Lord Lytton was attempting to enter into direct communications with the Amir, our agent stated his opinion to him, that Shere Ali "would be glad to come to our terms if he were once convinced of our meaning real business; but that we must be clear and open in our communications, as the Afghans have come to suspect a second meaning in all we utter." This could only have had reference to the impression produced on the Amir's mind by the Simla negotiations.

The effect of the interview upon the Amir is beyond doubt. He returned an an answer which, for cool insolence, probably surpassed anything that had ever reached the Foreign Department at Calcutta. He thanked God "that such security has been established in all countries that no aggressions will take place, nor will any power raise discussions or disputes within the dominions of that power; and that the use of inimical expressions has been discontinued in diplomatic correspondence, and that peace and tranquillity have been secured to the whole world." He then remarked, in substance, that under the circumstances Syad Nur Mahomed had taken a great deal of unnecessary trouble in going to Simla.

Evidently the "suitable opportunity" was not likely to recur. It never did. Upon this point Yakub Khan's evidence is conclusive. He said to General Roberts last year: "In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on the throne of Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had won lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but nevertheless he returned to

Cabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of Nur Mahomed to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Nur Mahomed during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended."

I think we shall not be far wrong in dating the Afghan War back to the Duke of Argyll's telegram.

The interchange of letters between Shere Ali and the authorities at Tashkend now continued and became more frequent, and the Amir gradually ceased to forward such letters to the Indian Government or to consult them upon his replies. In 1875 Envoys began to arrive from General Kaufmann, and in 1876 they became so numerous that the Government of India requested the Foreign Office to complain of the proceding as a direct violation of the understanding arrived at in 1869. The manner in which the complaint was met was characteristic of Russian diplomacy, whose great principle appears to be, not to let its right hand know what its left hand is doing. Prince Gortschakoff telegraphed to Count Schouvaloff desiring him to give a flat contradiction to the statement that General Kaufmann had been interfering at Cabul either by an agent or in any other manner. General Kaufmann put his hand to his heart, and appealed indignantly to his general character as shielding him from such an accusation. He asserted that his relations with Shere Ali had been limited to changes of civility, and that he had never sent to Cabul either agents or even a single messenger. His letters had only been matters of pure courtesy, and had been forwarded through the Amir of Bokhara, once or twice a year. This explanation was met by the Indian Government with a simple contradiction. The letters, many of which were forthcoming, spoke for themselves. They said of their number, "During the past year they have been incessant.

The bearers of them are regarded by the Amir as agents of the Russian Government, and on one pretext or another some person recognized by the Afghan Government as a Russian agent is now almost constantly at Cabul." It certainly confirms this view that Shere Ali, in acknowledging one of these letters from General Kaufmann, speaks of it as having been received "by hand of your Envoy Aishan Khwaja Bazurg." It is now well known that a mass of correspondence has been found in Cabul shewing dealings between the Amir and the Russians of a much more intimate character than had previously been suspected. All that is publicly known of these papers as yet is that the Government considers that they cannot safely be published.

It is now time to take up that series of events which culminated in the final refusal of Shere Ali to receive a British Embassy, and in the consequent declaration of war.

In January, 1875, Lord Salisbury wrote to the Government of India pointing out the comparative uselessness of the Native Agent at Cabul, and instructing them to take measures for procuring the assent of the Amir to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat, to be subsequently followed by a similar agency at Kandahar. No agency was suggested at Cabul. This despatch was answered on the 7th June, by an elaborate reply, in which the Government of India stated their objections to the course proposed. Their principal argument was that the Amir would either refuse the proffered agency, or accept it with great reluctance. Lord Salisbury pressed his views again upon the Government of India in November, 1875, and Lord Northbrook again renewed his objections in January, 1876. In the latter despatch he says: "We fully appreciate the force of the considerations referred to in your lordship's despatch, which render it conceivable that circumstances may occur, as they have occurred before, to draw the Russian Government into a line of action contrary to their real intentions and wishes. At present, however, we are in possession of no information which leads us to look upon Russian interference in Afghanistan as a probable or near contingency, or to anticipate that the Russian

Government will deviate from the policy of non-extension so recently declared."

It is difficult to imagine a franker confession of ignorance than this, or one which more fully shows the necessity for such an agency as Lord Salisbury had desired. As to the objection founded on Shere Ali's unwillingness to receive a British Agent, it is very probable that, in his existing state of feeling he would have objected. But in 1875, the Eastern Question had not been opened up. The advances of Russia to Shere Ali were being cautiously made in preparation for a crisis which had not arrived ; and it is probable that if the matter had been strongly pressed upon him, the Russians would not have counselled an open resistance. Had he yielded at that time, the result might have been to check the intrigue which finally lured him to his ruin. Difficulties there were, no doubt. But the result showed that to postpone a difficulty is not to overcome it. He who shrinks from encountering the cub may have to fight the lion.

The next steps in the matter were taken by Lord Lytton who succeeded Lord Northbrook, as Viceroy, early in 1876. They extended over several months, and may be stated briefly as possible.

A messenger was sent to Shere Ali asking him to receive a special British Mission at Cabul. The ostensible object of the Mission was to make a formal communication of the arrival of the New Viceroy, and of Her Majesty's assumption of the title of Empress of India. The substantial object, however, was to bring about a renewal of the discussions of 1869 and 1873. Shere Ali refused to receive the Mission, but offered to depute the British Agent at Cabul, or a special agent of his own, to learn the proposals of the Government. The British Agent accordingly arrived, and was sent back with the offer of an alliance substantially the same as that which the Amir had sought for in 1873. It was made conditional, however, on his declining all communications with Russia, receiving British Agents at Herat and on the frontier, though not at Cabul, receiving special missions when desired, and deputing an Envoy to the Viceroy's head-quarters. A considerable delay followed before the Amir

would receive or discuss this communication. At length he sent an Envoy of his own who reached Peshawur in the end of January, 1877, and was there met on behalf of the Government of India by Sir Lewis Pelly. It appeared at once that he had no authority to negotiate on the basis that was offered. He remained, however, a considerable time at Peshawur, stating at great length the grievances of his master, and at last died. A fresh envoy was on his way from Cabul, who it was reported had authority eventually to accede to the British demands. But in the meantime the Viceroy had received intelligence of the growing hostility of Sheer Ali, of his massing his troops in the British frontier, preaching a religious war, tampering with the border tribes, and seeking to make alliances with the neighbouring chiefs. An alliance which involved large gifts of money and arms to one who was already almost our foe, was a thing not to be pressed forward, and Lord Lytton put an end to the negotiations.

It would be unnecessary to say anything more about a transaction which came to nothing, but that a vigorous attempt has been made to represent the hostility of Shere Ali as dating from Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, and as arising, first from our establishing a British force at Quettah, and secondly from the attempt to thrust a British Embassy upon him in violation of an express pledge, supposed to have been given by Lord Mayo in 1869, that no such Embassy should be sent.

As to the first assertion, the facts are these:—

Quettah is at the head of the Bolan Pass, which is the principal approach to Afghanistan from Bombay. It is not in Afghan territory at all, but belongs to the Khan of Khelat. By a treaty of 1854 between the British Government and the Khan of Khelat we were authorized to occupy it whenever we liked. In 1876 it was occupied pending arrangements for the settlement of dissensions in Khelat itself, and the occupation was made permanent in 1877, partly on account of the beneficial effect it had had upon Khelat, and partly with a view to eventualities in Afghanistan. Even if Shere Ali had been dissatisfied with the measure, this was no reason why

we should not have taken a step of the first importance to ourselves, which we were entitled to take by treaty. But there is in fact no evidence that it was considered a real grievance by the Amir. Our agent stated indeed that he had taken umbrage at these proceedings, because he regarded Khelat as forming a part of the Afghan State since the days of Ahmed Shah, but he admitted that this was a sentimental grievance, and not seriously urged.

As to the second point, the only foundation for the idea that any such pledge was given, is a statement to that effect contained in a private letter from Lord Mayo to the Duke of Argyll. The public and official records of the Umballah Conference, and the discussions connected with it, show that no such pledge was given. Before Shere Ali left his own dominions he held a sort of Cabinet Council at Cabul, in which the propriety of admitting British Agents was discussed. He stated his own opinion to be that European Agents should not be received at Cabul, but that there would be no objection to their being located at Candahar, Balkh, or Herat. This view was assented to by all present. The same view was put forward in conversation at Umballah by his Minister. No formal proposal to send any such agents was made by Lord Mayo in 1869, and the matter was evidently considered one which did not press for a decision. In the discussion which took place during Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, Shere Ali never put forward any pledge by Lord Mayo as a reason for not receiving an Embassy. He stated several grounds of objection, one of which was that if he received an English Envoy he would also have to receive a Russian Envoy. The plea which is set up for him by his English defenders appears never to have entered his mind.

We now come to the third and final stage of the matter in 1878. In the beginning of that year the war between Russia and Turkey came to an end, and then followed a period of several months during which it seemed probable that it would be followed by a war between Russia and England.

On the 26th May, 1878, an official order appeared in the

Turkestan Gazette for the formation of three expeditionary detachments whose lines of march were given. They all formed a concentrated movement in Afghanistan. And while the Congress at Berlin was sitting, Russian troops were steadily advancing to the frontiers of India. At the same time the news letters from Afghanistan teemed with accounts of the arrival, actual or expected, of Russian envoys of high military rank. On the 18th June, the Peshawar agent informed our Government that the Russian Envoy at Cabul had laid before the Amir certain proposals, which he sent in full. They contained amongst other things, requests that the Amir should allow Russian troops to be stationed in four places in the boundaries of Afghanistan, and give them passage and supplies on their way to India.

Leave was to be given to Russia to construct telegraphs and roads through Afghanistan. An alliance offensive and defensive was to be made between the two States. In short, the resources of Afghanistan were to be placed for all purposes of attack against England at the service of Russia.

In the end of July the Russian General Stoletoff, with his retinue, arrived in Cabul, and they were received by the Amir with every mark of honour and confidence.

These proceedings were discussed triumphantly by the Russian journals, and six days after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin, the *Moscow Gazette* referred to them in these words:—"The time has arrived for Russia to establish her influence over the whole of Central Asia, and this is all the more easy as the Ruler of Afghanistan is not on good terms with England—our foe in Central Asia. The concentration of our influence on the frontiers of the territory of the Empress of India would be only a natural answer to the English seizure of Cyprus and all the approaches to Asia. Such may be the unobtrusive, though peaceable object of the military operations undertaken by the troops of the Turkestan military circuit, as our correspondent at Berlin truly remarked the other day:—'In Asia there are two political powers confronting each other, and they must inevitably come into collision.' England wishes to be Russia's nearest neighbour in Asia Minor; and it is only natural, therefore,

that Russia, in her turn, should desire to approach somewhat nearer to the English frontiers in India."

It has never been clearly known how far the Russian forces proceeded, but it is stated that they were recalled after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin. The Russian Embassy, however, remained in Cabul long after the conclusion of the treaty was known, and did not finally leave until Shere Ali's departure from Afghanistan.

It was clearly impossible for the British Government to allow Shere Ali to receive a Russian Embassy, and refuse one from England. Accordingly on the 14th August, 1878, the Government wrote informing the Amir of their intention to send Sir Neville Chamberlain to him, upon a special mission. The letter was sent by a Native Envoy, and reached Cabul in the middle of September. The answers he received from the Amir and his Ministers were evasive and procrastinating, and he wrote that he suspected that the coming of the English Mission was impossible, so long as the Russians were there. The real facts of the case, however, as to the rejection of the English Mission are now known from two independent sources. A letter from Cabul, dated the 13th October, and addressed to the Russian paper, *The Golos*, says, "The Amir had asked General Stolietoff for advice regarding the reception of the British Mission. General Stolietoff replied in an evasive manner, but gave the Amir to understand that the simultaneous presence of Embassies of two countries which were almost in hostile relations, would be inconvenient. The Amir then decided to refuse admission to the English Mission."

The account Yakoob Khan gave to General Roberts is to the same effect. He said, "When my father received from the Government of India the letter informing him that a British Mission was about to proceed to Cabul, he read it out in Durbar. The members of the Russian Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel Stolietoff rose, saluted the Amir, and asked permission to leave Cabul. If permitted, he would, he said, travel to Tashkend without delay and report the state of affairs to General Kaufmann,

who would inform the Czar, and thus bring pressure to bear upon England. He promised to return in six weeks or two months, and urged the Amir meanwhile to do everything in his power to prevent the British Mission from reaching Cabul." This gets rid of all the argumentation which was used in the end of 1878, to the effect that the Amir would have been willing to receive the mission, if we had not flurried him by our indecent haste to force ourselves into his presence.

On the 21st September the mission reached the Afghan outpost, and Major Cavagnari rode on to know what reception it would meet. The officer in command informed him that he was prepared to resist the passage of the Envoy by force. An ultimatum, demanding an apology and full satisfaction was then sent, but also without effect. And then the British Government had to decide the question, what was to be done?

There could be no doubt that technically this insolent refusal to receive an Embassy was in itself a ground of war. If when relations were strained between Germany and Russia, we were to *fête* the German Ambassador, and send word to St. Petersburg that the Russian Ambassador would not be received at court, and would be shot if he tried to land at Dover pier, there can be very little doubt that a declaration of war would follow as fast as a messenger could bring it. But Shere Ali did more than this. He reversed to our detriment the whole policy of an Indian Empire. Both Liberals and Conservatives had laid down as the cardinal point of our policy that Afghanistan should be friendly and independent, and that for that purpose it should be kept free from all Russian interference, direct or indirect. This policy had been communicated to Shere Ali, and assented to by him. To further it he had asked for and received money and arms, and, what was of far more value, he had had the displeasure of the British Government threatened to his rivals. Yet without provocation, and to suit his own caprice, at a time when we were threatened with war by Russia, he had introduced our rivals, who might at any moment become our enemies, to the weakest part of our Empire, and given them not merely the key of the door, but the door itself. The strictest

stickler for international law can hardly deny that such treachery might justly be punished by war. But I go further, and say that war was not only just but necessary. Suppose we had done nothing, and allowed the Russians to obtain the treaty they demanded, what would have been the result? The Amir's army would have been drilled and disciplined by skilful instructors. Military roads and telegraphs would have been constructed, the passes would have been fortified, an impregnable barrier would have been raised to bar our advance, while behind it intrigues could have been prosecuted, and invasion prepared with secresy and safety. We are often told that a Russian invasion of India is an impossibility. I think it is, until Russia is in possession of Afghanistan or some similar point of departure. At present, owing to distance and want of transport, her forces would have to arrive in driblets, and could be cut off in detail. But the gardens of Herat and the plains of Candahar would suffice for the gathering of an army, and every fragment would be in perfect safety till the whole was ready to swoop down from their heights. With such a vantage ground, however, invasion would be unnecessary. Russia would be the master of our destiny, and could afford to allow us to bleed slowly to death Stationed in Afghanistan her influence would be supreme in Persia, and she could annex as much of it as she required as marching ground for her army of the Caucasus. Our position in India would be revolutionised. Our Empire is girdled round by independent states, such as Beloochistan, Cashmere, Nepaul, and Burmah, who now willingly recognize our superiority. Within our frontiers are numerous feudatories; the unconquered Rajputs, who trace their ancestry from the sun; the great Mahratta States of Baroda, Gwalior, and Indore, who still pine over the memory of their former independence; the territory of the Nizam, whose wild Arab mercenaries are with difficulty kept in order by Sir Salar Jung. All of these are now at peace, because we are stronger than they, and because they know none as strong as ourselves. But when Afghanistan was once mediatised by Russia, Beloochistan, Cashmere, Nepaul, and perhaps even Burmah, would soon have

Russian Ambassadors to direct their Courts, and Russian Generals to drill their armies. We should be surrounded by a ring of fire. Every feudal Court would be a centre for intrigue, and the Foreign Office on the Neva would be a Court of Appeal from the India Office on the Thames. The whole tone of our Government would have to change. Distrust and coercion would take the place of confidence and liberty. The Native States which at present are wholesome centres of National life, would have to be sternly disarmed and perhaps absorbed. The perpetual peace which now reigns from the Himalayas to Ceylon would be replaced by suspicion and strife. By the time rebellion had been suppressed, and a dead level of depression and discontent had been attained, the debt of India would have been doubled; taxation would have been increased, and the railways and works of irrigation would have been checked. The dark Northern cloud alone would still remain. We should be compelled to maintain along the Indus alone a European Army larger than is now sufficient for the whole of India. Even without war we should find a creeping paralysis spreading over us in the East. Our influence in Europe would disappear, for we should have become helpless in the presence of Russia, or any nation with whom Russia was allied. At the slightest rumour of war we should have to draft all our available forces to the Punjaub.

The present war has, no doubt, brought us dangers and difficulties, but they are nothing to the dangers and difficulties which would have followed from doing nothing. I have never yet met anyone who could say what they would have done except go to war. The only other suggestion I have ever heard is, that our real cause of offence was with Russia, and that it was unmanly to attack a weak power, when we were afraid to attack a strong one. This is the sort of argument that raises a roar among a mob, but is hardly adapted to rational beings. If war is an evil, the smaller the war the smaller the evil. Do those who declaim against the war in Afghanistan really think that we ought to have commenced a war with Russia, which would have wrapped the whole of Europe in flames? or that when

we wanted to strengthen our position in the Khyber Pass the wisest way was to commence operations in the Baltic and the Black Sea? If they mean anything, they must mean that we should have applied diplomatic pressure to Russia to withdraw its Embassy. This is exactly what we did, and the pressure was successful, because we had previously made the position of the Embassy untenable. But if we had resorted to diplomacy at St. Petersburg alone, we must have admitted that as against Shere Ali we had no ground of complaint. He, therefore, would have maintained his position, that he had a right to exclude us and to receive Russia. But if he had a right to receive Russia, it is difficult to see why Russia had not a right to be received. At all events at a crisis of European negotiations, when our weight was essential in the interests of peace, we should have been involved in a fresh litigation with Russia, and forced to stand ready at any moment for a great war. In the end Russia would probably have withdrawn her Embassy to return again when wanted, but she would have left behind her consuls, her engineers, and her officers. She would have established the point that she could break treaties when and how she liked, and that she could protect others in doing the same. A war might have been avoided, but our position in the East would have perished. The Queen of England might still call herself Empress of India, but the real Emperor would be the Czar of Russia.

With all its losses and outlay I believe the Afghan war has been a great success. It has maintained our influence in Europe, and exalted it in Asia. It has shown the nations who surround our Indian Empire that we are not afraid to strike, even though the great Colossus of the North stands behind our foe. Russia has been publicly seen to tempt a friend to his ruin, and then to leave him to his fate. The voices which accused us of decrepitude are silenced. The loyalty of our feudatories has been quickened and refreshed, for they are proud to serve a master whom they can respect as well as fear. Perhaps before long even the Afghans may learn that submission to law is the first step to liberty.

J. D. M.

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KANDAHAR:

AND THE

REASONS FOR NOT ABANDONING IT.

A Lecture delivered before "The Constitutional Union" at St. James's Hall, London, February 22nd, 1881.

BY

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KANDAHAR:

AND THE

REASONS FOR NOT ABANDONING IT.

ADDRESSING such an assembly as that which I see before me, it is quite unnecessary, I apprehend, to raise the question of the value of India to England. I do not suppose any man of a fair and candid mind doubts the enormous advantages which must accrue to the inhabitants of a small island in the Atlantic from the possession of an empire so vast, so renowned, and so important. With your indulgence, then, I shall take it for granted that you all consider it a matter of vital consequence that England should retain her hold on India, and, ensuring to her people security and personal freedom, should protect them against invasion from whatever quarter it may come.

If you examine the geographical formation of India you will observe that whilst the portion south of the great Vindhya range, running from the gulf of Cambay to the mouths of the Ganges, is a peninsula with an extensive seaboard, the northern, north-eastern and north-western sections are bounded for the most part by mountain ranges, some of them of enormous heights. I say for the most part, for it is the exception, to which I shall presently allude, which constitutes the reason of my addressing you this afternoon.

Now, in considering the defence of India, the first portion, that possessing the seaboard of which I have spoken, may be dismissed promptly from consideration. The only conquerors of India who have penetrated by that portal are the English. The men who ruled India when the English began to settle on the coasts possessed no fleet, and, with the sea at their command, the English entered by a way ingress by which had never been anticipated. In this respect the present rulers of India possess an advantage which was denied to their predecessors.

All other successful invaders have penetrated into India from the north. They have marched through the country south of the Oxus, and making a new base in that country, and using the splendid material in men and horses to be found there, have marched into the plains immediately north of the Indus, and, watching their time and their opportunity, have

struck their blow, always successfully, at the particular part of that famous river which they discovered to be either the least guarded or the easiest of approach. Before I name to you the famous warriors who have marched by this route and have accomplished this result, I propose very briefly to sketch to you the actual frontier of India on the outline upon which it is open to attack, the line of the north-west.

The river Indus, rising at the feet of the Kailas mountain, enters the north-western angle of the Panjab at Derbend about six hundred and fifty miles from its source, and running, first a south-westerly, then an almost southerly, and then again an almost westerly course, enters the Arabian Sea after traversing in its entire length eighteen hundred miles. From its entry into the Panjab it follows, within an average range of some fifty miles, the windings of the frontier of the Indian Empire. The various passes which lead from the mountainous regions of Afghanistan to the British frontier east of the Indus, cannot, with one exception, be considered dangerous to the power possessing India. The enemy who should traverse them could only debouch by detachments on a small plain where the British would be prepared to overwhelm them. The nature of the defiles and of the mountains overhanging those defiles would always prevent an enemy from emerging from the end nearest the British frontier in sufficient force to be formidable. To this general rule, however, there is one remarkable exception.

That exception is the Bolan Pass. The territory west of the Indus, which is connected by the Bolan Pass with the mountainous country beyond it, differs in many essential particulars from the more eastern portions of the Indus valley. From Dádar, five miles east of the entrance to the Bolan Pass, to the nearest point on the Indus, the distance is something over a hundred miles—not a narrow causeway of a hundred miles, but a magnificent plain one hundred miles in length and more than one hundred and fifty in width, upon which the invader could rest at ease, his rear protected and his front open, until he should decide the point of the Indus upon which to direct his attack. It is upon this plain, in fact, that the invaders of India have always marched as soon as they had overcome the one obstacle which stood between them and its possession. But no invader ever trod upon its soil without first having gained the citadel which completely guarded it. And that citadel is Kandahár!

Here, then, we see at a glance the position of India. The peninsula, south of the Vindhya range, guarded by the sea; the north and north-east protected by the mountains and the armed force at the foot of the passes; the north-west, similarly protected, with the exception of that one break in the general scheme caused by the vast plain lying between the Indus and the Bolan Pass and by the impossibility of guarding the Bolan from any other point but Kandahár. The

great conquerors who deemed the occupation of Kandahár the necessary preliminary to the conquest of India are Chenghiz Khan, Taimúr, Bábar, Nadir Shah, and Ahmad Shah. The power of the two first was irresistible. Bábar, however, was nothing more than an adventurer of princely birth, who had conquered eastern Afghanistan from the north, but who had not subdued Kandahár. He had occupied Kabul and Ghazni, and had under his control the passes leading from eastern Afghanistan into India. He coveted India. To possess that rich country was the dream of his mature manhood. But he dared not at the moment undertake the invasion—he tells you in his memoirs why. He resolved, he says, to set every other object aside, and to exert the whole force of his dominions for the conquest of Kandahár, because he considered that measure an indispensable preliminary to his Indian enterprise. He occupied three years in besieging Kandahár. That place taken the conquest of India was comparatively easy.

Nádir Shah is the next example. That prince wielded all the power of Central Asia, including the splendid cavalry of the Turkomans. He too wished to invade India. But he too dared not attack that country so long as Kandahár remained unsubdued. Though he disposed of eighty thousand men, Kandahár resisted him, according to the Persian historian, for eighteen months. But when that city fell, all opposition to the invasion of India fell with it.

The next conqueror, Ahmad Shah, possessed Kandahár when he set out to invade India. He met no serious opposition till he reached Dehli.

Such being the convictions of the invaders of India, viz., that the reduction of Kandahár was a necessary preliminary to the passage of the Indus, I propose now to glance for a moment at the opinions held regarding the same city by the Moghol sovereigns of India, the immediate predecessors of the English.

Bábar, the founder of that dynasty, who had deemed the possession of Kandahár indispensable to the conquest of India, was careful to retain the place after that conquest had been achieved.

During the reigns of his successors, Humayún, Akbar, Jehángir, and Shah Jahán, Persia, with a keen eye to the commercial value of the place, constantly attacked and sometimes gained it. The Moghol sovereigns, sensible of its political importance, always, until the close of the reign of Shah Jahán, regained it. Finally, however, they lost it. Shah Abbas II., taking advantage of the smallness of the garrison, and of the fact that the snow had made the roads to India impassable, attacked Kandahár in the early days of December, 1647, and, after a siege of ten weeks, captured it. But Shah Jahán did not bear its loss lightly. His son, Aurungzib, besieged it for five months in 1649, and for a longer period in 1652, on both occasions in vain. The abler and more instructed son, Dárá Shekho, renewed the attack two

years later; but, though the army was the most formidable ever equipped by a Moghol, and Dárá had Europeans in his employ, he could not take the place. Kandahár, for ever lost to the Moghol, became the gate through which the first capable master of the Persian empire advanced to the invasion of India. It is said that, when he heard of this last repulse, Shah Jahan, rising for a moment above his debaucheries, told his courtiers that, though it would not happen in his time, the loss of Kandahár was the certain prelude to an invasion of Hindustan.

We have seen then, the light in which Kandahár was regarded alike by the invaders of India and by the sovereigns who ruled that country prior to the domination of the English. The invader of Hindustan and the ruler of Hindustan alike considered it the critical point, by the guarding of which the ruler would render invasion impossible, whilst its occupation by an invader would make the conquest of India a mere question of time. In a word, they regarded the line of Kandahár and the Bolan Pass as the one line by which India could be assailed with a certainty of success.

The opinion of these men, all deeply interested in the subject—of Bábar and of Akbar, of Shah Jahán and of Nadir Shah—is the precise opinion which one of the most illustrious strategical writers of the present day, writing dispassionately and without any reference to party politics, has formed on the subject. General

Sir E. B. Hamley, lecturing in London little more than two years ago, declared that he had arrived at the scientific conclusion that, whilst it would be easy to baffle invasion which should come through the passes of eastern Afghanistan, the occupation of Kandahár, with the command of the Helmand at Girishk, was necessary to the defence of India. The opinion of the modern strategist coincided exactly with the experience of the practised warriors of the two centuries immediately preceding.

Later experience has confirmed these views. The march from Quetta to Kandahár bristles with natural difficulties. During the late campaign Sir Frederick Roberts marched from Kabul to Kandahár more quickly than it was possible for General Phayre to move to the same place from the British frontier. Is it not apparent, then, that if Kandahár possesses the importance I claim for it, its continued occupation by British troops, and the extension to it of the railway line, are absolutely essential?

Placed as our garrisons now are, in this month of February, 1881—India south of the Vindhya range guarded by the sea, India to the north-east protected by the mountains, and the gap in the defensive line of India to the north-west made good by the occupation of Kandahár—I should, under ordinary circumstances, only have to congratulate you, ladies and gentlemen, on the fact that our great empire in the East possesses at this moment a position perfectly

defensible, behind which the native chiefs and the native population can dwell in assured tranquillity, knowing that it is impossible for any enemy in the world to attempt, with the smallest chance of success, to break through the protecting barrier.

But these are not ordinary times. These are times when the diminution of the Empire, gained by the skill and the devotion of our forefathers, is openly advocated. And what do we hear now? Possessing this strong frontier, it is stated on the highest authority—the authority of the Government of the day—that we are about to make it weak, to deprive it of its value as a line of defence, by withdrawing our troops from that particular portion of it where it is most to be desired that we should be strong; in a word, that we are about to give up Kandahár, the Kandahár the guarding of which was deemed by the greatest of the Moghol sovereigns to be necessary for the defence of India, the attack upon which has been deemed an absolute necessary prelude to the invasion of India.

And at what time are we going to retire from this important place? At the very time when the successor of the Moghols, the Túrkis, and the Khorasánis,* to domination over the fierce tribes and magnificent cavalry of Central Asia—when Russia, creeping stealthily onwards, has overcome the hardy warriors

* Nadir Shah was a Khorasáni.

of northern Irán, and is about to incorporate them in her legions. Those tribes and that cavalry have always gladly obeyed the commands of a conqueror from the north bent on marching southwards. They obeyed Chengiz Khan, they obeyed Taimúr, they obeyed Nádir Shah, all of whom they had, in the first instance, opposed. Since the time of Nádir Shah they have revelled, as they revelled before the time of the conquerors I have named, in the lawless independence of the desert. But their instincts have remained unaltered; and when a powerful leader, supported by a formidable army, shall call upon them to lead the way to the rich plains of Hindustan, the Turkoman horsemen, true to those instincts, will act as their forefathers acted when a similar appeal was made to them by Chengiz, by Taimúr, and by Nádir. And it is at this period—when these formidable warriors have been subdued by Russia, when their stronghold has been stormed, and when some of their chiefs have actually submitted—that England talks of withdrawing from Kandahár, of leaving open to the descendants of the men who have overrun India at least once in every previous century the one gate through which it is absolutely necessary they should pass. It is all very well to say that Russia disclaims all design of marching upon India. Granted that she has no design, she will yet be forced to undertake the venture. She cannot escape the universal law which compels the possessor of the sandy deserts and barren

rocks of Central Asia to press forward to the more southern lands, where the green fields and crowded cities promise wealth and abundance. A few years ago Russia had no settled design against Samarkhand, against Bokhara, against Ferghána, against Khiva, still less against the deserts of the Turkomans. But the universal law which has forced her to proceed so far will compel her to march further, to march southward, to the point where she or England will meet her fate.

On this subject I may add that even within the last few days the Russian paper, the *Golos*, has declared that in the face of the recent successes of Russia, England would be mad to evacuate Kandahár unless she were convinced that Russia had no designs of marching upon India. Do you believe, does England believe, that in the presence of enormous temptation, it will be possible for Russia to abstain? She will be forced, sooner or later, to dare the venture. Take the case of Russia and England being at war! Is not, then, the admission of the Russian journal fatal to the advocates of retirement?

If England be true to herself, Russia, under the circumstances I have mentioned, would meet her fate at the spot where Aurungzib and where Dárá Sheko met theirs—before the walls of Kandahár. The occupation in force of that place by England, and the connection of it with India by a line of railway, would keep every invader at bay, and give confidence in

our power to defend them to the native princes of India. The abandonment of it would entice invasion into India itself, with a result which no Englishman can regard with absolute equanimity; for, in that case, the actual invasion of the country would not be the greatest evil.

Let me dwell for a few moments on the actual result which would follow the abandonment of Kandahár. We govern India to a great extent by opinion. The native princes and the native peoples are convinced that the English are a powerful nation, capable alike of defending them from an enemy without and of suppressing disorders within. They have absolute confidence in our ability to achieve those two results. But they have heard of Russia; they have known that she has been moving on stealthily southward; and, occasionally they have been somewhat disquieted. I will give you a proof of this. Within the last few years a friend of mine, who is not an Englishman, travelled a great deal in India and visited several native courts. Now the rulers of native states are particularly careful what they say to Englishmen. They would never think of seriously asking an Englishman about the resources of Russia. But this is just the question which two native princes, and those not the least powerful, separated from each other by miles, put to my friend. Learning he was not an Englishman, they called him to a private audience and interrogated him in the

most searching manner regarding the plans of Russia and the ability of England to resist her. This little incident proves, I think, conclusively, how keenly the native princes watch the progress made by the great colossus of the North.

Now, I have spent many years in India, and have taken a more than usual interest in native society. There are very few natives of any consequence in India who do not know me by name, and with many I have relations of cordial friendship and esteem. I have just returned from seeing many of those friends. During my stay of two months in India I conversed with them and they conversed with me in the most unreserved manner, and, I am sure, from my knowledge of their modes of expression and habits of thought, that I obtained a very accurate insight into their views regarding the retention of Kandahár.

They told me—and this happened, be it recollected, before the storming of Geok Tépé—that native opinion had been very much excited regarding the gradual advance of Russia, but that the confidence in the power of the British to protect India would remain unabated so long as Kandahár should be held. They could understand, they said, the retirement from Kábul, because the British went to that city with an avowed end, which they accomplished before retiring. Besides, they added, we are well aware that no danger is to be apprehended from eastern

Afghanistan. But there is danger on the other side, and there is not an educated man in the country who does not know that with Kandahár in any hands other than the hands of the rulers of India, India is always open to invasion. This fact, they added, would alone cause doubt and weaken confidence. It would give strength to every intriguer, and, should an invader come, would prevent your meeting him with the united forces of Hindustan. "You know what we are," they continued; "you are our masters, and your rule is the best we ever had. But you are still strangers, and if we saw other strangers coming from the north, making great promises, and having apparently, through your negligence, a great chance of success, we could not help ourselves. Many would flock to the stranger, some would set up for themselves, but the effect upon you would be the same. You could not oppose Russia and reconquer India at the same time. You would have to go."

"But," they stated again, in reply to my queries, "if you hold such a position as would make an invasion from the north to our minds impossible, you would have no troubles in India. And Kandahár would undoubtedly be such a position."

Besides talking to these men, I conversed also freely with native soldiers. What they actually said I will state presently. Suffice it here to say that it was generally in accord with the opinions I have just stated.

I may add that these opinions will be much more deeply rooted now, since the success of Russia at Geok Tépé, than they were before that event.

Such then is the position. The evacuation of Kandahár will be interpreted by the natives of India as a retirement caused by dread at the advance of Russia. It will impair the loyalty of the native princes, weaken the confidence of the people, open the door to intriguers, and induce the natives of India to regard the English as their masters so long only as it shall please Russia to stay her advance. In a word, all bonds of discipline and obedience will be relaxed, and the first movement of Russia southwards will be the signal for an outbreak in the interior of India.

This is what you will have to face. This will be the consequence of the evacuation of Kandahár. I am not expressing my opinions alone; I am expressing the convictions of the most enlightened of the natives of India—men who within the last two months have opened their minds to me on the subject freely and without reserve.

But, it may be asked, if this terrible catastrophe is so certain, there must be valid reasons on the opposite side which induce Ministers of the Crown to face it, reasons which, in their eyes, must greatly counterbalance the risk of the loss of India.

Ladies and Gentlemen, my appearance before you this afternoon would be inexcusable if I were not prepared to state to the best of my knowledge

fairly and fully the reasons which, on this grave question, actuate the Ministers of the Crown and their advisers. No one is more anxious than I am that this question should be removed from the category of party and discussed solely on its merits. Questions affecting the integrity or the stability of the empire ought not to be discussed from the standpoint of Conservatism or Liberalism. On the manner in which this question of Kandahár shall be decided depends, in my mind, the British hold on India. The more necessary, then, that before we arrive at a decision we should free ourselves from all party bias, and carefully scrutinise the reasons which have induced an intelligent body of our fellow countrymen to arrive at conclusions differing in all respects from our own.

The reasons which have been assigned as those which have induced the Government of the Queen to decide upon retiring from Kandahár may thus be stated :—

1. The unwillingness of the native soldiers to serve in Afghanistan.

2. The difficulty of recruiting.

3. The injustice which would be thus inflicted upon the Kandaháris.

4. The expense.

I shall examine these reasons in the order in which I have stated them.

The first is—the unwillingness of the native soldier to serve in Afghanistan.

This unwillingness has been loudly proclaimed, but, as often happens, when men deal in general assertions, only a part of the story has been told. The supplement to that story which I shall now give you entirely alters the meaning of the tale. I conversed freely during my late stay in India with native officers and soldiers who had served in Afghanistan. I am free to admit that they had no affection either for the country or the people. But they were glad they had gone there ; they were ready, if called upon, to go again. They were, without one exception, of opinion that they would be disgraced and the name of the Sirkar (the British name) would be tarnished if Kandahár were to be abandoned. Pressed closely by me as to the assertions which had been made on their behalf regarding their unwillingness to serve in that country, they replied to the following effect: "In one sense it is true that it would be distasteful to us to serve for a continuous period in Afghanistan. That is, we would feel it a hardship to serve there, as we do in India, five years without being relieved. But let us have yearly reliefs ; let each regiment be relieved at the end of one year's service, and we should positively like the change. Not only should we have a chance of showing our loyalty to the Sirkar, but our return would furnish us with a new pleasure." Remarks to this effect, made to me not

by one man, but by many, give a very different colouring to the loud and boisterous assertions that the native soldiers are unwilling to serve in Afghanistan. They are willing to serve there under proper conditions.

The solution of this question is made easier still if considered in connection with the second objection to the continued occupation of Kandahár—the difficulties of enlistment. But, before proceeding to this, I may remind you for a moment that the occupation of Afghanistan by Indian troops is no new thing; it is no innovation.

During the reigns of the greatest of the Moghols, from the time of Akbar to the time of Nádir Shah, the city of Kábul was constantly guarded by Indian troops. In the reign of Aurungzib, indeed, the Rajpút sovereign of Jaipur held that city for his overlord with soldiers raised for the most part in Rajpútána. No complaints were heard then. The Rajpúts knew that it was the settled purpose of the Moghol to retain Kábul, and they guarded it for him with fidelity. In those days the Afghans were known only as robbers of the mountains. But even in later days, when the Afghans had descended from the mountains and occupied the cities, the illustrious D'Arcy Todd, who served for a considerable time as Political Agent at Herát, was struck with the contentment of the sepoys who formed his guard. "The Bengal sepoy," he said to myself afterwards, "will

go anywhere if properly treated." They are certainly ready now, under that condition, to proceed to Kandahár.

I turn now to the second objection—the difficulty of recruiting. Now there are two ways of doing everything, a good way and a bad way. The difficulty of recruiting, which undoubtedly was felt for a time, had in point of fact, little or no connection with the Afghan war. The difficulty had been felt long before a war with Afghanistan was contemplated. In two remarkable papers, the first dated the 25th of December 1867, the other the 1st of July 1876—both, you will see, written before the Afghan war was contemplated—General Sir Charles Reid, K.C.B., an officer distinguished in the field, and possessing great experience of native troops, indicated the causes which were making the British service unpopular with the natives of India. In the first of these papers, written eleven years before the Afghan war, he wrote as follows:—"That our service has fallen into disrepute, and that there is a want of confidence in the minds of the very men we would wish to see flocking to our standard, there cannot, I think, be a doubt." He then proceeds to indicate the reasons. What they were is foreign to our subject. Let it suffice to say they had no reference to Afghanistan.

Sir Charles Reid's warnings were unheeded, and the difficulty of recruiting increased each year. But

this would have happened if we had had no Afghan war. Even in the circumstances of actual warfare, recruits were eventually enlisted. No difficulty whatever would have occurred if the causes of discontent had been removed.

It is quite unfair, then, to connect the difficulty experienced at one time regarding enlistment with the occupation of Kandahár. It is marvellous, too, to me that the question of the difficulty of enlistment should have been brought prominently into the line of adverse arguments before any attempt had been made to tap the new recruiting grounds. This is a policy as old as the first Pitt. We have tried it successfully in every part of India into which the British arms have been carried. Adopted with proper precautions, it could not fail in western Afghanistan. A few regiments of Khorasánis—for be it recollected that in the olden days Kandahár was considered as forming a portion of Khorasán—of Kizilbashis, of Tajiks, and of Aimaks, officered by European officers, would form a valuable addition to the British army. They could be easily obtained.

The third objection has reference to the injustice which the occupation of Kandahár would inflict upon the Kandaháris. This objection derives all its weight —I may say its only weight—from the fact that it was used by Lord Hartington in reply to a deputation which waited upon him last September. But what are the facts? It is these very Kandaháris who

implore us to remain! It is the people who dwell on the slopes of the Kojak Kotal, in the Pishín valley, in the city of Kandahár, and in the country between Kandahár and the Helmand, who dread our departure as the greatest calamity that would befall them. The inhabitants of Kandahár are not Afghans. They are the descendants of the Turkis, the Kizilbashis, the Tajiks, and the Khorasánis, who peopled the city during the days of Persian and Moghol rule before the Afghans had descended from the mountains. The old chronicler states that when, in 1709, the chief of the Ghalzi tribe murdered the Persian governor and his nobles at a banquet, and shut the gates of the town upon his troops, he caused the principal inhabitants to be summoned and told them that the Afghans would esteem them as the companions of their past servitude, and would treat them accordingly. How have the Afghans kept their promises? By acts of the grossest oppression ; by tyranny hardly to be supported ; by the ruin of the city, the spoiling of its commerce, the devastation of its fields. It is from such tyranny, such ruin, and such devastation that the British have freed the Kandahárís. In which direction, then, does justice point—to the maintaining for these men whom we have enfranchised the peace and security we have given them, or to handing them over to the barbarians who have ground them down for more than a century and a half? To such a question I need not, I am confident, pause for a reply.

I next turn to the objection which has been made so much of—the expense. Now I do not for a moment underrate the vast importance of this question, nor the preponderating influence which it exercises in the minds of many on the solution of the main argument. I approach it, nevertheless, with very great confidence; for a short consideration, devoid of prejudice and passion, will not fail to show what a shadowy spirit has been summoned from the vasty deep to overawe the fainthearted.

Now there are two ways of looking at this question, from our adversary's point of view and from our own. I shall examine it under both aspects, and on both I shall claim to have proved the shallowness of the objection.

I will first take Lord Hartington's own figures that the occupation of Kandahár will add two millions sterling to the annual expenditure of the country. I will admit under protest, and for the sake of argument only, that there is no set-off to this outlay, that there will be no revenues from the city and districts, and no increase of trade. The result simply is, that for an annual payment of two millions we ensure the security of India against invasion, and the confidence of the native princes and peoples in our power to defend them. But, our opponents will say, it is too much; why incur even that expense when you can withdraw and avoid it? Yes, and what will be the result of your withdrawal? For two, or four, or

five years you may live in a fools' paradise, but when Russia, having gained the Turkomans and the hardy warriors of Khorasán, shall begin to move southwards, you will feel you have been sitting during those five years on a mine. At the first approach of the northern invader that mine will explode. What will profit you then the ten millions you will have saved ? To save that paltry sum you will have imperilled and lost India!

But I deny altogether that the continued occupation of Kandahár will cost India two millions. I affirm, on the contrary, that in the course of a few years India will gain largely by the acquisition. I accept again Lord Hartington's figures, that the immediate outlay will cost annually two millions. But is there no set-off? Have you forgotten what the province of Kandahár was alike under the Moghol and under the Persian? The Persian princes who possessed themselves of Kandahár had no idea of invading India. They desired to gain a province the fertility of whose soil was renowned through Central Asia. Shah Abbas the Great and Shah Abbas II. valued Kandahár solely because of the revenue it brought to the Persian exchequer. There are abundant proofs alike in the Ain-i-Akbari and in the old Persian manuscripts of the worth of Kandahár as a producing province. That which has been once can be again. Superficial observers who have been sent to Kandahár during the most unproductive season

of the year, have declared that all there is barren. Its appearance at the best of times now falls far short, I admit, of its appearance as described by Persian writers during the second half of the eighteenth century. The garden has been for a hundred and seventy years desolated and laid waste by the Afghans. But it has the substratum of a garden still. I have seen and I have received letters from English gentlemen on the spot, telling me how enormously cultivation has developed under the sense of security inspired by English domination; how a few years more only of such security are required to re-transform the desert into the garden, the scene of desolation into the granary? Will there then be no set-off to the expenditure of £2,000,000? I express the confident opinion of many thinking men who have served on the spot when I affirm that—once the annexation of Kandahár and the country up to the Helmand boldly declared—within ten years the province will, by means of its increased cultivation and its great commercial development, have become not only self-supporting, but a source of profit to the Indian exchequer. What province has been from the first self-supporting? The Panjáb was not; Burma was not. Look at the Panjáb and at Burma now. Kandahár will follow close in their footsteps.

I have now, to the best of my ability, answered every objection which has been brought against the continued occupation of Kandahár. I have endea-

voured to set before you, as clearly as I could, both sides of the question. I have shown you that the country between the Indus and the Bolan Pass is the weak point in the defensive system of our Indian Empire; that that weak point is rendered strong and unassailable by the occupation of Kandahár; that such an occupation was held to be necessary to the safety of India by all the successful invaders of that country, and by the greatest sovereigns who sat on the throne of Dehli ; that retirement from Kandahár will lead inevitably, and at no distant period, to the loss of India; and that the reasons in favour of such a step, intrinsically of no great value, crumble to the dust when placed side by side with the weighty considerations which counsel its retention. It is not yet too late for Her Majesty's ministers to reconsider their decision. No discredit can attach to the reversal of a decision arrived at under considerable excitement, and when a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances of the case was not to be attained. And if Her Majesty's ministers, guided by the patriotic instincts which generally influence the advisers of the Crown, on whichever side of the House they may sit, should recall the fatal sentence regarding Kandahár, there is not a single class of Her Majesty's subjects—I had almost said there is not a single man of Her Majesty's subjects—that would not award them the credit due to their patriotism and their fair dealing.

And there are, I am glad to think, still grounds, faint

though they be, for believing that the decision is not entirely past recall. Lord Hartington is reported to have stated, as late as the 19th of this month that, "in the event of it being proved to the satisfaction of the Government that the retention of Kandahár would materially add to the stability of the Indian Empire, the Ministers of the Crown would be quite ready to reconsider their decision." I earnestly trust that the reasons which have been, and may yet be, put forth in this hall this afternoon may appear to Lord Hartington and his colleagues sufficiently cogent to induce them to act upon this assurance. I would remind him of a very touching episode which occurred only seventy-four years ago, during the negotiations of Tilsit. At a critical period of those negotiations the great conqueror, who was at the time the arbiter of the destinies of Prussia, approached the beautiful Queen of that country and offered her a rose. The illustrious lady accepted the flower, with the words, "Sire, with Magdebourg." Napoleon turned rudely away. Can Her Majesty's ministers forget, not only the fate of the man who refused a reasonable prayer, but the fact that it was the country of the beautiful Queen whom he insulted which took the lead in ensuring his ruin. History is now repeating itself. The Ministers of England are preparing for India a reconstructed frontier. The people of that country are distant from the point on which their destinies are being

decded. But, through the instrumentality of a humble individual, fresh from conferring with them, they make known the burning aspirations of their hearts, and in reply to the proffer of a secure frontier, with one voice they exclaim, "No frontier can be secure which does not include Kandahár!"

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THE

RETENTION OF CANDAHAR.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY RODES GREEN, K.C.S.I., C.B.,

FORMERLY POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENT AND COMMANDANT ON THE SIND FRONTIER AND IN BELOOCHISTAN.

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THE

RETENTION OF CANDAHAR.

THE Government has at last, as was expected, declared its intention to evacuate Candahar, thus abandoning all the advantages towards the settlement of the vexed question of English and Russian supremacy in Central Asia that might have been obtained from the late campaign; and leaving to their successors the task of dealing with the difficulties inevitably attendant upon having immediately on our Indian frontier a disorganised, if not disintegrated State, to assist in the settlement of which there is a rival Power ready, willing, and indeed anxious to interfere.

I have never credited the Birmingham Caucus with the desire, or even with the political sagacity to understand the reasoning of Pitt, that empire alone can ensure permanent national greatness, and that as empire slips from the grasp of purely trading communities, such as Holland, they inevitably sink and become an object of ambition to those Powers which are still aggressive. I do, however, credit them with a sincere desire to maintain and develop to the utmost the industrial prosperity of their country.

They will understand the selfish argument of increased trade, and may possibly support on that ground a policy in accordance with the abiding commercial interests of the empire, whose destinies they at present virtually sway.

I do not wish to go back to the mistakes of the past, and am ready to admit that if statesmen of either party had had the courage of their convictions, and had not been so submissive to popular clamour, or so dreaded the criticisms of their opponents, the present crisis might never have occurred. The decision to which we must now come, however, has nothing to do with the policy which led to the late war, but with its results. It is idle to speculate as to what might have been done prior to the reception by Shere Ali of the Russian mission, and his refusal of our own; or even at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of Gandamak, and during the period immediately succeeding it. Since then, even the semblance of a united Afghanistan has passed away, with little apparent prospect of its reconstruction. We have ourselves proclaimed the independence of Candahar; its ruler has abdicated; and we remain in possession. The question now therefore is, how can the best interests of its people, and the greatest security to our Indian dependency be obtained, by retaining Candahar, or by abandoning it, to become the prize, after protracted struggles, of the strongest of the contending native factions.

For greater convenience, the subject may be

considered under three heads, Military, Political, and Financial; and under all three I believe that the weight of argument and experienced opinion will be found in favour of retention.

Military.

Even the present Government and their supporters admit that our influence must be paramount in the external relations of Afghanistan. We have seen the opposition that may be organised, and the intrigues that may be carried on beyond the mountain barrier that divides us from our unruly neighbours, and the situation in 1879 would have been much more serious if a small nucleus of Russian troops with artillery had been prepared to cross the Oxus into Badakshan in support of their now famous embassy. Such a contingency might easily have altered the result of Shirpur, and would at any rate have entailed upon us a struggle that must have tried to their utmost the resources of England.

The evidence of Sir F. Roberts upon this point is conclusive :—"The occupation of Cabul in 1879 revealed to us much valuable information concerning the offensive power which the Ameer possessed in his army, his well-stocked arsenal, and his skilful artisans. With such means at his disposal for good or evil, it is easy to foresee what serious complications might at any time have arisen were he assisted by Russia, either with men, money, or officers.

"This unmasking of the Ameer's considerable warlike preparations, hitherto carefully concealed from us, is surely in itself a sufficient justification of the line of action taken by the Indian Government when it declared war against Afghanistan in 1878."

It would therefore seem to anybody endowed with the least military instinct that a position of observation beyond that mountain barrier, which would at the same time flank any movement upon Cabul, or our own territory, is a necessity; that it is, in fact, the only alternative to an Afghan Government, strong enough to be free from the influence of external intrigue, which we believe to be an impossibility. We may here again quote Sir F. Roberts, who only gave in his adhesion to the proposal of evacuating the positions obtained under the treaty of Gandamak on the ground of "the announced intention to maintain a British garrison permanently at Candahar," endorsed by Sir D. Stewart in the following words: "I do not propose to enter into a detailed criticism of General Roberts' paper, with the drift of which I heartily agree. We do not require any greater facilities for the invasion of Afghanistan than are secured to us by our position in the south (viz. Candahar), and our control of the Khyber in the north." * We

* In the Blue Book just published, Afghanistan 1881, No. 2, there is a Memorandum by Sir D. Stewart, declaring in favour of withdrawal from Candahar. This is misleading, as will be seen by reference to dates. It is dated April 18, 1879, and was written in view of the position prior to the treaty of Gandamak. The one quoted above is dated July 2, 1880, and was written in view of the changed and existing circumstances.

add the 11th paragraph of Lord Ripon's despatch of the 14th of September, 1880 :—

"Our late colleague, Sir Edwin Johnson, who was a member of our Government when these arrangements were under discussion, wishes us to state that, while agreeing with the measures proposed, and thus consenting to give up the command over Cabul which the Khyber positions, in his opinion, possess, he considers that such a measure only renders it still more incumbent on us not to relax our hold on Candahar, nor to abandon the strategical advantages which he believes its occupation affords. He desires it, therefore, to be understood that any change in respect to our tenure of Candahar would materially alter the conditions of the discussion, and the state of affairs with which the present despatch deals, and that it would therefore set him free to reconsider altogether his opinion on the subject. Sir Edwin Johnson considers that this view is supported by the recorded opinion of Sir Frederick Roberts, which forms one of the enclosures to this despatch."

Sir R. E. Egerton, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, writing upon Sir F. Roberts' Memorandum, says :—"I agree in all that General Roberts says regarding the importance of Candahar and the necessity for holding it."

General Watson agrees for the most part in that distinguished officer's views, his dissents having nothing to do with the question of Candahar. The minute of the Commander-in-Chief, concurred

in by Mr. Stokes, member of the Viceroy's Council, we give *in extenso* :—

"I should with Sir F. Roberts wish to assert that my view of the propriety of the withdrawal from Cabul and from Gandamak is based on the supposition that Candahar will be held in force. This is the keystone of the whole military situation, as modified by our withdrawal from Cabul.

"To ensure an effective advance from the southward against an enemy in the interior of the country, as contemplated in this despatch, the retention of Candahar is a necessity. Further, it appears to me that to ensure the acquisition of some knowledge of the Ameer's foreign relations, over which we have so recently asserted some power of control, and to give us some real power of influencing them, we must hold Candahar.

"If we decide all the points alluded to in this despatch, without reference to Candahar, we may some day be told that, when we were engaged in the settlement of our relations with Afghanistan, there was no evidence of our having considered Candahar of any value.

(Signed) "F. P. HAINES."

"I concur in the above minute.

(Signed) "W. STOKES."

What we require for cheap administration in India, including economical and effective military control, is the complete isolation of that country from European politics, in order that its population should be impressed with the idea that India is the one portion of the empire at which no blow can be levelled, and that they consequently have nothing to hope from external sympathy and intrigue. It is not so much invasion we have to fear, but the existence of even a possible base for intrigue. We must realise that operations on our Indian frontier may not be occasioned by purely local troubles, but by complications in the politics of Europe, where we cannot hope, or even wish, that our interests should be identical with those of Russia. But by abandoning Candahar now, we give Russia the power of forcing our hand at any time which may best suit her interests. By a feint on the northern frontier of Afghanistan, she would oblige us to advance, thereby probably necessitating a large reinforcement of our troops in India at the very moment they are wanted in another field.

We know the strain that an attempted advance, under the most favourable circumstances, has been during a time of absolute peace in Europe; what then would such a movement entail upon us if an uneasy expectancy, or hope of change, was the spirit, not only of the disaffected, but of the majority of our Indian subjects?

If, on the other hand, we retain Candahar, we could afford to remain quiescent, being certain that Russia would not simply threaten advance, knowing it to be useless, and that an advance in force would be a costly and hazardous enterprise in the face of such a position as Candahar, connected as it would be with India by an effective railway. It could then only mean war with England, which Russia will always avoid while she can.

Thus India would be kept out of the field of European politics, and our Indian subjects generally would probably look upon a war with Russia, if we ever had to engage in one with her, as they would upon any other European convulsion—as something happening in almost another world, and having no personal interest for them.

An opinion is strongly held by some military authorities that the Pishin Valley would be preferable to Candahar, on the ground of economy. This view has been ably advanced lately in a lecture delivered before the East Indian Association; but we notice that the men who are supposed to support it have either never been within hundreds of miles of the locality, or have an experience of it which is superficial and of old date. They contend that half the force necessary for the retention of Candahar would suffice for the minor advance they advocate, and in the lecture above referred to, the actual numbers are given. Their argument, however, refutes itself. In the

first place, while stating that the valley of the Pishin is very fertile, which we admit, they say that it is limited in extent, but that the extra supplies could be brought in from the Candahar districts. Can we count upon this if we have no control there, and these districts are the theatre of native factional struggles? And can the smaller force they estimate be considered sufficient, when its first duty may be to advance upon Candahar? Is not the inference overwhelming that a force sufficient to take a place should be at least equal to that sufficient to hold it in garrison? We believe that such a proposition, if carried into effect, would necessitate a reserve division in Scinde, maintained entirely at the expense of Indian revenues; that the immediate expense of it, in fact, would be the same, not taking into consideration prospective necessities; and that it would leave us without any of the advantages of the alternative policy in security, assistance from the revenues of the new districts, and, indirectly, from the development of trade.

There is one other supposed military difficulty which is advanced in Lord Hartington's despatch of May 21st, viz. that of securing recruits for the native army for service beyond the frontier of India. We do not believe in the difficulty, and have no faith in the men who have propounded it. Lord Napier, of Magdala, than whom there can be no weightier authority as to the organisation of

our Indian army, and the feelings of the Sepoy, considers "that the same comparatively liberal payment that has filled the colonies of Great Britain and France with coolies, and has provided bodies of Sikh police for Shanghai and Singapore, will fill a Candahar corps d'armée. Let the soldiers be sufficiently paid for the hardships and dangers of exile in Afghanistan, and there will be no difficulty in filling the ranks." But even should this not be the case, we believe that we should increase our strength infinitely in this respect by retaining Candahar. We should open a new recruiting ground that would not only enable us to cope effectually with frontier exigencies, but make our position in India more secure, and render the Indian army in time really an Imperial force, for employment elsewhere than in India, should occasion require it. Our best Indian regiments at present are those which number among their men Afghans and Pathans.

Political.

As regards the political aspect of the question, there can, we think, be no doubt in the minds of those who have any knowledge of the subject, and who impartially consider it. We have, on our Indian frontier, a neutral zone of barbarism between two civilised states, advancing on it from the north and south.

It is certain that this zone must eventually be

civilised in the interest of one or the other of them, and it is equally certain that this result must be arrived at by the development of social and commercial intercourse. Is it wise, under such circumstances, to abandon a position which will help us materially to the command of both influences? A permanent garrison at Candahar would make thousands dependent upon us, and largely develop the place as a centre of trade, and consequent power. It is the mutual engagements of trade and material interests that bind peoples together, not subsidies to their rulers. Russia has shown her appreciation of this fact in the tenacity with which she has held and developed trade routes within her control, and her repeated attempts to destroy those beyond it. We need not go further than the Poti and Bayazid routes, as examples of this, although many instances might be adduced, the results of which are that not only are Russian manufacturers able to compete with those of England in the bazaars of Teheran and of Central Asia, but we find those manufactures exposed for sale at Shikarpoor on the Indus.

All agree that our influence must be paramount in Afghanistan, but it is hardly realised that the only means at our disposal to secure it is trade, and that trade means, in uncivilised countries, a basis for its development, securely held by British bayonets. This is no new theory. Lord Wellesley

said that the true empire of England was the empire of the commerce of the world; and he showed throughout his career (the greatest, we believe, of the century) how he would give effect to that axiom in the policy of his country.

Financial.

Financially, the question is even more serious. We need hardly recall late events, and the difficulties to which we are only too accustoned—deficits year by year, severely commented upon by alarmists, and explained away by those of Utopian ideas, the inelastic revenue of India, and other kindred circumstances, which it is not necessary to particularise. A happy medium between the views of the extreme pessimists and the optimists is probably the truth.

Indian finance is an anxious subject, and a diminution of military expenditure, if practicable, is advisable; at any rate, there should be no increase of it, if security can otherwise be obained. How does this consideration affect the retenion of Candahar?

To occupy Candahar, according to the best military authorities, a force of 13,000 men would be necessary, and the extra cost of this force is roundly estimated at 345,950*l.** This, however, allows for a considerable extra expenditure for food and other supplies for camp followers, as well as roops, besides transport, whereas we believe that both

* See Appendix.

would be maintained at a less cost in those rich districts than in Scinde ; and in any case an equal force, as we have already shown, would be required somewhere on the frontier, if we are to maintain our supremacy, and be prepared for the eventualities that are only too likely to arise. On the other hand, we should have a revenue from the Candahar districts estimated in Sir D. Stewart's despatch of February 16th, 1880, at twenty and a half lacs of rupees, which he considered would be largely increased, by the construction of a railway from India and Kurrachee.

To hold Pishin and the Khojak, the expenditure would be the same, without the income to be derived from Candahar.

To retreat to Quettah and the Indus would be no present economy, whilst it would be necessary to calculate upon a large expenditure for advance, contingent upon European complications, besides the inevitable constant expenditure upon small expeditions to ensure or restore order among the frontier tribes. Under the two last alternatives, also, all idea of a railway to Candahar would have to be abandoned. It may be urged that this would be an economy, but experience in the East has proved that a railway is more effectual as a civiliser than a military or police force ; and the trade returns show that even at first it would be, if not a successful speculation, at any rate a not more extravagant scheme for ensuring order than many that have been tried by the Government of India.

Government Arguments for Abandonment.

We need only further notice the views held by the present Government with reference to the question, the latest exposition of which is contained in the Duke of Argyle's speech of January 10, in answer to Lord Lytton, and in Lord Hartington's despatch of the 11th of November. The Duke admitted that the policy of all Viceroys, including Lord Lawrence, had been to exclude Russian influence from Afghanistan (which, by inference, he would lead us to believe had been successful until the time of Lord Lytton), and he attributed Shere Ali's late attitude to the threatening letters and Boycotting to which he was subjected by the late Viceroy. But this could not have affected Shere Ali's disposition towards the British Government during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, which was hostile, or, at the least, most suspicious, as is evidenced by the tone of Noor Mohamed when at Simla, and by the fact that Shere Ali continuously abstained from drawing the subsidy that had been granted to him, and which was lying to his credit in the Peshawur treasury. There is no doubt that, at first, the feeling of the late Ameer, as stated by the Duke of Argyle, was that of genuine fear of Russia, and had his advances at that time been met in a generous spirit, looking to the great issues at stake, recent events would probably never have occurred.

Unfortunately, the changed position brought about by circumstances, more particularly by the continuous and rapid advances of Russia, was not sufficiently recognised by the Liberal Government, when last in power, and naturally Shere Ali threw himself into the arms of his more energetic neighbour. He was not driven to this suicidal act by threatening letters, which were not really threatening, but because, to his mind, there was no alternative. He had been refused by us that support which could alone enable him to maintain the attitude which, according to our declarations, was necessary to secure our friendship and countenance, and in his despair he submitted to his and our common enemy. Having lost our opportunity, the error had to be repaired, and our first advance became inevitable. Even then Lord Lytton's Government showed every desire to return to the original position, as far as changed circumstances would permit of it. This is clear from the conditions of the treaty of Gandamak. The result of an advance upon Cabul itself was foreseen—the entire disintegration of the kingdom, which was certain to ensue, and it was avoided.*

Nothing is proved by history to be truer than that an opportunity once lost can never be regained. Support generously given at a critical moment might have preserved a strong government, such as it was, in Afghanistan; but to

* *Vide* Lord Lytton's despatches.

reconstruct it was beyond the power of either the English or Indian Governments, and the experiment failed. The Duke of Argyle condemned the despatch of the Cavagnari mission on the ground "that the objection of the late Ameer to receive British officers in his capital was that he could not protect them;" but the fact must not be lost sight of that he had in the interval received not only a Russian mission, but that practically Russia had been represented at his capital for a period of eighteen months, by a succession of special messengers, one never leaving until the arrival of the next, who was to replace him.

We have besides in evidence* that the only qualification insisted upon by the Ameer to the proposal that British officers should reside in his dominions, was that it should be at Cabul under his immediate protection, and further that it was not the intention of the Indian Government to propose Cabul for the residence of their representative. But "when the capital was thus expressly selected by the Ameer himself, there were many grounds for deferring to the choice of his Highness, and there was no tenable ground for opposing it." It is possible that the Indian Government was not sufficiently alive to the change of feeling that had been brought about by our hostile advance; but we contend that they were justified in their action. In fact that they would have neglected their

* Lord Lytton's despatch of January 7th, 1880.

duty had they not made the attempt to have their representative at a place so important to us as Cabul, and where Russian representatives had been received for a considerable time; although perhaps it might have been wiser to have delayed sending him for a few months until things had become quieter, and the power of the Ameer had become consolidated.

Exception is then taken to the breach of faith, as the Duke of Argyle considers it would be, if we retained Candahar. But treaties are not binding on one of the signataries alone, but on all; and in the case of that concluded at Gandamak, Yakoob Khan failed to keep his part of the engagements. It is a new theory, as advanced by his Grace, that Powers are precluded from taking such steps as may be necessary to their own security, or which are for the common weal, unless their territory is first invaded, and they have been subjected to two bloody wars, as in the case of the Punjab; although, as far as the last title is concerned, we surely should have earned an indefeasible right to fixity of tenure at Candahar. We are under the impression that Russia was the aggressor in the last war with Turkey, but we do not recollect that the Duke of Argyle raised his voice in protest against her insistance on her right, the logical result of victory, to annex Bessarabia, with Kars and other territory in Asia, although she had bound herself by the treaty of 1856 to

respect the territorial integrity of her enemy. It is no excuse that the belligerents in that case were foreign Powers, as the final settlement was a European one, to which England was a party. As we have already, however, pointed out, the Indian Government were from the first anxious, as far as possible, to return to the old condition of things, a united friendly Afghanistan, free from the interference of other Powers. After the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari, it was evident that a Government which was unable to keep its engagements and control even Cabul (we must remember that it was no mere assassination by a few fanatics, as argued by the Duke of Argyle, but such a movement among the population that the Ameer himself had to seek safety in our lines) would be absolutely powerless in more distant places. The opinion of the then Government of India was most decided on this point. They said in their despatch on the subject :—"The kingdom laboriously recovered by Shere Ali has fallen to pieces at the first blow; and it would now be an impracticable task, even were it politically desirable, to reunite these fragments under any single ruler."* The later history of that "strong Afghanistan" of Lord Lawrence and the Duke of Argyle bears out this view. Dost Mohammed, after many vicissitudes, only obtained possession of Candahar in 1856, and

* Lord Lytton's despatch of January 7th.

of Herat in 1863. It took Shere Ali five years to consolidate his power. Are we prepared to allow another like period of anarchy, now that Russia is in a position to interfere in the final settlement? Still the Government shrank from anything like annexation. "It is our desire to avoid territorial annexation, and the further extension of our administrative responsibilities. While maintaining a dominant influence over these provinces which form the outworks of our Indian Empire, we still desire to minimise our interference in their internal affairs."* And the united Afghanistan policy having failed, they determined to try a divided Afghanistan under native rulers, with what result, as regards Candahar, we all know.

There then seemed to be no alternative but annexation, until the present Government hit upon the desperate expedient they are about to try, of abandoning it. That policy we hold to be morally impossible. We have told the chiefs and people of the Candahar districts, a much more serious undertaking than any given to the Wali, that "there was no chance of Candahar again falling under a supreme ruler in Cabul." On the faith of that declaration many committed acts which must place them for ever in a position of hostility to any possible Cabul Government. Also during our occupation we

* Lord Lytton's despatch of January 7th.

have countenanced and encouraged commercial ventures and engagements which it is impossible can exist under any Government but our own, or one protected by and under our influence. It is impossible under these two heads alone to gauge the responsibility in the cause of peace or civilisation that we should incur, by abandoning to their fate those who considered themselves safeguarded by our most solemn declaration. Neither do our responsibilities end here. Lord Hartington has himself said, "I entirely admit that it would not be worthy of English honour, or of the English name, if we were to leave Afghanistan in its present condition. Having created the present state of things in Afghanistan, having reduced the country to perfect anarchy, having deprived it of all the elements which existed for the purpose of keeping order, it would not be possible for us to retire and leave this anarchy and confusion, and it will be necessary for any Government, whichever it may be, which succeeds the present one, to restore order in the country before it retires back behind its scientific frontier."*

It is true that we may not, at the moment we evacuate Candahar, leave the country in a state of anarchy, but we cannot avoid leaving the latent embers of it, which will blaze up in a few months, if not weeks, unless Afghanistan suddenly produces

* Speech at Oswaldtwistle, April 6th, 1880.

a heaven-born ruler of men, for which *rôle* neither Abdul Rahman nor Ayoob Khan have as yet shown any aptitude.

Politically, we shall by abandoning Candahar commit an act of national suicide in the East, which we believe history will condemn as highest treason to the British Empire. What underlies the whole policy of the Government seems to be the fanciful idea—we can call it nothing else—expressed in the following sentence by the Duke of Argyle: "Sir F. Roberts, not two years ago, found himself surrounded by the whole population of Afghanistan, those who have no national feeling, or independence, or sentiment, and was shut up in Shirpur." Now, we do not desire to impute to the Duke of Argyle any wish to mislead his audience, or the country, but we presume that he had shared in the debates in the Cabinet on the subject; and we do say that any body of men so misinformed, or so incapable of drawing a correct impression from facts, are not fit to guide the country in a decision of so momentous a character. The facts are that Sir F. Roberts was attacked by the Ghilzais, and other tribes of Northern Afghanistan; that those districts were entirely cut off from Candahar by the Hazaras, at that time hostile to the Ghilzais, and that there was not the slightest sympathy between Northern and

Southern Afghanistan. An Afghanistan united in feeling on any subject is a figment of the Duke of Argyle's brain.

Lord Hartington, as his share to the reasons which have led himself and his colleagues to come to their disastrous determination, has little more to offer than a quotation from a despatch of the late Government of India, written under other circumstances, which do not now apply; the fear that the possession of Candahar will distract the minds of the Government of India from the construction of public works, and the agrarian condition of the people; and the opinion that there was no danger to India from foreign invasion, which nobody had ever maintained. He gives one more, which simply proves that the time to lock the stable door is when the steed is stolen. We cannot believe, looking to those evidences of high statesmanship which have won him the confidence of all parties alike, and point him out as the great Liberal Minister of the future, that he could have been altogether self-inspired when giving serious expression to such arguments. The concluding paragraph of his despatch refers to Mr. Lyall's mission to Candahar, and suggests that his report * may enable the Viceroy to form a more accurate judgment. Would it be too much to ask the Government to make public that gentleman's report, and the judgment on it at which the

* Blue Book, Afghanistan, No. 1, 1881.

present Viceroy has arrived? The wisdom of the proposed policy might be fairly tested, if the Government could be induced to answer the following questions:—

If Abdul Rahman is able to anticipate Ayoob Khan at Candahar, are they prepared to see Herat either under the direct influence of Russia, or of Russia through Persia?

Should Ayoob Khan anticipate Abdul Rahman, are they prepared to recognise the victor of Maiwand as its ruler, or do they still intend to pursue the policy of a united Afghanistan with the indefinite military obligations it may entail?

In either case, are they prepared to have so disturbed a condition of things immediately beyond our frontier, giving Russia directly or through Persia a fair excuse for interference, at any moment that may suit her?

It would not be the first time that she has so interfered. We need not go beyond the Kurdish rebellion, within the last few months, for an instance.

The above is written in no party spirit. We believe it to be a fair statement of facts; and we appeal to the evidence of the Blue Book to show that the weight of well-informed opinions is in favour of the view we advocate. Government may have other equally valuable opinions in their possession, but if so they have refused to produce it, and we are justified in considering, until they

do, that they have no further support for their policy. We only ask for a fair discussion on the merits of the case, our only object being the peaceable integrity of the empire, with the least possible burdens on its populations.

NOTE.

Since the foregoing was written, another Blue Book, Afghanistan 1881, No. 2, has been issued. It is hardly necessary to criticise it, as it adds nothing to the information already in the hands of the public.

It may be noticed, however, of Lord Lytton's minute, that it was written under other circumstances, dealing with great questions of policy, and was clearly never intended for publication. Although it is there declared that from a military point of view our position on the west leaves little to be desired, it is added that political or special military considerations may make it necessary for us to occupy Candahar, and the importance of Herat is specially urged.

Sir Garnet Wolseley gives weight to this opinion by saying, "Whenever the Russians march upon Herat, we must certainly occupy Candahar."

Surely the political and special military considerations indicated by Lord Lytton have arisen since General Skobelieff's late victories, and though he may not be marching upon Herat, his

position so far threatens it, that it would be madness to evacuate Candahar, with the certainty of having to return to it within a few years, if not months.

The publication of Sir D. Stewart's Memorandum in its present position is, as we have already pointed out in a note, misleading. It is dated April 18, 1879, being written in view of the circumstances prior to the treaty of Gandamak; and that his opinion has since been modified is proved by another Memorandum dated July 2, 1880. This last is quoted in the text.

Sir Henry Norman's estimate of the number of men required is, after all, a mere matter of opinion, and, as we have already stated, we have high military authority for the smaller force given in the Appendix. Again, his addition of 100 per cent. to the cost of maintaining the same troops in India, we believe to be excessive. In our estimate we have charged under this head what high military and financial authorities in consultation have considered not only a sufficient, but an extravagant amount, and we may point out that Sir W. Merewether and others, with a personal acquaintance with the country, believe that no extra expenditure would be eventually entailed.

Of the other Memorandums adverse to our continued occupation, we can only say, although extremely able, particularly Major Baring's, they, in our opinion, lose sight of one great fact. We could

understand their reasoning if Afghanistan could remain as it is, and if its people were not likely to be brought under fresh influences. But this is impossible. Civilisation always absorbs barbarism, and Afghanistan must eventually fall under the influence of Russia or England. We have now to decide which it shall be.

APPENDIX.

To elucidate the financial side of the question, we append a statement of the estimated cost of the occupation of Candahar, based on the opinions of the most reliable authorities that Government could consult. We premise that it does not take into consideration the fresh revenues we should obtain, and it assumes, in the larger total, that the whole force would be an increase to the garrison of India. We need hardly point out that the justification for a portion of the present establishment is the necessities of external defence, and that troops for such a purpose could nowhere be so well placed as at Candahar. That at any rate we could advance two native cavalry and two native infantry regiments from Scinde, viz., two out of the three regiments of Scinde Horse, and two from the two regiments of Belooch Infantry and Jacob's Rifles, and that holding Candahar we could dispense with one regiment of British Infantry at Peshawur.

We will only add that this is an extreme estimate, including ninety recruits at depôt in India for each cavalry and 200 for each infantry regiment, and that the force estimated for is based upon high military opinion as sufficient for the occupation of Candahar and maintenance of its communications.

ESTIMATE.

Detail of Force.	Pay and Ordinary Charges per Annum.	Extra-ordinary Charges.	TOTAL.
	£	£	£
1 Battery Royal Horse Artillery ..	16,700	3,750	20,450
1 Heavy Battery and 1 Mountain Battery, British	25,000	7,500	32,500
2 Native Mountain Batteries	12,500	7,500	20,000
1 British Cavalry Regiment	48,000	12,000	60,000
3 Native Cavalry Regiments	66,000	30,000	96,000
4 British Infantry Regiments	200,000	27,000	227,000
10 Native Infantry Regiments	150,000	150,000	300,000
2 Companies Sappers	8,500	8,200	16,700
Transport	—	100,000	100,000
Total	526,700	345,950	872,650

If, as we believe to be the case, no addition to the force now in India would be requisite, the increased cost on account of the occupation of Candahar would only amount to 345,950*l.*, as shown above.

ORDINARY UNIT COST PER ANNUM of each branch of the Service in India, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, upon which the above is founded.

	Battery Royal Horse Artillery.	Battery Field Artillery.	Regiment British Cavalry.	Regiment British Infantry.	Regiment Native Cavalry.	Regiment Native Infantry.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
1. Pay and Allowances of Officers and Men	9800	8430	31,333	32,817	21,658	13,900
2. Commissariat Supplies	1460	1460	4667	9100	—	—
3. Ordnance Supplies	1578	1330	1500	1666	300	750
4. Purchase and keep of Horses	2448	1603	6750	—	—	—
5. Clothing, Barrack, and Medical Supplies	1414	1377	3750	6417	42	350
TOTAL	16,700	14,200 *	48,000	50,000	22,000	15,000

* The cost of a heavy battery, and a mountain battery (British), may be taken respectively at 13,000*l.* and 12,000*l.* per annum. The cost of a native mountain battery at 6250*l.* per annum.

from the Author

E. Stilman-Bartlett Esq

C.C.-P.

TO

THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE,

MR. E. A. FREEMAN

'THE TIMES' AND 'DAILY NEWS'

THE RITUALISTS

AND POLITICAL DISSENTERS

AND ALL CRUSADING PHILANTHROPISTS

ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

This Pamphlet is respectfully Dedicated

BY

THE AUTHOR

THE

EXPOSURE OF SOME PREVALENT DELUSIONS.

THE aim of this pamphlet is Truth. Its object is to expose the deceptions with regard to the condition of Turkey and the motives of Russia in undertaking the present war, which were so successfully practised upon the English people last year, and which still retain a fatal hold upon a certain section of public opinion.

With this view materials have been collected from authentic sources open to the writer during the past six months. These materials consist of the evidence of eye-witnesses at the seat of war, for the most part Englishmen accompanying the Russian and Turkish armies, and the source of each quotation is carefully indicated.

Those who undertake the perusal of this pamphlet will, it is hoped, consider carefully and dispassionately the evidence here adduced, before allowing prejudice or party feeling to lead them to decisions which may lend the weight of their individual influence to a course of national action or national neglect subversive of international good faith, and equally injurious to the security of the British Empire and to the true interests of humanity.

It will be clearly shown, by evidence that cannot be disproved,

1. That the massacres in Bulgaria, in May 1876, were provoked by a widespread conspiracy and by a rebellion which, however abortive, might well have become serious, especially in view of the multifold dangers at that time threatening the Ottoman Empire.

2. That all disturbances in Bulgaria since May 1876 have been directly provoked by the Bulgarians acting with and under Russian leaders, and that atrocities committed by Turkish irregulars have in every case been preceded by even greater barbarities committed upon the Moslem population by Christian troops—Bulgarian and Cossack.

3. That the condition of the Bulgarian population under Turkish rule, so far from deserving our pity or needing amelioration, has been one of extreme prosperity and happiness, and superior in many respects to that of most other agricultural populations of Europe.

4. That the crimes committed by Turkish troops last year in Bulgaria are of no exceptional enormity, but have been paralleled by the armies of all countries in all ages, and even by our own English troops; and, so far from being confined to Turkey, that they have been hitherto the too frequent attendants of that most cruel of all scourges—civil war.

5. That the Ottoman Government is not one whit more corrupt or more cruel than that of Russia, and that the Turkish rule is not more heavy or more injurious to its subject population than that of Russia, but is in many points more enlightened and less tyrannical.

It might easily be shown also, if time and space allowed, that Russia, in undertaking this cruel and inhuman war, has been actuated by a desire for conquest, rather than by the pretended zeal for her Sclavonian fellow Christians, which has ever served as a convenient cloak for her ambition. It is certain that the well-founded dread lest the Turkish reforms, as guaranteed by the new Constitution, should remove all pretext for interference in the future, was the real reason, now, as in 1827, for the unjustifiable attack made by Russia on Turkey. The Czar's officials knew perfectly well that the liberality of the Ottoman Constitution would contrast but too favourably with the severe tyranny under which the Russian people are groaning. They determined, therefore, to crush in the bud the promising liberties of the Ottoman people, by an exhausting war, which would set race against race, even if it did not altogether destroy the fabric of Empire.

Before, however, entering directly upon the subject of Russian and Turkish Atrocities, a brief resumé of the development of Foreign Politics during the past twenty years may be useful in forming a judgment upon the present situation. The present war is no sudden outburst of ambition on the part of Russia. It is but the conclusion of a long and carefully planned scheme, gradually developed during the present century, for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and its partition, much in the same way as Poland was divided up by force not one hundred years ago by the infamous compact between Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

For many years Russia and Prussia have been working hand-in-hand. The two most despotic powers in Europe, who have turned their helpless populations into vast drilled camps for the purpose of aggression, have combined to further their own interests at the cost of more civilised and more peaceful peoples. The

Crimean war was a great blow to this confederacy. France and England then combined to prevent the partition of Turkey, which Russia had arranged, and to avenge the treacherous destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope. After a war of two years, which cost England 50,000 lives and 100,000,000*l.*, France and England were successful. Russia was compelled to yield, and signed the famous Treaty of Paris by which the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed. Among the most important clauses of this treaty were those which prevented foreign men-of-war from entering the Dardanelles, and which bound Russia not to build or maintain a war-fleet in the Black Sea. The last condition is well known as the 'Black Sea Clause,' and was the most valuable stipulation of the treaty, to obtain which we had spent so much blood and treasure.

Two facts respecting this war should never be forgotten. *First*, that the English Government that made this war, and indeed caused it, included Mr. Gladstone, the Duke of Argyle, and Lord J. Russell, all of whom are now trying to undo the results that cost their country such a terrible struggle. It is a melancholy reflection that the Crimean war would have been avoided had these Ministers, who then made up the English Government, had the courage to speak their mind plainly to Russia. The Emperor Nicolas said afterwards that he never would have begun the attack on Turkey had he believed that the English Government would have the courage to fight. Thus, as in the case of the Abyssinian and Ashantee wars, the neglect and vacillation of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues have brought upon England suffering and expenditure altogether unnecessary, and therefore all the more culpable.

The *second* fact to be remembered is *that no restriction was, or has been since, put upon the peaceful commerce of Russia. Her merchant ships have always enjoyed the fullest rights of entering and leaving the Black Sea.* This fact is completely left in the background by our factious agitators, who represent the Black Sea Clause as an unfair restraint on Russian development. If her men-of-war were allowed free passage through the Dardanelles and Bosporus it would place the Turkish Government and Constantinople completely at their mercy, for these straits are to the capital of Turkey very much what the Thames is to London. A German fleet might as reasonably claim the right to pass unhindered from Gravesend to Richmond, on the ground of natural

right, as the Russian ironclads claim to navigate the Golden Horn. London would not be more completely at the mercy of a hostile fleet lying off St. Paul's and London Bridge than Constantinople at the mercy of hostile ironclads in the Bosporus. During the Crimean war, Prussia was the only power in Europe friendly to Russia, and was only prevented all through the struggle from giving actual assistance to Russia from fear of Austria.

Time wore on, Russia and Prussia grew stronger and stronger, till in 1866 Prussia forced upon Austria that memorable struggle, the beginning of evil for Europe, in which Austria, driven to war by her unscrupulous rival, unprepared and unarmed, was easily crushed. The battle of Sadowa shifted the balance of power into the hands of Prussia, and therefore also into the hands of Russia, her ally. France was prevented from helping Austria partly by the menace of Russian intervention and partly by the extreme rapidity of the campaign and the sudden conclusion of peace. France was, however, still powerful; and Russia dared not openly unmask her designs on Turkey while French and English policy were combined, and watchful against her. The ground, however, was carefully prepared for a favourable moment. The animosities of the different races were carefully fomented. Money was freely distributed in the Turkish provinces, and bribery was doing its work at Constantinople, where General Ignatieff—that genius of mischief, whose baleful influence has been the chief instrument in causing all the horrors and bloodshed of the past two years—was acquiring a ruinous ascendency.

Then came the unhappy war of 1870, and the destruction of the French power at Sedan and Metz. Our old ally was gone, dethroned and a fugitive from his country, and France lay helpless before the sword of Prussia. In the earlier days of the war, Austria, terrified at the prospect, was preparing to make a stroke to restore the balance of power, when Russia threatened her with instant attack if she moved against Prussia. Austria was thus silenced. Mr. Gladstone was then Prime Minister, and, with his usual course of alternate indifference and timidity, he allowed France to be crushed and himself to be hoodwinked by an old draft treaty for the confiscation of Belgium and Holland between Prussia and France, which Prince Bismarck, well knowing the character of the man, sent him as a blind, hoping to play upon his sensibilities. The bait was eagerly taken and did its work well. What Prussia owed to Russia at this critical juncture is best shown by the words of the Emperor

William himself in the telegram which he sent to the Czar directly the war was over, on February 27, 1871.

We have arrived at the end of this glorious and bloody war. *Prussia will never forget that she owes it to you that the war did not enter upon extreme dimensions.* May God bless you for it! *Yours till death.*

The bargain between the two despots was thus ratified and formally made public. Nor had the Czar to wait long for his reward. He had already snatched it with all the hasty greed of a hungry schoolboy. Within ten days of the battle of Sedan, the Emperor Alexander had signed the famous ukase which deliberately, in the most unblushing manner, violated the solemn engagements of the Treaty of Paris, and tore up the Black Sea Clause, which had been formally and solemnly sanctioned by the Powers of Europe. This flagrant breach of international faith, and the public announcement that Russia intended to take the law into her own hands, and do away with the principal result of the Crimean War, naturally excited much indignation in England. But France was helpless to assist us, and Prince Gortschakoff knew well the man with whom he was dealing. Mr. Gladstone's Government pocketed the affront, and accepted the bullying of Russia with the most ignominious humility.

After a series of negotiations in which Mr. Gladstone displayed a combination of disingenuousness and unpatriotic weakness, happily unparalleled in English statesmanship, the Black Sea Clause was abrogated, and the fruits of the Crimean War to a great extent annulled. It needed another six years and exclusion from office to bring Mr. Gladstone to a frame of mind in which he would endeavour to cancel *all* its results and to prove that his own conduct, in waging that bloody and exhausting war, was not only a political blunder but a moral crime of the deepest dye. There is no more pitiable chapter of English diplomacy than these negotiations in which our Government was openly bullied by Russia, and treated by Prince Bismarck much as a strong man treats a good little boy, with a paternal and rather rude assumption of superiority. The weakness and disingenuousness of Mr. Gladstone's excuses are fully exposed in Sir Charles Dilke's able speech in the House of Commons early in 1871. It is noticeable that Sir C. Dilke has shown a power of appreciating the interests of his country, and a broad grasp of foreign politics, the want of which has never been so conspicuously apparent among the radical section of the Liberal party, to which he nominally belongs, as during the past three years.

But the abolition of the Black Sea Clause was only a portion of Russia's reward, or of the scheme of the two Chancellors, Princes Gortschakoff and Bismarck, who between them have caused Europe such immeasurable suffering and bloodshed. Austria, practically helpless between her masterful neighbours, was forced into the Triple Alliance of the northern Powers, an alliance said to be for the maintenance of European peace, but really a combination by which Prussia ruled Europe for her own benefit, and the benefit to a less degree of her co-conspirator, Russia, while schemes of partition were matured slowly but surely in the East. Austria, always dilatory and uncertain, and really at the mercy of Germany and Russia, was glad to secure the personal guarantee of the two Emperors for her own present immunity from destruction. But there can be no reasonable doubt that if ever the Turkish Empire is destroyed, the question of the partition between Germany, Russia, and Italy, of the diverse races which constitute the Austrian monarchy is but a matter of time. So the years passed till 1874. Russia increasing and remodelling her enormous army on the Prussian pattern, constructing her railway system not on commercial principles, but for military purposes, borrowing millions upon millions of our ever ready market, stretching her arms eastwards and southwards over Asia, and getting day by day nearer to our Indian Empire.

Immense tracts of country lying closer and closer to the boundaries of British India were annexed. Samarkand, Tashkent, Bokhara, and Khokand, the greatest cities of Central Asia, were conquered and made Russian stations. Khiva, the outpost of Persia, and commanding one of the easiest roads of attack against India, was seized and retained in spite of the most solemn promise of the Czar and his Government to Lord Granville, that he would not retain it.

On January 8, 1873, Count Schouvaloff was sent as special envoy from the Czar to Mr. Gladstone's Government. To Lord Granville Count Schouvaloff said :—'*With regard to the expedition to Khiva, it is true that it is decided on next spring. To give an idea of its character, it will consist of but four-and-a-half battalions. Its object is to punish acts of brigandage. Not only is it far from the intention of the Czar to take possession, or prolonged occupation, of Khiva, but positive orders have been prepared to prevent it.*' '*Count Schouvaloff gave me,*' *continues Lord Granville,* '*most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter.*

Well, in the same year Khiva fell an easy prey to Russian arms. *Not only was Khiva occupied, but, by a formal treaty with the Czar, a large portion of Khiva, including all the caravan routes*, was annexed to Russia.

The *Russians besides this obtained by force of arms free right of travel for all Russian subjects, free powers of trade in Khiva, and of acquiring and holding property of all kinds. To all intents and purposes, Khiva has been annexed to Russia. The solemn promises of the Russian Government, and not only this, but the personal honour of the Czar, distinctly pledged to Lord Granville, were, therefore, deliberately violated within eight months of their being given to our Government.*

In 1860 the Russian outposts on the Oural river were 1,400 miles, as the crow flies, from the north-west frontier of India. In 1875 they were but 200 miles. Samarcand, next to Tashkent (both of which cities have been conquered and annexed by Russia within the last ten years), the most populous city of Central Asia, numbering a population but little short of 100,000 souls, is only 450 miles from Peshawur, the gate of the Punjaub, *i.e.* a little farther than Edinburgh, and not so far as Perth is from London. Yet we are told that the study of maps will quiet our alarms. It is possible that those who give this advice to their countrymen only possess maps of Asia twenty years old, and are unaware of the hundreds of miles which Russian advance in Asia has lately covered. The Caspian is now a Russian lake; Khiva, the key of Persia, is annexed; and the Euphrates valley, the road which every great Eastern conqueror, from Alexander downwards, has taken to India, will soon be in Russian hands; for the possession of Armenia just as surely dominates the fertile valley of the Euphrates, as the possession of the Himalayan passes would dominate India. As to the importance of Armenia, Mr. Layard, our ambassador at Constantinople—who, be it noted, has been a strong Liberal all his life, and was Mr. Gladstone's own Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—gives the following irrefutable evidence.

Mr. Layard's opinion is all the more valuable, for, besides being a statesman and diplomatist of great experience, he knows the East as a traveller and explorer thoroughly well. Writing from Constantinople to Lord Derby a few months ago he says:—

Should Russia desire to annex at this time any of the European provinces of Turkey, European interests would probably be called into play, and she would be prevented from carrying out her intentions. But as regards the acquisition

by her of territory in Asia Minor the case is different. The interests of England would then be alone concerned. It would probably signify little to the rest of Europe whether Russia retained Armenia or not. But England has to consider the effect of the annexation to Russia of this important province upon the British possessions in India. Russia would then command the whole of Asia Minor and the great valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, which would inevitably fall into her hands in the course of time. Persia, moreover, would be placed entirely at her mercy. The suspicion that Russia has already made secret offers to Persia to assist her in acquiring the province of Bagdad in exchange for Ghilan and Mazanderan may be unfounded, but the fact that it exists, and has been entertained by persons not generally ill-informed, proves that this consideration is one not to be altogether lost sight of. In most cases, when the evident interests of two parties are concerned in effecting an exchange, the exchange is sooner or later effected. The possession of the entire coast of the Caspian Sea, and the direct road through a rich and well-inhabited country to Herat and Afghanistan, and ultimately to India, is a matter of vast political importance to Russia. Such being the case, there is every reason to believe that when Persia finds that the Turkish Empire is threatened with dismemberment her own interests will get the better of any sympathy for it founded upon community of faith. The possession by Persia of the province of Bagdad would be, as far as England is concerned, its possession by Russia.

It must not be forgotten that the possession of Armenia by Russia as regards any designs that she may have upon India, supposing her to entertain them, would be very different from that of any part of Turkestan or Central Asia. In *Armenia* and the north of Persia she *would have a hardy and abundant population*, affording her excellent materials for a large army, ready at any time to advance upon our Indian frontier, and resting upon a convenient and sure base of operations, in direct communication, by the Caspian Sea and by Batoum, with the heart of the Russian Empire.

The moral effect of the conquest of Armenia and the annexation of Ghilan and Mazanderan by Russia upon our Mahommedan subjects, and upon the populations of Central Asia, cannot be overlooked by a statesman who attaches any value to the retention of India as part of the British Empire.

Field-Marshal Von Moltke, the great German strategist, and the greatest living authority on military questions, and who knows Asia Minor from personal experience, said recently that:

The Russian conquest of Armenia would be a very serious affair for England. With Armenia Russia advances to the Euphrates, and once she possesses the Euphrates the way to India would for the greater part be already closed to England. The question is now whether the conquest of Kars, as formerly the burning of the Turkish fleet before Sinope, will at last incite England to manly action. Here (at Berlin) the opinion of England's power of action has sunk so low that it is doubted whether we shall see her rise from her lethargy.

Turkey meanwhile was becoming a victim to Russian intrigues, or, rather, her ruling class were; for this war has shown most clearly that the bulk of the Turkish people—those who earn their bread by the sweat of their brows—are still a brave, honest, and manly

race. English money was being poured into Constantinople with lavish hand, and the rascally financiers who acted as middlemen between the careless, good-natured Turk, and the ignorant English public, made a rich harvest by swindling both. No remonstrances —to our shame be it said—were addressed by England to Turkey with regard to the wasteful course her Government had run since the Crimean war—no hints as to the necessity of economy and reform. It is hardly credible that Mr. Gladstone, who now raves about the vices of the Turkish Government and the responsibilities of England, was in office for seventeen years out of the eighteen which succeeded the Crimean war. His new-born zeal for reforms and for local liberties, which has grown at such a prodigious rate since last August, might surely have been displayed with some advantage when he was all-powerful in the English Government, and when English influence was all-powerful at Constantinople. Does any single State paper exist in which Mr. Gladstone gave a word of warning, or even of advice—advice that would then have been so useful, and might have averted countless evils. Not one. He, who roars so loudly now, was then quiet as a sucking lamb. He, who now so fiercely and inhumanly denounces the Turkish race, uttered then, during those long years of peace, no timely suggestions, no kindly admonitions. Has Mr. Gladstone discovered that the Turkish race is irreclaimably bad *within the last year*? Or is it because his ancient rival Lord Beaconsfield, whom he hates with all the concentrated bitterness of a passionate soul smarting under defeat and wounded vanity, is now in office, and has shown himself disposed to defend 'the unspeakable Turk'?

Is it the Moslem or their reputed advocate, his lifelong and now successful opponent, against whom the fury of Mr. Gladstone's indignation, and the volumes of his rhetoric, are directed? We suspect that the English rival is the real object of Mr. Gladstone's venom, though he may hardly realise the fact in his own confused and many-sided conscience.

For a statesman and a student of history to have suddenly discovered a whole people, whose antecedents are known to every child—for whom he himself waged, but twenty years ago, a bloody and prolonged war—whom he has repeatedly upheld in every way—to be hopelessly depraved and only fit for extermination, is a phenomenon as extraordinary as it is, happily, rare. Mr. Gladstone might surely have made the marvellous discovery which the Bul-

garian atrocities seem to have unveiled to him, during the twenty years when he was in power, and could have wielded the might of England for the improvement of the Turkish Empire. But he naturally preferred making it when out of power, and when, as an irresponsible individual, he might use it as a convenient means of embarrassing his opponents, even though by so doing he ran counter to the interests of his country, the faith of treaties made by his own Ministry, and all the antecedents of his own political career.

But to resume: in 1875 General Ignatieff succeeded in persuading the Grand Vizier Mahmoud, who was greatly under his influence, to issue the famous decree of partial repudiation. This was the deathblow to Turkish credit, and very materially injured the Ottoman cause in this country. Events were now rapidly approaching a *dénouement*. The insurrection in the Herzegovina —that small cloud upon the horizon—broke out in 1875. It was carefully nourished and paid for by Russian agents. Whenever it had nearly collapsed, bands of Montenegrins issued from their mountain fastnesses and attacked the Turkish troops as opportunities offered. Montenegro has been, during the whole of the present century, the willing tool of Russia; and the Prince of that little State receives an annual subsidy from St. Petersburg, in return for which he plays the part of obedient henchman to the Czar, and is always ready to stir up a rebellion or lead a foray in the neighbouring provinces, when the *mot d'ordre* comes from Russia. The Ottoman Government, slow and careless, neglected these growing dangers, and sent but a small force to crush the rebellion. When the Porte did realise its importance it was almost too late.

In May 1876 took place in Bulgaria the insurrection which was stamped out with cruel severity. The Turks, now thoroughly alarmed, in their first panic committed those excesses which we know too well. Servia and Montenegro were now both arming openly, the one anxious to obtain Bosnia, the other the Herzegovina, while in the back-ground loomed the mighty figure of the Muscovite Colossus pulling the wires of intrigue, and urging on its miserable puppets among the South Sclavonian peoples to their ruin.

In July 1876 Servia and Montenegro declared war; and, after a campaign of three months, Servia, beaten, and completely at the mercy of Turkey, sued for peace. *By the advice of England and Austria*, and at their entreaty, the *Ottoman Government gave their helpless foe most liberal conditions.* The Porte might have most reasonably insisted on placing garrisons in Belgrade

and in other towns as a guarantee for Servia's future good conduct, but was persuaded by our Government to forego all such demands. No money ransom, *à la Bismarck*, or occupation of territory, was exacted from the conquered principality. Servia was let off with the simple *status quo* before the war. She is now repaying the generosity of her conqueror with the basest treachery. While the eighty millions of Russia are attacking her enfeebled suzerain, Servia threatens, with all the meanness of the jackal, to spring from behind upon the Ottoman people that treated her so generously but six months ago. Honour and gratitude, however, it is now laid down, are the monopoly of Mahometan peoples; Christian Governments scorn such old-fangled notions.

In April 1877, Russia, after long negotiation, persuaded the Powers, who hoped in this way to preserve peace, and were cajoled by the peaceful protestations of the Russian Government, to sign a protocol embodying reforms that might be expected of the Porte. No sooner was this protocol signed than Russia, fearing lest the Porte should accept the terms and so remove all excuse for a war, telegraphed it to Constantinople with a demand so insulting that no Government with a spark of self-respect could have yielded.

If peace is concluded with Montenegro, if the Porte accepts the advice of Europe and is ready to disarm, and seriously undertakes the reforms, let it send a special *envoy to St. Petersburg. If massacres like those which have stained Bulgaria with blood occur, this would put an end to demobilisation.*

Turkey refused to be coerced, and the war began in June. It was the expectation of everyone that it would be short and decisive; that Turkey must be crushed at once, and that Russia, this time at least, would have a military promenade.

Her preparations had been great. In twenty years the wounds of the Crimea had been slowly healing. An enormous military organisation, numbering on paper nearly two millions of men, had been formed. Arms of the latest precision had been provided, vast stores accumulated. While professing peace, and breathing the most humane intentions, Russia had been steadily preparing for her final onslaught on the Ottoman Empire, and for the acquisition of the Queen of Cities, Constantinople. Early in the spring of 1876, before even the Bulgarian insurrection, the officers stationed in Poland received private instructions to hold themselves in readiness for important events in the South-east. While the Czar was making his solemn protestations of peace last autumn, an enormous army was being quietly collected and moved

southwards towards the Pruth. It was the knowledge of this fact that made Lord Beaconsfield utter his famous warning at the Guildhall in Nov. 1876—a warning which held Russia back for six months. Had such a statesmanlike utterance been made in 1853 we should have had no Crimean War.

In Asia, too, men and arms were massed for the conquest of Armenia. And at length, when all seemed ready, the storm was let loose.

It would be useless to narrate what has happened, how, through the gross incapacity of the Turkish leaders, all was almost lost, how the Danube was passed, Bulgaria overrun, the Balkans traversed and Roumelia devastated, and how then, suddenly and sternly recovering themselves, the noble Ottoman people, with a valour and devotion unparalleled, by sheer downright courage and endurance, inflicted defeat after defeat upon their gigantic assailant, and reduced him and his advocates to go round begging for the assistance of every crumb-hunting State they could find.

Russia has always proceeded in her conquests upon a fixed plan. Resistance she crushes with merciless severity. The men who dare dispute her rule, or protest against her tyranny, are either slain or sent to Siberia, which, if it does not always destroy life, is albeit a living death. The women are the spoil of the conquerors.

It was thus Russia treated the Poles, the unhappy tribes who dwelt in the Caucasus, and the races of Central Asia. In proportion as the race over which she terrorises is removed from the observation and knowledge of the more civilised world, in that proportion she treats it with cruelty. Where the sufferers inhabit some remote corner, such as the Caucasian mountains and valleys, the most appalling barbarities are practised; whole tribes exterminated with horrible cruelty. In Central Asia the entire race of the Yomuds was massacred without provocation. In Poland, which is nearer the west, and where such proceedings could not be kept altogether secret, wholesale extermination and outrage have been impossible of late years. But the iron of persecution has been driven deep into the souls of this hapless people, whose only crime is their love of liberty. Millions, during the eighty years of Russian rule, have been butchered, or tortured to death by the knout or the prolonged horrors of the road to Siberia. No sadder or more disgraceful page defiles the history of our continent than the unredressed wrongs of that high-spirited, courageous, and intelligent people of Poland, who have been ground down by the heel of an

alien despotism, and whose unavailing protest against oppression has filled every country in the world with suffering but undaunted exiles. This plan Russia proposed for the conquest of Turkey. Before the war she began by exciting a rebellion which was intended to produce bitter animosity between the Turk and Bulgarian. After her successful invasion of Bulgaria this summer, she armed the Bulgarians and let them loose upon the Turkish people wherever the Russian troops got the upper hand. The Bulgarians, ignorant and cruel, lent themselves readily to the scheme. And so Russia hoped to exterminate the brave Turkish race in Bulgaria and Roumelia, and in this way prepare the ground for her own undisputed predominance. The horrible doings which will be detailed in this pamphlet were the result of this deliberate plan.

Prince Tcherkasski was to administer Bulgaria. This was the tyrant who had been given charge of the Polish people after the suppression of the rising of 1863, and who had so distinguished himself, by pillaging the landowners and generally confiscating the property of the Poles, that, as a Pole said but a few days ago, there was but one native left in Poland with the enjoyment of more than a mere pittance. The Poles were even forbidden the use of their own language. Prince Tcherkasski was accompanied by a whole staff of Russian officials who were to reorganise the country on the true Russian principle—*i.e.* take everything of value from the conquered Turk, and transfer the bulk of it to themselves, giving a small share to their jackals—the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians were incited to do all the dirty and cruel work, while the Russian officials were ready to reap the rich harvest.

These gentlemen have, however, thus far met with a cruel disappointment. Their sphere of operation has been much limited by the valour of the Turkish soldier. In August things looked very promising. General Gourko's marauding band had got across the Balkans, and had filled the lovely and fertile valleys of Northern Roumelia with blood and fire. The mouths of these experienced confiscators watered at the rich harvest before them, when a sudden and unexpected check took place. Osman Pasha showed what the Turk could do if properly led, and the Russians had, until quite recently, great difficulty in maintaining their hold upon a few miles of Turkish territory. It is stated that most of these official harpies have returned sorrowing to Russia.

The part played by 'atrocities' and 'atrocity' mongers within the past eighteen months is an entirely novel feature in European

politics. Pandering to a prurient taste, by horrible stories with elaborate and disgusting minuteness of detail, has been until lately the despised privilege of the inferior journals whose circulation lies among the ignorant and the depraved. Particulars of outrages, which a few years back no respectable paper would have been willing to print, now cover columns in our leading journals. Correspondents are sent out to hunt up and bring to light every loathsome detail they can scent out, and even 'The Times,' copying its Radical exemplar the 'Daily News,' but, as usual, ridiculously late in the day, has opened its pages to this popular garbage. A heavy responsibility rests upon the 'Daily News' in this matter. It allowed its correspondent, Mr. MacGahan, the well-known American journalist, to set the fashion, and has, since his now too famous letters, despatched its emissaries everywhere on the hunt for tales of outrage.

The part played by individuals in moulding the course of history is often greatly underrated. It is too much the fashion to attribute everything to profound and far-fetched causes, whereas often an accident determines the fate of a people. It seems hardly too much to say that if good fortune had retained Mr. MacGahan last year at home, among his appreciative countrymen, we might have had no autumn agitation, no encouragement to Russian aggression, and possibly no war between Russia and Turkey with all its terrible accompaniments.

I. With regard to the so-called Turkish atrocities, the English public has been completely deceived by paid agents of Russia, by insane sentimentalists, and by honest but ignorant Russian partisans in this country. The real truth is now slowly coming to light, and it is evident that, so far from the Turk being in the first instance to blame for these outrages, it has been the agents of Russia, and the Christian population of Turkey, that have provoked them. It is perfectly capable of demonstration that every instance of cruelty on the part of the Turks has been provoked in the first case by rebellion and acts of barbarity on the part of the Bulgarians. The pro-Russians in this country have denied that there was any insurrection last year prior to the massacres of May. They will hardly dare deny this again in the face of Mr. Archibald Forbes's recent article in the 'Nineteenth Century.' This gentleman is the most distinguished newspaper correspondent of the English press, who corresponded for the 'Daily News' during the Franco-German war, and wrote the graphic descriptions of the fighting in

the Shipka Pass and around Plevna, which were telegraphed to the 'Daily News' this year. Both from his own antecedents, which have been very pro-Russian, and from those of his journal, which is the notorious Russian organ in this country, Mr. Forbes is likely to be as unfavourable a witness as could possibly be called on behalf of the Turks. Mr. Forbes demonstrates his right to be considered as an authority upon these questions in his opening sentence.

> During the last five months I have been with Russian soldiers on the march or in the field; during the last three months I have been with them in Bulgaria north of the Balkans. I have been a close spectator of much hard fighting; I have been repeatedly with Cossacks or other cavalry acting as the extreme advance; I have traversed Bulgarian territory and entered Bulgarian villages in advance of any Russian troops. I have lived with, talked with, and dealt with the Bulgarian population, and taken great and persistent pains to ascertain their real condition and true character.

Of Mr. Forbes's capacity and character Mr. Gladstone thus speaks in his speech at Hawarden on November 23:—

> Now Mr. Forbes, the correspondent of the 'Daily News,' has perhaps surpassed every other writer in the brilliancy and in the fidelity of his military descriptions, as well as the plainness of speech with which he has described the evils of those among whom he has been living. Mr. Forbes is a man, in addition to his other merits, of the greatest personal gallantry. Some say that he has been a soldier, but whether that is so or not he has the personal courage of a hero. He has gone into action himself, and placed himself in great danger in order to gain the most direct and authentic information. Therefore on matters of fact the testimony of Mr. Forbes is first-rate.

In his article in the 'Nineteenth Century' for November—an article which should be read by every Englishman—he distinctly states that there were careful arrangements for a general rising in Bulgaria—a rising which was only partial because—and the reason should be carefully marked—because the Bulgarians lacked courage in most places. In the few localities where it did take place it was mercilessly stamped out, with the result we know but too well. American journalists, in the service of English newspapers, and Russian agents shrieked the exaggerated horrors all over Europe, till the Turk, who never takes the trouble to defend himself, came to be regarded as 'unspeakable.' General Tchernaieff, who commanded the Servian army, himself told Mr. Forbes that an organised rising was already planned throughout the whole of Bulgaria. Mr. Baring, the English attaché, who issued a report upon the massacres, distinctly affirms that there was first a Bulgarian rising, and that in several cases Turks were treated with horrible cruelty, some being burnt alive. Now what was the

position of Turkey at that moment? She was literally environed by enemies. One of her provinces, the Herzegovina, was in open insurrection; Servia and Montenegro were completing their warlike preparations as fast as they could upon her frontiers; Russia was threatening an attack and everywhere scheming her destruction. At such a moment as this an insurrection breaks out in her central province, right on the high road of her main communication, midway between Adrianople and Sofia. Evidences of a widespread conspiracy are everywhere detected. As to this conspiracy it will be well to quote Mr. Forbes's own words. In the 'Nineteenth Century' for November, page 575, he says:—

The Bulgarians who abode at home, ignoring their substantial prosperity, and stimulated by their grudge against the Turk by reason of his masterfulness and his religion, tempted further by encouragement that came to them from Russian sources in Constantinople, listened to the voice of their exiled countrymen persuading them to insurrection. *Persistent efforts have been made to minimise the radius and importance of the organisation of that uprising which collapsed so futilely and for which the penalty was so tragic. But these efforts can avail nothing before hard facts. When Tchernaieff was in England last winter, he detailed to me the widespread ramifications of the organisation for revolt all over Bulgaria, north as well as south of the Balkans, of which documentary evidence and fullest verbal assurances were furnished to him by the various Committees outside Bulgaria, as he passed through the south of Russia and Roumania on his way to Servia. I could name several gentlemen with whom Tchernaieff, during the same visit, entered into the fullest particularity of details on this subject.* It was by reason of the assurances of support and co-operation on which his knowledge of this organisation entitled him to rely, that he dared to violate strict military considerations, and struck across the frontier into Bulgaria as soon as Servia had declared war. We know how feeble and patchy was the rising of the Bulgarians in reality, but that was owing not to the scanty area of the organisation, but to the unpracticality of the conspirators and the faint-heartedness of the instruments. *There was no outbreak at all north of the Balkans, but do not let it be supposed therefore that there was no organisation for revolt.* At Poradim, just before the July battle of Plevna, I, in company with a Russian staff-officer of high position, fell in with a Bulgarian who, now a thriving villager there, had during the previous year been the agent in Plevna of the American Book Society. Six years previously he had been imprisoned for active disaffection, but had regained his liberty by bribery. He had been the head centre of the insurrectionary organisation in and around Plevna in 1875–6. He showed us the lists of membership and of subscriptions—the latter not particularly reckless in their liberality. Everything had been pre-arranged, but when the time came there was not even a 'cabbage garden' rising. The conspirators realised that the theory and practice of insurrection were two very different things, and remained content with the former luxury. The 'head centre' had thought it prudent to relegate himself to village life and to make a friend of the local moullah through the medium of presents of poultry.

The Bulgarian risings, then, such as they were, occurred. The Turks pro-

bably were unacquainted with the extent of the organisation, but we must assume that they at least knew something. For the rest, *omne ignotum pro magnifico*. They had their hands full already. Montenegro and the Herzegovine were harassing them sorely: Servia was getting ready for war with all the energy of which she was capable. Other insurrections threatened in other regions of the great incongruous empire. This one at least was in the hollow of their hand; it must be crushed, stamped out, annihilated.

Is it any wonder, then, that this rebellion was nipped in the bud, and that when Turkey was forced to employ irregular troops, such as the Circassians and the armed Mahometan population, the rising should have been savagely repressed? Have not we done the same things ourselves? And could not Ireland and India almost parallel the barbarities of this suppression? We should never forget, in our estimate of these offences, that the Turks are not Christians, and cannot fairly be judged by a high standard of Christian civilisation to which they have never pretended. Like other eastern nations (and among them their Russian antagonists) they estimate human life at a far lower value than we do, and in war they are old-fashioned enough to consider the sharpest way the best. It is preposterous to condemn a whole race as unworthy of existence because they are less civilised than ourselves, and use methods of warfare which, however unusual now, were the regular practice of all the heroes of the Old Testament. The millions of people in various stages of civilisation who inhabit Asia, Africa, and parts of America, would at once, by such a decision, be improved off the face of the earth. We may regret that all nations do not own the humanising religion of Christ, but we cannot destroy them because they happen to be unbelievers (indeed, the Turks have far more faith than many of our Radical agitators, who are now compassing heaven and earth to destroy Turkey under the pretence of a zeal for the very Christianity they detest most ardently in their hearts). The non-Christian population of the world greatly outnumbers the Christian, and certainly the sword is not, as Russia asserts, the right instrument with which to effect their conversion.

We should recollect, too, how very recent indeed has been our own adoption of humane practices in war. Not so many centuries ago, we, no less than other nations, used to kill our useless prisoners and outrage and plunder conquered countries wherever we had the chance, and often without provocation. Proofs of this will be given later, see pp. 69, 70.

Yet, notwithstanding the backwardness of Turkish civilisation

and the great provocation given, Mr. Forbes distinctly states, what is a well-known fact, that the 'atrocities' were confined to the places where actual rebellion had taken place. On pp. 576 and 577, he says, 'The Turkish barbarities, like the Bulgarian risings, were localised.'

In all my wayfarings, from the Lom near to the Vid, from the Danube to the Balkans, I could neither hear of nor find human being who had suffered because of the business of last year; and I am sure I enquired sedulously enough. I found no man scored with yataghan slashes, no woman with a story of outrage, which from my later experiences I believe she would have been frank enough with if she had cause to speak. Last year's straw stack stands in the farmyard of every Bulgarian cottager; the colour of its thatch proves that his habitation is not an erection of yesterday. The two-year colt trots on the lea along with the dam and the foal. His buffaloes are mature in their ugliness; his wife's white-metal water-pails are pitted with the dints of years. And if the belongings of the rural Bulgarian furnish testimony to the hitherto stable security of his way of life, not less do the surroundings of the townspeople prove their abiding conviction of non-molestation. Of the vines whose leaves and tendrils spread with verdant green shade over the garden arbours of Sistova, and whose fruit clusters dangle on the brown fronts of Drenova's old oaken houses, the gnarled stems are as thick as my wrist. Pretty Maritza of Tirnova shows you proudly her blooming balsams, and tells you how she took the trouble to bespeak the seed a year in advance from a famous balsam cultivator across the Balkans in Kezanlik. It is to be doubted now whether he will ever grow balsams more. Her mother displays the yet remaining large stock of her last autumn's preservings. And, by the way, it was of this same mother that the tale was written to England how the Pasha had informed her he would hang her, and indeed had even fixed the day for the operation, on the charge of concealing some obnoxious personage. I was given to understand, indeed, that some unpleasant communications had passed between the Pasha and the good lady, but how much, or little, she was perturbed thereby, may be gathered from the fact that she did not desist from her placid preparation of paprika paste—no, not on the very day named or reported to have been named for disqualifying her from the further enjoyment of that dainty.

II. So much for last year. As to the massacres of May 1876, it has been clearly shown that the provocation came from the Bulgarians and Russians. The present war has afforded a still more remarkable proof of this. This year, notwithstanding all the provocation that Turkey had received, notwithstanding the fact that Russia had declared war on account of these very Bulgarians, and was invading Turkish territory and endeavouring to destroy the Turkish power, notwithstanding the notorious fact that swarms of Russian agents were trying their best to stir up her Christian subjects to rebellion, there was not a single case of outrage, murder, or even plunder on the part of the Turks, their soldiers, or their irregular troops north of the Balkans. It was not till they had the amplest

provocation from the massacres and outrages committed by Christian Bulgarians and Cossacks on the helpless Moslem population that retaliatory cruelties were committed. War was declared in April. The whole of Bulgaria was swarming with Turkish troops. It was these very Bulgarians that were the ostensible cause of the whole business. Yet 'the unspeakable Turk' did no harm to them. The Danube was passed, fighting ensued, the Turks were driven back, and everything seemed lost, yet still 'the base and bloody' Moslem committed no outrage. The Bulgarian women and children were not maltreated, the men received no injury. In fact, three whole months passed without a single outrage upon a Christian. Mr. Archibald Forbes's evidence on this point is conclusive. On pp. 577–578 of the 'Nineteenth Century' he writes:—

The Turkish soldiers, when the Russians made good their footing on the southern bank of the Danube, evacuated Sistova without so much as breaking a twig on the front of a Bulgarian house. Their civilian brethren had already departed with like unanimity of harmlessness. *The disorganised bands of soldiers fell back through the rural villages without so much as filching a Bulgarian goose or requisitioning a Bulgarian egg. A Turkish army abode for days around Bjela, and finally departed, its rearguard consisting of irregulars, without a jot of injury wrought on the townfolk or their property.* All along the Turkish retreat from the Jantra to the Lom, the Bulgarians experienced the same immunity. The Turkish inhabitants quitted, and the Turkish troops ran away from Tirnova without a blow or a robbery. It may, in fine, be said that the Turks departed absolutely harmlessly out of the territory from the Danube to the Balkans, of which the Russians stood possessed when their area of occupation was largest. How the Bulgarians requited this forbearance—or immunity, if the other word seems to ask too much—will have to be told later.

Mr. Forbes's complaint against the Turks is very different from those we have had so dinned into our ears, and must prove singularly confusing to our anti-Turkish agitators in this country. He does not say that the Turks outraged, plundered, massacred, ravaged. Not at all. But that they were too kind! too considerate!! towards the Bulgarians, that they neglected to take advantage of the simple rules of warfare, and devastate the country as they fell back before the Russians! that they left him a land overflowing with all kind of supplies instead of a howling wilderness, as the laws of war would have justified and as other nations have often done.

On p. 572, speaking of the chief military errors committed by the Turks. Mr. Forbes says:—

Their second cardinal error comes within the pale of civilised warfare. Not

having chosen to resist in force the Russian crossing of the Danube, and having elected to fall back before the invaders of Bulgaria, *it was on the part of the Turks a grave military omission that they did not lay waste the territory which they left open to that invader's occupation.* Had the territory been exclusively inhabited by their own people, it would have been none the less a military duty to have destroyed the crops, burnt the villages to the last cottage, and left only desolation behind them. It might have been that some fanatic philanthropists might have clamoured of the inhumanity of this line of action; but sensible people would have sorrowfully recognised it as one of the stern necessities of ever-cruel war. The Russians could have uttered no reproach, with the precedents in their own history wrought by Kutusoff, Barclay de Tolly, and Rastopchin. If precedents are wanted at a later date, the American civil war—a war between brethren—swarms with them. If the Turks should have obeyed the demands of a military necessity, had the civilian population been mainly their own people, how much less incumbent on them was it to admit deterrent humanitarian considerations as the case stood! *The whole Turkish population was ordered back by a command from Constantinople: there remained only Bulgarians, co-religionists of the invader, notoriously sympathisers with his aims, notoriously disaffected to Turkish rule, sure to become guides, spies, hewers of wood and drawers of water to their 'deliverers,' willing vendors to these of their substance. To leave behind, instead of reeking desolation, a land flowing with milk and honey, a land swarming with unmolested friends to the invader, was a piece of military lunacy almost unparalleled. The Turks should have driven the Bulgarian population inland before them to the last man, and left extant not a sheaf of barley that could have been destroyed. The outcome, as a hard fact, stands that the Bulgarian population, left behind unmolested when the Turks fell back, were spared unheard-of suffering. They were in fact left in full enjoyment of their prosperity, it might be for ever, certainly for an indefinite period. I want to know, if the Turks assert that they thus sacrificed themselves and spared the Bulgarians from motives exclusively of pure humanity, on what valid grounds is any one to contradict them?* If I find my way into a cellar full of untold gold, and am found coming out with empty pockets, am I not, even were I by habit and repute a thief, entitled to claim that my honesty deterred me from plunder?

The end of July was reached before the scene changed, and outrages on the part of the Circassians and Bashi-bazouks began south of the Balkans. What then was the cause of the sudden change in the conduct of the Turks. It was—we may blush to say it—but it is too notorious to be blinked or denied, the barbarities of the Christian Bulgarians and Cossacks committed upon the helpless Moslem population that led to similar acts of retaliation.

How, asks Mr. Forbes, was the forbearance of the Turks requited—a forbearance that might have gone far to dim the memory of the conventional four centuries of oppression? While the Turks yet remained in their entirety in the mixed villages, the Bulgarians did not dare to meddle with them. But reprisals were not to be apprehended from Turks on the run, encumbered with wives, children, and household substance; and the Bulgarians hardened their hearts, and fell on with bitter currish venom.

Further on, pp. 580–581, he says :—

If ever one race owed a deep obligation to another, the Bulgarians did to the Turks, for the forbearance of the latter in leaving them and theirs unmolested in the evacuation before the advancing Russians in the last days of June and in July. The non-molestation on the part of those 'unspeakable' barbarians was as thorough as that on the part of the last remnant of the German army of occupation, which Manteuffel marched from out the gates of Verdun through fertile Lorraine and over the new frontier line bisecting the battle-field of Gravelotte. The moment the last Turk was gone from Sistova —not before, for your Bulgarian is not fond of chancing contingencies—the Bulgarians of that town betook themselves to the sack, plunder, and destruction of the dwellings vacated by the Turks. I have seen few dismaller spectacles than that presented by the Turkish quarters of Sistova when I visited it two days after the crossing. In every town and village of Bulgaria whence the Turkish inhabitants have fled, their houses were at once wrecked, the huts of the Circassians burnt to the ground. Colonel Lennox and Lord Melgund must be able to testify with how great order the Turks evacuated Bjela. I can speak to the unharmed state of the place when I entered it while as yet the Turkish irregulars were not out of sight. I can speak also to the zest with which its Bulgarian inhabitants began to wreak their spite on the houses of the Turks as soon as they believed that the presence of Arnoldi's dragoons on the heights above the place deprived the work of any risk. Before the Emperor came to Bjela, it took some days to repair or clear away the dilapidations wrought in the Turkish bey's house which he was to inhabit, and after all His Majesty could not but have noticed evidences of the ravage which had been wrought on it. Now this bey was a special favourite of the Bjela Bulgarians. He had effectually kept Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians from molesting them, and they had begged the good man not to go. Had he come back next day, he would have returned to a house wrecked by his well-wishers of the day before. For aught I know, the fittings and timbers of the abandoned Turkish houses of Tirnova still furnish its Bulgarian inhabitants with their supplies of firewood. This was so the last time I was in Tirnova, in the end of August.

What the Bulgarian really was capable of, and did, is best expressed in Mr. Forbes's powerful language. 'They hung on the rear of the helpless retreating Turkish villagers in July, and slew them ruthlessly, men, women, and children, when the *safe* chance offered.' For the Bulgarian is a coward as well as a brute. The 'Times' correspondent with General Gourko confirms this entirely :—

The first sight on entering the town after the action of Tirnova was that of a number of men, women, and children, carrying furniture of all sorts. The houses of the Turks are being pillaged, and, what is worse, the Turks in the villages are being driven out by the Bulgarians. All the Osmanli have not been robbers, and while it might be sufficient answer to say that such matters are for a Government to deal with, there is the further fact that some of the Turks have been industrious labourers. Yesterday some 300 or 400 Turkish

men, women, and children delivered themselves up to the Russians, saying, that the Bulgarians in the villages would not let them remain, that they had no food, and that the Russians might kill them if they liked, for their life was not worth keeping.

The most remarkable confirmation of all comes, however, from the Russian authorities themselves. Ashamed at last of the horrors committed within a few miles of the Imperial head-quarters, they have just made a show of arresting some of the scoundrels who for four months have been working their cowardly and cruel spite upon the Turkish women and children. The St. Petersburg 'Official Messenger,' of October 20, contains the following narrative of 'a band of Bulgarian brigands who have been perpetrating atrocities of the worst kind,' in the midst of the Russian philanthropists. The account goes on to say—

Quitseff, the chief of the malefactors, with a village schoolmaster, a priest, and an accountant as his principal officers, was in the habit of visiting places near those occupied by Russian troops, and proclaiming 'the Russian law;' under which the inhabitants had to bring him their cattle, their horses, their corn, and their ready money. The schoolmaster went through the form of entering in a register a statement as to the value of the property surrendered, while the accountant took charge of the cash. Those inhabitants who refused to comply with Quitseff's requisitions were mercilessly flogged. The robbers went to no less than ten or twelve different villages, and levied contributions in each. In Turkish and Tartar villages they made the inhabitants kiss their hands and feet, and searched the houses. When, after a search, the money they had found was less than they had expected, they inflicted odious tortures on the householder to make him give up his treasures, and ultimately put him to death. The priest, Jordan by name, is said to have particularly distinguished himself at this work. The band had accomplices everywhere, and its vast ramifications extended through all the villages of the districts of Tirnova and Sistova, whose inhabitants concealed, transported, and sold the plunder confided to them. In nearly every village persons had been wounded or cruelly flogged by this band. At Batak Quitseff and his followers had violated several young girls. A Bulgarian named Stephen Stoianoff, a deserter from the Bulgarian Legion, aided by four Bulgarian shopkeepers, had directed Quitseff's convoys of stolen cattle. It appeared, moreover, that he had, 'arms in hand, subjected the inhabitants of the villages of Tentcha and Mekish to torture, and had violated fifteen young Turkish girls, between the ages of twelve and fifteen.'

The 'atrocities' perpetrated in cold blood by the bands of Bulgarians just arrested are fully as atrocious as any that were perpetrated by the Turks, Circassians, and Bashi Bazouks under provocation, and often by way of reprisals, in the May of last year. It is stated, moreover, that the malefactors had for their accomplices all the Bulgarians of the districts in which they robbed, ravished, and murdered. These, then, are atrocities for which the Bulgarian population generally must be held responsible.

Consul Reade, writing from Shumla on July 23, describes the

sad condition of the wounded Moslem men, women, and children, lying there. He says:—

Several of the elder ones gave very clear accounts of what had occurred to them (as they all said) by horsemen carrying lances, and many of them stated that they were attacked in the long grass where they were hiding themselves. One poor infant, of about nine months, had two frightful gashes on the head, and had one toe cut off. From what all asserted, these cruelties can only be attributed to Cossacks, as the perpetrators were all described as 'horsemen with lances.' The number of these victims is increasing, as others are brought in daily; and from what those I saw said, a considerable number must have been killed on the spot.

Mr. Layard, writing to the Earl of Derby on August 1, says:—

The arrival of many thousands of victims of the cruel manner in which Russia is waging this war has no doubt caused feelings of indignation amongst the Mussulmans. But they have not as yet shown any disposition to vent it upon the Christians. *The Turks*, notwithstanding the bad character they now enjoy in England, *are, on the whole, a humane and charitable people.*' The women and children who have come to Constantinople utterly destitute have been taken in and cared for by the principal Turkish families. Aarifi Pasha, who was for a few days Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me that he had received several into his house, and amongst them one or two Christians. Turks are foolish enough to do their acts of charity quietly and unobtrusively, instead of publishing them in newspapers and announcing them at public meetings.

The Sultan himself, who feels as keenly for the suffering of his people, and shows as keen a sympathy with their distress, as any European sovereign could display, was so moved by these horrible doings that he made a personal appeal, through our Ambassador, to the Queen, to obtain her influence with the Czar to put an end to this barbarous and unchivalrous warfare. Mr. Layard writes to Lord Derby on July 24, from Therapia:—

Therapia, July 24, 1877.

My Lord,—The Sultan requested me to receive an account, from Tahir Bey, of the atrocities committed by the Russian troops upon the inoffensive Mussulman population. Tahir Bey, who has just arrived from Shumla and the seat of war, then gave me a shocking description of the women and children—to the number, he said, of seventy or eighty—who had been horribly wounded and mutilated by Cossack lances, and had been brought in a dying state to the hospitals of Shumla. He further stated that the Turkish authorities possessed undoubted evidence that a very large number of persons, who were escaping in carts with all they could carry away from their homes, were set upon by the Cossacks and barbarously murdered, not even little children escaping. He said that nothing could exceed the consternation of the Mahommedan population, which was flying in all directions, and that the flames of their deserted villages were seen far and wide over the face of the country.

After giving me a number of harrowing details of the manner in which

women and children had been treated by the Russians, which I forbear from repeating, Tahir Bey delivered to me the following message from the Sultan:

'His Majesty requests you to lose no time in entreating the Queen and her Majesty's Government to make use of their influence with the Emperor of Russia to prevail upon his Majesty to take measures to prevent and put an end to the shocking cruelties which are now being committed upon the unarmed and inoffensive Mussulman population by his troops. In all parts of the Ottoman territories invaded by the Emperor's armies, the men, women, and children are exposed to dreadful outrages, and are being massacred in the most horrible manner.

Tahir Bey was really affected in describing to me the scenes that he had witnessed.

Finally, Mr. Layard gives his own opinion upon the accounts placed in his hands by the Porte:—

I have no reason to doubt that many of them are well founded. I cannot reasonably doubt the evidence furnished by Her Majesty's Consular Agents and Military Attachés as to some of the outrages attributed to Russian troops and to Bulgarians acting under their protection. That Mussulman villages to a large number have been destroyed and burnt during the advance of the Russian army is beyond question. Your lordship will remember that I was warned by an influential Bulgarian gentleman some time ago that the greatest danger to the Mussulman population was to be expected from the Bulgarian refugees and the Bulgarians of Wallachia, who had been organised by the Russian Government in regiments to accompany the invading army. My informant feared that these Christians would commit every manner of outrage upon the Mohammedans. What he anticipated has probably come to pass, and to these so-called 'avengers' may be mainly attributed the 'atrocities' committed upon the inoffensive Mussulman population, although the Cossack lance may not have been idle. Districts formerly happy and flourishing are now ruined and desolate.

Further on Mr. Layard says:—

The proclamations of the Emperor of Russia have been read by the Turks as a declaration that the Turkish occupation of Bulgaria and Roumelia is to cease, and, coupled with the proceedings of the Russian troops and their Bulgarian allies, they are held to mean that the Mussulman population is to be exterminated. Hitherto the Porte and the local authorities have done something to check the spirit of retaliation and revenge to which this conviction may give rise, but it may be either unable or unwilling to continue to do so. According to the reports that I have transmitted to your lordship from Mr. Blunt and our other consular agents in Roumelia, a good understanding exists as yet between the Mohammedans and Christians in that province, and the superior authorities and notables have done their best to maintain it. But events may occur to put an end to it, and it is by no means impossible that, if the Russian advance continues, terrible massacres may take place. It cannot be said that what is occurring and what is threatened is unexpected. It is but an inevitable result of a war deprecated by everyone who had the real interests of humanity and civilisation at heart.

The Ottoman Government published, among many others, the following case of outrage:—

A telegram from the Caimakam of Loftscha, dated August 11–23, informs the Ministry of the Interior of an act of awful brutality, which gives the measure of the barbarous instinct developed among the Bulgarian population by the presence of the Russians: 'A Bulgarian shepherd who had been fifteen years in the service of a man named Ahmed Agha Ben Abdoullah, living in the village of Granititcha, in the district of Selvi, having heard of the approach of the Russians, armed himself, and suddenly entered the house of his master, in company with some other Bulgarians. "Effendi," said the shepherd to Ahmed Agha, "I have watched long for a favourable moment; now it has come." At these words he seized his master's daughter, about twelve years of age, with the object of outraging her, and actually proposed to her parents to assist him in his act of violence. On their refusal, he maltreated the father, and then consummated his assault upon the young girl. As the unfortunate child gave way to groans and cries of agony, her butcher struck her with a knife with which he was armed, and made a large wound below the left breast. He then murdered the poor father, and would have subjected the mother to the same fate, if she had not succeeded in escaping. When this monster had left the house, the wife of Ahmed Agha, assisted by some of her neighbours, returned to relieve the unfortunate girl, who was found to be still alive. Both the mother and daughter have been conveyed to Loftscha, where the victim is being cared for. What precedes is the testimony given by the two women before Brigadier-General Rifat Pasha, in the presence of several persons. The victim is in the hospital of Loftscha, where the doctors are bestowing upon her every attention to effect her recovery.'

There is a mass of evidence besides that given by Mr. Forbes to prove the evil deeds of the Bulgarians north of the Balkans, and before they had been in any way maltreated by the Turks. In the official correspondence respecting affairs in Turkey printed by the Foreign Office, Consul Blunt, writing on July 14 from Kezanlik, gives evidence of the massacre of Turkish villagers with circumstances of incredible barbarity. Mr. Edmund Calvert acting under his instructions, obtained statements from the Turkish refugees themselves regarding the villages of Balvan and Malkotch. News that the Russian vanguard had passed the Balkans in the night, and was only a few hours from Kezanlik, caused such excitement as to suspend Mr. Calvert's inquiries. From Khalil Oglu Hussein, Mustafa Oglu Abdullah, and Suleiman Oglu Raschid, three fugitive inhabitants of Balvan, which contains 200 houses, and is distant three hours from Tirnova, on the road to Selvi, he had meanwhile obtained the following:

On Saturday morning last (July 7) two squadrons of Cossacks arrived at Balvan. The elders of the village, on hearing of the approach of the Russians, went out to meet them and make their submission. The Cossacks surrounded the village and summoned the inhabitants to deliver up their arms.

On the following day two other squadrons of Cossacks arrived and again sur-

rounded the village. The Russian troops were accompanied on this occasion by a number of Bulgarians from the neighbouring villages, to the number of 2,000 or 3,000. These were armed with hatchets, clubs, and knives, as well as guns and sabres of non-military pattern. The rabble began by driving off all the cattle of the village and stripping the persons and houses of the defenceless villagers of everything worth taking. They then set the village on fire in many places at once, and fell upon the inhabitants as they attempted to escape, cutting down men, women, and children, and driving them back into the flames. The Cossacks, who formed an outer cordon around the village looked on quietly whilst these deeds were being perpetrated. The men who made the above statement contrived to escape by a gully which broke the continuity of the Cossack cordon at one end of the village.

Mr. Calvert appends a note to the foregoing, in which he says:—

Khalil Oglu Hussein, who was the first spokesman, began to tell the above story with some composure; but when he came to the crowning catastrophe he broke down and sobbed like a child, and his companions with him. It was some time before he could explain that there had been living with him two of his sisters, whose husbands were serving in the army, and whom he was supporting, and that they and their children and his own family—eleven souls in all—had perished. He saw them being thrown into the flames—the little children with their mothers.

The fate of Kazardjik was almost as bad. Kazardjik is a village containing 130 houses and distant one hour from Drenovo. The Bulgarians, made bold apparently by the presence of Cossacks at Drenovo, first collected all the arms from the Turkish villagers.

They then proceeded to plunder the village of Kazardjik, and so thoroughly did this work as to leave nothing but the bare walls and floors. They next took the Turkish women and children apart, and stripped them not only of their ornaments (mostly consisting of strings of coins), but of all the clothes which were worth taking. In this way, while poorly-clad persons were let alone, the better-dressed women and children were left in many cases without a particle of clothing on them. Lastly, the Bulgarians set fire to the village. Some of the inhabitants escaped, but the two eye-witnesses who gave this account saw three or four of the remainder killed, and they suppose that the others shared their fate. As regards the shameful indignities to which the Turkish women were otherwise subjected they expressly affirm that a certain number of the women who wore fine chemises were literally stripped to the skin, and left weeping and wringing their hands in a state of complete nudity.

This statement is remarkably confirmed by 'The Times' correspondent with General Gourko—a very strong pro-Russian—whose frantic efforts to blacken the Turks, and to conceal the misdeeds of his protégés, were very amusing. Writing from Tirnova on July 4, he says:—

No old women are they, however, these wild Cossacks, and one could only feel admiration for them were it not that the eye is caught by that whip with its short handle, short lash, with leather tassel at the end like a cow's tail, and stories will come to the mind of the uses to which these whips have been put before now. No roads exist, or, at least, we had come by none, until a red light showed that we were in the right direction and close to the bivouac fires. But no bivouac fires gave so strong a light. It is a village in flames. The houses from which the firing had come were given to the flames, and I cannot but think that this was a mistake—first, because the conduct of the Russians in Bulgaria will be watched, and occasions seized for vilifying them; secondly, because the innocent would suffer with the guilty; thirdly, because this force is far in advance of all infantry, and its whereabouts need not be proclaimed; last, but not least, it is better to strain the law of mercy, even if it droppeth not 'like the gentle rain from heaven,' in this much tried land. *Already the Russian soldier*, with hazy notion of right and wrong in war, begins *to ask whether he ought not to massacre all Turks, whom he thinks of as unclean animals.* Their officers restrain them now; but how long will they be able to do so? *For, understand, Russian discipline is very different from Prussian.* Here the man, within certain bounds, is accustomed to do much as he pleases.

Another correspondent of 'The Times,' writing from Nicopolis on July 25, gives a good example of the use to which the Cossack whip is put:—

As we wound round the road leading up to the citadel a Cossack rode by, driving before him a Turk and a small boy. The former had been arrested for some cause, and the Cossack amused himself with cutting the elder Turk across the back with his riding whip. I could not help feeling a strong sympathy for the Turk, when I reflected how bitter must be his feelings at being whipped in the street of his own town by the Giaour. The haughty Moslem never flinched, but marched on with a stoical expression of countenance that told of immense self-control under difficulties. But I should not like to be a Cossack if that Moslem ever meets him where he can take his revenge.

Great numbers of wounded Turkish women and children—families who were endeavouring to escape from the invader—and attacked while flying and helpless, were brought into Shumla and there seen by the correspondents of all the English and foreign newspapers, who drew up and signed the following statement:—

The Ottoman Embassy at Paris has received the following from the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated Constantinople, July 21:—

I have to communicate to you the text of a minute signed at Shumla by the representatives of the following foreign newspapers: 'Cologne Gazette,' 'Journal des Débats,' 'Neue Freie Presse,' 'Standard,' 'Daily Telegraph,' 'Illustrated London News,' 'Manchester Guardian,' 'The Times,' 'Frankfurter Zeitung,' 'Morning Post,' 'République Française,' 'Pesther Lloyd,' 'Wiener Tagblatt,' 'Morning Advertiser,' 'Scotsman,' 'New York Herald,' and 'Manchester Examiner.' It is as follows:—

'The undersigned, representatives of the foreign Press assembled at Shumla

deem it as their duty to sum up and sign the narratives they have separately addressed to their newspapers on the acts of cruelty committed in Bulgaria against the inoffensive Mussulman population. They declare that they have with their own eyes seen and have interrogated, both at Rasgrad and at Shumla, women, children, and old men wounded by lance and sword thrusts, not to speak of injuries from firearms, which might be attributed to the accidents of legitimate war. These victims gave horrible accounts of the treatment the Russian troops, and sometimes even the Bulgarians, inflict on the fugitive Mussulmans. According to their declarations, the entire Mussulman population of several villages has been massacred. Every day there are fresh arrivals of wounded. The undersigned declare that women and children are the most numerous among the victims, and that they bear lance wounds.'

The following list of the numbers of Mussulman inhabitants massacred in each village has been drawn up by the Turkish Government:—

We have ascertained as accurately as possible the number of houses burnt and Mussulmans massacred by the Russians and Bulgarians in the villages which have most suffered from the enemy's invasion, and the result is this:—At Batak, an exclusively Mussulman village in the district of Sistova, 100 houses have been burnt, and 200 men and 300 women have been killed; seven inhabitants are believed to have survived. At Balovan, a Mussulman village in the district of Tirnova, 250 houses have been burnt, 100 men and 1,200 women have been killed. Only one person is believed to have escaped the massacre. At Caba Bonnas 100 houses have been burnt, 200 men and 300 women killed; two persons escaping death. At Kestanbol 150 houses have been burnt, and 300 men and 600 women perished. At Chems, a mixed village, 60 Mussulman houses have been destroyed; 120 men and 200 women perished; only one person escaped. At Tundja, a mixed village, 100 houses were destroyed; 250 men and 400 women perished; three only survived. The following are the number of houses burnt in the villages which had been deserted before the arrival of the enemy:—At Tranish Homri, 40; at Beran, 150; at Odalar, 180; at Armdlouk, 80; at Bouroueh, 100; at Kodjina, 70; at Okdili, 200: total of houses, burnt 820. You will perceive that these terrible figures are a most crushing testimony to the pitiless cruelty of the Russian policy.

This state of things was extremely unsatisfactory to the Russian invaders. So far from finding a miserable, oppressed, and ground-down people, they saw the Bulgarians, whom they had come to deliver, abounding in comforts and wealth, and more flourishing than their own peasantry. They found the Turks behaving with excessive and very unwise (according to Mr. Forbes) good-nature, and treating their Christian fellow-subjects with a more than Christian forbearance and consideration. Such a state of things could not be allowed to remain, or Russia's 'philanthropic mission' would become the ridicule of the world. Whispers of the happy condition of Bulgaria were already reaching

England, and the Turkish good conduct was getting abroad. Something must be done to justify the war and to set the two races against each other by deeds of mutual brutality which would leave an undying hatred as a bitter legacy of the war. So General Gourko's raid across the Balkans was planned and executed with an unshrinking ferocity to bear a fatal crop of atrocities. Of all heartless, cruel, and objectless military expeditions this of General Gourko was the worst. He was sent across the Balkans *with but* 10,000 *men*, a force with which it was, of course, hopeless to expect to effect any permanent conquest. No one could have dreamt that 10,000 men would be sufficient to conquer Roumelia and to take Adrianople; much less to advance on Constantinople. No one could suppose that such an expedition would intimidate the valiant Turk into submission. The simple object was to do as much mischief as he possibly could, to destroy as many Turkish villages and crops as he could, to ravage what was one of the most peaceful and happy valleys in the world, with all the horrors of a merciless war. That the expedition was almost a forlorn hope, the correspondent of 'The Times' with General Gourko, clearly shows. Writing from Hain Boghz in July, he says:—

> The Grand Duke saw the great risk of the movement, and refused until overpersuaded by the General, who thus takes the responsibility, as he should have the credit in case of success. It is a sort of forlorn hope which hopes to penetrate the Turkish army, and so confuse the Osmanli. Nothing could excuse the rashness of the design, except the strong feeling which exists that the Turkish army is demoralised. Only one promise has been extracted from General Gourko by the Grand Duke—namely, that he should not go beyond Kasanlik, a few miles the other side of the mountains. This little force was put together in haste, and has no proper system of military police. How it is with the army behind I know not; but the lack of proper organisation of all sorts is very apparent in this force, and may lead to trouble hereafter, in spite of its gallant deeds. The main body will probably organise as it advances, but meanwhile deeds may be done that can never be undone, crimes committed that can never be repaired. And without doubt the Russian good name will suffer from neglect.

The Tundja valley, before the arrival of Gourko's squadrons, was a charming and prosperous district. Flourishing villages, thriving towns, blooming cornfields and rich vines, overspread its fertile soil, and the rose-gardens from which the famous attar-of-rose is derived made the face of the country a Paradise to look upon, and the industrious villager rich and comfortable. To quote a picturesque description :—

> Kasanlik, the region in which General Gourko has been lately operating

with his Cossacks, is the land whence by far the greatest quantity of attar-of-roses comes to Western Europe. Kasanlik, the name of which has so often figured during the past fortnight as a point of strategical importance, is also the centre of one of the most remarkable species of horticulture, or rather agriculture, to be found in the whole world. The Mussulman tradition assigns the origin of the rose to the night of Mahomet's journey to Heaven. The white roses sprang from the drops of sweat which fell from the blessed forehead of the prophet himself in the toilsome ascent; the sweat of Borak, the miraculous animal he rode, gave birth to the yellow ones; while the celestial drops which fell from Gabriel were the source of the red rose. The appearance of the neighbourhood of Kasanlik would favour a suspicion that the heavenward journey must have sorely tried the Archangel; and Count von Moltke, who was well acquainted with Bulgaria and the Balkans, has styled the valley of the Tundja 'the Cashmere of Europe, the Turkish Gulistan, the land of roses.' Roses are not grown there as with us in isolated patches in gardens, but in fields and in ridges as if they were no better than potatoes. It would be difficult to imagine anything more charming than the appearance of those rose fields; and any painter who should attempt to reproduce this picture would assuredly be charged with exaggeration. But it would be impossible to catch the infinite alternations of colour both among the roses themselves and the green leaves of the shrubs. Hundreds of millions of rose-leaves strew the ground. The wealth of water in the valley is prodigious; springs are not only numerous but most abundant in yield. There is a general system of irrigation which, remembering that the country is Bulgaria and not Lombardy, is admirable. The whole valley was a picture of prosperity, the result of natural fertility carefully tended by human industry. Where roses are not cultivated, heavy crops of maize are gathered, and along the slopes and down by the waterside are numerous herds and flocks. Kasanlik itself is a town of 10,000 inhabitants, and is surrounded by magnificent walnut woods, which also are a source of commercial industry. Von Moltke speaks of the situation as one of the rarest beauty. Many of the trees, he says, cover an extent of 100 feet with their spreading branches, while countless wild pigeons fill the woods with their cooing. The murmuring or the rush of waters is heard in every direction; the sky itself presents perpetually changing aspects by reason of the neighbouring mountains; while the deliciously fresh air is redolent with delicate perfume. About 25 miles to the south-east of Kasanlik, and divided from the Tundja valley by a range of hills, is Eski-Saghra, a town of 18,000 inhabitants, also a notable industrial centre, the best silk and the finest wheat in Turkey being produced in the surrounding district. The campaign of which these beautiful and fertile valleys are now the theatre will have probably ruined the rose culture for many a year.

Or, again, as 'The Times' correspondent wrote from Hainkioi.

Yesterday, the natural richness of the soil and climate was still apparent. On the first day nearly the whole route lay through fields of barley about ripe, and maize and meadows gone mad with flowers. Whenever the hills opened out into a valley, it was rich with things useful and beautiful. Nothing richer or more charming can be imagined than the valley through which the Turks fled, pursued for some miles by the dragoons on foot. Cornfields, vineyards, and meadows rich in flowers slope down to the road.

Turk and Bulgarian lived in peace and goodwill with each other. Rumours of war and disturbance had been heard, but the leading men of both communities had combined to repress all feeling and to maintain order and mutual forbearance.

Into this happy valley the Russian and Bulgarian troops descended at the end of July. With what results? That beautiful and populous district is now one vast sepulchre; burnt villages, ruined houses, inhabitants slaughtered with every conceivable horror of outrage and torture, where before this accursed war flourished so much busy and prosperous life. Hell itself has been let loose. Pillage, outrage, rapine, and massacre have raged throughout these peaceful homes. A few thousands of ruined and despairing women and children, starving and hopeless, are all that remain of a numerous and wealthy population.

Consul-General Fawcett, writing from Radosto, gives an awful description of their state.

Mr. Murray, the correspondent of the 'Scotsman,' gave me the following dreadful details of the district to the north-west of Eski Zaghra, Kalofer, Carlova, and Sopot—near the pass through which the Russians first debouched on Southern Bulgaria. He states that these towns are wholly destroyed, and that the streets, the vineyards, and the fields are strewn with the putrefying corpses of men, women, and children. His account is that, on taking possession of these towns, the Russian commanders forced the Turkish peasantry to give up their arms, promising them that they should be protected; that on the approach of Suleiman Pasha the Russians retired, handing the arms abovementioned, and others also, to the Bulgarian peasantry, who immediately turned upon their Turkish neighbours and ruthlessly murdered them indiscriminately, the women being first subjected to the most horrible outrages. The Bashi Bazouks and Circassians are carrying on the work of reprisals in their own manner. Mr. Murray found a few miles from Carlova a sort of camp of Turkish men, women, and children, whose number he estimated at 4,000, in a state of absolute destitution.

It should be remembered that there was no discord in the quiet villages lying about the sunny slopes of the Southern Balkan upon which the Russians descended. No marauding bands had disturbed the country. No insurrection had burst forth here and been repressed. The rising in the spring of 1876 which had been so sternly stamped out did not touch this portion of the country. Moslem and Christian had not been set against each other by mutual suspicion, much less by open struggle. The state of the population is best described by a correspondent of the 'Daily Telegraph' written from Kezanlik, it should be noted, in July, before the horrible results of Gourko's incursion were known, and

indeed, before they had been brought into effect. The account is evidently written without exaggeration and is a sample narrative of what the writer saw with his own eyes.

The town was full of destitute Turkish fugitives from the other side of the Balkans, bringing the most fearful accounts of barbarities committed by the Cossacks and Bulgarians. I need, therefore, only here state that, according to eye-witnesses, whose consistent narratives contain nothing worse than others which have been verified on this side of the Balkans, in one instance, that of Balvan, a Turkish village near Tirnova, the Cossacks are alleged to have assisted in the work, collecting the arms themselves one day and returning the next, accompanied by some 2,000 or 3,000 Bulgarians who were armed with every variety of weapon, from guns and swords to axes, knives, and clubs. This rabble was let loose to work its will upon the place. After sacking it and stripping the persons of its defenceless inhabitants, they set the village on fire and fell upon all who attempted to escape, cutting down men, women, and children, and driving them back into the flames. The Cossacks, it is affirmed, 'kept the ring' the while, and looked on complacently as these fiendish deeds were being perpetrated. Such tragedies as these, recounted by those who had effected their escape from the slaughter, began to disturb even the good feeling and mutual confidence which had always existed between both sections of the inhabitants of Kezanlik, and had stood the test of last year's troubles ; for it is to be remarked that Moslems and Christians are in nearly equal numbers thereabouts, and very much mixed together both locally and in the daily transactions of life. Last year, in the neighbouring district of Eski Zaghra, the two communities, which seem now imbued with a spirit of mutual extermination, entered into a kind of offensive and defensive alliance against all intruders from without, whether in the shape of insurgents or Bashi Bazouks. At Kezanlik not even this precaution had been needed. But now the seeds of distrust were sown. Opportunely for the time being, Consul Blunt, at this juncture coming from Adrianople, appeared on the scene. Thanks to his being an old acquaintance of most of the leading members of both communities, and a known friend to Turk and Bulgarian alike, a good understanding was soon brought about.

Hardly had the above serviceable result been attained, when a new and startling event threw the little town into a violent state of commotion.

About noon on July 14, news was brought that a Russian column many thousands strong was in full march upon Kezanlik. In the afternoon preceding its occupation by the Russians Kezanlik passed through a crisis. An alarm was spread that the enemy was within half-an-hour of the town. In the space of two minutes a barricade of waggons was thrown up at the town entrance, and was manned by an ever-thickening crowd of Turks, from the grey-beard to the stripling, who came pouring through the streets, each carrying a long old-fashioned gun and other weapons to match. Whilst pitying the folly of the thing, it was impossible not to admire the manly, resolute bearing, and the intent business-like air of these would-be defenders of their hearths and homes. If there was a tension of feeling there was not a trace of excitement, and, though many were speaking earnestly, not a voice was raised above its usual pitch. No less admirable, I thought, was the demeanour of the 'Turkesses.' From every window peered forth faces and forms displaying the female counterpart of a

physique which few races can match. There was hardly one young woman which one might not describe as 'rather pretty.' Beyond the fact that they were in this sudden emergency mostly unveiled, there was scarcely a sign of emotion, unless it were an extra touch of that pride which, mingled with womanly softness, constitutes the peculiar charm of the Turkish 'khanum.' As much cannot be said of the demeanour of their Bulgarian sisters on this occasion. The premises of my host were filled with screaming and swooning women. I have indulged in the above little sketch chiefly by way of illustrating in one point of view what it is so difficult to give an idea of in general terms—the qualities which enable the ruling race, with all the dead-weight that is against them in some respects, to maintain their moral and material ascendency over the other communities of the empire. The Kaimakan of Kezanlik had gone to the field of battle the day before in command of a force of irregulars, leaving the administration of affairs in the hands of the Cadi, an intelligent man of about five-and-twenty. Called upon to bring to reason the unruly spirit which had possessed the Turkish population, at the same time that he was holding urgent telegraphic consultation on military matters with the commandant at Chipka, the young expounder of the law had more than enough of unaccustomed weight on his shoulders, and at one moment he modestly exclaimed, as he raised his small green turban from his forehead with both hands, that he had lost his head. If he did he soon found it again, and used his influence with the Turkish notables to such good effect, that they, the real 'wire-pullers' of provincial public opinion, soon came back with the welcome announcement that the townspeople recognised the hopelessness of contending against an army which had beaten the Turkish regulars. The poor Turkish women within the town waved white handkerchiefs from sticks as the Russians approached the town, crying out 'Pardon! pardon!' (the French word has obtained currency of late in Turkey). The uniform process of collecting the arms of the Turkish inhabitants, and making them over to the Bulgarians, was adopted as a first step after the occupation of the town. Then followed the equally inevitable process of pillaging, insult, and bloodshed, continued over many days. The facts in this instance will soon be established on incontrovertible evidence. Yet the worst that has befallen any town is but a mild reproduction of the horrors enacted in many villages. I pass by the systematic giving over of every Turkish village, or Turkish portion of a mixed village, on or near the Russian line of march, to pillage by the Bulgarians first and to fire afterwards, a rule to which there is, I believe, no exception (I can speak to the eight or nine places between Haien Boghaz and Kezanlik, at any rate). The mere partial massacres which accompanied some of these are also unworthy of mention by the side of the wholesale slaughter of men, women, and children which was perpetrated in others; and these again pale before the deliberate collecting and burning to death in a straw-barn of the whole male population of the village of Buklumuk, near Eski Zaghra, and of the female inhabitants in another building some days after. The tale, as told by four male fugitive survivors, will be confirmed, I believe, by the evidence of Captain Fife, Military Attaché to the British Embassy at Constantinople, who visited the scene of horror, and saw the bodies of the victims. The distinction between Bulgarian and Turkish atrocity now, as last year, is this, that the latter is committed in the heat of passion, and in the way of vengeance for injuries received; the former is perpetrated in cold blood, without provocation.

Almost equally instructive is a letter from the 'Daily News' correspondent from the other side with General Gourko, who narrates what he saw while with the evangelising army of Russia.

We were advancing along the valley of the Tundja in the direction of Kezanlik. It is about ten miles wide, very rich, and for the most part highly cultivated, Turkish and Bulgarian villages alternating nearly equally. Four or five of these Turkish villages were in flames, and huge columns of smoke rose slowly up and hung over them in black, heavy clouds, rendered blacker and more unnatural by the hot, bright sunshine, and seeming like monster vultures hanging over their prey; and so with the noise of battle still sounding in our ears far ahead in the direction of Kezanlik, amid clouds of dust and smoke, the overpowering heat; the blinding glare of the sun, we arrived at Maglish. Here I found myself with General Stoleteff, the commander of the Bulgarian legion, who had taken refuge from the heat in the shade of a large elm, and who kindly invited me to share pot-luck with him. The Bulgarian population of the village soon gathered round us. There had been a few Turks in the village, all but two of whom had fled. These had been unable to escape, and were found hid in their houses, and they were immediately brought before the General, who had to decide what was to be done with them. The first was an elderly man, hard-visaged, and poorly clad, who was immediatety condemned to death on the testimony of two priests who had come with the rest of the population to welcome us. Now the Russians shoot every Turk not in uniform caught with arms in his hands, if there is a reasonable probability that he has been fighting the Russians. It was upon this principle that the old man was condemned; he was taken off into an adjoining field, and a few minutes later a volley of half-a-dozen shots told that the sentence was executed. For my part I was not at all satisfied as to the justice of the sentence. I should like to have had some better testimony than that of the two priests, who, I thought, had a grudge against him.

General Gourko's band carried ruin and desolation to the Turkish homes, and when the wave of war swept them back defeated, the Turkish irregulars, returning infuriated by the barbarities inflicted on their own people, retaliated in equal measure upon the Bulgarian villagers. An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth was the stern law of retribution exacted.

We have seen how well in every respect the Turks had behaved up to this time both north and south of the Balkans, in the face of provocation that would have excited many Christian peoples to wild fury. But now it was too much to expect a more than Christian forbearance of the Mahometan forces, who saw everywhere the awful handiwork of their hereditary enemies upon their helpless wives and daughters and in their desolated homes. As Mr. Forbes, with his clear-sighted and impartial vividness of description, says (and mark it, that bloodthirsty Christian Mr. E. C. Freeman, whose exterminating propensities it would be

difficult to match in the wildest of Bashi Bazouks, finds fault with Mr. Forbes for his impartiality),—

As the Russians have drawn in from the outskirts of that area, and the Turks have occupied the vacated territory, the immunity has ceased. *It is not given to barbarians to accept with Christian resignation, or civilised phlegm, the spectacle of their dwellings wantonly razed, their crops stolen and sold, their little garden patches obliterated. They know that the miserables they find unaccountably remaining in the villages, deprived of Russian protection, were the culprits. They know that these welcomed the enemy of the Turk, acted as his guides, served him as spies, and found in him a customer for the Turkish crops. They know that these hung on the rear of the hapless retreating Turkish villagers in July, and slew them ruthlessly—men, women, and children—when the safe chance offered. So the 'unspeakable' Turk lets the rough edge come uppermost again, and perpetrates atrocities—inflicts reprisals? Bah! what matters it about a form of words?*

The correspondent of the 'Standard,' with the Grand Duke Nicolas, who traversed the whole country north of the Balkans, bears convincing witness to the good conduct of the Turks:—

I have left myself scarce room to speak of the 'atrocities' as they deserve to be treated. No race, not even the Redskins, have behaved towards a flying and helpless population with such stolid cruelty as have the Bulgars towards the Turks. There was little enmity between the villagers, as is frankly confessed. It was mere lust of blood and loot which caused the Christian to rise against his neighbour when he saw him defenceless. In a wine shop at Sistof a Bulgar was displaying his hacked knife when my courier entered. He said, 'At first I used to go out with a gun, but this is better. I have killed ten of them. I have cut them like lambs.' For brute ferocity this expression could not be matched, I think; it was far beyond the imagination of my honest servant, who repeated it to me five minutes after. The northern Moslems were indeed slaughtered 'like lambs.' No excesses had they committed; even in their flight they had paid for everything, as was universally admitted. Awful tales we heard of massacre by the Turks, but always, on approaching, they were localised further off. So minute and circumstantial were these stories, that no one could disbelieve them wholly until he had visited the place. Thus every correspondent telegraphed all over Europe how thousands had been murdered at Lovcha and Plevna, and the villages round about. But when Lovcha was recaptured all the massacred Bulgarians came back to noxious life, to torture, kill, loot, and destroy. For two months the Russians have been there, and no report is issued on a single case of ill-treatment by a Turk. Of the villages round Plevna I have already described the state, and we know that all the Bulgar population which did not fly is living there yet, unmolested—or, if expelled of late, it has only shared the wretchedness of its Moslem fellow-citizens.

Another instance out of hundreds with which memory supplies me. When Gravitza redoubt was captured, of course we all rode into the village, which had been named as one where the Bashi Bazouk had played his most unspeakable excesses. Not only was the population there, not a soul missing, but the place, moreover, was full of country wealth—oxen, corn, and poultry. A Russian

officer asked a passing peasant, from whom he had bought two young turkeys for sixpence, if the people were not pleased to welcome their fellow Christians. 'We wait to see,' replied the other frankly, 'if you will treat us as well as the Turks did.' The answer showed that Bulgars are beginning to discriminate.

Your readers will not have forgotten the disgraceful scenes at Sistof, Tirnova, and elsewhere, but in the country deeds were done immeasurably more dreadful. Gourko's march seemed to raise a swarm of devils. The assassins of Roumelia last year were 'Pomaks'—renegade Bulgars, as was told me by a whole group of fugitives from thence; it is too abundantly proved by the deeds of their Christian kindred that a merciful religion may fail to subdue the inborn savagery of blood.

The Bulgarian legion, as Mr. Layard had predicted, armed, organised, and led by Russian officers, who were thus directly responsible for its abominable crimes (crimes that are now admitted on all sides), were in most cases used by the Russian leaders to do their barbarous work. These men committed every conceivable form of cruelty upon the Turkish villagers and urged their civilian countrymen to imitate them.

Their course was uniform. They first forced the male Mahometan population to give up their arms. They then massacred the men and outraged the women and girls. These were kept alive as long as they could gratify the passions of their oppressors, and were then murdered. Many were, on the approach of the relieving Turkish army, carried off to the mountain recesses by the Bulgarians, where their dead bodies have since been found. The 'Times' correspondent with Suleiman Pasha, writing from Hain Boghaz with regard to the massacre at Offlanlick on August 16, says:—

> The story of all the people who escaped, and who have repeated it at different times, is that the Bulgarians, with a few Cossacks—some say two Cossack officers—came to the village some ten or twelve days ago. They appear to have collected all the young women and children in one or two large houses, to have taken all the men outside the village and shot them, and to have continued pillaging and burning, and occasionally killing anybody they found. All accounts agree that the unhappy girls and young women, who were kept prisoners in these houses, were daily and hourly ravished, that fifteen of them were killed, and that a very large number were taken away to the mountains, when the Bulgarians retreated on the advance of Suleiman Pasha's army.

Is it any wonder that, with these awful incentives before their eyes, the Turkish irregular troops (for the regulars were, from all accounts, proof against even this provocation) should have fallen in revenge upon the wretched Bulgarian villagers, themselves assassins and accomplices of assassins?

This retaliation, however, is no reason that some of our English journals should have steadily misrepresented the facts and ignored the provocation. 'The Times' and 'Daily News' were discreetly silent while Gourko's fiends were doing their bloody work, and they have done their best ever since to conceal its fruits. But when the Turks got the upper hand we were deluged with accounts of their atrocities, and every telegram from the seat of war was headed, '"The Terror" in Bulgaria!' What, however, caused 'the terror' but that barbarous and unjustifiable raid of General Gourko, and what words should be used to describe the feelings and sufferings of the Turkish inhabitants? But Moslem miseries count for nothing in the eyes of our Russo-philanthropists who draw a veil over the ruin of Turkish homes, while they shriek their loudest wails of hypocritical sentiment over the scratches of a Bulgarian.

There was a fixed purpose in this raid. Its object was not military but political, or rather demoniacal. It was not to crush the Turkish armies, to capture their fortresses and break down their armed defence; but it was Russia's fixed and relentless purpose (the same now as ever) to set race against race, by giving reins to the evil passions of the Bulgarians, and by inciting them to deeds of barbarous cruelty which would excite a fierce spirit of revenge in the Turks and rouse them in turn to acts of cruel retaliation.

These could once again, as during last autumn, be used with signal effect by an unprincipled press in the service of Russia. The object of this raid was, in a word, to create so bitter and undying an antipathy between the two religions and races in Bulgaria that it would not be possible for them to live together again, and to raise such a barrier wall of cruel outrage between the Mahometan and Christian, that their association would be for the future made horrible, if not impossible, by the bitter memories of mutual wrong. How far the raid succeeded, History will relate. Probably never in the annals of the world was equal ruin wrought with such small materials. Probably never was such desolation, agony, and despair brought upon an inoffensive population as was brought upon the peaceful peasantry of Northern Roumelia by this irruption of 12,000 Russians, coming alas! in the name of Christianity, but bearing with them the torch of war and the two-edged sword of religious and national hatred.

The 'Times' correspondent with General Gourko, who saw this raid throughout, and who carefully kept back all he could against his dear friends, the Russians, cannot help letting drop now and

then a few awkward facts about the conduct of the war. Writing from the camp south of the Balkans about July 12, he says:—

This war is not an affair of civilisation, but of horror upon horror. The Russian soldier looks on the Turk as an animal whom he has to chase and kill. The Bulgarians will kill if they can. Prince Wechtenstein rides up and says that the Bulgarians are murdering the wounded Turks. When later we passed over the field of battle, the Bulgarian peasants were pillaging the dead. How can a man with a heart do otherwise than turn away with a shudder from comfortable matrons who draw their hands across their throats to suggest murder when they hear that Turkish prisoners have been taken? How can gallant soldiers look with pleasure on men who sully the cause by *habitual* deeds of blood and massacre.

The deliberate horrors wrought upon the thriving village of Offlanlick are attested by so many credible eye-witnesses that even if it stood a solitary case, it would sufficiently condemn the Cossacks and Bulgarians, and afford convincing proof of the criminal responsibility of those who began this war. The correspondent of 'The Times' with Suleiman Pasha writes from Hain Boghaz on August 16:—

Yesterday we were invited by Suleiman Pasha to go and see a village that had within the last week been the scene of a frightful massacre by the Bulgarians, aided by Cossacks. The scene of this last massacre is a village called Offlanlick, or Ufflana, about half way between this and Kezanlik, and consequently very near to the Russian lines at the latter place. It was a most flourishing village or town, and probably contained upwards of 3,500 inhabitants, many of them, judging from the few houses that remain standing, being very well to do. The death of one young woman could only have occurred two or three days ago at the furthest. It is painful and revolting to give one's reasons for being thus able to fix the date, but I must briefly say that the flesh which was still adhering to the almost skeleton remains and which had not been devoured by the dogs was quite fresh-looking, while the upper part of the body was very little discoloured. I can never forget that woman's face. I was accompanied by the correspondent of the 'Daily Telegraph,' and by our servants, as well as by a Turkish Major and an escort of two or three soldiers. We all stood round that awful sight without saying a word. Her face, which the dogs had respected and left intact, was most strikingly beautiful, with a delicacy of outline and perfect contour of cheek and chin that was only heightened by the pallor of death. Her mouth, which was small and beautifully formed, was slightly open, and her teeth visible, her eyes closed, and long fringed lashes lying on her cheek. There was just a faint expression of pain on the forehead, and her hair was lying all round her head like a rich brown wavy halo. She was entirely nude, and her throat had been cut with one clean deep cut which must have severed the jugular and windpipe immediately. We also found the remains of women and children in a well. How many there were it was difficult to say, as we did not get them up. But they must have been numerous, and I am inclined to believe the story of a poor trembling old woman who accompanied us to the spot, that there were twelve or fifteen women in the well. On our way

home we came across upwards of 120 dead Turks, who had all been massacred by bayonet or sword or shot suddenly. They were lying in groups, in one place 40, another 50, and two or three smaller parties. That these men were slaughtered in cold blood there can be no reason to doubt. There were several very old men among them. A most successful cavalry expedition returned here last night. At Mouflis, in the Valley of the Tundja, they first found 250 women and children, whose lives, but not their honour, had been spared by the retreating Bulgarians. In the evening the force arrived at Kezanlik. In the town they found upwards of 2,000 Turkish women and children. These were unanimous in saying that during the last ten or fifteen days since they have been left in the hands of the Bulgarians almost every young woman or girl has been ravished and several have been taken away to the mountains. There was hardly a male Turk in the place; they had all been slaughtered.

All of which is confirmed with more detail by the correspondent of the 'Telegraph,' writing from the same camp.

The day following our arrival at the Haien Pass four Mussulman women presented themselves to Suleiman Pasha and told a tale of horror which has rarely been equalled even in this country. Not one of the women was under 60 years of age, and it was not difficult to see that their naturally thin cheeks were still further contracted by hunger and want, and that the terrible scenes which they had witnessed had for ever left their impress upon them, for there was a look of terror in their eyes which death would alone efface, and unconsciously they looked around from time to time as if still expecting to see their torturers near at hand. As with trembling lips they mumbled out the history of the massacre of their husbands and children, they were frequently interrupted by expressions of horror or of emotion which their hearers could not restrain. The facts as related by the old women are as follows: Offlanlich, the scene of the massacre, is, or rather was, a village containing 300 houses, situated in the valley of the Tundja, about 8 miles from Haien, on the road to Kezanlik, from which town it is some 20 miles distant. The inhabitants of Offlanlick were nearly all Mussulmans; a few Christian families also resided there, and had always been on the best terms with their neighbours. The village was a very rich one, as are all those in the fertile valley of the Tundja, and there was but little poverty and no want among the simple living inhabitants of a place so especially favoured by nature. When the Russians first crossed the Balkans about a month since, they entered Offlanlick without resistance, the unfortunate Mussulmans foolishly accepting the promise that their lives and property would be respected. Having, as usual, disarmed the Turks and distributed their arms to the Bulgarians, the Russians left. On the 2nd inst. a body of Cossacks and Bulgarians entered the village, and at once made all the inhabitants prisoners, shutting up the women and children in separate houses, and carrying off all the men to work on the fortifications they intended constructing on the heights where we are now bivouacked. The men were marched off to Haien, and hardly had they left when officers entered the houses where the terrified women and children were confined, and separating those who were young and pretty from those who were old and ugly, led off the former to a fate worse than death, and shut up the others in three houses, where they were left for ten whole days without food, many of the wretched children and women dying of starvation during their horrible captivity.

The old women could give us no information as to the ten days they were kept prisoners, except that their ears were constantly assailed by the sounds of drunken orgies in which there mingled the shrieks of agony of innocent girls with the guttural shouts of the Cossacks and the oaths of the Bulgarians. When the news of the approach of Suleiman Pasha arrived, the Russians evacuated Offlanlick, carrying with them some of the victims of their hateful passion, but many, many others were murdered by their barbarian captors. These are the main events which the fugitives related, denuded of all the dreadful details which are not fit for publication. We at once accepted the General's offer to visit the place. Our Military Attaché, Captain Fife, the correspondents of 'The Times' and 'Morning Post,' as well as two other English gentlemen, with your correspondent, have witnessed all that I am about to relate. Numerous groups of large oak trees, the shade of which was most welcome on this burning day, and green sward made the country look like an immense park, where peace held complete sway, instead of being the scene where all the passions which fiends possess had been let loose so short a time since, and it was dreadful to remember that those verdant glades had resounded with the death-shrieks of women and children. We soon reached the village, and found that it had been entirely burnt; but we could see from the ruins that the houses had mostly been large and comfortable, several having possessed Turkish baths, and all being surrounded by nice neat gardens full of rose trees—for this is the country of attar-of-roses. There was an overpowering smell of decomposed human bodies throughout the village; but no one could tell where the victims lay. We were led by a trembling old woman to the ruins of the house of one of the richest inhabitants of the village, and, stopping beside a well some 20 ft. deep, she pointed down it. Horror-stricken, we looked down, but the smell was overpowering, and we had to draw back; my Turkish servant, however, went down the well, and found that it was filled with the bodies of women. The bodies were in too advanced a state of decomposition to think of removing them, so, having again crept close to the mouth of the open grave, we looked down and saw the outlines of several bodies piled up together. We left the dreadful place, and followed our guide to another house, where before the door we found the body of a young and lovely girl, whose throat had been cut after she had been violated—she lay before us on the threshold of her father's house, naked and mutilated. She had only been dead about three days, and her features were still perfectly intact, and showed that she must have been extremely beautiful when alive.

Throughout the village fiendish deeds like those above related were too common, but worse sights remained for us to witness. Outside the village, amid the giant oaks which I have already mentioned, we noticed a flock of birds of prey, and then a crowd of dogs, and next the most awful sight it has ever been my misfortune to witness. In a circle ten yards square lay the decomposed corpses of fifty human beings, men and women indiscriminately mixed together; while dozens of dogs wandered among the bodies, portions of which they had devoured during the eight days they had lain where they had been murdered. There was nothing to tell the tale of how they had met their death, as all lay in similar positions, with their legs and arms stretched out, clearly showing that they had been neither shot nor hanged. The pestilential odour which hung around the place prevented us making a closer examination, but we saw enough

to prove that a horrible tragedy had taken place. A hundred yards further on we came across a little group of seven corpses in the same condition and position as the others, while behind some bushes we found girls' clothes, evidently where the poor victims had been outraged and stripped previous to being assassinated. Following the path beneath the trees, we suddenly came upon a long line of corpses, numbering sixty-one, and these, as all we had previously seen, had their arms and legs stretched out as a man never falls when shot. In what manner these 118 Turks were murdered will never be known, but the fact remains that murdered they were, and there was not a fighting man amongst them, as we could tell from the white hair and beards of nine-tenths of the victims. Had we continued our search we should in all probability have found many hundred corpses, but we had seen enough, and were sickened at the brutal murders which had been committed. It was a relief to turn back to the main road and leave the blood-stained village of Offlanlick behind us.

The above story is not highly coloured, nor are the numbers grossly exaggerated, as was the case when the civilised world was shocked by the accounts given of the Bulgarian atrocities. I have given the exact number of the corpses we saw and counted, and the names of the witnesses. I have given the place, the facts, and numbers beyond doubt. It is also necessary to recall to mind that when the Turks acted as they did last year, it was under the influence of rage, caused by the resistance they encountered—a rage which cannot be justified, but which may be understood; whereas the horrible murders which I have had to relate were committed in cold blood on the persons of unfortunate peasants who accepted the pledged word of the Russian commander, and remained in their homes. I have only mentioned 118 corpses, but the whole population of Offlanlick has been destroyed, and the mountains around are covered with the victims of Christian bloodthirstiness. All the villages around have been treated like Offlanlick, and there remain no people to lay claim to the richest soil in Turkey, whole families having been murdered, so that there exists to-day no heir to many a fertile property. Not content with entering on an unnecessary war which should, in any case, bring misery upon thousands, Russia is now the cause of massacres which she pretends to condemn.

Another correspondent of 'The Times,' with Suleiman Pasha, who went through the country after Gourko had been driven back, thus describes the outcome of this expedition. It is a most graphic description, and one which those who advised, urged on, and set on foot this awful war, should print on the tablets of their hearts.

The young and the strong of the men, Bulgarians and Turks, have both found safety in joining, the Bulgarians the Russian army, the Turks in becoming Bashi Bazouks. Both sets have formed themselves into vast bands of merciless executioners, and under the protection of their respective armies pillage, murder, ravish, and destroy whatever comes in their way belonging to the other race or creed. From any hill-top the fires of ten or a dozen burning villages can be counted, while every road is crowded with fugitives, flying they know not whither, and their lives absolutely depending on this or that move of the opposing armies. I have seen a large valley, blocked up by hundreds of Moslem

fugitives, resting in supposed safety near a Turkish army. I have heard soon after of some change of position of that army, and knew that it must have been physically impossible for those unfortunate people to escape the murdering Bulgarians, who are ever ready to pounce upon the defenceless and wreak on them their long-pent-up vengeance. I hear on every side the same story—Turks murdered and defiled by Christians and Christians by Turks. I pass through villages actually by the hundred where nothing remains alive but the dogs and poultry, and where every house alike has in its turn been ransacked. In the fields the most bounteous crop that Providence has given—partly, perhaps, to heal the sores of last year, if men would allow it to be so—lies rotting on the ground, while far and near the husbandman has disappeared, his cattle scattered, his stacks of winter fodder a charred heap, and his cottage a ruin; his wife and children, if God has been merciful to them, dead, and their dishonour forgotten, or lost in some mountain forests, where they pass their trembling hours in terror and starvation. As to isolated cases of cruelty and barbarity, it is impossible to record them, so innumerable are they and so irrefutable is the evidence.

Narrating his endeavours to relieve some Bulgarian women and children, he says:—

All these, with two orphan children, we with immense labour carried out of the churchyard and deposited in a bullock-cart. By this time two Bulgarian men had turned up, and it is hardly credible that we were obliged to thrash one of these idle, stupid vagabonds before he could be induced to go and fetch from the field close to the village the bullock to draw the araba.

There is not the least doubt that the massacres continue. At two villages near Tchirpan, called Karavenar and Allana, the Bulgarians have killed a good many Turks, and subjected women to such cruelty that one shudders to repeat it. In more than one instance, the Bulgarians have cut off the breasts of nursing mothers, and have amused themselves by applying the unconscious infant to the mutilated part. In the camp I found two or three Turkish women who had been brutally treated and received wounds showing the most fiendish malice—one woman with her head cut open, her arm broken at the elbow, and a sword wound in the back. A young girl of seventeen or eighteen had three terrible sword wounds in the head and a dagger thrust in the neck. Her beauty alone should have pleaded for her, and the unfortunate girl had just escaped other horrors which are, alas! only too common.

In a most striking letter the 'Standard' correspondent, with the Grand Duke Nicolas at Poradim, thus criticises the atrocities imputed, and often in good faith, but erroneously imputed, to the Turks.

The gentleman who lately saw 'crowds of Bashi Bazouks' swarming out of Plevna behind the regulars, for no purpose apparently but to massacre the wounded, had extraordinary luck and wonderful field-glasses. The other correspondent, who heard screams and yells all night after the second battle, could not be actually sure that they were caused by fresh pangs. As for the terrible deeds reported from the other side the Balkans, after the retreat of Ghourko's army, there is no good evidence that they were committed by the

soldiers. Supposing that they were, if ever atrocities could be extenuated, that was the case. The very air was poisoned with the carcases of murdered Turks. They lay in festering heaps upon the road itself by which the pursuing columns marched. Violated women and tortured children were there, burnt in the fire of their own houses. The worst crimes of the Indian mutiny were outdone, and the victims were not tens but thousands. The offence lies with those who begin inhuman deeds. Had the advancing Turks massacred every Bulgar on their road, they would have done no more—seeing the unparalleled measure of atrocities for which vengeance was due—than the most humane of armies have done. What was the treachery of Bazeilles to this, or even the horrors of Cawnpore? What Arab *razzia* in the French colony caused one-thousandth part of the suffering and shame? But it is not certain that the Turkish soldiers requited cruelty for cruelty. Many Bulgars were shot and many hanged, but the tortures, if such there were, may well have been inflicted by the maddened peasantry which returned in the army's wake. By that code of war upon which Russian generals act, any Moslem carrying arms, but wearing no uniform, is a Bashi Bazouk, and therefore a ravisher of women and a murderer, to be killed like a dog or handed over to the Bulgars for their ghastly sport. He might be a native of Bolwan, or a survivor from the thousand villages burnt, wandering back at peril of his life to claim Russian protection. He might be a man from whom everything had been reft, his wife and children massacred, his home destroyed, driven to arms by starvation. This matters nothing. The behaviour of the Moslem army, when it began to move, certainly favours the idea that the devastation of the Tunja valley was not the work of soldiers. Nothing was heard at that time but rumours of death and outrage. The Bashi-Bazouk was alleged to be at his deadly work about Tirnova, and I and other correspondents reported them upon evidence which seemed trustworthy. But wherever we ourselves went, east or west, the Bashi Bazouk vanished like the rainbow, to appear again a little farther off. When the Turkish army got into actual motion Tirnova was flooded with fugitives, the most dismal cavalcade to be imagined. And they all reported terrible events. Forty thousand souls of Plevna and Lovcha were said to have been murdered with every possible shape of cruelty. The narratives of the survivors were circumstantial, and the telegraph carried them through all Europe. But they were false—the inventions of blind panic. When Lovcha fell again into Russian hands, the people alleged to have perished all reappeared; and so it will be doubtless at the retaking of Plevna. Already it is known that in the villages round, Grivitza, Tucenitza, Radisovo, Bogot, and the rest, the inhabitants were not only uninjured but unplundered. If the Bashi Bazouks 'swarm in Plevna,' and occupy themselves in torturing the helpless, it is incredible that those who have lain in their power for months past should have against them not so much as a complaint.

Instances of these terrible crimes committed by Christians on Moslems and Jews might be multiplied *ad infinitum* from the testimony of English Consuls, their assistants, the correspondents of journals and English gentlemen who have been of late through these suffering districts as simple travellers. A few more must suffice. Consul-General Fawcett, writing to Mr. Layard from near

Radosto, says of the destitute refugees he was relieving from the Baroness Burdett Coutts's 'Compassionate Fund':—

Many of the women had scarcely any clothes on, and many of the children were quite naked. Infants at the breast were dying of hunger, owing to the mothers' milk failing. In Adrianople, which Mr. Fawcett also visited, there were 6,000 destitute Osmanlis, about 1,600 Jews, and about 400 Bulgarians. The two hospitals there are a heart-rending sight, grey-haired old women, young girls, children, and infants in arms, shot, maimed, and slashed with sabre and knife cuts. They were all Osmanli and gipsies, and all told the same tale, that their neighbours the Bulgarians had fallen upon them and murdered them without sparing age or sex. There was one very horrible case, a very beautiful young woman, wife of a Turkish telegraph clerk, now lodged in Mrs. Carnana's house; her tale is that, only five days after she had been delivered of her first child, the Cossacks arrived, murdered her husband, then nine of them violated her one after another, and, lastly, attempted to kill her infant, she receiving some sabre cuts on her arms in her endeavours to shield the child. The number of wounded in these two hospitals is 101, and more wounded were coming in.

The Ottoman Embassy received the following statement from the Porte:—

The Russians and Bulgarians drove out all the Mussulman inhabitants of the village of Herste, and burnt all the men and some of the women. Seventy Mussulmans and the Imam of Yuklem were shut up by the Bulgarians in a barn, to which they set fire, in conjunction with the Cossacks. Forty-four other Mussulmans of the same village were massacred, and all the Mussulman women outraged. Eight young girls who resisted were killed, and two others burnt with the men. The greater part of the other women, with their children, were taken outside the village, where one after another, with their children at their sides, were slaughtered. Twenty women and children who escaped the massacre were rescued by the Imperial Ottoman troops. The English Military Attaché himself witnessed all these horrors. The Russians, on entering these parts, disarmed all the Mussulmans of Eski Zaghra, Kezanlik, and the neighbouring villages, and distributed the arms seized among the Bulgarians. The latter then drove down 400 Mussulmans from Mughlis, in the district of Kezanlik, to the bank of the River Tundja, and there massacred them. At Eski Zaghra and in its neighbourhood the Bulgarians continue to massacre the Mussulman population.

A German refugee from the Dobrudscha, sent to the 'Standard' of August 28, a very interesting account of his own and his comrades' experiences during the Russian occupation of that district. At Kustendje he met some Cossacks who told him of their pleasures. The Bulgarian development of Mr. Gladstone's suggestions is very amusing and must cause that eminent statesman great satisfaction. The Cossacks said:—

We have mostly outpost duty, and then is our time to kill those cursed dogs of Circassians. Near a place called Casabkeu we surrounded forty of them, and when they saw that they could not escape they threw down their arms and held

up their hands in token of having surrendered, but we cut them all down but two, who managed to escape somehow. On all of them we found money, some in paper, but the greater part in gold. As soon as we had settled the dogs we stripped and searched them. 'Well, you have made a good thing of it and punished the Circassians as well; but how about the Bulgarians, what have they been doing?' 'Not many Turks will live who fall into their hands. Why, they cut off a man's nose here in the town only yesterday, and thought it fine fun.' For my part I think the Bulgarians are greater beasts than the Turks themselves. Why, look in what a disgraceful state they have made the mosque here. You will see that they will spare neither age nor sex if they have the chance. They thought they were going to have it all their own way when they got rid of the Turks. 'Our day will come,' they said, 'and then "Bis sizie ateshã yackaries," which literally translated means 'We will burn you in the fire.' They have kept their word, and are likely to go on doing so. How often have Bulgarians told me that England would be glad to see all the Turks made an end of, and when I have asked them their reason for thinking so, they have answered me, 'Why, Mr. Gladstone, your Prime Minister, says so in his book, which we have translated into Bulgarian. He says the Turks are to be turned out, bag and baggage, and of course if we killed them all it would be much simpler, and he would be better pleased.'

On November 2, the execution and confession of a Bulgarian criminal at Constantinople is thus narrated by the 'Standard' correspondent at Pera:—

A Bulgarian named Deli Yovan, or 'Mad John,' was hanged here this morning.

For the criminal himself nothing could be said. He was a savage of the worst type. He had confessed his crimes, for it is a characteristic of the Bulgarians that when they are brought face to face with their fate, they confess their crimes freely, and, as it were, delightedly. The criminal of yesterday was no exception to this rule. He confessed to having violated and subsequently murdered five Turkish girls. He confessed to having killed with his own hand some fifteen to eighteen Turkish children; he boasted that he and some comrades had collected the blood of these victims in a pitcher, broken into the synagogue of the village and forced the wretched Jews who had taken refuge in the synagogue to drink the contents of the pitcher.

But, say the defenders of the Bulgarians, no doubt they have done terrible things, but what better can you expect from a people so long oppressed, and in the first flush of their liberation wreaking their vengeance on their tyrants? As to their long oppression and their miserable condition, some few important revelations will be made further on. But, granting the force of this argument, how can the treatment of the unhappy Jewish inhabitants of the Balkan villages, by General Gourko's Russians and Bulgarians, be explained? The Israelites were not of the dominant race. Like the Bulgarians, they were fellow subjects under the Ottoman

Empire, and had done no wrong to the soldiery that fell upon them with ruthless savageness. The Bulgarians, Cossacks, and even Russians pure and simple, are all responsible for the fiendish conduct narrated in the following description. And, be it noted, the Russians are no novices at the pillage and massacre of Jews in their own country. Within the past two years there have been several instances of wholesale maltreatment of the Jewish population in Russian towns, the outcome of that fierce spirit of ignorant and superstitious religious intolerance which is so strong in the Russian character, and which seems so dear to many of our pro-Russian admirers of the Holy Orthodox Church of Russia. The correspondent of the 'Standard,' writing from Bucharest, on October 1, narrates the story told him personally by the few Jewish refugees who had escaped from the massacres in the Kezanlik and Eski Zaghra districts.

For the last nine or ten days there have been in Bucharest some three hundred and fifty Jewish refugees, mostly widows and orphans, a miserable remnant of the unhappy Hebrew communities of Kezanlik, Eski Zaghra, and other places in Roumelia and Bulgaria, where the Russians have been carrying out their Christian mission. These unfortunates were received naked and starving—many died on the road from absolute inanition—many of the women and children bear the scars of recently healed wounds; and all retain unmistakable indications of the bitter sufferings and hardships to which they have been subjected.

Their sad story, too well attested, unfortunately, to admit of any doubt, is as follows:—Before the Russian column under General Gourko crossed the Balkans the Jewish inhabitants of Eski Zagra and Kezanlik numbered over sixteen hundred. Three days before the Russians entered Kezanlik the Kaimaikan, or sub-governor of the province, came to those places, and advised the Jews, that, as they might anticipate ill-treatment from the Bulgars and Russians, they had better leave for a place of safety. Acting on this suggestion they followed the Turkish inhabitants, who sought shelter in a forest on the Balkans. In Kezanlik only two or three very poor families remained. The narrator of what follows was one of the natives of Kezanlik, but there is no doubt what occurred there applies, with very little variation, to every other town and village in which these atrocities have taken place. Three days after the Turks and Jews had left, General Gourko's troops arrived, and a Jew messenger and five Bulgars, who were the bearers of the Grand Duke Nicholas's proclamation, promising to all and sundry, of whatever creed or nationality, peace and tranquillity, under Russian protection, were sent to the refugee camp. Influenced by and on the faith of the Imperial proclamation, the inhabitants of Kezanlik and Eski Zagra returned to their respective towns.

After a few days the Russians evacuated the town to go and attack the Turkish force which was approaching; and no sooner had the last soldier cleared the place than the Bulgars commenced operations by seizing every man, woman, and child of the Jewish community and forcing them into the synagogue and

its courtyard, which seems to have been fenced off with iron railings. The richest men amongst them were then summoned by some of the Bulgars, and a demand was made for a large sum of money. Some demur naturally arose for the moment, so the Bulgars hastened the decision by firing volleys between the railings into the crowded courtyard, eighteen people being killed at the first discharge. All the money in the possession of the men was given up then without further parley, the bodies of the dead being searched for their contribution. Next, a demand was made for the jewellery of the women and girls, and, without waiting for its delivery, the cowardly ruffians rushed in amongst the shrieking, terrified creatures, tearing off necklaces and bracelets, rings, and ear pendants, and in many cases facilitating the operation by cutting off the ears or the fingers of any miserable woman who could not quickly enough disengage her rings. This occurred on a Saturday. On the Monday morning the synagogue was invaded by crowds of half-drunken ruffians, who seized all the young women and girls, and outraged them in the sacred building in the presence of their friends. The elder of the town, Aaram Ben Kanetti, the richest of the community, saw his two daughters seized in their turn, and prayed that he might be spared the horrible sight by being killed at once. The response to his prayer was that two men, who were armed with hay forks, placed a prong in each ear and threatened that if he attempted to turn away his head, they would thrust them into his brain. It is declared that the maddened father then seized one of the forks, and thrust a prong into his own eyes rather than witness the shameful outrage on his offspring, and as he fell in agony at the feet of the Bulgars who had him in charge they mercifully ended his torment by prodding him to death with the forks. After a long day's murder and outrage, the nine hundred were reduced to less than half, all the richest men having been killed, as also all the young women and girls who had survived the horrible outrages to which they had been for hours subjected.

'The survivors were sent by a Russian officer under Cossack escort to Shipka. As soon as his back was turned the Bulgars came back, and, furnishing the Cossacks with drink, soon had them in a condition to co-operate fraternally in the business they contemplated. Then commenced a scene of carnage in which the survivors declared that the Cossacks, men of the Bulgar Legion, embodied by the Russians, took their full share. Amongst other horrors it is said that men and women were impaled on the spikes of the iron railings, and children were pinned to the doors and seats of the synagogue with lances. The unhappy survivors were formed into a chain-gang, two-and-two, and set off on their journey to Shipka. After a five hours' march they were halted and allowed to rest; and soon after four Cossacks and a number of Bulgars came along from Kezanlik, and proceeded deliberately to strip the unhappy prisoners and murder them. The commandant of some Russian dragoons, arriving on the spot, found only thirty-four surviving, the Cossacks and Bulgars making off with their booty. This time the regular escort saw them safe to Shipka, and thence they were marched under escort, but with no provision of food, to Sistova. They declare they had nothing to eat on the way except what the charitable of their own persuasion provided for them. On the road they were joined by other detachments of Jews, the survivors of massacres at other towns and villages, bringing up the number of refugees, as I have said, now here to 351. Many died on the road, and some few since their arrival here, and many have become insane from their sufferings. One pitiful instance of the latter affliction is that of a poor young

widow, whose infant child died on the journey from starvation, and who sits rocking a ragged coverture in her arms, imploring silence at the least noise, in the belief that her little one is asleep in her arms.

These outrages on the Jews are confirmed by Mr. Forbes, who says, speaking of another place, Carlovo, the mouth of the pass of that name :—

But this I say, that all the Turks are reported as having done, on their re-occupation of the districts, is on credible evidence not one whit more barbarous than was the conduct of the Bulgarians towards the Turks when Gourko's star was in the ascendant. The one 'terror' has but followed on the other. Apologists for the proven barbarity of the Bulgarians—men who acknowledge that they saw them driven away with horror from their work of slaughtering Turkish wounded, over whom an advancing Russian column had passed—advance the plea, *ad culpam minuendam,* that the Bulgarians have at least not ravished. There is told a different tale in the sad spectacle of the four Jewish ladies, sisters, now forlornly resident in the house of a merchant banker in Bucharest of their own faith—outraged by God knows what ruffiandom of uncounted Bulgarians in sight of their own father as he lay dying, murdered in his own house in Carlovo.

Finally to conclude the proofs of the guilt of the Russian and Bulgarian troops, a few more instances will be cited. Consul-General Fawcett writes on September 10, from Yeni Saghra, to Mr. Layard :—

We arrived at Miderasli, a small Turkish village half burnt by Russians. We relieved those who had suffered. Further on the road we met a caravan of 17 Turkish families returning to their village, called Karakui; they were in abject misery and destitution; we relieved them. Afternoon arrived at Kalofen, a large village, nearly as large as Carlovo. This place is totally burnt and destroyed. Chipka village was in a horrible state, many bodies remaining unburied. Proceeded next morning to Kyzanlik; the road from Chipka to Kyzanlik is strewed on each side of the way with festering corpses. The country is lovely, groves of walnut and plane trees, which makes the scene, if possible, the more horrible. Kyzanlik is a large place, beautifully situated, half burned by the Russians and Bulgars. At present it is simply a large pest-house—wounded soldiers, fever and dysentery patients in every house which has a roof. We saw in different courtyards dozens of dead laid out waiting burial. The stench of the whole place was sickening, and how malignant typhus has not appeared I cannot imagine.

Passed a burnt Turk village, and close to bodies of women rotting in the sun. Next morning we got to Muklis. This thriving Turk village has been wholly destroyed, with the exception of six or seven houses, into which were crowded the survivors of the village in a dreadful state of misery. This is the place where 60 women and children, Mussulmans, were taken to the Balkans and murdered in cold blood after being violated. Most of the villagers were also murdered. An old man told me that a few Cossacks assisted the Bulgars in this massacre; but, he added, 'it was not our neighbours, but rayahs from foreign villages.' Further on we found another large Turkish village burnt and wholly

destroyed, called Ofanli, surrounded with walnut and plum groves. We stayed a couple of hours at Hain-keui, near the Hain-Boghaz Pass, by which the Russians entered. Arrived late at Lodskui, another burnt Turkish village. The village is burnt and destroyed. In fact, the whole country between Carlova and this place is depopulated, and is reeking with the odour of human remains.

Concluding his report with the following pregnant words:—

It is impossible, without having personally witnessed it, to picture to yourself the extremity of misery to which a simple and industrious peasantry have been plunged by this unholy war, a war which, its authors proclaimed, is carried on in the name of the Christian religion, humanity, and freedom.

Major Hume, writing from Shumla, says:—

The tales of outrage and murder of the defenceless peasant families by the Cossacks and their Bulgarian Christian auxiliaries are now unfortunately too many and too well supported to admit of doubt. I have myself seen and questioned scores of poor women and children who have, although grievously wounded and diabolically outraged, been so far fortunate as to have preserved their lives; and they all concur in the statement that vast numbers of their people have been massacred.

A correspondent who went through the scene of General Gourko's raid thus contrasts the country before and after it:—

I should like the men who advocated the Russian crusade to contrast the appearance of this country now with what it was when I last passed through it nine months ago. Then all was smiling and peaceful; the barns were full of wheat, the villages of inhabitants. But the Cossack has come, and the houses and barns are burnt, the villagers have fled or are killed, and the district is charred with the blast of war. Yet still the sun shines on the fearful scene, lighting up its horrors as brilliantly as it used in olden times its beauties. Its cheerful warmth seems to make the spectacle more sad. What a sight for those whose hearts are not altogether steeled! All along the roads are rough country waggons filled with wounded men. Some lie by the wayside crying and writhing in pain. But few of them have yet been attended to though they were wounded ten days ago. Many of them have not even had water or bread for a couple of days. Some whose wounds are fountains of pain call aloud upon Allah to let them die; others sit silent and wring their hands in despairing agony. The pen refuses to describe the sight, and then camped on the road, not far from them, are hundreds of women and children who have lost their all and fled hither for shelter. Their fathers, brothers, and sons, where are they?

And a gentleman who accompanied Consuls Fawcett and Blunt in their humane mission gives an awfully graphic picture of the outcome of the Christian mission of Russian soldiers.

Hundreds and hundreds, chiefly women and children, next to naked, starving, fevered, their faces bearing an expression of unspeakable horror, for most of them have witnessed their husbands, fathers, sons hung before their eyes—their little children cut in pieces and thrown at them! Let not the people of England

nurse the illusion that these terrible facts are 'exaggerations,' tales of 'party feeling;' they are reality, and far worse, if possible, than has yet become known. This morning we distributed relief to over 1,100 Turks. The unfortunates crowd round us, clasp their hands, utter all sorts of 'Inshallahs!' try to pat us on our shoulders, crawl to kiss our boots. Truly it is a painful scene. Most of them are specimens for anatomy; you can count their bones. We often have to feel the poor little children's pulse, doubtful whether they are alive or dead. Thank God, some money has also been given us to distribute. The dirt and effluvia are sickening. Some terrible disease will soon overspread this unhappy land; and what will it be when cold adds its suffering to their torments?

What are the Powers—what is England doing? Can no voice be raised to stem this torrent of bloodshed and torture—this war, not only of man against man, but of barbarians against defenceless women and innocent children?

Now it may be asked, 'With what purpose have these horrible proofs been adduced of Russian and Bulgarian cruelty? No one supposes that great questions of the domination of races, of the rivalry of religions, of the struggles of Imperial Powers for ascendency, are to be decided by convicting one side or the other of a preponderance of atrocities. No one will believe that the settling of the Eastern Question depends upon whether it can be shown in English journals that the Christians have been greater murderers and ravishers than the Moslems, or that the Mahometans have surpassed the Christians in these crimes.' The force of this is perfectly admitted by the writer; and had we been living in the days of Mr. Pitt or Lord Palmerston it would have been worse than folly to have addressed a political appeal to the English people on the grounds of an 'atrocity' sentiment. A new fashion has, however, been set of late, and set by an ex-Prime Minister of England; and he is still, week by week, pressing frantic appeals against Turkey upon the country, all grounded upon the 'atrocity' argument. Read any of his speeches within the past six months, from his famous bag and baggage invocation down to the last scandalous lecture at Hawarden, in which he so demeaned himself as to try to blacken the character of the most distinguished of Turkish patriots, by the repetition of a miserable calumny. This calumny is published to the world by Mr. Gladstone on little better than third-hand hearsay evidence. What is the one conspicuous feature of all these utterances? It is the constant endeavour to paint the Turks as dark as possible, and to whitewash, so far as he can, his quondam foes of the Crimean War; but in this Mr. Gladstone has been less successful than in his purely vituperative efforts. We may search his speeches in vain for any careful consideration of the really great questions involved in the

present struggle—the security of India, and of the routes to that wonderful dependency of the British Crown—the question of English and Russian antagonism in the future—the possession of Constantinople, the Queen of Cities—the redistribution of power over the fairest and richest territories of our continent—these are themes worthy of a statesman, and their importance is now engrossing the thoughtful interest of every intelligent Englishman. But to Mr. Gladstone they are of no moment. If he does think of them he says nothing about them; and if his silence is due to prudence, it is a prudence which the people of England do not appreciate in one who claims to be a statesman, and who, in neglecting to advise and to lead public opinion on such vital questions, shows himself devoid of the first qualities of a true leader of men. It is the perfidy, the dishonesty, the cruelty of the Turkish Government and its troops which he is trying to force upon the English nation; it is the corruption, the barbarity, the aggressiveness of the Russian Government, and the awful responsibility for the horrors of this war resting upon them and their abettors in this country, which he is trying to gloss over and hide from his countrymen. A considerable section of public opinion is always ready to follow any prominent leader, and is sure to follow one of Mr. Gladstone's great distinction, ready eloquence, and ardent religious zeal. It is because many are led away by Mr. Gladstone's line of argument, and have allowed the crimes he has charged against the Turks to influence their judgment upon the present crisis in the East, that the writer of this pamphlet has been compelled to meet Mr. Gladstone with his own weapons and to endeavour to prove, as he trusts has been done, that the first provocation in all the recent atrocities came from the Christians—Russians and Bulgarians—and not only this; but that the actual atrocities committed by the Christians have equalled, and even exceeded those committed by Mahometans.

Mr. Gladstone may be asked in common fairness to explain on what principle he condemns the Turks for the very same crimes and delinquencies as to which he acquits the Russians of blame. Let us compare the massacres of Christians in Bulgaria in May 1876 with the massacres of Moslems in Bulgaria in July and August 1877. According to Mr. Gladstone, not only are the perpetrators of the former massacres—that is the irregular troops—and the officers who had the suppression of the insurrection in charge, but also the Ottoman Government itself, to be joined in

one sweeping denunciation and condemnation on account of those crimes. But Mr. Gladstone will hardly say that the Ottoman Government, being at the time at Constantinople, many miles away, or that the chief officers who directed the operations against the rebellion, actually killed or outraged women and children, or that they told their subordinates to do so. The insurrection was stamped out by a semi-civilised people, frantic with the fear of threatening dangers, as such rebellions are usually stamped out. Hence, according to Mr. Gladstone, the Turks, from Pasha to Bashi-Bazouk, are brutal, vile, beyond hope of reform, deserving only expulsion from Europe, if not extermination. Now Chefket Pasha is one of those whom Mr. Gladstone and his party have selected for the choicest vials of their wrath. It may be that Chefket Pasha deserves the condemnation he has received. The matter is hardly worth contention. But let us suppose, as Chefket Pasha is an educated and able man, in spite of his being a Turk, that he were to defend himself by a comparison of his conduct with that of the Russians—Mr. Gladstone's favourites—during the present war, what answer could Mr. Gladstone make to him? Supposing Chefket Pasha were to say: 'It is true that such and such things were done at Batak and Otloukeui, but what was our position? We were threatened with a general rising which had been carefully organised, paid for, and fomented by Russian agents. This rising did take place right on our main artery of communications. Servia and Montenegro were preparing to attack us as fast as they could. Russia was getting ready for our destruction. It was a case of life and death with us. In civil war the shortest and sternest way is the best, and in the end the kindest. We did stamp it out in three or four places, and horrors occurred, which I deeply deplore, but which, as you know, always have occurred when men's blood is up, and where panic reigns. Our ignorant irregulars did evil deeds enough, but were these worse than what frequently occurred in the Thirty Years' War, in the rebellion in Ireland in 1798, in India in 1857, or even in the Peninsular war at Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo? At all events it was successful, for no further risings took place, and Bulgaria was spared a general conflagration, at the cost of a few thousand lives.'

'But,' Chefket Pasha might continue, 'condemn me if you like, only extend the same judgment to your Russian friends. They and their protégés the Bulgarians have done—and this Mr.

Gladstone cannot deny—like crimes on a more extensive scale both north and south of the Balkans. What a contrast between their position and mine! They were threatened with no foreign attacks and no civil war. Russia has come hundreds of miles to attack us who never wished to attack her, or gave her ground for offence; for these Bulgarians whom she pretends to liberate are better off than most European peasantry, certainly far better off than her own. In this aggressive and unprovoked war, Russian troops, and Bulgarians acting under them, slaughter the innocent civilian populace, outrage the women, burn the villages and crops.'

Mr. Gladstone would probably reply, 'These crimes that you say were committed were not committed by Russians but by Bulgarians.' 'I will grant you this for the sake of argument,' Chefket might answer, 'though it would not be difficult to show that Russians have in person done many evil deeds upon our people. How can you free the Russians from the same responsibility you fix upon me, and my fellow officers, and my Government? Who incited the Bulgarians to rebellion? Who gave them arms and formed them into battalions; who organised them into a fighting legion, and who disarmed the civilian Turks and gave their arms to the Bulgarian peasants? Russians, and Russians only! Russian officers led the Bulgarians who ravaged the Tundja valley, and who wrought the massacres of Balvan, Offlanlick, and Eski Zaghra, and many others. A Russian General—Stoleteff—actually commanded the Bulgarian legion. What difference is there between our responsibility, and the responsibility of the Russian leaders? If anything, are not we less to blame, for we were struggling for bare existence—the Russians merely invading another country for love of conquest? The Grand Duke Nicolas, even the Czar himself, were living in the midst of villages where (according to Russian reports) rapine, outrage, and destruction of all kinds were going on. General Gourko was in the midst of all the indescribable carnage caused by his bootless raid. Are not they more to blame than the Government at Constantinople? If the Russians disapprove of these foul deeds of their Bulgarian brethren, why do they not punish them? Why do they not hang Stoleteff or his officers, or shoot Gourko, as you wished done with me? At least they might make a show (as we were accused of doing last year) of punishing some of the inferior criminals? But they do not do so. They dare not do so, even if they wished it. No Bulgarian or Russian has been, or will be

executed for the thousands of barbarities they have committed. If the Porte be condemned for not executing its servants who last year saved their country, though they may have shown an excess of zeal, how can you fail to award a similar condemnation to the Russian leaders, who bring fire and sword upon our country, and let the perpetrators off scot-free?' What answer could Mr. Gladstone make to such a defence by Chefket Pasha?

III. It having now been shown that in all recent cruelties in Bulgaria the Christians and not the Turks were the aggressors, it will be important to notice what was the respective condition of the two races, and what were their mutual relations. It may be said, 'We will grant that the Bulgarians have done all these things, but then they have good excuse, they have been horribly misgoverned, they were oppressed for centuries, they have been victimised and outraged by their Turkish masters. It is their hour of vengeance, and the Turk is reaping the fruits of his oppression.' This is the argument relied upon by the 'Times' correspondent with Gourko, and no doubt this reasoning would be admirable, were it based on facts. But are the Bulgarians the poor miserable victims they have been represented? Are the Turks the horrible tyrants they have been painted? All the independent evidence collected of late has been directly the reverse of this. Nothing has more astonished our pro-Russian Englishmen than to find every correspondent with the Russian armies describing in glowing colours the wealth and prosperity of these oppressed Bulgarians, and the universal plenty of their homes and farmsteads. To quote a few instances—what says Mr. Forbes on the point?—

The lot of the Bulgarians, from all I have been able to learn, was tolerable enough. It seems to have been a lot for which the practical British philanthropist would gladly see a considerable section of his fellow country people exchange their own wretched, sodden, hopeless plight. The life of the Bulgarian was eminently preferable to that of the miserable victims of the 'sweater' who exist rather than live, in Whitechapel garrets. I think Devonshire Giles, with his nine shillings a week and a few mugs of cider, would cheerfully have put up with the zaptieh, exclusion from a share in the management of public affairs—although his home share of that privilege is so large and so highly prized—and would have even been resigned under the dispensation of debarment from military service, for the sake of the rich acres of pasture and barley land, the cattle and brood mares of the rural Bulgarian. I know that the Russian peasant soldier, who has crossed the Danube as the 'deliverer' of the Bulgarian from 'oppression,' feels with a stolid bewildered envy that, to use a slang phrase, he would be glad indeed 'to have half his complaint.'

The times, no doubt, had a certain roughness, and occasionally there were Bulgarians who could not accept the roughs with the smooths, and who kicked

against the pricks. There have been Irishmen who have manifested active discontent with the rule of the 'hated Saxon,' and who have been made to suffer for their peculiar way of looking at things. The discontented Bulgarians sometimes were sent to prison, but mostly escaped into neutral territory without undergoing this infliction; and wherever they found themselves—in Bucharest, in Galatz, up among the hills at Cronstadt, or down in the flat at Crajovo or Turn Severin—there they sedulously plotted against the Turkish dominance over the Bulgaria from which they were exiles. I suppose they had a perfect right to do this, and to strive to implicate in their plots their brethren who still remained 'oppressed,' if prosperous: only the man who plots and the man who joins a plot, must, like the man who speculates, be prepared to take the consequences of failure.

Further on, comparing their condition with that of their Turkish neighbours, Mr. Forbes says:—

In the preceding section I have spoken at length of his material prosperity prior to the arrival of the 'deliverers.' The two races—Turk and Bulgarian—dwelt apart; and the Bulgarian, as he drove his wainload of bearded wheat, or his herd of plump cattle and fertile brood mares down the slope to his white cottage among its corn-stacks bowered among the trees by the fountain, must often have smiled grimly as his eye caught the barer farm-yards and the scantier comfort of the Turkish quarter, and the ramshackle hovels among the scrappy tobacco-spots of the Circassian squatters on or beyond the outskirts of the village. The Bulgarian kept the village shop, and the Turk, when he came for his necessaries, had to sniff the hated odour of pork sausages. The village swarmed with Christian pigs, free to roam into the Turkish quarter till chevied by Moslem dogs. If in the towns and large villages the Bulgarian ear had to put up with the call of the Muezzin from the minaret of a mosque, the Osmanli were fain to tolerate the clangour of the bells from the glittering towers of floridly ornate Christian churches. For every mosque in Bulgaria there are at least three churches. Draw near to Sistova from what direction you will, the sparkle of the metallic covering of the towers of churches, imposing in all the showy garishness of Byzantine architecture, first meets the eye. From the Russian batteries on the blood-stained height of Radisovo you discern where lies Plevna nestling among the foliage, not by the slender white minarets, but by the glittering domes and stately spires of her Christian churches.

And with regard to the relative qualities of the two races, Mr. Forbes is equally explicit:—

And I sincerely believe, on the evidence of my own eyes and ears, that the Turks—the dominant race in virtue of those characteristics which, until the millenium, will ever continue to ensure the dominance of a race—allowed the Bulgarians—the subject race in virtue of those characteristics which, while they exist, will always make a race subject to some one or other—to have by no means a bad time of it. Proof of this belief I will adduce in detail when I come to deal with the Bulgarians. But just cast a hasty glance at the conduct of the barbarian Turks during the past two years. The period opens with the Bulgarians, subject indeed to the Turks, taxed, no doubt, heavily and arbitrarily, annoyed occasionally by a zaptieh who must have been nearly as bad as the omnipotent 'agent' on

the estate of an Irish absentee landlord, bound to dismount when encountering a Turk on the road, just as a rural inferior at home is virtually bound to touch his hat to his local superior; but withal prospering mightily. The recently imported Circassians are a thorn in their flesh, against whom they have to put up iron bars and keep numerous fierce dogs, precautions which do not always avail; but the Circassian nuisance may be 'squared' by judicious occasional presents of poultry and farm produce to the moullah of the district. To judge by the manner in which the Bulgarian civic functionaries appointed by Prince Tcherkassky are presently fulfilling their duties, from the municipal councillor who is making haste to be rich by pillaging alike casual Russian and resident countryman, to the street policeman of Tirnova or Gabrova, who, clothed in a little brief authority, whacks about him indiscriminately with his ratan, it may be questioned whether the general progress of the world was seriously retarded by the enforced abstention of the Bulgarians from a share in the management of public affairs.

But important as is Mr. Forbes's witness, first and foremost in value comes the evidence of the Russian invaders themselves, who came—at least the ignorant bulk of them, for it can but be supposed that the Gortchakoffs and Ignatieffs laughed in their sleeves at the delusion—to deliver their oppressed and long-suffering Sclavonic brethren. M. Giers, the Russian correspondent of the Russian journal 'Sêverny Vêstnik,' writes, as quoted in the 'Times':—

The economic condition of the Bulgarians is so good that we Russians can only envy them. Not unfrequently I have heard sighs of envy among our Cossacks and soldiers at the sight of the plenty which exists in the Bulgarian villages. There is land in abundance. The majority of the peasants have such a quantity of grain that they can never reap and store it all in time. Labourers cannot be obtained even at a high price. The Bulgarian peasant almost never goes elsewhere to seek work (as the Russian is very often obliged to do). All remain at home and find plenty of occupation. Being exempt from the military conscription, all the labouring population can be usefully employed. The stack-yards are filled with wheat and barley. Indian corn is grown in enormous quantities. Each one has his own vineyard. The gardens are stocked with pears, plums, peaches, cherries, walnuts, and apricots. Melons and water-melons are the most common fruits. Masses of mulberry trees give the raw materials for silk. The flocks and herds are innumerable. Around each village you meet with thousands of sheep, pigs, long-horned cattle, buffaloes, and horses. Barn-door fowls and game exist in great quantities. In the villages there are such hosts of geese and ducks, that sometimes in the morning they prevent one from sleeping. Living is wonderfully cheap. At the sight of all this our sceptics often ask, 'Where is the oppression and devastation about which so much was written?'

Regarding the relations between the Bulgarians and the Russians, M. Giers gives us the best account which I have yet found in the Russian press. The *petite bourgeoisie*, known under the name of *Tchorbadjees*, were well satisfied with the Turkish rule. All the trade was in their hands. Ideas of freedom and national independence were wholly foreign to their minds. As the war

necessarily disturbed trade, the *Tchorbadjees* were opposed to it, and showed no enthusiasm. What was demanded of them they gave with a more or less good grace, but they strongly objected to having Russian officers and soldiers billeted on them. In Sistova it was necessary to fine some of them for their obstinacy in this respect. This measure naturally led to reprisals on the part of the female *Tchorbadjees*. They refused to sell their chickens and ducks at any price to the hungry soldiers and officers. So it was in Sistova and Tirnova. Our author does not, however, form a very high idea of the intellectual capacities of the Bulgarians. They seem to him heavy, slow of understanding, and little disposed to undertake anything new. They have no domestic industries, and no art industry worthy of the name; the art of irrigation was received by them from the Turks, and their greatest architectural efforts would amuse Russian stonemasons. That scarcity of educated men makes it difficult for the Russian authorities to find proper people for the civil administration and for the spiritual regeneration of the Bulgarian people. All who could be found were appointed interpreters for the army and the public offices; but that element leaves much to be desired. It is impossible to find good interpreters, good officials, priests, doctors, mechanics, jurists, &c. The teachers are fit only for primary schools. The clergy are totally without education and uncultivated. Even the clergy of the towns differ little externally from the peasants. Their good influence on the people is extremely doubtful. The long domination of the Greek clergy has laid on the Bulgarian parish priests the stamp of servility and of cunning.

The Plevna correspondent of the 'Times' writes on August 15:—

The night of the 15th I spent at the village of Vino, bivouacking in the yard of a Bulgarian peasant said to be worth 30,000*l.* sterling; he has 8,000 sheep and many cattle, his yards are filled with immense stacks of wheat, oats, barley, and hay, and yet he refused to sell me a sack of grain for my horses. No reason whatever was assigned, as I offered any price he would name. These stupid Bulgarians should sell everything they can get cash for, so as to have something in hand in case the Turks return and drive them from their homes. The longer an unprejudiced foreigner sojourns among these Eastern Christians the less sympathy he has for them. The Russians express the utmost contempt for both Roumanians and Bulgarians, and many of them are asking why they should fight for such people. The idea that the Turk is a wild beast to be exterminated is so evident among the Bulgarians, that I can believe them capable of any atrocity. Even the Bulgarian Legion is affected with the same brutal ferocity.

That most pro-Russian of Englishmen, the 'Times' correspondent with General Gourko, who, like Mr. Gladstone, exhausts his ingenuity in vilifying the Turks and bepraising the Russians, unwillingly admits at Tirnova, that—

There seems to be plenty of food both actual and in prospect. Though the villages are little more than collections of huts, there is no sign of actual destitution, and the Turks have not destroyed the crops. The people of Tirnova seem to have all the necessaries of life in abundance, though the quality is deficient, and they are wealthy enough to provide food. Though there is no

bank, there is plenty of gold, but not a form of bill to draw on a house elsewhere is to be found. Barbarism and civilisation touch very closely. My hosts here have a plentiful table and appear well to do, yet the family dive with forks into the same dish for the morsels they choose, and both the mother and daughter, named Maritza, occasionally fish out a tit-bit from the dish or plates to put into the stranger's mouth. It is decided that the daughter is to be married in about three months, and I am invited to the *fête*, but the bridegroom has not yet been appointed, and neither the girl nor the parents have the least idea who he is to be. The house is large, and downstairs is a fine room which makes both hall and kitchen, with deeply recessed fireplaces. Both the people of the household and visitors think nothing of setting both elbows on the table to have a good stare at the stranger, and the old mother with tender care visited his bed last night to save him from certain creatures whose disturbing presence she discovered by his tumbling. Maritza is full of life and energy, and waits meanwhile the inevitable husband with the same unconcern that she awaits the arrangements of the supper the day after to-morrow. There are many good things, including worked silver plate, one of the productions of Tirnova. On a loom downstairs are made what we call Turkish towels, and Maritza works handkerchiefs with gold threads, as well as producing some good worsted work, probably for her future home.

As to the moral, social, and intellectual qualities of the Bulgarians, the testimony is interesting and overwhelming. The last-mentioned correspondent says :—

I do not wonder at the disgust with which Mr. Forbes speaks of them as a whole; for, speaking generally, it must be confessed that they are a most uninviting race. One has only to conceive all that one can imagine to be the opposite to the English gentleman and behold the Bulgarian. The uneducated men of both towns and villages are dirty, submissive, and greedy of pelf; the educated are, for the most part, conceited and languid. They had looked forward to the entry of the Russians as a period, not only of safety, but of restoration, and they speedily began to take from every deserted Turkish house the goods which they considered had come directly or indirectly from their own homes. No arguments which I could ever use seemed to have the slightest weight with Bulgarians. The people withheld cattle and corn unless well paid for, and soon gained for themselves a name as ungrateful extortioners. Moreover, they had appealed to the pity of Russia and Europe as a people pillaged and kept poor by the Turk, and their deliverers found them to be far wealthier as to food and drink and lodging than themselves in their own country. The word 'swindle' began to be pretty freely applied, and there arose a coldness which soon froze to death all the old sympathy. Nor was it long before the Bulgarians began to show an untameable ferocity, little short of that which forms the distinguishing characteristic of their old masters. Their friends may excuse them by saying, 'What can one expect from the pupils in such a school?' But the fact remains that, no matter who taught them, they are barbarous and cruel to the last degree. They claim the virtue of sparing women and children, but it is hard to say what happens when a general massacre is going on.

Perhaps, however, the most instructive and interesting account

of all is given by the correspondent of the 'Standard,' with the Russian Headquarters, who, writing on November 1, says:—

It may be disagreeable for those who so hotly took his part to admit that the Bulgar is a most unworthy hero; but for the Russian to admit so much is to accuse his Government of ignorance or ambition, discreditable alike, and to tell his fellow-countrymen that their blood is wasting in a stupid cause. In spite of these considerations the truth was too obvious and too offensive to be suppressed; but not until the correspondence of officers began to be published did Russian journalists venture to tell all they saw. Things as bad as any I shall set down have been said by the friends of the Bulgar.

The Bulgar is of middle height, very strongly built, but round-shouldered. His features are lumpish, complexion nearly always fair in childhood, but darkening as he grows up. Flaxen hair seems to be uncommon in men or women, but one cannot speak with certainty, because soap and water would make a difference. The ugliness of the population is really surprising. Children pretty as any in the world are common, but as they grow out of childhood their features swell, their figures flatten or develop in wrong places, and they assume the sullen look of their progenitors. I never saw a good-looking woman amongst the peasantry, and very, very seldom in the towns—so seldom that one could not but suspect a strain of foreign blood. At Tirnova, when the whole population appeared to meet the Grand Duke, Russian officers were offended to observe not a pretty girl in all the crowd. They thought that jealous husbands and over-anxious parents kept them from sight. It was not so at all; the pretty girls did not show because they do not exist. The relations of a Bulgar with his family are those usual amongst savages. The mother of his children has a great deal of influence, as she deserves to have, but much more than her share of labour is imposed upon her. In the field, one sees the women doing the hardest work, while the man drives his oxen, or loads his cart. Amongst the endless train of fugitives who toiled through the Shipka Pass, the males commonly rode ahead unencumbered, while the women dragged afoot through the dust, bending beneath their loads.

They work as no other people work, with a conscience, an obstinacy, a pitiless disregard for human weakness outrivalling the Chinese by far. Many a time have I observed a family at work by the roadside, hoeing maize or reaping, of which not a member looked up while we passed by, though Nicholas Nicholaevitch rode at our head, with fifty officers behind him, all glitter and jangle. They sit and sleep upon the earth; boys and girls all huddled together, on frowsy rags and sheepskins. Every article in the hut is filthy, but nothing so caked with dirt as the human inmates. They go unwashed from Sunday to Sunday, and their clothes last till they drop to pieces.

It is said that the Mussulman peasant, lazy and tyrannical, lives by robbing the industrious Bulgar. The statement is false. It is not even true that the Moslem peasant is lazy. I have seen him working, I have entered his hut, I have admired the rolling harvest which his labour raised—for others' gathering too often. He may not work so stubbornly as the Bulgar, having a few kindly weaknesses from which that individual is exempt; but no European labourer toils so hard; necessity compels him to do so, for otherwise his rival would 'eat him up.' Would that the Christian could learn a few qualities from him, such

as cleanliness, honesty, self-respect. Enter a Turkish dwelling, though it be never so poor, the men look you in the face, offer a cigarette, or a spoonful of jam with a glass of water, or more, if you want and they have it. Everything is clean in the hut, though it be carelessly kept outside—not more so than the Bulgars, however. The pretty, round-eyed children have no fear of you, nor need you fear them. All is in contrast, and all to the favour of the infidel. There is no secret in the disposal of a Turkish peasant's earnings. You see it in the modest finery of his children, or his wife's trumpery jewels. The Bulgar is more despicably prudent than to waste his substance on such trifles, and his wisdom is justified by the stacks of wheat and barley, the oxen and cows and horses that people his farm-yard, the flocks of poultry that scratch therein.

The Turk shows poorly in this comparison; it must be admitted, however, that I saw him mostly after the mild Bulgarian had plundered him. But if the rule of Pachas was so unjust and oppressive as has been declared, one cannot understand how those who suffered it were left in such prosperity. Not in France, alleged to be the Elysium of small proprietors, do the country people enjoy material wealth like that general in Bulgaria. If crops sell for little, the farmer's wants are less, and his 'margin' is enormous. The Russians had stolen some property from an old peasant of Vina. For a certain stack of barley his grief was sore. It had been looted to the last sheaf by Cossacks, whilst their Colonel sat on the earthen *stoop* and declined to interfere. I asked what was the value, and to my astonishment he said 100 francs —no more, in this land of wine and corn, for a large stack of barley. I said, 'But the Turks must have plundered you much more grievously?' 'Oh,' he answered, 'the Tcherkess came from Radovince sometimes, and they took a fowl or a lamb, but never, never, in all their pilferings together, did they rob me of so much as this.'

I remember telegraphing to 'the Standard,' in my first astonishment at sight of Gabrova, that I wished any mountain village in Great Britain of like size had one bridge as good as the four which I had just observed. But those at Gabrova are not unusually fine nor large. They could be matched everywhere in the country, and excelled in a score of places. The Biela bridge would not pass unnoticed in England, and 'Murray' would call attention to it if it stood anywhere in Europe, saving Bulgaria. The roads also are better than in Roumania—a poor compliment truly. Most people will think that when roads and bridges are attended to, the Government is not likely to be very monstrous, very unintelligent. The stories of systematic oppression which have been circulated in Europe came from the 'educated Bulgar.' An English officer, most strongly prejudiced against the Turk, suddenly broke silence at a breakfast in Biela, with the pregnant words, 'Whenever I see an educated Bulgarian I long to kick him!' With rather a large experience of the 'gentleman negro' in Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Barbados, Panama, and elsewhere, I feel justified in stating that the educated Bulgar is the most offensive being that exists. He shows a variety of talent, surface-deep, which makes one question whether the *savants* are right in declaring him to be Slavonic only by language. He knows everything, more or less, except the manly virtues, truth, self-respect, courtesy, regard for weaker things, magnanimity, and courage.

The stupidity of Bulgarians is matched only by their sullen ill-will; the two qualities, working together, cause a state of things nowhere paralleled. A man

with his pockets full of money might starve—were he not murdered—in the villages where food is so abundant. They will neither sell nor give to the stranger, but when he takes, they accept his cash without remonstrance as without thanks. This is such a strange feature of their disposition that we all tried to discover the meaning of it, but vainly.

But twelve years ago the whole agricultural population of Russia were serfs. Even now their condition cannot compare with that of the Bulgarian. They have less land and are more heavily taxed, and more fleeced by their own Russian officials than the Bulgarians by the Turkish. The 'Times' correspondent at St. Petersburg writes:—

The Correspondent of the 'Novoe Wremya,' for instance, related that many Russian officers are extremely surprised to find flourishing villages and an air of plenty which Russian peasants might well envy. He, himself, did not find among the people the extreme depression which he expected. On the contrary, he found that as soon as the Russians arrived in a village, the peasants assumed an independent air and showed no trace of sociability. Some officers, according to the same witness, admitted that they had been completely deceived regarding the position of the Bulgarian Christians. They imagined them to be crushed, oppressed, hampered in the performance of the ordinances of their religion, in hourly danger of being robbed, dishonoured, and murdered. But what did they find in reality? People living in comfort such as the Russian peasant does not know, fields stretching far and wide, in each village a fine herd of cattle, houses which might be called palaces in comparison with the huts of the Roumanians and Wallachians, several Christian churches for every Turkish *metchet*, and never any difficulty to get a gold piece changed. Not less remarkable than utterances of this kind are the remarks of some Correspondents regarding the Turks. According to preconceived notions the Turk is always 'the unspeakable'—a monster in human form—but actual acquaintance has somewhat modified this notion. Not unfrequently now we read in the Russian papers passages like the following from the 'St. Petersburgskiya Vedomosti':—

'Among the Turks one meets very sympathetic people. The prisoners show no hostility to us. For the most part they are honest, somewhat proud and vain, conscious of their own dignity, but good-hearted. The prisoners live admirably with each other. Amongst all that have been here I never saw any of them quarrelling or even disputing; on the contrary they help each other, and if one of them has no money the other pays for him.'

How would the condition of the Irish Roman Catholic peasant during the past two centuries compare with the Bulgarian? Most unfavourably. Not only did we give him no political privileges, but we took away his land, and persecuted him for his religion. It is barely fifty years since Catholic Emancipation, and this in free, happy, prosperous England, which we all think so blessed above other countries. Mr. Forbes distinctly says the Bulgarian is better off in most respects than the English farm labourer or

the 'victim of the sweater' of Whitechapel, and he is right. Yet this is under 'the unspeakable' Turk. Surely we have been the victims of a skilful deception. Russians, after all, are not the simple open-minded children which the clever correspondent of the 'Times' has found them. For they have made us believe in as monstrous a fabric of falsehood regarding the condition of Turkey as could be imagined. The simple truth is, as Mr. Forbes says: 'The Turks are the dominant race by virtue of those qualities which, till the millennium will always make a race dominant, and the Bulgarians a subject race for precisely the opposite reason.' In spite of our pro-Russian sciolists, there is, and always has been, and always will be a great difference in races. National inferiority you cannot eradicate by external pressure. It can only be remedied by some mysterious internal influence which leads a race to develop and reform itself. Some races are brave, others patient, others industrious, others superstitious, others cowardly and mean. Some are merciful and tolerant, others cruel and debased. The Bulgarians have, since they first appeared in Europe, been distinguished for brutality, and this, by-the-by, was not so long before the Turks. They were no less invaders and intruders in their time than the Turks. This is what Gibbon says of them, in cap. xlii. of the 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire:'—

The same year was marked by an invasion of the Bulgarians, so dreadful that it almost effaced the memory of their past inroads. They spread from the suburbs of Constantinople to the Ionian Gulf, destroyed thirty-two cities and repassed the Danube, dragging at their horses' heels one hundred and twenty thousand of the subjects of Justinian. The boldness of the Sclavonians is sullied by the wanton and deliberate cruelty which they are accused of exercising on their prisoners. Without distinction of rank, or age, or sex, the captives were impaled or flayed alive, or suspended between four posts, and beaten with clubs till they expired, or inclosed in some spacious building and left to perish in the flames with the spoil and cattle that might impede the march of these savage victors. In the siege of Topirus they massacred fifteen thousand males, but they kept the women and children.

But, says the 'Times' correspondent with General Gourko, to his own great satisfaction, no wonder the Bulgarians are mean and cruel. They have been enslaved for four hundred years, and denied all privileges by their masters. When this sort of slipshod unhistorical argument is used, a feeling of hopeless despair comes over the reader. He may well ask by what Utopian standard of high political development does he wish to judge the Turk. As Mr. Forbes says, he is sick of 'this four hundred years of oppression.' What does it mean? That the Bulgarians are slaves? Certainly not; for they are

rich, and prosperous, and owning and cultivating their own land. That their religion is denied them? Certainly not; for, as this correspondent admits, the Turk is the most tolerant of dominant races and allows the Christian to build as many churches and worship as much as he likes. Does it mean that the opportunity for political advancement is denied him? Certainly not. No State is so liberal in its distribution of the high offices of state as Turkey. Many of her highest public functionaries—ambassadors, ministers, pashas, judges are Christians. Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Maronites, Arabs, and Bulgarians—all may rise to the top of the tree. What, then, does it mean? Simply this, that the Bulgarian has no share in the government of the country; that he is not an elector, a city alderman, a town councillor, or a lord-lieutenant. What proportion of Englishmen are voters? What share has an English agricultural labourer in the Municipal or Parliamentary elections? Quite as much as the Bulgarians. And yet this is the state of things to which these philosophising gentlemen who will not let a thing, that is, be, but must always be finding some recondite or elaborate theory to explain facts and account for existing conditions by going back to the Flood in their investigations.

What a contrast to this avaricious, sordid, mean-spirited, and cowardly people is presented by the Turkish race!

Honest, brave, frugal, temperate, patient under suffering, manly, and self-contained, the Turkish peasant has, by the sheer solidity and excellence of his character maintained his own against countless enemies, and that in spite of a religion which certainly is of no advantage to him in the battle of life. From all sides comes praise of the Turk. Everyone who knows the East—that is to say, who has lived there any time—admires his noble qualities. Sir George Campbell, indeed, who spent about three weeks in Turkey, and thought himself, with characteristic self-satisfaction, able to write a book and to settle the Eastern Question off-hand, is perhaps an exception. But the pro-Russians are welcome to their champion. Two qualities, courage and honesty, combined, as they generally are, with a great deal of simplicity of mind, stand out as conspicuous traits of the Turkish character. When a race is honest and brave it need never be despaired of. There is a good and substantial foundation to work upon, no matter how backward it may be, in what we call civilisation. Much may be hoped for from the Turk, who is trustworthy and truthful; little from the Roumanians, Servians, and Bulgarians, who are deceitful, treache-

rous, and timid. Nor is the Turk the ferocious creature he has been painted. Like all Eastern and semi-civilised nations, when aroused and infuriated, he is guilty at times of excesses; but on most occasions, and in most cases, the Turk is gentle, considerate, dignified, and humane. The massacres of last year were chiefly wrought by Mahometan Bulgarians—Pomaks as they are called—who retain the savageness of their Christian brethren. The last-quoted correspondent well illustrates the difference between the Turk and the Bulgarian. As to his patient endurance of pain another correspondent writes :—

The patience of suffering which characterises the Mahometans of this country, and which does not desert them amid the active terrors of the battle-field, or the passive but perhaps more appalling terrors of the ambulance or the hospital. I have talked much lately with some of the English surgeons who have been in attendance on the wounded Turkish soldiers and are all loud in their praises of the poor fellows' patience and endurance. The marvellous nerve which enables the Turkish soldier to withstand the shock of operations under which the soldiers of most other countries would succumb is no doubt in great part attributable to his constant sobriety; but, apart from this, his tranquillity and cheerfulness under intense suffering are beyond all praise. The men lead such abstemious lives, never drinking anything but water, as good and conscientious Turks, that, although horribly wounded, there is little or no fever or inflammation, and the wounds appear to be healing rapidly.' Were it not for the abstemiousness of the Turks, twice as many of the wounded would die. I have just been looking at a man who received a bullet just below the eye. It passed out at his neck. This was three days ago, and he is now walking about helping to attend on other wounded men. His eye is somewhat swelled, the wound beneath is covered with plaister, as is also that at the back of the neck—that is all one could observe as the consequences of a wound which would have killed an average Englishman. However, despite all this, death is doing its fearful work with sufficient celerity.

Writing from Adrianople on September 10 the 'Times' correspondent says :-

In the last four months a grand total of 80,000 recruits passed to the front. The not uncommon notion that they are raw levies fresh from the plough tail, and no better than *chair à canon*, is very wide of the mark. They are, indeed, in one sense fresh from the plough, as they are taken entirely from the agricultural classes, and their conversion from thrifty workers into non-productive consumers is a frightful drain upon the resources of the country. They are fond of rifle practice on their own account, and take so kindly to fire-arms and fighting, that they master the intricacies of the latest improved weapons, in what, to a drill sergeant accustomed to English plough-boys, would seem an incredibly short space of time. They come from all parts of Asia, and the supply is, I am assured, still far from being exhausted, though this assurance scarcely tallies with the fact that the majority are advanced in years, the conscription now embracing all under 60. However, *there is a good deal of fighting still left in a Turkish*

peasant of sixty, owing in a great measure to the wonderfully frugal, simple life he leads. They are full of religious enthusiasm, devoutly believing that they are doing battle with the Giaour for the preservation of the true faith. It is difficult for a non-Mussulman to realise the extent to which the Turk's religious belief colours his whole conduct and character, blending itself inseparably, not merely with such higher feelings as patriotism, loyalty, and affection, but even with the most seemingly trivial minutiæ of food and dress. It not merely sends these men by thousands cheerfully to the battle-field, but inspires them beforehand with a profound conviction of their own moral and national superiority.

No one, in fact, who knows the Turks can be much surprised at the courage with which they have fought, to whatever cause he may attribute it; but what has certainly surprised their best friends almost as much as their foes is the way in which they have moved their men and material about. The same authority who gave me information about the number of troops which have passed through Constantinople tells me that over 110,000 men, with 10,000 horses, 250 cannon, with ammunition, stores, &c., have been moved by rail and steamer even considerable distances, without one single accident, delay, or breakdown of any importance.

The 'Times' correspondent gives an interesting account of a Turkish Zaptieh :—

The lieutenant in command of the handful of troops at Sopot is evidently a kindhearted man, but *the sergeant of Zaptiehs, as fine a specimen of the honest Turk as any could wish to meet with, is one to whom even more credit is due. He is the very ideal of all that is best in a Turk, noble and chivalrous in bearing, trusted by the women and children of his town.* This man went out to the hill-sides, where the poor fugitives who had fled during the three awful days of destruction were starving, and gave them his word that no harm should happen to those who might return. As I have said, 640 took him at his word. Government supplies fell short, and the distress of the poor fellow was painful to witness, as he confessed to us that his flock was dying of hunger. Most of them he had known since they were so high, making the gesture so common among our own peasantry when they wish to express affection and a date at once.

There is one other species of remark, or, as it is called, argument, which is too frequently made use of. In the mouth of an ignorant critic it would be simply ridiculous. In that of one who claims to be a historian, like Mr. Freeman, it is culpably unjustifiable. The Turks are not a nation, says this gentleman; they are a camp. They have no right to their possessions, for they simply are a military caste. They should therefore be expelled from Europe, and the amiable Bulgars should be put in their place. Nothing could be more absolutely untrue. The Turks live throughout their territories, from the Danube to the Adriatic, just as other people live. They inhabit houses; they cultivate the soil, and cultivate it industriously with their own hands; they buy and sell just as other nations. They have towns and villages,

and live in the same place and in the same way as their Bulgarian, Greek, and Armenian fellow subjects. As to their being turned out of Europe because they were once invaders and conquerors, no proposition could be more manifestly absurd. Every race in Europe has acquired its territory at some time or other in just the same way as the Turks. In many cases preceding peoples have not been made merely subject, and left with their lives, fortunes, and religion, as in Turkey; but they have been absolutely exterminated, as the Britons in England, and the ancient races in France and Spain. Mr. Forbes has some trenchant remarks on this theory.

As for the argument that the Turks were new-comers and have no abiding places in European Turkey, but that their tenure there is but the empire of superior power—if that is to be admitted and acted on, there logically follows a revolution in the face of the world, and all but universal chaos. We must quit India, and bid an apologetic adieu to the Maori, the Kaffir, and the Hottentot, the Spaniard from whom we wrested Gibraltar, the Dutchman from whom we masterfully took the Cape. We are to take ship from the jetties over which frown the Heights of Abraham, and leave the French *habitants* and the remnant of red men left at Cachnawaga to settle between them the ownership of Canada East. Poland must revolt against Austria, Prussia, Russia; the Tartars of the Crimea are to make a struggle for independence; the Irish are to drive forth the Saxon Viceroy and his myrmidons at the point of the shillelagh; the Austro-Hungarian Empire shall blaze into a chaotic conflagration, in which 'furious Frank and fiery Hun,' Serb, Magyar, Croat, and Teuton shall seethe confusedly.

IV. Mr. Gladstone, in one of his many speeches, stigmatised their cruelties in Bulgaria last year as without parallel. No statement could be more utterly absurd.

In the invasions of France under Edward III. and Henry V., and in the Thirty Years' War in Germany, cruelties were committed which would throw the Bulgarian massacres into the shade. At the storming of Magdeburgh by Count Tilly not 4,000, as in Bulgaria, but 30,000 thousand of the inhabitants were put to the sword with every refinement of barbarity. In the historian Schiller's words:—

'Now began a scene of blood, for which history has no language, poetry no pencil. Neither innocent children nor helpless old age; neither youth, sex, condition, nor beauty, could disarm the fury of the vanquisher. Women are violated before the eyes of their husbands, daughters at the feet of their mothers, and the defenceless sex has merely the privilege to fall a sacrifice to a two-fold fury. The most obscure retreat, the most sacred places, cannot preserve them from the eager research of an infuriated soldiery. Fifty-three women were found beheaded in one church. The Croats took pleasure in throwing children into the flames, Pappenheim's Walloons in piercing infants upon the bosoms of

their mothers. Some officers of the League, disgusted by so many horrors, ventured going to Count Tilly, to engage him to put an end to the slaughter. "Return in an hour," was the reply; "I will see then what is to be done; the soldier must have some reward for his dangers and his labours." These barbarities continued with uninterrupted fury, until at last the flames and smoke put an end to the soldiers' rapacity.'

And this was done by Christian, not Mahometan, soldiers in the heart of Germany.

Even in the Napoleonic wars, at the beginning of this century, the licentiousness and rapacity of the French soldiery was but little less horrible in its way than that of the Turkish irregular.

But all who know anything of military history, know that outrages and cruelty are always to be expected where an excited and furious soldiery are brought in contact with a civil population. The mad passions of men, even in the armies of the most civilised states, cannot be kept under control, and will burst forth into wild and terrible excesses. On these occasions it is, unhappily, the most innocent that suffer most. The wretched women and children that happen to fall across the path of a victorious and infuriated soldiery always pay the penalty of others' misdeeds.

Our own English troops committed horrible outrages upon the Irish population in repressing the insurrection of 1798, while the Irish peasantry spared no Englishman or Englishwoman that fell into their hands.

In the Duke of Wellington's great campaigns in Spain against the French—when we were fighting for the Spaniards, who were our allies—on several occasions the English troops broke loose from all restraint, and indulged in the most terrible excesses.

These were most conspicuous after the storming of the town of Badajos in 1809, and of Ciudad Rodrigo, when all control was lost, and the towns were abandoned for days to the utmost cruelty of drunken and licentious soldiery. The Spanish women and children that suffered at their hands were not our enemies, but our allies for whom we were fighting. Their only crime was that they happened to live in towns which the French had taken, and which our troops retook from the French; but while the French only suffered the usual losses of a fighting enemy, all our soldiers' fury was exhausted upon the innocent Spanish population.

Again, not twenty years back, our troops in India, exasperated by the rebellion and by the cruelty of the Sepoy rebels, committed wholesale massacres which would not discredit even Turkish re-

pression. These are notorious instances from our own history, and from that of the most civilised nations.

If we were anxious to search the recent annals of the less advanced Christian nations, especially those of Russia, Turkey's great opponent, we should find constant cases of wholesale massacre and outrage quite as bad as those of Turkey. It is the regular practice of Russia in her wars with the Asiatic tribes to exterminate a village or a people whenever she meets with a too obstinate resistance. The well-known instance of the destruction of the Yomud Turcomans is quoted in Mr. Winn Knight's letter on page 77.

V. Russia in this war affects the *rôle* of champion of humanity. Her righteous soul is moved at sight of the suffering Christian brethren in Bulgaria, and to free them she has undertaken a gigantic war. She has put over half-a-million of men into the field, and besides the frightful slaughter on the battle-fields, in which over 100,000 human beings have perished, this war has caused ruin, desolation, and horrors worse than death to thousands of unoffending women and children. To justify a scene of blood and carnage such as in truth the world has rarely seen, there must be at least two postulates: first, that the condition of the people for whom all this has been undertaken should be so wretched as to render any efforts to free them excusable; and secondly, that the power undertaking this work should have clean hands itself, and be able to say that its mission on behalf of the Christian subjects of Turkey—a mission attended with such horrible accompaniments—was an act of real sincere un-self-seeking philanthropy. As to the first of these conditions, we need make no further answer than has already been given. The Bulgarians were not the oppressed, and desperate victims of Turkish cruelty, but they were rich, comfortable, and fairly independent.

As to the second condition, what is Russia herself? Is she a well-governed country? Do her people enjoy order and liberty? Has she a constitutional or representative government, in which the people have a voice in the management of public affairs? Has she a free press? Has she an upright body of officials directing the finances and the general and local machinery? Are her subject races treated with leniency and kindness? To every one of these questions we must answer emphatically, No!

Every one of the abuses charged against Turkey can be proved to a worse degree against Russia.

The Russian people have no liberty. They have not the

smallest share in the administration of the state. The Czar is absolute. He has the power of life and death in his hands. A word from him is sufficient to degrade the most powerful of his subjects to the condition of an abject, to exile him in Siberia, or to order him to instant execution. There is no Parliament or constitutional assembly of any kind. The press is under a rigid censorship, so rigid that any attempt at independent action would lead to the most serious penalties. All printed matter coming into the country is carefully examined. And the English visitor to Russia will receive his 'Times' or his 'Punch' with a page erased and torn out or a cartoon blackened over if anything in the paper has offended the official scrutineers. Still less is there any educated public opinion. The mass of Russians are sunk in crass and aimless ignorance. Not 20 per cent. of the people can read or write. Their sole object of reverence is the Czar, whom they practically deify. With all the Czar's autocracy, however, there is one powerful influence always pressing upon him—the feeling of his enormous army.

The army, and the enormous body of corrupt officials that administer the Empire for their own benefit, have indeed, powerful influence over the Czar, but influence of the most pernicious kind. Before the settled determination of his vast hierarchy of officers even the Czar's despotic will must bow. The desire for aggrandisement, for promotion and decorations, and for opportunities for distinction, pervade the army and drive the Czar forward to every injurious scheme that is planned against weaker neighbours. Few of the family of Romanoff have died in their beds, and the Czar knows what risks he would run if he were to run counter to the wishes of his army.

But life under a despotism, provided the despot is benignant, and protects his subjects from other pillage than his own, may be endurable. But what is the state of things? Let us first take Mr. Schuyler's opinion. This gentleman was for many years American Consul at St. Petersburg. He is better known as the author of a report on the Bulgarian atrocities, being very pro-Russian. In his book on Turkistan Mr. Schuyler says:

There is not a single administrative or police official in Asiatic or European Russia that does not make two, three and sometimes ten times the amount of his salary out of the people by bribery.

What does Mr. Forbes say in the 'Nineteenth Century' of the corruption of Russian military and administrative officials:—

I tremble to think how high corruption reaches in the Russian army; I shudder to reflect how low it descends. It permeates and vitiates the whole military system. To be venal, so far from not being recognised as a crime, is not so much as regarded as a thing to be ashamed of. Peculation faces the inquirer at every turn; indeed it lies patently, glaringly on the surface. An illustrious personage, high in the army and near the throne, has mines which produce iron. Desiring to sell this iron for military purposes, he, spite of his rank and position, had to accede to the universal usage, and bribe to gain his purpose—a perfectly honest and legitimate purpose. A Vienna contractor comes to intendance headquarters with intent to sell boots to the army. He learns that it is of no use to forward his tender direct in a straightforward business way; he must be introduced. He finds the right person to introduce him, and duly arranges with him the terms under which the favour of introduction is to be accorded. The introduction is made, and the contractor displays his samples and states that he is prepared to supply boots of that quality at six roubles a pair. The answer given him is that his offer will be accepted, but that his invoice must be made out at the rate of seven roubles per pair, although the payment will be at the rate of the tender. Scarcely anywhere are the accumulated Russian stores—at Bucharest, at Fratesti, at Simnitza, at Sistova, at Braila—protected by shedding from the destructive influences of weather. Why should they be, when it is in the interest of all concerned except the state and the army, that the inevitable result should ensue—the rotting and condemnation of a huge proportion of the accumulated stores? The contractors are paid by a commission on the quantity of material laid down by them in certain specified places; their commission is earned when that work has been accomplished; their commission swells in proportion to the quantities of fresh supplies rendered necessary by the unserviceability of what has already been laid down. Every intendant concerned has a pinch, greater or smaller according to his position, of this commission; it is to the direct general and several interest of the gang that as much weather damage as may be shall occur among the supplies when once laid down. If any man wants proof of the universal system of plunder, he has only to visit Roumania and use his eyes. He will find the restaurants thronged with gentlemen of the twisted shoulder-knots. Each gallant besworded non-combatant eats of the costliest dishes, and orders sweet champagne in grating French; the *tout ensemble* of him would not be complete unless his companion were some French or Roumanian beauty, as venal as himself, who is serving him as he is serving Holy Russia. A French correspondent, with a disinclination for going to the front, and a desire to employ his spare time, has been employing himself in collecting and authenticating cases of peculation throughout the Russian army, the record to be published at a safe season when the war is over. The exposure will astonish the world—at least that portion of the world which does not know Russia. In the meantime I venture to assert that every article of consumption or wear supplied to the Russian army costs, by the time it comes into use, more than double what it ought to do under a well-managed and decently honest system. *Of other and yet baser corruption—of the little difficulty with which men of whom other things might be expected are to be found willing to be virtual traitors for a consideration, by offering to sell secrets and secret documents—I dare not trust myself to speak. The subject is too grievously melancholy.*

Further on, as to the favouritism in the Russian army Mr. Forbes says:—

After his first exploit in crossing the Danube, when the Emperor embraced Dragimiroff and shook hands with Yolchine, he turned his back ostentatiously on Skobeloff, simply because he was out of favour, and had not yet got back into favour by dint of hard fighting. Every Russian circle I have had experience of—the camp—court, the headquarter staff, the subsidiary staffs, the regiment, the battalion—each is a focus of unworthy intrigue. Men live in superficial amity one with another, while, to use an Americanism, they are 'going behind' each other by every underhand means in their power. Young Skobeloff was under a cloud, and Prince —— was his enemy. Skobeloff, who is not a courtier, cleft the cloud with the edge of his good sword, and the cloud drifts on to settle above Prince ——. General Ignatieff is in high favour, seemingly fixed firmly in his place close to the Emperor's right hand, a man of power, influence, and position. The bad fortune of the war goads certain people on whom the odium lies of that bad fortune, to wrath against the man who had done so much to bring the war about. There is a period of swaying to and fro of the forces of intrigue, and then Ignatieff goes back to Russia to assist his wife in the nursing of her sick sister. The wheel will come full circle again, no doubt, and then that presently afflicted lady will recover. Unfortunately, the man who is the greatest adept in intrigue, and benefits by it in the attainment of a high place, has not always—indeed, as intrigue is demoralising, it may be said seldom—the qualifications which the high place into which he may have intrigued himself demands.

It is the same story with everyone who knows Russia. A bridge cannot be built, nor a road made, nor a trade concession obtained without extensive bribery of all the officials of the province, from the Governor-General down to the doorkeeper of the Government offices. A Russian thinks it no dishonour to pilfer or to take bribes. The more he gets the more is he admired for his cleverness by his envious comrades. Can anything worse than this be said of the Ottoman Government? Is it more corrupt than the Czar's *entourage?* Are the Pashas more exacting than the Russian governors and administrations? The evidence of all who know the two countries proves that, of the two nations, the Russian is the more sordidly corrupt.

Liberty of the subject is literally unknown in Russia. Not long ago several hundreds of foolish youths who raised some cries for liberty in St. Petersburg were sent to Siberia with the mockery of a trial, and not only these, but the *advocates* who had the courage to appear for them *were arrested directly afterwards and sent to Siberia without trial.* Russia is honeycombed with secret societies, and these are watched by swarms of police agents who render life miserable.

But the great question is, how are the subject peoples of Russia treated? How does her rule over alien and conquered races contrast with that of the Ottoman Empire?

Those graver crimes, charged so lavishly and so recklessly against Turkey by her factious enemies in this country, of cruel massacre and brutal outrage, can be paralleled in every page of Russian history, not only in the past, but in the present generation. The wholesale massacres in the Khanates of Central Asia, the barbarous treatment of Poland, where thousands of men and women have been done to death with every species of torment, suffering, outrage, for no other crime than that of love for their country; the bloodstained hills and valleys of the Caucasus, where a noble race has been exterminated because it would not be enslaved—these are horrible pages in Russian annals which make the spectator shrink with horror from the contemplation of the power that has committed and is committing these atrocities daring to pose before the world as the reformer of Turkey and the champion of civilisation.

The story of Poland is too familiar to Europe to need much illustration here. It has been the shame of the world for eighty years. English ministers have in vain addressed remonstrances, expostulations, threats to Russia on the massacres, the confiscations, the knoutings, and the exile to Siberia inflicted on hundreds of thousands of the Polish race. Let the Poles speak for themselves. At the outbreak of this war a remarkable warning was addressed by the Poles to the Bulgarians—one Sclavonian people to another, warning it against a third.

'*Fellow Christians and Slavonians!*

'A great crisis is at hand in the history of Bulgaria. You have long been made aware, by the agents of the Panslavistic Society of Moscow, that the Czar of Russia takes a deep interest in your welfare. He has at length carried his arms into your country, and he declares that he has done so in order to liberate you from oppression. You naturally receive a deliverer with gratitude. But many among you are wise and cautious men, and such men, without harbouring unworthy suspicions, do not place implicit reliance on mere words—they look at actions as well. Bulgarians! the Poles also are Slavonians, and Russia entered Poland, as she has entered Bulgaria, professing to come as the friend of religious liberty, and for no selfish object whatever. Many Poles listened to her professions, and embraced her assistance no less eagerly than you. Now, ask yourselves these questions: What has Russian friendship brought to Poland? Religious freedom? Autonomy? National institutions and prosperity? Education? The cultivation of language and literature? Bulgarians! the very reverse of these blessings has been the result of Russian friendship. Poland,

before Russia interfered on her behalf, possessed a free Constitution. She has now no Constitution whatever. Before Russia befriended her the Poles knew nothing of a conscription. Now her sons are dragged from their homes in order to assist Russia in extending her dominions over the independent races of Asia. Our language—a language possessing a rich literature—is now proscribed, even in courts of justice. Polish children must be instructed in Russian only, and educated—if at all, where they can be educated—with a much larger number of Russian children, in order that they may be Russianised. No Christian Church is safe in Russia except the Russian Church, which is governed from St. Petersburg. Bulgarians! listen to men who know Russia and the value of her professions and promises by terrible experience, men who have no possible interest in deceiving you. Russia has declared war against Turkey, not for your sakes, as some among you are weak enough to imagine, but for her own ambitious ends. She will seek to annex Bulgaria, or a large portion of it (as she has taken Bessarabia from Moldavia), and after a few years she will make it a province of Russia. She has, it is said, abolished the tax you pay the Sultan for exemption from military service. In return Russia will exact from you and your sons 15 years' military service in Siberia, in the Caucasus, or, it may be, in Central Asia and on the confines of China. Instruction will be given to your children in Russian only. The Bulgarian language will not be admitted in courts of justice, because it is unintelligible to the judges whom Russia will furnish to you. Every measure will be adopted to convert you from Bulgarians into Russians. Your ancient Church will be placed under the control, not of a Bulgarian Exarch, but of Russian bishops controlled from St. Petersburg. Under the Sultan you might have obtained autonomy and the right of conducting your own affairs; under the Czar you will possess, like the rest of his innumerable provinces, whether Russian, Polish, German, or Finnish, no political privileges whatever, for Russia is a pure and unmitigated despotism, in which the lives and the fortunes of all men lie absolutely at the mercy of the Czar. Refrain, therefore, before it is too late, from giving aid to Russia, who, if victorious, will destroy your nationality, crush you by taxation and the conscription, and reduce you to the condition of her own wretched peasantry.

How has Russia treated the brave population of the Caucasus, whom, without the least reason except a desire for conquest, she has at length conquered after many years of merciless warfare?

Mr. F. Winn Knight, the Member for Worcestershire, thus relates in a letter to the 'Daily Telegraph' replying to Mr. Gladstone's reckless denunciation of the Circassians:—

In his recent speech at Hawarden Mr. Gladstone is represented to have held up the Circassians to universal obloquy, and to have said of 'the race of men called Circassians,' 'I have read hundreds of accounts of thousands of outrages committed by these Circassians and, it is with deep regret I say it, I have never come across a single instance of leniency or humanity on the part of one of those wretches whose names are Circassians; and unless a great change takes place the name will be handed down to everlasting infamy.' As long as the maligners of the Circassian race were anonymous, and in all probability paid Russian scribes, I was silent. But when an ex-Prime Minister of England—deprecating

at the same time the use of violent language—holds them up to the execration of the world and of posterity, I cannot help volunteering a few words on their behalf.

I claim to know more about the Circassians than Mr. Gladstone, as having, a short time before I came into Parliament, passed a winter (seven months) in Circassia, then unenslaved by Russia. I lived intimately among the people, and knew and understood them well, which is, I apprehend, not the case with their maligners.

I found them to be a courageous, patriotic, and kindly race. They were not nomads, but a settled agricultural population. I saw among them no trace of that innate cruelty which savages are said to possess and which is also very strongly marked in some of the Christian populations of the south of Europe.

Their dependents, their families, the Russian or Polish deserters, their horses, their cattle, and I may also say their guests, were liberally and kindly treated. Towards the deserters, in particular I know of repeated instances of almost chivalrous kindness and good feeling such as I have rarely if ever seen equalled in Christendom. Cruel, the Circassians (as I knew them) certainly were not. Robbers they were, in the sense that the English and Scotch borderers (including the ancestors of many of our greatest families) were robbers only a few generations ago. Thieves the Circassians certainly were not. During the seven months I was in Circassia, and, in spite of the numerous and varied homesteads in which my travelling cases were unpacked and packed by native servants, and in the presence of strangers, I never lost by theft the smallest article. Their feelings towards the Russians were Spartan. I stayed with one old man who had lost his four sons in war against them. He did not regret them, and only hoped for the same death himself.

If the generous and gallant race I knew in the Caucasus have since been changed into the remorseless fiends that Mr. Gladstone represents them to be, who is responsible for it? What lessons have they learnt since I knew them? and from whom have they learnt them? Those Circassians, on whom the curse of the Russophil falls so heavily, are hopeless exiles from their native land. They have lost at the hands of the Russians everything that could make life desirable. Their house has not even been 'left unto them desolate.' They have been robbed by Russia of all that they possessed—of house, of property, family, and country.

To the Turk they now owe their very existence. When all was lost but life the Turk protected them, sheltered them, and settled them on his waste lands. To the Turk they owe a deep allegiance, which is now being gallantly and gratefully paid.

The many thousand Circassian horsemen who are daily engaged in carrying death into the ranks of the Northern tyrant are composed of these exiles. They serve their benefactors the Turks without pay, and without their aid the Turkish armies would be lamentably deficient in cavalry. This may, perhaps be one of the causes that render them so hateful to the irate and baffled Russophils.

It is, perhaps, well for the world that the Circassian language has never been reduced to writing, and that these poor Circassians are incapable of giving us the details of the diabolical scenes of massacre that they must have witnessed before their final expulsion from their native homes, although they are, doubtless, fresh in the memory of the poor victims themselves. We learn, however,

from Mr. Schuyler and from Captain Burnaby the meaning of an execution 'in the Circassian style.' Their collateral evidence, which admits of no denial proves what these massacres must have been. When General Kaufmann issued a general order to his destroying columns 'to give over the settlement of the Yomud Tartars and their families to complete destruction, and their herds and property to confiscation,' an eye-witness who accompanied the expedition says: 'When we had gone about twenty-five miles from Khiva, General Golovatcheff said, before a large number of officers, in my presence, "I have received an order from the Commander-in-Chief—I hope you will remember it, and give it to your soldiers—this expedition does not spare either sex or age. Kill all of them." The detachment from the army of the Caucasus had not yet arrived, but came that evening. Golovatcheff called together the officers of the Caucasus, and said, "I hope you will fulfil all these commands strictly in the Circassian style, without a question. You are not to spare either sex or age. Kill all of them." The old colonel of the Caucasus said, "Certainly we will do exactly as you say."'

From such scenes of slaughter 'in the Circassian style' these poor exiles had escaped. *If they be now ferocious it has been from Holy Russia that they learnt their ferocity. If the Muscovite lesson, 'Kill all of them,'* has been as deeply imprinted on the Circassians as on Kaufmann's own officers, can we now blame them for it? Having thus seen 'Hell let loose' in their native land, men, women, and children at the breast massacred with ruthless barbarity by the orders of the Czar and his generals, can we wonder if those men, 'mad from life's history,' wreak their vengeance on the destroyer?

We must remember that these Circassians are now domiciled in Bulgaria on lands allotted to them by the Porte. That, as inhabitants of Bulgaria, they knew, of their own personal knowledge of the conspiracy of the Bulgarian Christians, promoted by Russia, to compass the murder of all the Mussulmans of that country.

That they knew also that the object of the Russian invasion is to drive them from their new homes, and to seize the inheritance and the lands of the Turks in the same way that they themselves had been driven from Circassia.

In one respect only I agree with Mr. Gladstone—viz., in not believing all the reports we hear of proceedings in Turkey. He disbelieves the Turkish Government, the English Ambassadors, the English Consuls, even though many of them are of his own appointment. I take leave to disbelieve all those writers and speakers who, in an attempt to shelter from 'everlasting infamy' the real authors of this cruel war, attribute the greater part of its atrocities to my poor friends the Circassians.

Captain Burnaby, in his recent ride through Asia, met many Circassians who talked freely with him. A Circassian chief, in defending his desire for revenge on the Russians, said:—

The Russians have killed our old men, have cut to pieces pregnant women, and have tossed the children on the bayonets, while the soldiers have satisfied their lust upon our wives and then burnt them to death afterwards. The chief added, 'Let those Englishmen who wish to be satisfied of this go through our country—if the Russians will let them—and talk to the people, but not in the presence of Russians.'

What the hapless people of the Caucasus have to fear from Russian civilisation at the present moment is shown by the following letter from the 'Times' correspondent at Soukoum Kalé :—

Dire will be the vengeance exacted for the burning of Soukoum Kalé; but the world at large will hear little of what is done, for the Russians know how to conceal that which it is not convenient for Europe to see too much of, and if questioned the official answer will deny much and give a very different colouring to the rest. The Abkassees know what they have to fear, and almost all of them are desirous of leaving the country. The Porte has sent numerous transports and men-of-war to Soukoum, and the work will commence at once. It will be no light task, for it is said that 25,000 families is the lowest estimate of the people who wish to escape.

The present revolt in the Caucasus is being stamped out with more horrors than the Bulgarian insurrection, and all the insurgents taken prisoners are shot without mercy. Many prefer defending themselves to the last gasp, and when all is hopeless, kill their own wives and children, to save them from the barbarity of the Russians.

In certain districts of Russia there have been until lately what were called United Greeks. These differed in some respects in their faith from the Holy Orthodox Church of Russia, and it was determined by that Government—now the admiration of our Christian and Liberal philanthropists—to make them conform. In January 1875, and let the date be marked, barely three years ago, the consul at Warsaw, Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield, wrote :—

'I have the honour to report to your Lordship that 52,000 United Greeks in the Government of Siedlee have been received into the Russian National Church. The passing over of these 50,000 *United Greeks has been effected by various means, in which physical maltreatment has formed a not inconsiderable element,* in some parishes the *most obstinate having been sent to the interior of the Empire or Siberia.* The remainder, finding their substance being eaten up by the Cossacks, gave in to the pressure of the subordinate officials, and signed the petition desiring to be received into the Russian Church. *In one village the peasants were assembled and beaten by the Cossacks,* until the military surgeon stated that more would endanger life ; *they were then driven through a half-frozen river up to their waists into the parish church, through files of soldiers,* where their names were entered in the petition as above, and passed out at an opposite door, the peasants all the time crying out, "You may call us Orthodox, but we remain in the faith of our fathers." In the district of Minciewicz, the peasants surrounded the church, and objected to the military introducing the priest. The former, with their wives and children, were finally mastered and surrounded, and were given the option of signing a declaration accepting the priest ; on their refusal fifty blows with the nagaika (Cossack whip) were given to every adult man, twenty-five to every woman, and ten to every child, irrespective of age or sex : one woman, more determined than the rest, received as many as one hundred lashes.'

Captain Burnaby asks if this is the way the Rev. Mr. Malcolm Maccoll would like to see the union of the Eastern and Western Churches brought about?

Again in his recent book, Captain Burnaby, *à propos* of the condemnation of the Turks, asks:—

Does Mr. Gladstone know how many of our officers and soldiers met their death at the battle of Inkerman when they were lying helpless on the field? Does he know how Captain the Hon. Henry Neville, and Captain Sir R. Newman, of the Grenadier Guards, were butchered? Does he know how poor Disbrowe of the Coldstreams was tortured? Possibly all these things have escaped from his memory, but the Cabinet to which he belonged did not forget them at the time. A Court of Inquiry was held in the Crimea. In these papers will be found the names of many British officers and privates who were proved to have been brutally massacred by the Russian soldiers, when imploring mercy, lying helpless owing to their wounds. Such horror was created that the Duke of Newcastle, then Minister of War, alluded to it, (Dec. 12, 1854) in the House of Lords. I give his own words: 'The enemy which our men met were not content with the legitimate use of their weapons, but had the *barbarity*, the *atrocious villany*, I will call it, to murder in cold blood the *wounded soldiers as they lay helpless on the field*; not the ignorant serfs alone did that, but men holding the position of Russian officers. *Our men have had to fight the savages, but in no instance have they experienced such barbarism as from the Russian soldiers.*'

Her Majesty the Queen, in a letter written during the war, says:—

'The Russians behaved with the greatest barbarity; many of our poor officers who were only slightly wounded were brutally butchered on the ground. Several lived long enough to say this.

'When poor Sir G. Cathcart fell, mortally wounded, his faithful and devoted military secretary (Colonel Charles Seymour), who had been with him at the Cape, sprang from his horse, and with one arm—he was wounded in the other—supported his dying chief, when three wretches came and bayoneted him. This is monstrous, and requisitions have been sent by the two Commanders-in-Chief to Menschikoff to remonstrate. . . .'

'The atrocities,' Her Majesty says, 'committed by the Russians on the wounded are too horrible to be believed.'

Do the Turks do worse than this?

Nor do the Russians treat their own wounded any better.

In the 'Telegraph' of September 28 the report is given of the statement of an American surgeon of high repute and distinguished official station in the United States, who has just returned from an exhaustive tour of professional inspection through Bulgaria and Roumania.

I can only say that the Russian treatment of their wounded is *the most damnable outrage on humanity* I have ever read or heard of, or conceived to be

possible. It is a sin which cries aloud to God for His vengeance, and to man for the strongest possible pronouncement of his loathing and abhorrence!

Some of the Russian surgeons are men of talent and experience; and by so much the more reprehensible are they for their laxity in enforcing proper police regulations in and around the hospitals, in permitting the wounded to be huddled without order into the tents in which no arrangements whatsoever have previously been made for their comfort—in which they are left to lie upon the filthy, stinking litters upon which they have been brought, their wounds undressed, from the field, or to crouch as best they may upon the foul and fetid straw with which the floor of the tent is bestrewn. The men are, as a rule, put into bullock carts, close to the field of action, not even a first bandage having been applied to their hurts, and are jolted off for 10 or 12 miles to some village where there is a field hospital, generally already crowded. There they are allowed to lie, just as they first fell, in their uniforms, stiff and stained with blood; nobody attends to them, brings them food or water, or does the least thing for them; they groan their wretched lives out in agony of body and despair of soul. I was at Radonicza, the head-quarters of the Czar, on the second evening after the great battle. About ten P.M. a train of about 2,000 wounded came in bullock carts. There was no one to receive them. Nobody brought them a cup of *bouillon* or a drop of brandy. They had had no food save a small ration of black bread, since they were carried off the field. None of their wounds were dressed. Their condition was simply indescribable. There they were, in the carts ranged along the side of the road, filling the air with their cries and groans; and there they remained all night, exposed to the bitter cold, within a few hundred yards of the Emperor's sleeping place. I left Radonicza between ten and eleven A.M. of the following day; and then *not one* of these unfortunates had been taken out of a cart, had his wounds dressed, or received the least nourishment or attention. Whatever assistance I proffered was uniformly refused on the plea that none but a graduate of a Russian Surgical College could be allowed to touch Russian wounded. Over 50 hours certainly elapsed between the time at which these poor wretches received their wounds to that in which they had any treatment whatsoever. My blood curdles in my veins when I think upon the sufferings they must have undergone during those two days and nights of physical pain, privation, jolting, and exposure.

Utterly inexcusable is the barbarous roughness of the Russian army surgeons. I have repeatedly been a distressed and indignant witness of brutalities, and even sheer cruelties, practised by the medical officer towards wounded soldiers, such as I could not have conceived it possible that any civilised human being would have been guilty of. For instance, I was present at an operation performed on one fellow, whose wound was not only dangerous, but of a peculiarly agonising character. He was lying on his filthy litter; the necessary operation might have been perfectly well performed upon him whilst in a recumbent position—it was horrible torture to him to move; but the surgeon insisted upon his getting up and seating himself on a stool, which he did with the greatest difficulty. The surgeon was just about to begin his work, when he caught sight of the soldier's long boots, which had not been removed since he was taken off the field. He broke out into a torrent of abuse, calling the man 'an accursed hog,' and asking him 'how he dared to present himself for operation with his filthy

boots on?' The poor fellow stammered out that nobody had taken them off for him, and that he was not strong enough to pull them off himself. 'I will teach you, you pig, to keep your boots on in hospital!' shouted the surgeon, and kicked the unfortunate creature three or four times furiously on his legs.

Neither is there any excuse for the total failure to provide necessary nourishment for the poor fellows when they are brought off the field—for allowing them to lie groaning in unceasing torments all through the night, when a properly applied injection of morphia would give them hours of rest and oblivion. To all these cruel wrongs is the brave and patient Russian soldier subjected. In fact, the treatment of the Russian wounded, from the time of their removal from the field upon which they have fallen to that of their delivery at Gorny Studen, Radonicza, &c., is a disgrace to a civilised nation, a blot upon the Russian escutcheon, a damnable outrage upon humanity, in extenuation of which no plea can be advanced which will hold water for an instant, and which calls for immediate and vehement protest from the European Powers.

On my road from Plevna to the Danube I passed over 600 waggons laden with wounded of all ranks. They had been for 48 hours on the road, with no provision whatsoever for food or medical attendance, under a burning sun by day, and a cold heavy dew by night, guarded by a few Cossacks. No nurses, no commissary, no stimulant to cheer, no kind word to encourage; they were wounded, and therefore no longer useful as slaying-machines—the sooner they died the less trouble they would give the army. I can only say that a country has no right to go to war if it cannot afford to ensure proper treatment to its wounded; and that the money spent in *champagne and luxuries in the Russian head-quarters* would be better applied to the alleviation of the agony endured by the Czar's 'children' at his behest. His Majesty should put a stop to the splendid living, rioting, and drunkenness of his high officers, and insist that the poor wretches whom he has forced into the fight shall be properly taken care of. The horrors I have attempted to describe take place under his very eyes, if he chooses to open them and see. I wish to hear no more of 'Bulgarian horrors,' for what I have witnessed personally convince me that the tender mercies of the 'humane Russian' towards his wounded are worse to bear than the barbarities of the Turk.

Do the Turks do worse than this?

Great stress has been laid on the fact that Russia in this war is really the champion of religion and Christianity. Without entering upon this question, as a matter of fact they are sunk in superstition and ignorance of the most degraded kind. The clergy of the Greek Church are fanatical and uneducated. The few educated Russians despise their Church; the poor crouch before it. As a correspondent of the 'Standard' writes:—

As to the Russian Church, or Christianity *à la Russe*, what can one say of such a libel on the very name of Christ? The people have ever been kept down in ign o rance and idolatry, and the priests are mostly poor, unwashed, ill-educated men, who fail to gain even the conventional respect of their flocks, and teach mechanically the dullest routine of ritual and of image worship. Living faith and holy life

are unknown—the Church is an imposture, fit and good enough, it is thought, for the common people, but ignored or despised by nearly all Russians who have any culture or enlightenment. I have before me, as I write, Rajon's etching (after Gerome) 'Le Muezzin.' The Turk stands on an open balcony overlooking the city, and, with eyes uplifted to the rising sun, calls on the 'faithful' to awake and look up to God—he calls to prayer. How simple, how beautiful, is this compared with the tawdry draperies, the gilded shrines, enriched with mock jewels and half concealed pictures, that disfigure the interior of St. Isaac's at St. Petersburg, and the cathedrals of the Kremlin at Moscow! I am familiar with the Churches of Italy and Spain; I knew Naples under Bomba's rule; Madrid under Isabella; but never have I seen or heard tell of a form of Christianity that was so low, so mean, and so debasing, as 'the Church' throughout the kingdom of the Czar. 'The Cross' must not count on triumphing over 'the Crescent' if Russia is to represent the religion of Jesus.

Russian civilisation, as understood by the bulk of the wealthy, means enjoyment of the moment in all kinds of carnal pleasures, in self-assertion, ostentation, and in ease. The millions toil on in their weary peasant drudgery, or, if less happy, are sent to be drilled, and to fight for Czar and Cross, 'food for powder,' the victims of the incompetence of those who lead them, and for whose vain-glory they are led to battle, now against Turkey, now to crush the Poles or the Finns, or to break a lance, as in 1854, against the French and English. Selfishness *in excelsis*—the few usurp all—the many live at best but from hand to mouth, and are ever at the mercy of the tax-gatherer or the recruiting agent. There is no middle class in Russia. Arts and sciences, manufactures and commerce, all languish under the shade of this head-centre of military despotism.

The idea of militant Christianity, joining a service in honour of the Deity with the destruction of human life, seems to be put into practice by the Russians. It has been thought that such sacrifices of hecatombs of human life were now confined to the savages of Africa; but a Russian official despatch shows we are mistaken. In honour of the fall of Kars, this Christian celebration took place:—

November 20.

To-day *the Emperor, the Prince, and the Grand Duke,* in the presence of a considerable number of troops, *were present at an open-air celebration of Divine service in honour of St. Michael,* the patron saint of the Grand Duke commanding in Asia, and of the triumph just achieved. *Salvoes of shells, fired at the Turkish works, formed part of the celebration.*

Russia's liberal treatment of newspaper correspondents in Europe in this war has been remarked. It is a mere pretence to get a reputation. In Asia, where she is removed from observation, a very different course has been adopted. As the 'Times' correspondent says, writing from Marza in August:—

Correspondents with the Turkish army do not seem to appreciate the similarity between their position and ours, between their army and that of the

Caucasus. The chief difference is that they have far greater liberty. 'The people are kept in the dark as to what is really going on at the seat of war.' Telegrams are kept back. Alterations are made, so that in one case you received a telegram signed with my name, part of the substance of which (relating to the Russian defeats) was completely altered.

The rejection of telegrams here is most quaintly capricious, making it rather hard for correspondents to know what it is worth while to hazard. On the whole, however, as regards Russia you may pretty safely reverse the proverb, and consider no news bad news.

Nor has our pro-Russian press acted much better than Russian censors. Something has been already said as to the partisan and unfair spirit shown by a certain section of the English press, before and during this war. The 'Daily News' is too openly a Russian organ for any explanation to be required of its systematic suppression of everything that might tell in favour of the Turks. Being the organ of political dissenters, it is pretty certain that the main motive of the 'Daily News' has been that bitter hatred of a Conservative government, and especially of Lord Beaconsfield, which always characterises this section of English political life. These ever-ready agitators thought last year they could fasten the atrocities on the Tory party; and in their endeavour to do this, and to justify their blind anti-Turkish bitterness, they have drifted into a most amusing alliance with the illiberal despotism of Russia.

From the 'Times,' however, more was expected. The journal that was once *facile princeps* amid the press of this country has injured its reputation, and lost its popularity, by the unpatriotic and biassed line it has taken since last autumn. After a period of ridiculous indecision, in which its leading articles displayed, as Mr. Clare Read once said, 'not one, but every phase of the Eastern Question,' it became thoroughly subservient to Russian politics and finance; and has during this year laboured in the anti-English cause with all the resources of the vast machinery at its command. The traditional wisdom of the conductors of the paper, which was supposed always to lead them right in adopting each momentary wave of public opinion, has been confounded, and on every phase of the Eastern Question they have managed, in one way or another, to run counter to the feelings of the English people. Their news has been scanty, and always very late, and by no means always true. It is to be hoped that the 'Times' may recover its old position, and become once more an honour to the English name. Indecision or even downright inconsistency may be pardoned in leading articles, which, after all, reflect but the confused

ideas of individuals struggling to provide fresh matter day by day, and to a satiated reader. So long as the source of news—the foreign correspondence—is kept honest and impartial, other failings may be condoned.

It has remained for the leading journal to set the example to the English press of poisoning the sources of intelligence at the fountain, and of deliberately suppressing what does not tell in favour of their Russian *protégés*. Their correspondents at the seat of war have been chosen for their anti-Turkish sympathies; and information favourable to the unfortunate Moslem has been carefully struck out. It is true that the 'Times' does not stand alone in sending correspondents to hunt everywhere for sensational horrors.

But one of its correspondents, who was with Suleiman Pasha in the Tundja Valley and in the Shipka Pass, has earned for himself the unenviable palm of surpassing all other correspondents in displaying a truly novel ardour in his search for atrocities. Having been unsuccessful at Yeni Saghra on the first day of his search, he returned undauntedly next morning, and may be called 'the digger for atrocities;' for, being told that the wife of one 'Monin' had been killed, he adopted the following course. In his own language, on September 18—

> We were informed that she had been slaughtered by a blow on the head, and was buried in a manure heap in the farmyard. We procured men and set to work on our horrible task, and in a short time came on the corpse of a woman of apparently thirty-five to forty years old. The limbs which were lying exposed seemed fair and white, and showed no signs of a struggle. Her dress was very good, ornamented with a good deal of embroidery, and her long white undergarment was as fresh as when first put on, proving that she had not been many hours in that damp soil. We next went to a place close by, where in a few moments without hesitation our workmen uncovered the remains of a man in rough Bulgarian clothes.

After the battle of Yeni Saghra the Turkish wounded and prisoners were butchered wholesale by General Gourko's troops. A whole trainload of wounded, being left at Yeni Saghra station, were brained by the Bulgarian axe or pierced with the Cossack lance, while holding up their helpless hands for mercy to their murderers. Yet the 'Times' correspondent with General Gourko, in mildly Scriptural language, thus glances at this brutal massacre:—

> By two o'clock the Turkish artillery fire ceased, and their infantry were driven from point to point of a strong position; flying at last from the field in disorder, and pursued by the Russians for seven or eight miles. *And the wrath of the pursuers burned hotly.*

About three months ago some such charges as have just been made were brought against the 'Times' by a contemporary, and evidently stung the conductors of that paper to the quick; for, what is almost without precedent in the history of the 'Times,' notice was taken of the charge, and a carefully worded, and pompously indignant, denial was given.

We scarcely know how, with due inference to our own self-respect or honour for English journalism to characterise as it deserves the insinuation which our contemporary has ventured to convey. We leave it to the public to decide if we are in the habit of suppressing information which may be supposed to conflict with editorial views we have expressed. It would certainly never have occurred to ourselves to think there was any 'courage' in stating facts, whatever conclusions soever they might be used to support. We publish whatever news reaches us, leaving to our readers the liberty we claim for ourselves of drawing inferences from it.

Nothing is so offensive to the evil-doer as Truth. 'Be sure your sin will find you out!' might have been remembered by the 'Times.' An exposure, most bitter and most effective, was at hand. The 'Times' correspondent with Suleiman Pasha, won over by what he saw of the valour, kindness, and virtues of the Turkish soldiery among whom he was living, telegraphed the following pregnant remarks to his journal:—

According to British practice, I am an object for the scorn of the street Arab, but among the Turkish soldiery not only have I never experienced an uncivil word, never heard a jest at my expense, but I—*one stranger among thousands of anti-humans*—have to acknowledge numberless small services rendered by cheerful willing hands, with all the heartiness and disinterestedness of simple patriarchal hospitality. *It imports little that my heart should ache because the great cause of humanity demands the wholesale slaughter of these brave and gentle folk; but it does so ache, and I wish that some of our bitterest anti-Turkish agitators could spend a month in a Turkish camp that they might see these people for themselves.* Among the camp followers is an old shrivelled Indian, &c., &c.

Now the words in italics, be it marked, were deliberately erased and the passage printed without them. The discovery was made by an accident. The editor who struck them out of the proof-sheets did not know that a portion of the edition had already been printed. Consequently, next day, a few of the earlier copies appeared with the words so obnoxious to the pro-Russian direction of the 'Times,' while the greater portion of the copies was without them. When we come to remark the character of the passage struck out, the ungenerous character, not to use a worse word, of the step is most apparent. They were no fierce abuse of Russia, or

defence of Turkey, which perhaps the 'Times' could hardly be expected to insert, even after its indignant assurances of impartiality given last summer. But they were a simple, kindly, tribute of respect to the poor but brave and simple-minded soldiery among whom the correspondent was living.

The opinions delivered by that great patriot and statesman, M. Thiers, must always carry with them conviction. His opinion on the Eastern Question is quoted below.

No greater contrast to Mr. Gladstone's loose and declamatory invectives against Turkey, and to his reckless estimate of political questions of such vital import to his country by the rule of preponderating atrocity, can be found than in the latest expressions of M. Thiers regarding the present war. That eminent man, with matchless prescience, fully justified his great reputation as a statesman, diplomatist, and historian, in the following pregnant sentences uttered by him, at the outbreak of the war, to the Paris correspondent of the 'Times':—

As a Frenchman, I am led to ask myself whether Europe can agree to the eventual disappearance of Turkey, and whether she can abandon to indifference the finest corner of our old continent. Well, I reply, *No, there is nobody who can be put in the place of the Turks; nobody whose presence at Constantinople would be equally reassuring to entire Europe.* Russia is a powerful nation, which possesses great qualities and very great force of expansion, but she is not yet ripe, and Europe would be alarmed when she placed her broad hand on Turkey, lest she should want to place it on the whole continent. Moreover, even if part of Europe, indifferent or timorous, should agree to let Russia do as she liked, Turkey would defend herself to her last gasp before succumbing, and other nations would, involuntarily as it were, be drawn into the struggle. We should then find ourselves confronted by a terrible convulsion, lasting perhaps twenty or thirty years. I consider then, that a conflict on the Eastern Question, a conflict entered upon between two or more great nations, would be a misfortune as useless as it would be irreparable. I do not overlook the great mistakes which the Turks have committed, and I love Russia, where I count many friends, even intimate friends; *but among all the races which are in conflict in the East the Turkish race is the one which offers the most resources and character, and which is the least hated of all,* and I do not think Europe would condemn her with impunity. I said, fifteen months ago, to those then directing events:—Take care, you want to do everything by the three Empires alone; *you want to rest on that triple autocracy alone; you are wrong;* you forget the rest of Europe, which, perhaps, is worth your thinking of. Italy, perhaps, will let you do as you like, *but you will have to reckon with France and with England.* France is not at present, perhaps, a subject of great anxiety for you, but a nation like France is only momentarily brought low, and were it only by her wealth, she never ceases to possess weight in the world's balance. *But England? You do not know her. She has incalculable power, for she is invulnerable at home. One*

man alone ever thought her assailable at home, and he was mistaken. Yet that man was Napoleon, one of the two greatest generals the world has ever seen. He was a character, imperial, audacious, indomitable, of unmeasured pride, but, after all, he was a great organiser and a wonderful soldier. Well, he dreamt of throwing an army on the English coast, and he died vanquished and England's prisoner. England is now invulnerable at home, and it may even be said from home. France, after losing a battle, may be disheartened, overcome, but, as for England, one ship sunk is another ship launched, and going out to sea. Then, too, do not forget she is mistress of the road of the universe. Imagine that by some supernatural event that universal road was suddenly intercepted. Imagine the cataclysm that would cause, and how humanity would feel the shock! Well, England is invulnerable at home. *There is one point which she will not at any price allowed to be touched, that is the road leading to the East. Never at any cost will she allow that to be touched.* Here is what you ought not to lose sight of, but what you will seem to lose sight of if you do not consult entire Europe on the work you want to undertake in the East. Convoke all the Powers, then organise a general police on land and sea, and seize by the collar all who would fain set light to that powder barrel called the Eastern Question.

We are often reproached with having a socialist *queue*, and of not allowing it to be cut off; but the Turkish Slavs are also a *queue* which Russia ought to cut off to prevent her acting sometimes against her will. I advise you, therefore, not to encourage the Slavs, for there is no knowing what it would lead to. *And look now at sermon after sermon, for people have been spending time in composing sermons. How is the Eastern Question submitted in them? By a programme of eleven points. And what a programme! I defy any one of the Powers which are going to meet round the green tablecloth to put it in execution at home. Turkey is asked to disarm those who are fighting for her, to make all her functionaries elective, and to transform by degrees the collection of her taxes, she being given to understand that the execution of these reforms must be watched over by a foreign occupation.* That means that the occupation will be permanent, for it is forgotten that France, whose taxes before the Revolution of 1789 were collected like Turkey's by farmers-general, which had at her head an organiser like the first Napoleon, took nearly a century to settle her direct taxation after having formed that admirable body of controllers of direct taxes—a devoted, esteemed, experienced body which administrative Europe envies us. Of the other points I will say nothing. France has entrusted her representatives with the most pacific instructions, and has marked out peace as the great object of their efforts. Austria desires peace also, and she has grave reasons for desiring it. She cannot see with indifference Russia coming down to the Danube, and the Slavs of her frontiers could not see with indifference the defeat of Slavonic arms.

Unfortunately, contrary to what is generally the case, it is the two adversaries in this duel who are the least disposed to an accommodation. Russia and Turkey both approach the Conference with the purpose, or, at least, the desire, of fighting, even if no solution were to be the result of the struggle.

Russia has not to fear being threatened; for all that the Turks would aim at would be to repel her attacks. Europe would have little to do or fear as long as the Turks resisted; but from the moment the Turks appeared to succumb, Europe would have to consider whether she would consent to leave Russia victorious

to dictate laws to vanquished Turkey, or even whether Turkey should be exposed to the necessity of declaring herself conquered. It is then that the general conflagration, of which I have spoken, would have to be dreaded.

What would M. Thiers say were he still living and could see how deliberately the value of that road to the East, which he says England would never abandon, is contemptuously underrated by a large section of our political leaders, and perhaps neglected by the Government itself?

The latest utterance of M. Thiers on the Eastern Question, written to Mr. Henry Reeve on August 8—but a few days before his death—indeed bears, as Mr. Reeve writes, the stamp of his unrivalled political sagacity.

Voilà les Turcs en veine de succès. L'Europe a été inique envers eux, car la justice et le véritable intérêt de l'équilibre universel étaient avec eux. On aura fort à regretter l'abandon dans lequel on les a laissés. Je dis cela pour l'honneur de la raison et de la prévoyance lointaine. Dans les vues de la paix présente un accommodement prochain est désirable. Je crains bien les suites d'une second campagne, car la campagne de cette année ne me paraît pas devoir être suffisant pour amener l'appaisement de l'Orient.

Of which a literal translation is appended:—

Behold the Turks on the road to success. Europe has been unjust to them; for justice and the real interests of the general balance of power were on their side. Europe will have strong reason to regret the isolation in which the Turks have been left. This I say for the honour of common sense and of far-sighted prescience. In the interests of peace an early arrangement is desirable. I fear greatly the consequences of a second campaign; for this year's campaign seems to me insufficient to bring about the pacification of the East.

Granting, then, that Turkey be as bad as she is painted by her enemies, it is not Russia that should undertake her correction. Turkish vices, public and private, are quite equalled by those of Russia, and for the latter to attack the Moslem in the name of humanity and Christianity is an act of gross and unparalleled hypocrisy. It may well be questioned whether we have gained much in reality by substituting false professions of philanthropy for the cynical straightforwardness with which conquering governments and peoples in old times frankly avowed their real aims.

If might is, by its sheer brute power, to be right, let us have it call itself, and be called, by its real name. Do not let it come fawning upon us with specious untruths, and murder its victims with tender speeches and an affectation of magnanimous regret. The following extract gives, in the conversation of a Russian officer

with a German colonist in the Dobrudscha, the true aims of Russia :—

'I'll tell you what it is,' said an intelligent-looking officer. '*Old Gortschakoff will make a fool of England till it is too late for her to do anything,* and then we shall have the game in our own hands.' 'England is the only one,' said another officer, 'likely to give us trouble ; confound her!' They were all of them pretty free in their condemnation of England. 'We did not come here to free thick-headed Bulgarians from the Turkish yoke ; *we are on our way to Constantinople,* where I and my comrades here (several more Cossacks had joined the first two while this conversation had been going on) mean to have a big "hulie" glorification in honour of the event with the money we have taken from the dead Circassians, and what more we may pick up on our way there. *Thank God for the day when our service is held in St. Sophia,' here they crossed themselves.* 'Yes,' said they, 'we will have a glorification then.'

This was what all of them said. Their object in entering Turkey was the capture and possession of Constantinople, not the emancipation of the Christians, '*The best thing to do with the Turks,' said they, 'is to kill them all,* and then we should be rid of them for good.' 'Well,' said the German, 'do you think you will get to Constantinople?' 'Oh, yes,' said they, 'if those cursed dogs of Englishmen do not get in the way ; if they do, we shall lose a lot of men ; but we are not to turn back till Constantinople is taken. The Turkish soldiers can fight, but their officers are no good. If they had English officers to lead them, as they say they will have before long, we should have hard work to beat them.

Russia is now attacking Turkey because she covets Turkish possessions—Armenia, ports on the Black Sea, Bulgaria, and sooner or later Constantinople. She is attacking Turkey just as she has attacked every independent people within her reach and not too powerful for the last 200 years. She is attacking Turkey now without protest and without resistance from other peoples because Prussia, her old ally, is now the most formidable power in Europe and holds the ring while Russia works her unchecked way, and because a section of Englishmen, misled by the cant of false sentiment and deceived by untrue or exaggerated stories of Turkish cruelty, have turned round upon the traditions of their whole historical policy, and have become blinded to the real dangers from Russian aggression.

How did Russia behave in 1827 to the noble and patriot Sultan Mahmoud II., one of the greatest men of this century, who devoted all the energies of his active and brilliant nature to the development and improvement of his country by most extensive and liberal reforms? Exactly as she treated the new Turkish Constitution in 1877. No sooner was the force of Mahmoud's policy understood than a quarrel was picked with him. His country

was ruined by a sanguinary invasion, as at present, and the free institutions he inaugurated crushed under the ruin of defeat.

In Creasy's 'History of the Ottoman Empire,' cap. 24, the opinion of Count Moltke is quoted on this subject.

'*If Turkey had enjoyed ten years of peace after the destruction of the Janissaries, Sultan Mahmoud's military reforms might in that time have gained some strength; and, supported by an army upon which he could depend, the Sultan might have carried out the needful reforms in the administration of his country, have infused new life into the dead branches of the Ottoman Empire, and made himself formidable to all his neighbours. All this was prevented by Russia, which nipped the Sultan's reforms in the bud.*' And the strongest possible proof of the wisdom with which Mahmoud's measures were planned, of the beneficial effects which they actually produced in Turkey, and far greater benefits which they would have conferred if Russia had not hastened to attack her while those measures had scarce begun to ripen, is to be found in the despatches of the chief statesmen of Russia during the war of 1828 and 1829, in which they take credit for their sagacity in discerning in Mahmoud's reforms the necessity for prompt hostilities on the part of Russia.

Lord Palmerston made the following momentous statement in Parliament during the Crimean War, and every word of it is true, and should be noted by our pro-Russian party :—

The intention of Russia to partition Turkey is manifest as the sun at noonday, and it is to prevent that that we are contending. Such is the object of the war, and not only to defend Turkey, the weak against the strong, but to avert injury and danger from ourselves. Let no man imagine that if Turkey is destroyed by Russia, and that gigantic power strides like a Colossus from the Baltic on the one hand, to the Mediterranean on the other, let no man suppose the great interests of this country would not be in peril; let not the peace-at-all-price party imagine that their commercial interests would not be deeply injured. . . . Trade would soon disappear were the Mediterranean and the Baltic under the command of a Russian naval force, and that power exercising a dominant control.

Mr. Disraeli lent the Government invaluable support, concluding a patriotic and high-toned speech in the following words, as remarkable a contrast to Mr. Gladstone's factious conduct as could be imagined :—

If the negotiations failed, Her Majesty might appeal with confidence to her Parliament to support her in a renewed struggle; and there was no sum which Parliament would not cheerfully vote, or her people cheerfully raise, to vindicate her honour and maintain the independence and interests of her kingdom.

A grave responsibility rests upon the English Government, graver than has devolved upon any government since the Crimean War—perhaps more important even than at that time ; for Russia,

then practically alone in her schemes of aggression, is now backed by the enormous moral influence and resources of the German Empire—the military arbiter of Continental Europe. Plans of redistribution of power, of partition and annexation, are foreshadowed by the close alliance of Prince Bismarck and Prince Gortschakoff which would startle the world if fully revealed, but which are being deliberately matured. As each favourable opportunity offers, the pieces on the great European chess-board are moved with unshrinking determination towards the goal desired by the two great Northern Powers—Antwerp and the command of the German Ocean for Prussia, with, perhaps, a little later, Trieste and the Adriatic; the Danube and Constantinople for Russia. Where will England and France be when, some few years hence, they find themselves confronted by sixty-five millions of Germans, and one hundred millions of Sclaves, both armed to the teeth, and able to put millions of trained soldiers into the field? The thought that eventually these two great despoilers may fall out and rend each other is but a sorry consolation for the Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Austrians who will first be made the victims of their combined ambition.

England and France, before such forces, would sink at once to the rank of second-rate Powers. Turkey, and Turkey alone, now stands in the way of the realisation of this long-planned conspiracy. Let Russia but once hopelessly crush the valiant Ottoman people, now fighting with the courage of despair for their homes and their faith, and the greatest bulwark against Muscovite and North German ambition is swept away. Austria, with her diverse races and her unwieldy fabric of empire, will fall a ready prey to the disintegrating influences that will envelop her on all sides. For Austria's vulnerable points are on her south-eastern side; and let Russia once creep around her Croatian frontier, and she will obtain a fatal vantage-ground against her old rival.

In Asia no European Power cares to check Russia, and if we are not prepared to stand up for our empire, and our road to India, no other Power will. Russia is not more than human to forget the Crimean War or to give up the hopes of revenge. The fabulous treasures of India are the talk of every Central Asian bazaar and the aim of every aspiring Russian officer, who, in plundering the sparse riches of Tartary, has acquired a dim foreshadowing of the prospect before him in the opulent cities of Hindostan. Let the English Government beware lest, in their

anxiety to avoid complications, they let slip for ever great opportunities.

No one is so foolish as to desire war for war's sake. The country is, and will be, thankful to the Ministry so long as they can, without dishonour or without the sacrifice of her Imperial security, keep England from the trials and misery of war. But the English people are, with all their prudence and love of wealth, a generous and high-spirited race. It is the policy of financiers and traders to put off as long as possible, to leave complications and dangers to be met by the next generation, or to postpone the evil day for a year or two, even at the risk of having then to encounter a danger multiplied tenfold by the delay. Let not the Government forget that it is the voting masses that will determine their fate, and give the verdict of the country upon their policy; and not the men of commerce who would sacrifice everything, and move heaven and earth, rather than risk a panic in the money-market, or on the Stock Exchange. These pecuniary influences have always an overwhelming weight with English Governments, and were completely predominant in Mr. Gladstone's administration.

But a mean and spiritless policy, regulated by the consideration of the money market, soon revolts the English people. This is not what guides the decision of the electors of the country. Nobler aims and more generous impulses have weight with them. There is nothing more certain than that the great mass of the electors of this country, apart from the political dissenters, who will always, by their constitution, be irreconcilable Radicals, are for the Turks and against the Russians. The amount of the sympathy varies greatly in different people and in different places; but it is there, and requires but a spark at a critical moment to kindle it into a flame. There are two things which Englishmen will not stand with complacency at the present moment. The one is the complete destruction of the Turkish power by overwhelming numbers; the other is menace to the British hold on India, either by Russian naval preponderance in the Black Sea, or by Russia's obtaining the Armenian fortresses, which are the key of the Euphrates valley—the great high-road of the future to India.

Their wrath is apt to blaze up suddenly and without much warning. The Government should beware of the danger they are in, of falling between two stools. Last year they irritated the pro-

Russians, but, after all, that did not matter so much, for their own party stood by them, and the mistaken fever of the autumn died of itself, so soon as it became evident that the generous impulses of the country were being worked in the interests of Russia by Russian agents and Russian journals. But if now, by a weak indifference to the traditional policy of England, and by a dread of that conspiracy of despots, called the Northern Alliance, the Government allows the Ottoman Empire to be destroyed, or even seriously crippled, they will forfeit the confidence and the respect of their own party, and of the bulk of the nation, without getting anything in return. The 'Daily News,' and Mr. Gladstone, may for the moment admire the apparent conversion of the Government to their views, but do not let the Cabinet ground any hopes on this unusual following.

What the country really wants is firmness and decision, not a beating about to see which way the wind blows, *or a timid acquiescence in each suppressed menace from Berlin.* The German Empire is big and powerful, but Englishmen have not yet learnt to stand cringing at Prince Bismarck's door, or to learn lessons of unrighteous aggrandisement at the hands of the oppressors of Poland. England is too proud-spirited to stand tamely by, and allow the Northern despots to settle the fate of the Ottoman Empire. If Turkey is allowed to be crushed, let the Government be under no delusions about the verdict of the country. It will be given in something of this style: 'So Mr. Gladstone was right, after all, when he urged you to join in coercing Turkey. You have allowed to be done what you then opposed, and you might very possibly have prevented the war had you at once joined with Russia. It has come about after all; and so you might, by joining in the business, have either modified its results, or, at any rate, had a share in the redistribution of power.' The very people who have abused and vilified the Government for its supposed pro-Turkish sympathies will be the first to lead the clamour of indignation that will surely follow the abandonment of the Ottoman Empire to the ambition of Russia. We are fond of vaunting of the might of England when she puts forth her full strength; but can we forget that without Turkey we should on land be practically helpless? Englishmen are brave—as valiant, no doubt, as their forefathers—but what could our fifty or a hundred thousand soldiers do against the millions which Russia could put into the field? Granted that our army would be a match for double its number of enemies,

Russia might lose half a million of men, and yet out-number our forces by ten to one. Nor are Russian soldiers to be despised. This war has shown them to be brave, enduring, and obedient to a marvellous extent. The Russian Generals have displayed little skill, but this need not always be the case. An able organiser and a great General could, in a few months, turn the Russian army into a fighting machine of overwhelming power. Providence has given us a natural ally in the East. The interests of Turkey and of England are identical—identical commercially and politically. Turkey admits our productions freely and gladly; Russia rigidly shuts out English goods from all her vast territories. As an instance, since she has conquered the Central Asian Khanates, some 2,000,000*l.* of English goods, which formerly went to these districts, have been excluded. A human being or an article of commerce has but to be called English to be contemned and tabooed by Russians. If 'the half-a-million of Ottoman warriors who are now fighting without pay and without reward' on behalf of—what would once have aroused the sympathy and admiration of *all* Englishmen—their country and their faith, against overwhelming numbers and in the face of every disheartening trial and treachery, should be finally and completely annihilated by Russian numbers, what is there to stand between Russia and India? Where are we to find the fighting material which it is absolutely necessary we should find, to supplement our own scanty army in a struggle with a Power which can put nearly two millions of devoted, brave, and patient soldiers into line against us? It is simple madness on the part of England to look on and see Turkey destroyed—a madness, too, which savours strongly of cowardice, and which will in time call forth the bitterest condemnation from the English people on the heads of the Ministry who allowed it. The Turks are now fighting quite as much for English interests as for their own, for they might easily, by bending to Russian designs and admitting Russian influence to be supreme at Constantinople, at our expense conclude a very favourable peace.

The proper maintenance of our imperial prestige is very dear to the hearts of Englishmen. It was the constant humiliation tamely submitted to from Germany, from Russia, and from the United States, which brought Mr. Gladstone's Government into contempt. It may be good policy to allow this cruel war to proceed further. It may be that matters are not ripe yet for putting an end to the awful miseries that are being inflicted in the name of

Christianity upon an inoffensive population, and chiefly upon innocent and helpless women and children; and it may be in the end that some concessions must be made to the evil power of might, and that Russia will be allowed to make some acquisitions as the reward of her skilful use of hypocritical pleas of humanity, and of her preponderating numbers. But *let the Government interpose the influence, and, if necessary, the might, of England to protect Turkey from dismemberment or serious injury. Nothing less than this will satisfy the English nation.* Lord Beaconsfield is a statesman who knows what are the interests of his country, and who has striven to guide, amidst a storm of obloquy and misrepresentation, the ship of state safe through the perils which of late have surrounded her at home and abroad. He must at times have been sorely tried by the short-sighted infatuation of those with whom he has had to deal. To a prescient mind it must have been galling in the extreme to have to struggle with the commercial and parochial views of foreign policy so pitiably prevalent, and to watch the ease with which those crafty and unscrupulous statesmen that wield the destinies of Germany and Russia have hoodwinked and deluded a large section of public opinion. It is to Lord Beaconsfield that the country now looks for the firm maintenance of its essential interests abroad. He is the centre and soul of the strength of the Conservative party. The elections of 1874 were won by him as against Mr. Gladstone. The people now feel towards him as they feel towards no other English statesman—a feeling of profound admiration for his brilliant and fascinating genius.

Let not Lord Beaconsfield allow his countrymen to feel that they have been mistaken in regarding him as a worthy successor of the greatest of our Foreign Ministers: nor allow them to be disappointed in the confidence so far reposed in him that he will uphold the interests and the honour of England no less unflinchingly than Lord Palmerston, who, with his true English hatred of deceit and hypocritical pretence, always boldly unmasked and denounced Russian intrigues, and stood like a lion across the path of Russian aggression.

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OUGHT WE TO HOLD CANDAHAR?

BY

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OUGHT WE TO HOLD CANDAHAR?

THE arrival of Yakoob Khan at the British camp at Gundamuck, the village on the Cabul road held by the advanced detachment of Sir Samuel Browne's division, brings us face to face with the necessity for specifying the terms of peace which we shall require the Ameer to consent to. For six months we have waged a war in Afghanistan with unvarying success. In the north we have reached a point within sixty miles of the capital. A forced march would take our soldiers to within sight of the Bala Hissar and the walls of Cabul. In the south our success has been not less complete. Candahar, the chief town in the southern portion of the country, the former capital of the whole State, the one spot which more than any other is associated with the past glory of the Afghans, whether under Ghiljies or Duranis, has for four months been occupied by a British army. The out-lying places, Girishk and Khelat-i-Ghiljie—watch-towers respectively to the north-west and the north-east—have also beheld the irresistible progress of our arms. But although our military triumph was perfect, there seemed to be little permanent outcome from it. The death of Shere Ali did not bring his successor to our feet, and for a time it was doubtful whether there was any Afghan prince with whom it would be possible to arrange terms. Yakoob Khan has now been formally recognized as Wali of Cabul by Lord Lytton, and,

consequently, that uncertainty is removed. It is only possible for us, after that recognition, to conclude a peace with Yakoob. Up to the present time what the conditions of that peace are to be is quite unknown. There have been rumours. There have been assertions bearing a stamp of probability; but if General Roberts's proclamation with regard to the Khurum Valley be excepted, there has been no definite and official statement of what our terms, or any of them, are to be.

On one point, however, all rumours and assertions agree with singular unanimity. Look where we may, to all sections of the London press, to the utterances of public men, to that mysterious side talk among those "who know," it is remarkable that there is a belief in the fact that whatever else may be demanded in the way of concession from the Ameer he will not be required to cede Candahar to us. At the most, probably, these views and expressions do but anticipate the future. At the present time there is not the slightest reason for believing that the question of the fate of Candahar has been irrevocably decided either by the Home or the Indian authorities. It is still a moot point. Of all the topics that are being discussed at Gundamuck it is the most delicate. It is so delicate that it may not even be decided there. The Ameer is in a hurry to return to his capital. The question of Candahar can easily be left in abeyance, when the main point has been agreed upon, viz., that between the British and Afghan Governments there shall be peace and alliance in the time to come. It is extremely probable that at Gundamuck the principal point of all with regard to the rectification of the frontier has not been definitely settled. The Candahar question should be the one vital point with all Anglo-Indian statesmen. In this country we cannot too clearly ask ourselves, we cannot too anxiously inquire, Ought we to hold Candahar?

Before discussing that question, the terms of peace, which are generally believed to have been specified, may be stated. It is not to be supposed that they are lite-

rally correct. They approximate to what is accepted in well-informed quarters, and while having a London origin, they are substantiated by telegrams from India. They have also the merit of representing the *minimum* that will be accepted. It is said that "the Indian Government will be content to retain garrisons in forts to be erected at Lundi-Kotal, Khurum, and Pisheen; the roads leading to these places from India being also left absolutely under our control. The Ameer to draw revenue from, and to administer in every respect, all the country not thus occupied. A British Resident to be permanently quartered at Cabul, and an Afghan Envoy always to accompany the Viceregal Court. The Indian Government to have the right to depute agents at any time to certain named towns in the North of Afghanistan, including Balkh, Maimene, Candahar, and Herat, for the purpose of obtaining political and commercial information. The two Powers to pledge themselves against listening to external intrigue levelled at the interests of one or the other, and to enter into a conditional defensive alliance. Finally, the Indian Government to pay the Ameer an annual subsidy of settled amount, nominally 'for keeping the passes open,' but in reality to strengthen his hands in dealing with malcontent tribes."

The verbal accuracy of these terms need not be insisted upon. It requires but a very slight acquaintance with the subject to perceive that in several points these conditions are, to say the least, of dubious authority. But, however inexact, they approximate to the truth. Pisheen marks the limit of our new frontier in the south, and there is no mention of Candahar. "Oh yes," it will be said, "there is. We are to have the right to depute an agent there whenever we may deem such a course to be necessary. We shall also have a garrison within eighty miles of Candahar. The Khojuck pass through the Amran range will be in our possession. So also will be the alternative Gwaja pass, farther to the west. What more could be wanted or demanded?" The writer of this pamphlet, relying on the evidence of his-

tory, and of every competent Anglo-Indian authority, replies, without hesitation, Candahar itself.

Less than any man, perhaps, am I disposed to attach little importance to the fact of a friendly Ameer being seated on the Cabul cushion. So long as there shall be an independent Afghanistan, so long should its prince be an ally of the British, the friend of their friend, the enemy of their enemy. For Yakoob Khan, personally, I have a great admiration—a true sympathy. Having followed his career with great closeness, having written of that career much more, probably, than any one else, I feel no hesitation in predicting for him a brilliant, perhaps a successful future. But because I sympathize with his difficulties as an Afghan ruler, because I admire him as a man, that is no reason why my judgment should be warped as to the necessity there is for him to make a very substantial territorial concession to this country. Yet it appears as if sympathy and admiration, in conjunction with a sense of boredom, had put judgment and common sense out of court altogether. Contrast what is written now in the papers on the Afghan question with what was said by the same authorities any time last year, from the news of the despatch of the Stoletoff Mission to the eventful 20th of November, when war was declared against the obstinate Shere Ali. What a difference! An Afghan policy, bold and comprehensive, was then sketched out. The necessity for such was admitted on all sides. We were to have, at the least, a "scientific frontier," and Russian pretensions were to be rolled backward from the confines of Afghanistan, and what our imagination had sketched out, the valour of our soldiers, Indian as well as English, the skill of our generals promptly rendered possible. Triumph succeeded triumph, and in a few short weeks we had secured what was a "scientific frontier." It needed but a punitive expedition against the Waziris, and the fortification of a post at the entrance to the Gomul pass, to have given us a line along the north-west frontier that would have been most easy of defence, and that would have brought us that sense of security which is now, and has for so

long, been lacking. There was an unanimity of opinion on this question up to Christmas that was very striking. It was still more significant because no one dared seriously to challenge the importance of Candahar. General Hamley's remarkable paper on the strategical conditions of our Indian north-west frontier carried conviction with it. No one dared to cross swords with that distinguished officer. It is only now, five months after the delivery of that lecture, when we are about to realize the benefit of our labours, that opposition to those views is beginning to manifest itself, not in words, but in acts. The bold man has not yet been found who will set himself to show that the importance of Candahar, military or political, has been exaggerated. It is impossible to resist the logic of facts. When they are irresistible it is only possible to evade them. The just and the true must be sacrificed to the convenient. On such principles as this can it alone be decided that we should withdraw from Candahar. It is not too late to arrest our action in this matter. There is ample time for insisting that, if the principle of a restoration of Candahar to the Ameer has to be admitted, there should, for most weighty reasons, be no *premature* withdrawal of our troops from that place.

It would be difficult to add anything to the reasons that have been advanced for the retention of Candahar; but even the reiteration of what has already been written may serve to warn us that what was wisdom six months ago is not folly now. If we stultify ourselves in Afghanistan, it will be said that we showed a reluctance to carry out our original programme, simply because our hands were so much occupied elsewhere. The war in Zululand took off the edge of our vigour in Afghanistan. There can be no doubt that the interest of the British public in the Afghan question waned very much, once it was perceived that Russia did not intend to follow up her first move by a proclaimed interference in Afghanistan. It grew still less when Cetewayo and his braves became the topic of the hour. But, as a matter of fact, the Afghan question is immea-

surably the more important of the two; and when Cetewayo and his formidable military system have become matters of history, the question of the relations between Cabul and Calcutta will still be a question of vital political interest. We should also remember that if, here in London and throughout England, our attention has been distracted from Candahar and Jellalabad to Natal and the Transvaal, such has not been the case in India. The Afghan question is still the question of the hour in the eyes of the Government and people of Hindostan. For that reason alone the fate of Candahar should not be lightly discussed. Still less should it be lightly decided. It is eminently a question upon which an opinion should be formed with deliberation. There is nothing urgent in the matter at all. Our prolonged stay at Candahar will cost us little. It will not weaken the cause of Yakoob Khan. It may very possibly serve to strengthen his position.

Intimately connected with the political subject are the questions: What is Candahar? what are the reasons which give it such special importance? why should we establish ourselves there? what would be the result of such an advance on our part? and finally, is such an advance necessary? The replies to these questions should be the reasons of our political action. There is yet the other question to be asked, should it be impossible, for convenience' sake, to arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to hold Candahar, Is this the time most suitable for withdrawing our troops from that town? That question can remain dormant until we have discussed the broader one.

The city of Candahar, which is supposed to owe its origin to Alexander of Macedon, lies between the Urgundab and Tarnuk rivers, in the midst of a plain of very considerable fertility. It has at all times been one of the principal cities in Afghanistan, and for almost a century it was the capital of the country. Its history need be only incidentally referred to. The modern city is rectangular in shape, but the ruins of former cities which surround it give it an appearance of greater size

than is warranted by the facts. To the north cemeteries stretch for a considerable distance, for Candahar is the necropolis of the Duranis. Ameers and Sirdars of all the branches of the main tribe have always made it a point of honour that their remains should repose in the ancestral city of their race. Gardens lie to the west and east of the town, and the southern suburbs are the most thickly populated of all.

The town is surrounded by lofty mud walls, with large circular towers at the flanks, a deep and wide ditch adding to its strength. Though nearly four miles in circumference, it is stated by Bellew, who lived there nearly six months, and has twice visited it, to contain not more than 20,000 houses. These are generally built of sun-dried bricks, and have flat roofs; though some of the dwellings of the richer classes are covered with chunam—a glistening white plaster, which, in the distance, gives them the appearance of marble. The tomb of Ahmed Shah, an octagonal structure, overlaid with coloured porcelain bricks, and surmounted by a golden dome, surrounded by small minarets, is the most striking building in the city, and attracts the eye of the traveller from afar. The trade between Candahar and Herat is carried on by Persians, who bring down silk, copper, weapons of all sorts, horses, and carpets, taking back felts, skins, and camels' hair cloaks. The Povindahs carry on the trade with Hindostan by the Gomul and Bholan passes.

There can be no doubt, however, that if it were attempted to make Candahar appear as a flourishing town the effort would be useless. Candahar is not a mart of affluence. For an Afghan town it is fairly prosperous. It has a trade with Herat and Cabul, and also with India. There is a large Persian and Hindoo element in the city, to whose industry it undoubtedly owes much of its prosperity. A detailed description of the city will be found in the writings of Dr. Bellew and Captain Marsh. I cannot refrain, however, from quoting here Lieutenant Rattray's description of the town and its environs:—

"Viewing Candahar from without, or at a distance, there is no peculiarity in its structure to strike the eye, as nothing appears above the long high walls but the top of Ahmed Shah's tomb, the summits of a few minarets, and the upper parapets of the citadel. But the interior, as seen from the battlements, cannot fail to delight. Its irregular mud-houses, partly in ruins, varied with trees and minarets; the square red brick buildings with doors and windows of Turkish arches; the lofty habitations of the Hindoo; the tents pitched here and there on the flat house-tops; the long terraces crowded with people busied in their various callings in the open air; the dung and mud-plastered hut of the Khakar, with his heavy wild-looking buffaloes tethered round it; the high enclosures of the different tribes; the warlike castles of the chieftains; the gaily-decorated palace of some great Durani Lord, with its fountains, squares, and court-yards; and the domed houses of the other inhabitants, the bazaars, mosques, turrets and cupolas rising up in the midst of stupendous and inaccessible mountains—from the whole rise a panorama pleasing to look upon." Since those lines were written many an Englishman has visited Candahar, but the description for accuracy and picturesqueness yet remains to be surpassed.

When the district of Candahar is said to be of considerable fertility, that statement must be taken as comparative. It is probably more so than any other portion of Afghanistan. The rivers Urgundab, Dora, Tarnuk, Argassan, Kadani, and others, are none of them very considerable, but at the least they present the means of fertilizing the eighty miles of country that lie between the Khojuck and Candahar. "The inhabitants have also," the late Sir Henry Durand tells us in his book recently published, "an ingenious method of bringing water to the surface for purposes of irrigation; the system is a result of the configuration of the surrounding plains, and consists in the excavation of underground galleries, which, by being carried nearly horizontally from the point at which a good spring of water is struck

high up on the glacis-slope, gradually bring it to the surface at a lower level. Having no means of ventilating galleries in the course of excavation, the Candaharees necessarily effect this object by sinking frequent shafts or wells at short distances apart, by means of which the execution of the subterranean galleries is much facilitated, the proper direction secured, and the water level carried on correctly; the wells gradually diminishing in depth as they approach the point where the gallery or *Rariz* discontinues, and delivers the water upon the surface to be irrigated." This rather primitive mode of irrigation shows the necessity there is for man to supplement the bounty of nature in the case of Candahar. No wise advocate for the occupation of Candahar attempts to deny the plain facts.

The province of Candahar, as at present administered, is only fairly productive. But it is sought to add to the recommendations of the Pisheen Valley what is taken off from those belonging legitimately to Candahar. Pisheen is certainly not as rich naturally as the plain of Candahar, and if we are to confine our advance in this quarter to its occupation, we may confidently anticipate having to make a great effort for its development. To render Pisheen fairly prosperous, we shall have to do precisely the same as if we were to attempt to render Candahar very productive. By no possibility can the result in the former case at all approximate to what it would infallibly be in the latter, for Candahar is a city, and Pisheen is only a valley, as malicious people would say, of rocks and stones. One authority told us, long before the occupation of Pisheen was advocated, that the tamarisk is found at the river which drains it. Are we to assume, with that writer, that its fertility is to be accepted because of that circumstance? General Biddulph's recent journey through it on his road to Dera Ghazi Khan, *viâ* Thull and Chotiali, proves that it possesses the undoubted advantage of being at the extremity of a new and shorter road from the Indian frontier to Southern Afghanistan. That fact is of undoubted importance, but it does not justify us in shut-

ting our eyes to the still greater and more apparent recommendations of Candahar.

But it will be said that we do not want a productive province. We only want a strong military frontier. Men on the spot, who must, it is said, know better than any theoretical observer, assert that Pisheen will meet all our requirements. Its occupation will give us a "scientific frontier." It is an easy, and, I think, a complete reply to them to retort that there are probably others on the spot who arrive at a completely opposite opinion. Certainly, if there are not, it is most singular, because among old Candahar officers, particularly those of the Scinde frontier force, there is, I have reason to say, a very strong opinion that the city of Candahar should not be restored to the Ameer—at least, for the present. Everybody was aware that the present town cannot be considered a powerful fortress. The weakness of the parapets, and the small dimensions of the ditch, would cause a besieger, provided with a siege train, but little trouble. That is telling us nothing new. It was asserted a few weeks ago that General Stewart had reported unfavourably of the military value of Candahar. The assertion may have been false, but in any case it is unnecessary to insist on the fact, which is admitted, that the present town of Candahar is almost indefensible against a modern foe. It should be remembered that the existing town of Candahar has never withstood a siege. On its old site it was a formidable fortress, and the same position is still available for the purpose of establishing there either a fortress or an entrenched camp. But such a consideration as that cannot deter us from advancing to Candahar, if, for other reasons, that step should be deemed advisable. No amount of arguing, no bold assertion to the contrary, can blind us to the fact that its strategic value is great; for it is the first and only place of any strength, or where supplies in any quantity can be obtained, between Herat and the Indus.

Another great recommendation in the eyes of military men is its climate. As Sir Vincent Eyre says, "Snow

seldom falls at Candahar, and an army can with ease keep the field there throughout the year." Even now, in the month of May, the weather is still cool, and, with ordinary precautions, European soldiers can live there throughout the whole of the year without suffering any very great discomfort, either from the heat or the cold. We find, then, that Candahar possesses two incontestable advantages—position and climate. As a fortress it is, at present, not formidable. The town could be made strong against any adversary, not possessing a field train. There is a site near it which could be made impregnable against any foe.

Nothing can sum up the advantages to be derived, in a military sense, from the garrisoning of Candahar, or some post near it, more admirably than the following passages from General Hamley's lecture, already referred to, a lecture of which it may be said that, unanswerable as it was admitted to be at the time, it has by some strange and inexcusable forgetfulness passed out of the memory of the public:—

"I will go on, then, to suppose that the result of our present operations is to give us the power, if we choose to use it, of occupying Kandahar, with a small space beyond it, necessary to complete its strategical value. The obstacle of the Khojak would thus disappear. At Kandahar, the richest district of Afghanistan lies before us. A river flows in front of the place, another in rear, and we ought to hold the passages of both. Several practicable roads lead from thence on Ghuzni and Caubul on the one side, on Herat on the other—and others lead from it down the Helmund to the Persian frontier, and thence on Meshed, in the rear of Herat. The space beyond should therefore include a portion of the Helmund river, with the command of the passage at Girishk. Of the communications with Quetta I have already spoken.

"It is to be noted that between Herat and Caubul, two of the great cities which I have supposed the enemy to occupy, lies the range of the Hazareh mountains, the road through which, between those

cities, is so bad that the circuit by Kandahar, or by a route north of the mountains, is generally preferred. Hence another important consequence would follow from our occupation of Kandahar, namely, the rupture of the enemy's front; for if he occupied Caubul we could isolate the forces there from those at Herat—if he did not, we should be free to bring our whole strength to bear on the side of Herat. At Kandahar, too, we should hold such a position towards Persia as would seriously affect her relations with Russia; and finally, our presence there would be almost decisive against any design of the enemy to invade India through the passes. Observe, I do not say *annex but occupy Kandahar, by friendly treaty, as we now occupy Quetta.*

"I think it is impossible to deny that our Army posted here, in a delightful climate, and with such strategical possibilities open to it, could desire no better field in which to contest with Russia and her allies the Empire of India. And perhaps many of you will think with me that the leader of that army will be, in his opportunities, the most fortunate British soldier whom we have seen since Wellington."

The italics are mine. After this very remarkable and clear exposition of the military recommendations of an occupation of Candahar, it would be supererogatory on my part to say anything more on that point. On a question of strategy the *dictum* of General Hamley may be taken without a single doubt. But it is necessary to remember that this advance of the Indian frontier is only the natural result of a previous advance. We occupied Quettah for various political reasons, but there was also one paramount military one. It secured the Bholan. So long as the Ameer was apparently only discontented and not hostile, so long as Russia abstained from any interference in the State, so long was it sufficient for our purpose to have secured the southern road leading from the British frontier into Afghanistan and the West. There can be no doubt that the advance to Quettah paralyzed the vigour of the Afghan ruler. It

nipped the danger in the bud. But do not let us suppose that because we have escaped that danger we are never to be exposed to it again. It would be sheer folly to imagine that because Yakoob Khan's necessities have thrown him into our arms, he is always to be our firm and stanch ally. Our Afghan policy has always had a tendency towards degeneration. The problem admits either of a prompt and sweeping remedy, or of being worked out with care and close vigilance. We are not prepared to adopt the former, and we may be wise. But is it quite certain that we shall have the patience to devote the necessary judgment and consideration to the latter? It is much to be feared that, if things remain tranquil, in a few years we shall be only anxious to believe what is most agreeable. The Ameer will have been accepted as the "friend of our friend, and the enemy of our enemy." A policy of inaction will once more come into vogue, and we shall be content to take the security of our interests in Afghanistan, and also in Central Asia, on trust. That is not a prospect to which a prudent man can look forward with any feeling of satisfaction.

There are two standpoints, and only two, from which it is possible to regard the negotiations being carried on between Yakoob Khan and our representatives. They can be regarded from our own standpoint, and also from that of the Ameer. It is to be feared that the predominant sentiment on our side is one of *ennui*. This is echoed in the hearts of the generals and soldiers on the spot, whose remaining interest in the war consisted in the prospect of an advance on Cabul. On the side of Yakoob we have the necessities of his position, scarcely secure even in Cabul, where the remnants of his father's army remain true in their allegiance to their old general. We have no guarantee that he is heartily resolved to be our friend. Still less have we any reason for supposing that his claims to supremacy would be generally acknowledged, were we, after officially recognizing him, to leave him to his own resources, assisted by a subsidy and a supply of arms. There is much

reason for saying that, if we were now to withdraw from Candahar, the flames of a civil war would break out in Afghanistan in all directions. It is probable that Yakoob Khan would succeed, after some time, in establishing his authority, just as his grandfather did during the last fifteen years of his life. But at what cost it would be rash to say. It would be still more hazardous to predict that that success would be complete. We may have a perfect admiration for Yakoob Khan, but that consideration alone should not impel us to trust the future recklessly into his hands. The power of the Afghan ruler is but the shadow of a name. The authority of the Barucksye house is shaken to its base. Among Ghiljies in the east, and Duranis in the west, loyalty to the House of Poyndah appears to have become an unknown sentiment. The central administration finds no favour in the eyes of khans and sirdars. The greater feudatories are eager to cast off the yoke that has sat so heavily upon them. Is it, when Afghanistan appears to be on the verge of disunion, that we shall willingly surrender the one place which gives us a casting vote in the decision of the country's fate? It cannot be supposed that such a fatal blunder could even be contemplated.

Were the Afghans the arbiters of their own destiny it would be imprudent to withdraw precipitately from Candahar. But as they are not, it would be doubly imprudent. There is the highest authority for asserting that one of the principal reasons of Yakoob Khan's arrival at Gundamuck was the appearance of a great danger north of the Hindoo Koosh. A rumour of disturbances in Badakshan reached Jellalabad, a few weeks ago. Since then the accuracy of the statement has been confirmed from other sources. This is not the talk of the bazaars, for as yet the news has not become matter of public conversation. But that a rising against the Ameer's authority has taken place in Afghan Turkestan may be accepted as a fact equally recognized by Yakoob Khan and by our Indian authorities. Its significance cannot be over-estimated. Let

us consider what the state of affairs in this part of Asia most probably is.

For ten years there has resided within Russian territory an Afghan prince of noted ability and considerable reputation. His name is Abderrahman. He is the eldest son of that Afzul, the eldest of all the children of Dost Mahomed, who was Ameer of Cabul for a brief space during the year 1867. At various periods Abderrahman officiated as Governor of Afghan Turkestan, residing generally at Balkh. He married a sister of the Mir of Badakshan. He ingratiated himself with the Usbeg population, as no Durani had done before. On two occasions he raised considerable armies in that region, by means of which he once decided the fate of Cabul. But when he was finally defeated in the winter of 1868–9 at Tinah Khan by his cousin Yakoob, he fled the country, and at last, after some wandering, betook himself to Russian territory. Upon Shere Ali restoring his authority in Balkh, the Mir of Badakshan, Jehandir by name, fled to Samarcand, where he joined Abderrahman. General Kaufmann gave these disstresed princes an honourable reception. He assigned Abderrahman an annual allowance of 30,000 roubles. That prince has very prudently contented himself with spending only one-third of his allowance—so, at least, he told Mr. Schuyler. He has, therefore, been able to save about 200,000 roubles during his exile. In those days he used to declare that for half that sum he would place Afghan Turkestan at the feet of General Kaufmann. Of the personal ability of Abderrahman there can be no question. He is a good general, and a first-rate administrator. His experience of Afghan affairs is unrivalled, and no one possesses the same personal influence in Balkh and the adjoining Khanates. The presence of this prince in the Russian camp was a standing menace to the peace of mind of Shere Ali. Now that Yakoob Khan stands in the place of Shere Ali the menace is more direct, the danger more imminent.

The first blow has already been struck. It has been levelled against the ruler of Badakshan, and it appears

to have been successful. Little as we hear regarding the condition of things in Badakshan, we know that the ruler whom Shere Ali put upon the throne in October, 1869, is a man of considerable force of character. His name is Mahmoud. But he appears to have aspired to be a reformer, and although a seyyid he is very unpopular. His rival Jehandir, though dissolute and wanting in ability, was far more popular. Now it is an established fact that this prince has re-entered his country. There is an ominous silence as to the result. Nothing is more reasonable than to suppose that his arrival has been the signal for a rising against the Mir, and when we bear in mind all the attendant circumstances, including the very important one that Jehandir would bring with him arms far superior to those of the Badakshi troops, there would be nothing strange in hearing that the authority of Mahmoud had been upset. The significance of such an event is rendered apparent by the fact that it must be held to be the forerunner of Abderrahman's more formidable expedition. If success crowned the enterprise in Badakshan assuredly Abderrahman did not dally in his resolve to re-establish his authority in Balkh. His chance would consist in closing the Bamian before Yakoob had time to collect his forces south of the mountains. By means of our position at Jellalabad we have learnt something of the progress of events in Badakshan. We know less of Abderrahman's movements. There is no obligation on Russia preventing her from permitting that prince undertaking such an expedition, if he may be disposed to do so. He is of course free to go whither he likes. If Abderrahman has entered Balkh, and succeeds in establishing his authority throughout Afghan Turkestan, we should have no legal grievance against Russia. Although it were accomplished with Russian money, and by means of Russian weapons, Russia would not have broken the letter of any of her engagements. At this time of day no one can expect from Russia an adherence to the spirit of her treaties.

But for all that Abderrahman would be a mere mouth-

piece of Russia. He owes everything to her. He is consequently at her complete disposal. The very nature of his position would compel him to lean on Tashkent. General Kaufmann will then have carried out one of those objects which it lies in his power to attain on his own resources. He will have given "a king to Afghan Turkestan." It is very doubtful whether Yakoob Khan would venture to enter upon a war with Abderrahman for supremacy north of the Hindoo Koosh, unless he were to receive from us very substantial assistance. It is almost certain that that aid would not be vouchsafed to him. He would be compelled, therefore, to acquiesce in the severance of the Usbeg, and probably also the Turcoman Khanates from the State. What then, it may be asked, becomes of that clause in the projected treaty which would give us the right to send agents to Balkh, Faizabad and Maimene? If Afzul's son rules in Balkh, what value does our parchment represent with the son of Shere Ali? Is it at such a time, when half the Ameer's concessions are possibly beyond his power to carry out, that we should abandon Candahar?

Nor if we turn our gaze westward is the prospect more satisfactory. It would require the gift of prophecy to discern the future of Herat. Its present condition is shrouded in a mist of uncertainty. The principal official left there by Shere Ali, Omar Khan, has been dismissed, and it is believed that Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, wields authority in his stead. Of this prince we know little. For five years he has resided within Persian territory. He has lived on the bounty of the Shah. He has always had a tendency to gravitate towards Persia. It is said that he is affectionately disposed towards his brother, but if Afghan history teaches one trait in national character more clearly than any other, it is that the ties of relationship are but slight fetters on personal ambition. On the other hand, we know that the Durani tribes of Zemindewar have, since the death of Shere Ali, openly proclaimed that they do not feel bound to fight against us at the order of Yakoob. That was the first symptom

of a loosening of authority. More recently the insubordination has shown itself in clearer acts. The Durani Khans are nothing loth to refuse their fealty to a ruler who is identified with a lost cause. From them Yakoob Khan can expect but little active assistance. At the most, they will remain passive. The fate of Herat depends on two things—the power and the honour of Ayoob. There is some reason for supposing that just as Abderrahman comes to Balkh as a Russian *protégé*, so did Ayoob come to Herat as a Persian. It was Persian assistance that equipped him for the enterprise. He derives his chief support from that Persian party which has always existed in Herat. If he had not that support, it is doubtful if he would be where he is. He embarked upon his adventure under Persian auspices, and it is often difficult to break loose from trammels which have been voluntarily accepted. If Persia is willing to make use of him, Ayoob will scarcely raise up obstacles.

Now if there is one thing more assured than any other in Afghan and Central Asian matters, it is that the Shah of Persia—whoever he may be, and the present ruler in particular—casts a covetous eye on Herat. Little as that prince strives to place himself in harmony with his people on most subjects, he is in harmony with them on this. He represents a national aspiration in longing to possess Herat. The war between England and Afghanistan, whose alliance in the past had been the chief stumbling-block to Persian aggressiveness, afforded a prospect of confusion in Herat—the fit opportunity for the realization of those schemes, hatched in the council-chamber of Teheran and fostered from elsewhere. With that object Ayoob was permitted to depart for Herat before his brother was released from his confinement at Cabul. When Shere Ali fled his capital Ayoob was already on the point of being installed in Herat; on the morrow of that flight he was supreme there.

How was that possible if Persia abstained from interference? Not long ago rumours, which were of

course contradicted, were circulated to the effect that a Persian army was being concentrated on the Afghan frontier. Now, as I happen to know the source from which that emanated, I have no hesitation in saying that there was some foundation for it. I have reason for believing that, so long ago as last Christmas, a small Persian force had been pushed forward from Meshed towards the Heri Rud. It is possible that that movement may have been the origin of the information which appeared early in April in a Russian official paper. But in any case it should be clear that Persia followed up her support of Ayoob by a military demonstration on the Afghan frontier. It is probable that this force does not exceed five thousand men, but that only makes it the more formidable. If Ayoob plays for the Shah—and how he can help himself it is difficult to see—that number of troops is amply sufficient. In the past, the great weakness of the Persian armies that have assailed Herat has been their unwieldiness. They were armed caravans rather than armies. If Persia has five thousand men on the Afghan frontier near Herat, she has the force most suitable for establishing her authority in Herat. The only reason inspiring caution in her eyes is the presence of British troops at Candahar. If we withdraw those troops hastily we shall remove the only cause for hesitation in the mind of the Shah. Is it at such a time, when the fate of Herat hangs by a thread, that we should abandon Candahar?

Nor should we forget that while Abderrahman and the Shah are the ostensible objects of danger, they are but the puppets of a show. The causes of their conduct are to be found behind. We have but to lift the veil to discern that the strings guiding their actions are pulled at Tashkent and Tiflis. Nor has Russia to overstep the limits of international obligations. She has but to work on the ambition of the one man, and the vanity of the other. And so long as she confines her acts to such delicate manipulations it will be difficult for us to do otherwise than mete out punishment to her dupes. But if, side by side with an advance on the

part of Abderrahman, and a demonstration against Herat by Persia, we should have a Russian march into the neighbourhood of Merv, to what other conclusion could we come but that there was a connecting link between the three events?

There is no question but that a large body of Russian troops has been assembled at the harbours of the Caspian for the purposes of a spring campaign against the Akhal Teke Turcomans. This campaign has now commenced. From a trustworthy source we are told that while some Russian politicians would fain make us believe that General Lomakine's expedition on the Atrek only aims at the coercion of the Teke tribes, others have no hesitation in telling us that the Persian campaign against Herat is intended to faciliate the occupation of Merv. The occupation of Merv, as was proved by last year's failure, is more easily projected than carried out. If really contemplated, it will be probably attempted by a combined movement from the Atrek and the Amou rivers.

The preliminary part of this campaign is to crush the Akhals in their fortified position in the Kuren Dagh. That accomplished, nothing lies between the Russian troops and the immediate outskirts of Merv. It cannot be long before we shall know the result of the fighting at Khoja Kala; and then not only shall we be on the threshold of a partial disruption of Afghanistan, but a Russian occupation of Merv will also be imminent. The one thing which gives us a voice in these matters, which enables us to adopt an active policy in them should we be so disposed, is our garrison at Candahar. Are we, when all the elements appear about to conspire against us, to sacrifice the one advantage which we have gained? Not the least of its recommendations is that it alone will justify us in waiting upon the progress of events. It alone encourages us to suppose that some of them will not happen so long as we remain there. At the least it is doubtful if Persia would proceed against Herat. It is also uncertain whether Russia would press home her

attack upon Merv. The Abderrahman enterprise must continue, for unless everything is the opposite of what it is said to be, that measure has already been decided upon. It has passed into the region of facts. Once more the question appeals to us, Is it at such a time that we should withdraw from Candahar?

It is a very pertinent question to ask, What has been the result of our four months' stay at Candahar? There is a prevailing opinion in the country that the whole of Afghanistan is a series of mountains and valleys held by turbulent and ferocious clans. The description applies with some truth to much of the State, but it is wholly inapplicable to Candahar and its vicinity. There the people are by nature of a peaceful and industrious disposition. They love quiet, not turmoil. They are possessed by no demon of unrest. Their one want has been that sense of security without which there can be no trade, no prosperity. Well, for four months they have had that in need of which they have stood so long. They have enjoyed the *Pax Romana*, that exists wherever the British flag flies, and what has been the result? The *Times* correspondent, telegraphing from Candahar on the 10th instant, tells us. The following is his telegram:—

"Perfect tranquillity now reigns here. Even attacks on camp followers have ceased for upwards of a month. To give an idea of the condition of the country I may mention that the wire from Pisheen has been cut only once during six weeks. There are no guards on the line, and the culprit was brought into the camp by the villagers, who tried to levy black mail in the shape of pay to imaginary guards. They were told that the wire if unmeddled with takes care of itself, and that severe punishment would be inflicted if the wire was again cut. There is scarcely a petty chief or headman who has not come to Candahar to pay his respects to the General. This has occurred without bribery or compulsion or even persuasion. The exhibition of strength without fuss or bravado has had an admirable effect. Seeing us indifferent whether they came or sulkily kept

aloof, the chiefs came voluntarily, getting trifling presents and good advice. They admired the 40-pounders and returned to their villages, any lingering feeling of loyalty towards the Barucksye rule being gone. The whole of the Candahar district is now safe and caravans are beginning to venture as far as Herat.

"The news of Yakoob's arrival at Gundamuck is regarded with satisfaction as heralding peace, but the prospect of a re-transfer to Barucksye rule appears to create something like consternation even among the Barucksyes. Private letters from Herat report general joy being felt at the prospect of peace. All the troops are in cantonments and mostly housed. Their health is good. The weather is still cool. The prospects of harvest are excellent."

Those are the results of a British occupation of Candahar. The loss of a freedom, which was no freedom, is not regretted. The advent of an unknown prosperity is hailed with expressions of delight. If those advantages do but continue, they will, in the eyes of the Candaharees, have been cheaply purchased at the price of an acknowledgment of British authority.

The present condition of Candahar makes two other points clear. It shows us, in the first place, that the people would speedily become contented with our rule. In fact they are already contented, and there is something akin to consternation among the Afghan clans at the prospect of our withdrawal. In the second place, it makes it clear that the province of Candahar, with a city which should become the great trade emporium for the whole of the country beyond the Indus, could without much difficulty be converted into a revenue-producing territory. In a little time it would pay all the cost of garrisoning it with a corps of eight thousand men—five thousand of whom should be Anglo-Indian troops, and three thousand Afghan militia. Between Candahar and the Indian frontier proper there would be no necessity to maintain a single regiment. Were the Khan of Khelat firmly united to us by an act showing our appreciation of his stanch fidelity, we could with

safety entrust to him the task of keeping our communication open with Scinde and the sea. He would, besides, have no object in proving treacherous, were he to receive that authority over Pisheen to which he aspires. It would be his undoubted interest to support us. He could not possibly play the traitor with any advantage to himself. Not only then would an occupation of Candahar be attended with safety, but it would be followed by economy. We should attain great military advantages. We should lessen the burden on the finances of India. Are these light considerations for retaining possession of Candahar? Is it because its recommendations are so apparent that we should hesitate to adopt a suggestion that has received the countenance of some of our greatest authorities?

But what about the alternative scheme? What of the Pisheen Valley? To me, I confess, it appears to be a sufficient reply to that point, to say that the Pisheen Valley represents the legitimate spoil of the Khan of Khelat. We have benefited by his alliance. It was to his friendship, that our being able to establish ourselves without a war at Quettah was due. The well-timed aid which he afforded us during the recent advance has been only imperfectly appreciated in this country. Both General Stewart and General Biddulph have, however, handsomely recognized it. It behoves us to render some very tangible reward for it. Khododad Khan was not always so warm to the English alliance that, now that he has proved himself stanch, we can afford to disappoint him; and if he does not receive some very tangible reward, he will undoubtedly be disappointed. What reward can we confer upon him save the Valley of Pisheen? For that reason alone it would appear to any one, who took the sentiment of Eastern potentates into consideration, impossible for us to annex Pisheen. We should certainly have to content ourselves with garrisoning some position in that Valley. It may be accepted as certain that that garrison would have to be of considerable size. At the least it would have to be much greater than the force we have been maintaining

at Quettah. It would consequently be an addition to our expenses. That is no slight objection to the claims of Pisheen.

Ill-natured people have been heard to call Pisheen a *cul-de-sac*. It certainly could, in itself, be converted into a position of considerable strength. It would be very difficult for an enemy to force the Khojuck. It might be easier to outflank the position by means of the Gwaja, or of that route farther to the east, which General Wiltshire followed in 1840 on his march from Ghizni to Khelat. That is only a suggestion. It may be admitted that, if the battle for the preservation of India is to be fought in a place of our selection, no position would answer the purpose better, so far as we were concerned, than the Pisheen Valley. The Amran range might without much difficulty be converted into lines similar to the historic ones of Torres Vedras.

But it is quite certain that, whenever and wherever that decisive contest may occur, it will not be in a place of our choosing. If we make our chief effort of defence in one place, the principal attack will come from another quarter. Still more important is it that we should remember that, when the danger comes upon us, in order to defend ourselves we shall have to assume the offensive. It will be quite out of the question for us to think of taking up a position in an entrenched camp, and there abiding the assault. General Hamley recognized that fact in his lecture, and it is that consideration which above every other gives a special importance to the future of Candahar. Whatever may be said of Pisheen as an improvement on Quettah—a statement which it is impossible to accept without reservation—Candahar is the only place which gives us a *striking* power. Candahar is the only possible base for an army acting beyond the Indus on the Indian side of Herat. That is another fact not to be permitted to pass out of our memory.

And apropos of offensive measures, it is necessary here to state very clearly what is the main necessity in the whole of this Afghan business. It is sheer

sophistry talking of "curbing the insolence of the Ameer," "compelling him to abandon his attitude of hostility." We know well enough that it was not the poor man's inclination to indulge needlessly in those expensive luxuries. It is simply absurd to talk of any danger to our rule from the Ameer's unaided ambition. There never has been a moment when that assertion was true, since Timour Shah collected his troops for a march on Delhi. Our Afghan policy has never had any other object than to make preparation for a Russian advance. The presence of Russia in Central Asia is the only *raison d'être* for an advance on our part into Afghanistan. It is well to recognize these facts very clearly. An act of perfidy on the part of Russia embroiled us with Shere Ali, and has in the result cost us two millions of pounds sterling and some bloodshed We have now reached the close of the war, and we have to secure some return for the outlay we have been put to. We have above all to obtain some fresh security against Russia. Having carried the business through with such remarkable vigour and success, it would be the height of weakness to go without our full reward.

The Prime Minister recently declared that we had obtained the "scientific frontier" of which we had been in search. The declaration raised a flutter of hope in the breasts of all those who knew how imperative it was that Candahar should be retained. Lord Napier of Magdala added his powerful testimony to those who have gone before him upon this question, and, in addition, expressed his decided opinion that Jellalabad also should be held. Those were in the days when Yakoob Khan was recalcitrant. He has evinced his willingness to become our ally now, can we not mitigate our demands? The reply is one that has to be made with some regret. It is impossible, with a just appreciation of our difficulties, to answer in the affirmative. The reasons which were all-sufficing until the other day, retain their force. The act of the Afghan

prince, driven into our camp by his own necessities, cannot alter the weighty judgment that has been formed upon the question. If we are to decide on the merits of the case alone, whether we are to hold Candahar or not, there can be no doubt as to the reply. But even if we permit sympathy to get the better of reason, we must, at all events, defer the generous act until the suitable occasion. Personally, I have not the slightest doubt that we ought to hold Candahar, and I feel sure that, even if we abandon it, our absence will not be for long. For many reasons it would be better that the question should be conclusively settled, now that it has been taken so satisfactorily in hand.

But if the principle of the restitution of Candahar has been recognized at the conference of Gundamuck, it is absolutely necessary to remember that no time could be more unsuited than the present for carrying that principle into execution. It is impossible for us to relax our hold on the country so long as we are not aware of the condition of things both in Herat and in Afghan Turkestan. It would be particularly weak to do so, until we saw how far consolidated the authority of Yakoob was likely to become. We have also to remember that our presence at Candahar is a benefit to the cause of the Ameer. He can devote his attention exclusively to the north and the west so long as we remain there, and if he fail to establish his authority, if he die on the field against his foes, or by the hand of the assassin hired by his rivals, then we are on the spot to prevent the realm from going to rack and ruin. We are at hand to enforce the stipulations of the treaty of Gundamuck. Far from hindering the course of Yakoob Khan to the attainment of complete power, we should have done much towards assisting him. He would not nurse up a resentment against us on that account.

In replying to the question at the head of this paper, we have to remember that the *permanent* retention of Candahar is a question that admits of further consideration. On that point it may here be said, that to occupy

some position near Candahar—to have a cantonment, say on the banks of the Urgundab—would probably secure for us everything that is necessary. We might carry out with regard to Candahar the same principle that was applied so successfully in the case of Quettah. That is a point worth suggesting to those who brand our advance into Afghanistan as an evidence of sheer lust of conquest. But there is no need for arriving at an immediate decision upon this point. The fate of Candahar may be permitted to remain in suspense until we know for certain the future of Afghanistan. But if our necessities are to be temporarily waived, it can only be on the understanding that we intend to retain our hold on Candahar until the dangers to which Yakoob Khan is exposed have been overcome, or have passed away. We cannot possibly retreat from Candahar so long as we are convinced that that act would be the greatest encouragement to Russia, Persia, and such adventurers as Abderrahman. If a withdrawal from Candahar is, as there can be no question, the certain prelude to changes in the political standing of the whilom kingdom of Afghanistan of the most momentous character, and in their effect sure to be most disastrous to some of our most cherished interests, such a withdrawal would find no favour in the eyes of any Englishman.

I have already endeavoured to show—and although the evidence is not of the clearest, it is still significant in its very bareness—that we are probably on the eve of the severance of the northern Khanates from Cabul. As has been well said by an Indian correspondent, that is a "question for home consideration." The danger to Herat is more indirect, perhaps less pressing. Still it exists. Russia's menace to Merv was never more prominent than now, when her troops stand on the threshold of the Teke country. We flatter ourselves when we say that, with these elements of uncertainty and danger around us, we have put our house in order with the Cabul Ameer. The result of a campaign

attended with undeviating success should, indeed, give permanent results. But precipitancy in imagining those results obtained can only lead to disappointment. Can we imagine that a trivial rectification of the Indian frontier will suffice to smooth over all these difficulties? Will a treaty of alliance with Yakoob Khan give us any standing with Abderrahman? Will the right to station agents in the northern cities possess any practical value when those cities have ceased to be under the sway of the Ameer of Cabul? Regard these facts and contingencies from whatever point of view we may, we cannot but consider them as productive of very intelligible apprehension. There is an Utopian sentiment current with regard to the approaching settlement of our difficulty with Yakoob Khan that is to be deplored. It cannot but lull us into a false sense of security.

For these reasons have the preceding pages been written. It is not necessary to suppose that there is any pressing danger from Russia to insist upon the necessity of holding Candahar for a certain time as a "material guarantee" for the future. We have only to consider the nature of the tenure of Yakoob's power, we have only to bear in mind the condition of Afghanistan itself, to arrive at that conclusion. The time has not yet come when we can say with any degree of assurance how far or how short we must push our frontier up from the south. Before we committed ourselves to too much or too little, we should consider the subject from every possible point of view. It is pre-eminently a question over which there should be deliberation. The *status quo* might, therefore, be maintained for the remainder of the year at all events. Certainly we should not dream of evacuating Candahar until we knew, on the testimony of Englishmen, the condition of things in Herat and in Balkh. Until then we certainly should hold Candahar. Its ultimate future could afterwards be very calmly discussed and decided. For the present, every principle of policy

compels us to remain there. When Afghanistan has regained its normal quiet, and foreign intrigue has been beaten back from its confines, we may be able to discuss the Candahar question in a mood favourable to the pretensions of Yakoob Khan. But, until that time, we ought to hold Candahar.

May 14, 1879.

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RUSSIAN DESIGNS

AGAINST

INDIA

AND

INTRIGUES IN AFGHANISTAN.

A SHORT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES.

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FEBRUARY, 1881

RUSSIAN INTRIGUES IN AFGHANISTAN.

The correspondence between the Ameer Shere Ali and General Kaufmann, the Russian Governor of Turkestan, extended over several years. At first it was of a very occasional character and confined to ordinary expressions of courtesy. It was not until 1872 that the Russian authorities expressed a desire to establish a regular and frequent correspondence, a proposal which caused some alarm to the Ameer. At this time he invariably communicated the letters which he received from the Russian authorities to the Government of India and consulted with them as to the answer to be returned by him. This practice was discontinued after 1873, probably in consequence of the annoyance which the Ameer felt at the failure of the Conferences held at Simla in that year, when he attempted to extract from the Government of India large assurances of support, and when Mr. Gladstone's Government postponed the discussion of the subject to a more convenient opportunity. "The Ameer," said the Government of India in 1875, "though at first regarding the communications with distrust and seeking the advice of the British Government as to the tenor of his reply, now acknowledges their receipt in cordial terms, and without consulting the Government of India." [Central Asia Papers, No. 1 (1878), p. 83.]

In 1878 the correspondence assumed a totally different phase, which led to important results.

In the latter part of 1877 public feeling between Russia and England had become very antagonistic, consequent on the Turco-Russian war, and indeed a collision between the two Powers

seemed not improbable. But on the 31st January, 1878, an armistice was signed between Russia and the Porte, and an European Conference on the Eastern Question thereupon proposed by Austria. Following this, however, and in consequence, apparently of Russia making further demonstrations of advance upon Constantinople, Her Majesty's Government passed a vote for six millions sterling for extra army expenditure, &c., in the House of Commons (7th February), and the British Mediterranean Fleet entered the Dardanelles (13th idem). The idea of a Conference was soon after these events changed into that of an International Congress of all the Great European Powers proposed to be held at Berlin.

In the meantime Russia concluded the Treaty of St. Stefano (3rd March, 1878) with Turkey, but she refused to submit that Treaty to the proposed Congress, and consequently held aloof from joining it. At this period warlike operations in Central Asia were being organized on a large scale by the Russian Government; *General Tchernaieff* (Lord A. Loftus to Marquess of Salisbury, 12th April and 3rd July, 1878) was received in special audience by the Emperor on 12th March, 1878, and *was deputed on a special mission of great importance to the "tribes of the Indian frontier," accompanied by General Stolieteff.*

On the 28th March the English Army Reserves were called out, and the Marquess of Salisbury (who on that day had assumed the Foreign Secretaryship in place of the Earl of Derby) issued (1st April) a circular to the Great Powers explaining the views of Her Majesty's Government on the Eastern Question. On the 17th April a division of Indian Native troops were ordered by Her Majesty's Government from India to Malta, whilst at the same moment, as the outcome of the very extensive warlike preparations which had been going on in Turkestan since January, 1878, three Russian columns, furnished with secret orders and aggregating 20,000 men, were formed at Samarkand, Marghilan, and Petro-Alexandrofsk, ready for advance southwards towards Afghanistan.

These warlike proceedings on the part of both Powers having

proceeded thus far, a change now became apparent. At the end of April, Russia agreed to join a preliminary Conference, peace prospects improved, and General Tchernaieff was suddenly recalled on account of "some change in the operations against British India" (Lord A. Loftus to Marquess of Salisbury, 15th May, 1878).

On the 6th of May, 1878, it was announced in Parliament that active peace negotiations were going on between England and Russia, and two days afterwards Count Schouvaloff left London for St. Petersburg to advocate, as is well known, the conclusion of an amicable settlement between the two Powers. On the 27th of May it was announced in Parliament that the prospects of the Conference were materially improved, and three days afterwards (30th May, 1878) a preliminary secret agreement was concluded between Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff which led to Russia consenting to join the Conference, and to invitations being issued on the 3rd of June to the International Congress at Berlin, which met on the 13th idem.

At this time there was telegraphic communication between St. Petersburg, Samarkand, and Tashkend, and *it becomes therefore an interesting fact* (which may never perhaps be completely explained) *that on the same day of the assembly of the Conference at Berlin* (13th June) *General Stolieteff left Samarkand furnished with the letter to Shere Ali and the draft treaty since discovered* among the late Ameer's papers at Kabul. General Stolieteff entered Afghan territory early in July, 1878, and finally reached Kabul amidst cordial demonstrations of friendship (according to the reports received from India) on the 22nd of July, 1878. The letter borne by him was as follows:—

Letter from General Von Kaufmann to Shere Ali, dated June, 1878.

"Be it known to you that in these days the relations between the British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require deep consideration. As I am unable to communicate my opinion verbally to you I have deputed my agent, Major General

Stolieteff. *This gentleman is a near friend of mine*, and performed excellent services in the late Russo-Turkish war, by which he earned favour of the Emperor. *The Emperor has always had a regard for him.* He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind. I hope you will pay great attention to what he says, and believe him as you would myself, and after due consideration you will give him your reply; meanwhile be it known to you that your union and friendship with the Russian Government will be beneficial to the latter and still more so to you. *The advantages of a close alliance with the Russian Government will be permanently evident.*

"This friendly letter is written by the Governor General of Turkestan, and Adjutant General to the Emperor, Von Kauffman,

"Tashkand, June, 1878."

Bearing these dates in mind, it is somewhat remarkable that on the 2nd of July, 1878, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg was solemnly assured by the Russian Government, in reply to enquiries which he was instructed to make, that *no Russian mission had been, or was intended to be, sent to Kabul*, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann. [Central Asia No. 1 (1878), p. 132.]

The Treaty of Berlin was signed on the 13th of July, 1878, and from that date, at any rate, all hostile preparations on the part of Russia ought undoubtedly to have ceased. But General Stolieteff himself remained at Kabul till nearly the end of September, and negotiated a treaty with the Ameer, a draft of which has now for the first time been published, and is as follows:—

Treaty between the Russian Government and Ameer Shere Ali Khan, written from memory by Mirza Muhammud Nubbee.

1. The Russian Government engages that the friendship of the Russian Government with the Government of Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Ameer of all Afghanistan, will be a permanent and perpetual one.

2. The Russian Government engages that, as Sirdar Abdulla

Jan, son of the Ameer, is dead, the friendship of the Russian Government with any person whom the Ameer may appoint heir apparent to the Throne of Afghanistan, and with the heir of the heir apparent, will remain firm and perpetual.

3. The Russian Government engages that if any foreign enemy attacks Afghanistan, and the Ameer is unable to drive him out, and asks the assistance of the Russian Government, the Russian Government will repel the enemy, either by means of advice or such other means as it may consider proper.

4. The Ameer of Afghanistan will not wage war with any foreign Power without consulting the Russian Government, and without its permission.

5. The Ameer of Afghanistan engages that he will always report in a friendly manner to the Russian Government what goes on in his kingdom.

6. The Ameer of Afghanistan will communicate every wish and important affair of his to General Kaufmann, Governor General of Turkestan, and the Governor General will be authorized by the Russian Government to fulfil the wishes of the Ameer.

7. The Russian Government engages that the Afghan merchants who may trade and sojourn in Russian territory will be safe from wrong, and that they will be allowed to carry away their profits.

8. The Ameer of Afghanistan will have the power to send his servants to Russia to learn arts and trades, and the Russian officers will treat them with consideration and respect as men of rank.

9. (Does not remember.)

10. I, Major General Stolieteff Nicholas, being a trusted agent of the Russian Government, have made the above-mentioned Articles betwen the Russian Government and the Government of Ameer Shere Ali Khan, and have put my seal to them.

When General Stolieteff quitted Kabul, he left behind him the Russian mission under the charge of Colonel Rosgonoff. It was not until *December*, 1878, *five months after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin*, that Colonel Rosgonoff left Kabul. He did so at that time in

company with the Ameer, who was forced to fly on the advance of the British troops.

In the meantime General Stolieteff had gone to Livadia, where the Emperor of Russia was staying, and from that place addressed a letter to Shere Ali to the following effect : —

" The Emperor considers you as a brother, and you also, who are on the other side of the water, must display the same sense of friendship and brotherhood. The English Government is anxious to come to terms with you through the intervention of the Sultan, and wishes you to take his advice and counsel ; but the Emperor's desire is that you should not admit the English into your country ; and, like last year, you are to treat them with deceit and deception until the present cold season passes away, then the Almighty's will will be made manifest to you, that is to say, the (Russian) Government having repeated the Bismillah, the Bismillah will come to your assistance. In short, you are to rest assured that affairs will end well. If God permits, we will convene a Government meeting at St. Petersburg, that is to say, a Congress, which means an assemblage of Powers. We will then open an official discussion with the English Government, and either by force of words and diplomatic action we will entirely cut off all English communication and interference with Afghanistan for ever, or else events will end in a mighty and important war. By the help of God, by spring not a symptom or vestige of trouble and dissatisfaction will remain in Afghanistan."

Shere Ali died in February, 1879, and was succeeded by Yahoob Khan. Immediately the Russian authorities commenced a correspondence with him, which continued until he finally abdicated on the approach of General Roberts.

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BY

AN INDIAN OFFICER.

THIRD EDITION.

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PALL MALL, S.W.

1880.

No page of our national annals has been more obscured and disfigured by party feeling than that which narrates the course of our recent policy on the Indian frontier. When these mists of factious misrepresentation shall have been cleared away, I am confident that none will shine more brightly, as a record of wisdom in the council-chamber and of gallantry in the field. As a contribution to this important end, and to the cause of TRUTH, I respectfully offer the following pages to the British public.

I have verified all statements by quotations from the published official documents. Of these documents, the most important are contained in the Parliamentary Blue Book called "Correspondence respecting the relations between the British Government and that of Afghanistan since the accession of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan," published in 1878. That Blue Book I have referred to everywhere under the title of "Afghan Correspondence." It may be ordered of any bookseller, and its price is 2s. 10d. I am quite certain that if that Blue Book were in the hands of every elector at the time of the coming elections, few members would be returned to the next Parliament without a promise heartily to support Lord Beaconsfield's Government, at any rate in its Afghan policy.

AN INDIAN OFFICER.

THE TRUE STORY

OF

OUR AFGHAN POLICY.

1. Sketch of the Argument.

To understand aright the history of our recent relations with Afghanistan, and (through Afghanistan) with Russia in Asia, we must divide that history into five epochs, marked off by these four events: (1) Lord Mayo's Conference with the Amir Sher Ali at Umballa in 1869; (2) The Mission of the Afghan Prime Minister to Lord Northbrook, at Simla, in 1873; (3) Lord Lytton's accession to the Viceroyalty in 1876; and (4) The repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission at Ali Musjid in 1878.

I shall show that, up to the time of the Umballa Conference, our Afghan policy was one of expectancy—we were waiting to see what Russia really intended to do. I shall show that, at the Umballa Conference, that wise and far-sighted statesman, Lord Mayo, determined what ought to be the general direction of our future policy; and that he at once adopted what he called "*an intermediate policy*,"—that is, a policy intended to be developed in the direction indicated. I shall show that Lord Mayo's wise intentions were baulked by the foolish timidity of the Duke of Argyll, Liberal Secretary of State for India; who, at last, on the occasion of the Mission of the Afghan Prime Minister to Simla in 1873, forced Lord Northbrook, finally and decisively, to repel the Afghan overtures, and to snub the Afghan ruler—thereby turning the Amir Sher Ali into a bitter enemy of British interests in Asia. I shall show that during the remaining years of Lord Northbrook's Viceroyalty, from 1873 to 1876, this foolish and criminal policy was carried out in a series of acts which more and more exasperated the Amir; and that, consequently, during this period he drew more and more closely the bonds of friendship between Russia and Afghanistan—so that when Lord Lytton landed in India, he found the Amir a deadly enemy, and Russian Agents the trusted confidants of the Afghan Court. I shall show, very briefly, that during the first two years of Lord Lytton's

Viceroyalty, that statesman made the most strenuous endeavours to win back the Amir, by friendly advances, to that state of mind to which he had been brought by Lord Mayo, and from which he had been driven by Lord Northbrook under orders from the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Gladstone; and these earnest attempts at reconciliation were not relinquished by Lord Lytton until a British Mission had been turned back from the Afghan frontier, with the gross insult of threats of personal violence. From that time to the present, Lord Lytton (under the orders of the Conservative Government) has consistently and honourably followed up, both in his military and in his political arrangements, that policy which has all along been the only possible ENGLISH policy. He has carried out the wishes of the British nation that our empire in India is to be protected from internal confusion and from external insult, by the establishment of a strong and easily-defensible frontier; by the exclusion of foreign and hostile influences from the countries immediately bordering that frontier; and by showing clearly to the tribes inhabiting those border-countries that their truest interests are identical with those of India and England, and that subservience to Russia is sure to bring on them many evils.

2. Events prior to the Umballa Conference, 1869.

Up to the time of the Umballa Conference, we had no definite Afghan policy at all. Until a few years before the Conference, our one idea had been to avoid all possibility of entanglement in the affairs of that troubled and troublesome country; nor had we any inducement to interfere. We had no reason to apprehend any serious annoyance from the Afghans themselves; and even if we had, it was easier for us to punish such annoyance as it might arise, than to make any great effort to prevent its occurrence. We had no reason to fear any serious annoyance, through Afghanistan, from any other foreign Power; for the only aggressive Power on that side was Russia, and her nearest outposts were at that time distant many hundreds of miles from the Afghan frontier. Such being the case, we felt that we could afford to allow the Afghan mountaineers to dominate the passes into India *for the present*, rather than give ourselves the trouble and expense of interfering with them.

It was always clear, however, that the rapid advance, towards our Indian possessions, of the Russian conquests in Central Asia would sooner or later compel us to throw off our apathy, and take measures for the security of our Indian Empire.* In 1864, Prince

* Mr. Grant Duff, in a recently-published pamphlet ("The Afghan Policy of the Beaconsfield Government"), actually has the audacity to claim credit for the Liberal party for the fact that "it was from the Liberal, not the Conservative, benches that came the first note of warning about the Russian advance in Central

Gortchakoff published a peaceful manifesto, in which he declared that recent annexations had taken place against the will of the Russian Government, and asserted categorically that "the expansion of the Russian Empire in Asia had now reached its limit"; and, as has usually been the case after such manifestoes, the ink with which it was written was hardly dry before all its promises were broken. Hostilities were almost immediately resumed in Central Asia; Chemkend and Tashkend and Khojend were captured in succession, and General Romanofski proceeded to invade Bokhara, and to establish the Russian power within hail of Samarcand.*

Asia"—referring to a speech made by a Liberal member in the House of Commons in July 1868. I, for my part, would be very unwilling to refuse to the Liberal party any credit of this kind to which they can possibly lay claim; I only wish that their leaders had been more anxious, in the critical times of two or three years ago, really to *deserve* credit for such patriotic feeling. It is certainly true—and, as a patriotic Briton, I glory in the fact— that large numbers of Liberals (of whom Mr. Cowen is a noble instance) have put loyalty to their country and their Queen before loyalty to their blinded and Russianised party-leaders; and have preferred to support ENGLAND and Lord Beaconsfield, rather than vote for Mr. Gladstone and the Cossacks. But it really seems little less than an insult to the intelligence of the country, for Mr. Grant Duff—one of the wildest and most reckless partisans of Mr. Gladstone and the philo-Russians—to claim any part or lot in a policy of patriotic opposition to Russian aggression. The Duke of Argyll's book, "The Eastern Question," is one long and laboured apology for his Russian friends and their Afghan clients. If any one wishes to see clearly on what side lie the sympathies of such pseudo-Liberals as the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Grant Duff, let him read the Duke's account of the mobilisation of the Russian army in 1876 ("Eastern Question," pp. 304–5). After quoting, with ill-concealed disgust, Lord Beaconsfield's words at Guildhall on the 9th of November 1876, the Duke goes on:—"Within twenty-four hours the following louder and clearer voice came from Moscow, the ancient capital of the Czars"; and, again:—"On the following day, the 18th of November, Count Schouvalow communicated to the Cabinet of St. James's the formal explanation of his Government as to the step which had thus been taken. There was no bluster in it, no vague inuendoes, no empty threats. It was a clear and simple recapitulation of events. Russia did not even take to herself the credit which undoubtedly belonged to her," &c. It is quite evident that if, "in spite of all temptations to belong to other nations," the Duke still remains a Briton, it is not his fault, and he is heartily ashamed of his nationality.

* The Duke of Argyll, in his book on "The Eastern Question," systematically endeavours to minimise the importance of the Russian advances towards India; indeed, the general impression produced by his account of those advances is, that they are the natural manifestation of the philanthropy and benevolence of the Russian Government, anxious to civilise and bless the countries bordering on India. But occasionally he forgets himself, and the truth appears. In his endeavours to show that the *recent* conquests of Russia, the subjugation of Khiva, the conquest of Kokhand, and the advance on Merv, are only *minor* ebullitions of Russian philanthropy, he thus speaks of Russia's conquests between 1864 and 1869:—"During no previous period had her steps been more gigantic than during the four years from 1864 to 1869. In 1865 the Russians had taken Tashkend. In 1866 they had taken Khojend, and had broken the power of the Khanate of Kokhand. In 1867 they had invaded Bokhara, and had established fortified positions far south of the Jaxartes. In the same year they had established the new province of Turkistan, and had erected it into a separate Viceroyalty, with Tashkend for its capital. In 1868 they had taken Samarcand, and had established complete power over the Khanate of Bokhara. *This conquest, and the establishment of this power, virtually brought Russia into contact with Afghanistan. . . . It meant Russian domination over a Government*

During this time, Sir John Lawrence, the Viceroy of India, had been uneasily watching the Russian advances and the civil commotions in Afghanistan. As one after another of the competitors for the throne of Cabul succeeded in setting himself up as Amir, Lawrence hastened to congratulate him; and though this might possibly have been the wisest course at the time, it greatly embittered that one of the competitors (Sher Ali) who finally succeeded in establishing his power. In September 1868 he sent the following message to Sir John Lawrence:—"From the British Government I have received comparatively no friendship or kindness with reference to my success in this miserable civil war, until God Almighty of His own favour has again bestowed upon me the country of my inheritance."* And, again, at the Umballa Conference, he referred to this treatment in terms of bitterness.†

In the autumn of 1868, however, Sir John Lawrence at last made up his mind that the time for this vacillating and time-serving policy had passed away for ever. In a despatch, dated the 4th of January 1869, Sir John Lawrence wrote as follows‡:—

> "The truth appears to us to be, that the advances of Russia, coupled with the constant allusions made in the newspapers to her progress as compared with what is called the inaction of the British Government, have produced, in the minds of Europeans and Natives, what we believe to be an exaggerated opinion of her resources and power. A mutual good understanding between the two Powers, though difficult of attainment, would enable us to take means to counteract unfounded rumours and to prevent unnecessary alarms.
>
> "Then, we think that our relations with the Court of Teheran should be placed entirely under the Secretary of State for India; and that we should be empowered te give to any *de facto* Ruler of Cabul some arms and ammunition and substantial pecuniary assistance, as well as moral support, as occasion may offer, but without any formal offensive or defensive alliance. We have already authorised the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to give Shere Ali six lakhs of rupees, and we shall further be prepared to supply him with some thousand stand of arms. We should be glad, therefore, if a discretion were given us, at once to act on any emergency on the above principles, without any special reference to Her Majesty's Government at home.
>
> "In the event of the Amir Shere Ali proving successful in

which marched with Afghanistan along the greater part of its northern frontier, and which had special relations with the people and Rulers of Cabul." Gentle reader, please note carefully that this statement is made, not by a so-called "Russophobe," it is made by that faithful advocate of the Russian policy in Asia, the Duke of Argyll, "Eastern Question," vol. ii. pp. 248, 249.

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 42.

† *Ibid.*, p. 198.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

the struggle now going on between him and his nephew, Sirdar Abdool Rahman, should His Highness desire to meet the Governor-General, we think it would be politic that his request should be complied with."

Lord Mayo became Viceroy in a few days after the date of this despatch; and, without sharing Sir John Lawrence's lamb-like confidence in the virtues of "a mutual good understanding between" England and Russia (he had noticed the results of Prince Gortchakoff's peaceful manifesto in 1864), he determined to carry on the more active part of the new phase of Lawrence's policy, namely, that directly affecting India and Afghanistan. He completed the arrangements for a meeting between himself and the Ruler of Cabul; and the result was the famous Conference of Umballa in April 1869.

3. Lord Mayo's Umballa Conference, 1869.

At considerable risk to himself in leaving his unsettled dominions, the Amir Sher Ali came down to the plains of India; and was received by Lord Mayo in great pomp at Umballa.

Sher Ali joyfully hastened down to this meeting, in the full belief that he would be able to obtain from the Viceroy all the material assistance he needed, and a clear straightforward treaty of defensive alliance between the British and Afghan Governments, now that the old shilly-shallying policy had been once definitely abandoned by Sir John Lawrence. Whether *in any case* it would have been possible for Lord Mayo *fully* to have satisfied him at once, may fairly be doubted; for Lord Mayo himself, and those who thought with him, were clearly of opinion that it would not be either decent or expedient to attempt such a sudden and complete reversal of our former policy, or rather no-policy. All Lord Mayo aspired to do *immediately* was, to initiate (to use his own words) "an intermediate policy."

What this policy was eventually to develop into, may readily be gathered from his speeches and minutes, which were collected and published by a native gentleman at Calcutta in 1873. He saw in the future our Indian Empire surrounded and secured by a belt of friendly States, independent as regards their domestic concerns, but pledged to conduct their foreign relations in accordance with the common interests of each other and of the paramount Power. Being thus guided in their external policy by us, they would naturally look to us for protection from unprovoked aggression; and Lord Mayo was unquestionably of opinion that we should give them full and satisfactory assurances that, in such a case, we should assist them with the full strength of the Empire if necessary. Moreover, to enable us to judge accurately both of the necessity of such assistance, and of the way it could best be rendered, he saw clearly that it would ultimately be requisite for us

to have largely increased intercourse with these semi-dependent States; and (as he wrote to the Duke of Argyll on the 26th of January 1869*) he believed that it would be both useful and feasible for us to place an English Agent for this purpose even in Cabul itself, when the difficulties in the way of doing so (difficulties which he expressly said he did not regard as necessarily permanent) should have been overcome. It is needless to add that he scouted the idea of Russian or any other foreign interference in these States as absolutely intolerable.

But unfortunately, before the Umballa Conference, and indeed almost immediately after Lord Mayo's accession to the Viceroyalty, the Conservative Ministry went out, and the Duke of Argyll became Secretary of State. With some difficulty,† Lord Mayo was able to carry the Duke of Argyll along with him so far as to obtain the assent of the Gladstone Cabinet to his "intermediate" policy; but any sensible development of that policy was obviously hopeless with such a Ministry in power at home, and Lord Mayo doubtless appreciated this fact, and wisely contented himself with doing only just so much in the matter as he could count on obtaining sanction for.

The arrangement concluded at Umballa with the Amir is given in the following words of Lord Mayo's letter to the Amir:—‡

> "Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.
>
> "It is my wish, therefore, that your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect."

It will be seen from this, that Sher Ali did not obtain at Umballa all that he had hoped for; indeed, he did not obtain that on which

* See the Duke of Argyll's "Eastern Question," vol. ii. p. 251.

† I say "with some difficulty"; see "Afghan Correspondence," pp. 91–100. On receipt of Lord Mayo's first account of what he had done at Umballa, the Duke of Argyll wrote immediately out in great alarm (*see* Despatch at p. 91), expressing "*apprehension*" and "*concern*" at some of the words (not specified) used by Lord Mayo to the Amir; and it was only after a laboured explanation from Lord Mayo of the limits of his "intermediate" policy that the Duke was pacified.

‡ "Afghan Correspondence," p. 90.

he had chiefly set his heart, a treaty giving him a British guarantee for himself and his dynasty in Cabul. But he had just received a large gift of money (£60,000) from Lord Lawrence; and an equal sum that had been promised him by that Viceroy was in course of being paid. This welcome supply of the sinews of war, backed up by the great increase of prestige acquired by his princely reception by the Viceroy, was sufficient for his *immediate needs;* that is, for the purpose of putting down rebellion and consolidating his power at Cabul. Above all, he learnt, from the frank and friendly bearing of Lord Mayo, to believe that the British Government would not desert him *at the time of need.* As the Afghan Prime Minister observed to the Foreign Secretary on the 1st of April 1869, in one of the Umballa meetings,* "He was looking far forward, and the day might come when the Russ would arrive, and the Amir would be glad not only of British officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them." How these hopes were dashed to the ground by Lord Northbrook under the orders of the Duke of Argyll in 1873, may best be told in the words of Yakub Khan,† the son and successor of the unfortunate Sher Ali, to General Roberts on the 22nd of October 1879:—

"In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on the throne of Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had won lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but, nevertheless, he returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of Nur Muhammud Shah to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Nur Muhammud Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended."

No better commentary, than this spontaneous and obviously truthful statement of the Afghan Amir, can be offered on the audacious assertions of the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Grant Duff, that the policy of Lord Mayo at Umballa was faithfully continued by Lord Northbrook in 1873, and that the Amir was equally pleased or displeased with both.

4. The Question of sending English Representatives or Consuls into Afghanistan.

I must here break the historical continuity of my narrative to notice the question of the location of English officers as Agents

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 173.
† "Afghan Correspondence, 1880," p. 170.

Residents, or Consuls, in Afghanistan, which was brought prominently into view at the Umballa Conference, as one of the objects aimed at by Lord Mayo (not immediately, but) ultimately in the development of his policy.* Lord Mayo's views on the point are fairly given by Duke of Argyll, who says :—

> "On the 26th of January 1869 Lord Mayo wrote to me the first letter in which he indicated his views in respect to our policy towards the Ameer. It is remarkable as indicating incidentally (1) that he recognised the utility of having a European official in Cabul, if this measure could properly be adopted; (2) that he did not consider the difficulties in the way of it as difficulties

* The Duke of Argyll has devoted a large portion of his long book, "The Eastern Question," to an attempt to establish the absurd positions, *first*, that Sher Ali at Umballa showed invincible repugnance to the presence of British officers, not only at Cabul, but even *in any other part of Afghanistan*; and, *secondly*, that Lord Mayo actually gave the Amir a solemn pledge that British officers should *never* be sent into Afghanistan. He supports the first position by the testimony of Mr. Seton Karr, the Indian Foreign Secretary, *which testimony most distinctly refers* ONLY *to the location of a Resident at Kabul itself, saying nothing with regard to the location of Agents at Balkh, Candahar, or elsewhere.* He further supports it by a speech of Sher Ali's minister—which speech most distinctly referred to the temporary circumstances of the time, *and actually (in a later part, not quoted by the Duke,) stated that "the time might come when the Amir would be glad, not only of British officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them* (see above, p. 9). The absurdity of the position is sufficiently shown by the evidence in the text.

The Duke supports his other equally wild assertion (that Lord Mayo solemnly pledged the British Government *never* to send British Agents to Afghanistan) by a quotation from a private letter of Lord Mayo's to himself, in which were included, among the things the Amir was "not to have," the following items:—(1) No Treaty, (2) no fixed subsidy, (3) no European troops, officers, or Residents, (4), no dynastic pledges. The phrase is repeated in Lord Mayo's despatch of 1st July 1869; and it is hardly necessary to point out that Lord Mayo was evidently referring to his *immediate* intentions in regard to the Amir. In another private letter to the Duke, Lord Mayo further mentioned that he had assured the Amir "that we would not force European officers or Residents upon him *against his wish*"; but, inasmuch as the Amir had over and over again (as I show in the text), expressed his willingness to receive British Agents anywhere *except at Cabul*, it is perfectly clear that all Lord Mayo meant was, that we would not force them on him *at Cabul*, unless he should hereafter express a wish for them there. This is virtually all the evidence the Duke has to offer in support of his allegation that Lord Mayo made this solemn pledge. His Grace ignores the facts, that no mention of such a pledge occurs in any of the official or private records of the Conference; that not the slightest reference to such a pledge was made by the Afghan envoy at Simla in 1873, when (under altered circumstances, and embittered by the Duke of Argyll's policy) he was most anxious to adduce every possible argument against British Agents; that no sanction for such a pledge was either asked from, or given by, the Home Government; that all the officers in Lord Mayo's special confidence at Umballa (his Private Secretary, Colonel Burne, and his Persian interpreter, Major Grey, "whose communications with the Ameer and his Minister were of the most confidential character," *see* Lord Mayo's despatch, "Afghan Correspondence," p. 95,) ridicule the idea of such a pledge having been even thought of. To any one who will take the trouble to sift the evidence, the idea appears clearly a figment of the Duke's imagination, which His Grace has (doubtless in perfect good faith) unconsciously connected with Lord Mayo's memory.

that would be necessarily permanent; and (3) that he was fully aware of the fact that, as matters then stood, it would be inexpedient to attempt it."

With the solitary exception of the Duke of Argyll,* there is probably hardly an English statesman who has given any attention to Indian questions, who does not agree with Lord Mayo as to the utility of having British officers resident, if not in Cabul itself, at least in some of the out-stations of Afghanistan. Such an arrangement was an essential stipulation in our Treaty of 1857, concluded with Dost Muhammad on the occasion of the Persian War. In a despatch† dated the 15th of September 1873, signed by Lord Northbrook, Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir Richard Temple, Sir B. Ellis, Sir Henry Norman, Sir A. Hobhouse, and Sir E. C. Bayley, occurs the following passage, which shows clearly that all these authorities concurred with Lord Mayo in believing that the time would soon come when it would be right and necessary to send British Agents into Afghanistan:—

"Though we think that the presence of accredited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and possibly also Candahar, would for many reasons be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries."

We all know that Lord Salisbury, Lord Cranbrook, and Lord Lytton, together with Sir Henry Rawlinson and all the other experienced and trusted advisers of the Government, are fully in accord with these views. Even Mr. Grant Duff, notwithstanding the party exigencies that force him to swear to everything that the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Gladstone may say,‡ gives a grudging assent to

* The British public should know that the Duke of Argyll justifies his objection to British Agents, in part at any rate, on the following estimate of our political relations with the Native states of India, which I take from his "Eastern Question," vol. ii., p. 225:—"The demands these officers have made on the Native Governments, the interferences they have practised with Native rule, the reports they have sent up of Native abuses and of Native maladministration, have been the usual and regular preliminaries of British annexation. And even where the internal independence of tributary or protected States is professedly respected, it is notorious in India, and is well known to all our neighbours, that the presence of British officers in an official position in Native States—however necessary it may be for our purposes—is an arrangement which generally ends in making those officers the centre of authority." It may fairly be asked whether any statesman who holds such views regarding our political arrangements in India, can ever be a fit person for the office of Secretary of State for that dependency.

† See "Afghan Correspondence," p. 110.

‡ Mr. Grant Duff feels the difficulty of harmonising the responsible statements of the Liberal Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, and the irresponsible talk of "The Eastern Question," and Mr. Gladstone in Mid-Lothian. But a more amusing instance of the embarrassments imposed on patriotic Liberals by the supposed necessity

omething like this doctrine. In his pamphlet (*Afghan Policy*, p. 9) ie says: "There would have been much to be said for this, if those Agents could have been used merely for the purpose of getting good nformation about Central Asia." I believe it may safely be affirmed hat no one, except for the purposes of the miserable party squab- ples of the last few years, has ever maintained the contrary opinion.

The Amir Sher Ali was, of course, well acquainted with the vishes of his English friends; and he came down to Umballa pre- pared to accede cordially to the proposal of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan *elsewhere than in Cabul*, as the condition of he Treaty and the material help for which he was seeking. This is proved by the following records:—

(*a.*) The record of a Council held by the Amir at Lahore on the 6th of March 1869, when he was on the road to Umballa; from which the following is an extract, certified by the Secretary to the Punjab Government:*

"The Amir observed that personally he would have no objection to an English Envoy being stationed at Cabul, but that owing to the turbulent character of the people it would not be safe. *The same objection, however, did not apply to Balkh, Candahar, or Herat*, and the arrangement by which an English officer should be stationed at these places would be beneficial to both Governments. A translation of this report was sent to the Foreign Office, and printed *in extenso*."

(*b.*) The statement of Major Grey, Lord Mayo's confidential Per- sian interpreter, which (as will be seen on reading it) is verified by the records of the Indian Foreign Office. It is printed at pp. 144, 145 of the "Afghan Correspondence"; but it is so important and conclusive, that I give it here in full:—

> "In reply to your letter No. E., of the 27th instant, I have the honour to state that the Amir *did* freely consent to the appointment of European British officers in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul.

upporting foolish leaders, is afforded by the following *naive* confession of Sir George Campbell, formerly an eminent Indian Civilian, now a Liberal M.P., olunteered at p. 41 of his pamphlet on "The Afghan Frontier,:—"I must admit, oo, that at this time I proposed as part of the arrangement *that the Ameer should eceive a Resident British Minister at Cabul*. It is possible that if things had been o arranged at that time, and a very substantial benefit conferred in return for what e asked, things might have settled down on that basis, and the arrangements ight now have become permanent and satisfactory to both parties. But perhaps I hould say that I am wiser now, and see the difficulties and disadvantages of the British Resident more clearly than I did then."

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 144.

"My authority is a copy, certified by the Foreign Secretary of a note submitted by me to Lord Mayo on conversations held with the Minister Noor Mahomed. In that copy I find the following passage: 'He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border; while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, he still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger for such, did they respect the Afghans and themselves.'

"Mr. Seton-Karr heads the paper from which the above is taken, 'Memorandum on conversations held with the confidential Minister,' and dates it the 31st of March. I observe, however, that my summary of proceedings, dated the 4th of April 1869, gives its date as being the day of the first private interview, *i.e.* the 29th of March 1869, and distinctly states that the Amir was party to the conversation, and such I remember to have been the case.

"A further authority, upon which I go, is a passage in my private memoranda to the following effect:

"'4. In accordance with my representations, therefore, a new letter (No. I.) was addressed to the Amir, to which I was directed (No. VII.) to obtain, if possible, an answer of complete satisfaction; and also to arrive at a definite understanding with him on various other points noted below, after which should be held the second private interview, which would, in a manner sanction and confirm the result of the negotiations. The points (recorded in pencil notes in my possession) were:

"'1. That the Amir should accede to our deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased. To this the Amir agreed and promised to assist them in every way.

"'2. To ascertain whether the Amir was agreeable to the deputation of an Envoy at some future date. On this point the Amir expressed his willingness to receive an Envoy as soon as things had somewhat settled down, anywhere save at Cabul, where he thought it would affect his power with the people. . . .'

"I may note that the Amir was at that time eager to meet what he supposed to be our views, and his whole attitude was that of one eager to please."

(*c*.) A note written at the time by the Foreign Under-Secretary to the Government of India, and officially recorded, as follows:—

"The Viceroy may possibly desire to have, without delay, the

following details, which I have learnt from Punjab officials in the course of conversation yesterday and to-day. The Amir is prepared, if asked, to allow European Agents at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh, but he would raise difficulties, though probably not insuperable ones, about such an officer at Cabul."

(*d*) The statement of Dr. Bellew, C.S.I., the confidential interpreter and most intimate personal friend of the Amir; who in 1875 wrote that the impression left on his mind was that the Amir "would gladly see Agents at Herat and Candahar."*

(*e*) The statement of Colonel Burne, Lord Mayo's Private Secretary† :—

"I can fully corroborate all that Captain Grey and Dr. Bellew say as to the willingness of the Ameer at Umballa to consider the subject of British Agencies in Afghanistan had he received encouragement to enter officially into the subject, and had his expectations of being granted a new treaty been responded to. The same evidence which certified to Shere Ali's desire for a treaty certified to his willingness to receive British Agents. If the one was imaginary, so was the other. Being at that time in Lord Mayo's full confidence, I can testify to the fact that both he himself and those associated with him accepted the evidence of the Ameer's wishes in both cases as genuine. The time, however, had not arrived for the consideration of either question; and the orders of Her Majesty's Government, added to Lord Mayo's own personal views as to the requirements of the moment, and the danger of suddenly deviating from the policy of the Viceroy who had just left India, induced him to discourage the official mention of either matter at the conferences. Moreover, His Highness made no formal proposition on the subject, hoping, as we were led to believe, that it might come first from the Viceroy, and thereby ensure him better terms."

(*f*) And finally, Lord Northbrook's Government wrote, in their despatch of the 7th of June 1875‡ :—

> On the whole, however, we think that either the Amir himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did, in confidential communication with Captain Grey, expresss a readiness to accept at some future time, not far distant, the presence of British Agents in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself."

At the risk of being tedious, I have given the proofs of the Amir's willingness in 1869 to accept British Agents at Balkh and Candahar, at some length, as both the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Grant Duff have done their best to discredit a fact which was patent to everyone

* "Afghan Correspondence, p. 173.
† *Ibid*, p. 174.
‡ *Ibid*, p. 174.

in India in 1869. Mr. Grant Duff, in his pamphlet ("Afghan Policy," p. 9) accentuates the weakness of his case: with the personal courtesy which has been characteristic of the party tactics of the Radical leaders of late, he actually suggests that the testimony of the eminent Indian officers quoted above (albeit some of it was officially accepted and recorded as genuine in 1869!) has been offered to please "*those who had the bestowal of patronage*"! Reader, I pray you look at page 9 of Mr. Grant Duff's pamphlet, and form your own conclusions as to the character of the Radical arguments. I now return to my narrative.

5. Lord Mayo's Policy neutralized by the Duke of Argyll. Russian Advance, and Afghan Alienation.

I have shown that both Lord Mayo and the Amir Sher Ali were contented, *for the immediate needs of the time*, with an "intermediate" policy*—a policy that was evidently intended and hoped by both to be merely one of transition. *At that time the Russians had not conquered and annexed Khiva, they had not subjugated Kokhand, they were not advancing on Merv.* Prince Gortchakoff's precious Manifesto of 1864 had spoken of a certain Russian military line as "fixing for us with geographical precision the limit up to which we (Russians) are bound to advance and at which we must halt"; and though (as I have shown from the Duke of Argyll's book) the Russian progress *beyond this line* had immediately recommenced at a "gigantic" rate, still the advance had not been very conspicuous along the road to India that leads through Merv and the open country. Lord Mayo, in a private letter to the Duke of Argyll,† shortly after the Umballa Conference, wrote:—

"During the Ameer's conversations here, he has hardly ever mentioned the name of Russia. Whether it is that he is so wrapped up in his own affairs, or knows little of their proceedings, he does not give them a thought, and when we have casually referred to them, he generally says that we shall not hear much of them in Afghanistan for a long time."

During the remainder of Lord Mayo's all-too-short viceroyalty his personal influence over Sher Ali kept matters straight in

* See "Afghan Correspondence," p. 92:—"The policy that we had endeavoured to establish may be termed an *intermediate* one."

† See the Duke of Argyll's "Eastern Question," p. 262. It is instructive to compare the above statement of Lord Mayo (actually quoted by the Duke) with Mr. Grant Duff's arguments at p. 8 of his pamphlet:—"He (the Amir) played, we may be sure, all his cards, including, *no doubt*, the card of the advance of Russia. He knew that there were many persons in India who lived, and others who affected to live, in a perpetual panic about Russia, and he thought, not unnaturally, that he might turn this *quasi*-panic to his own advantage," &c. &c.

Afghanistan; and the interest of the story of the next three years centres in the negotiations between the Foreign Offices of London and St. Petersburg. For rumours had already begun to fly about of Russian designs on Khiva. Lord Clarendon addressed Prince Gortchakoff on the subject: and on the 27th of March 1869 had the satisfaction of receiving one of those assurances so dear to the souls of the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Gladstone—Baron Brunow was authorised to give "a positive assurance that Afghanistan would be considered as entirely beyond the sphere in which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence." It is perhaps needless to say that (even supposing this assurance had been worth anything) the extent of territory which the Russians here chose to call "Afghanistan" was very different from that which English geographers assigned to the dominions of Sher Ali. This verbal fallacy was too much for even the Duke of Argyll and the Gladstone Ministry; and they boldly determined—to argue the matter out with Russia!! For three and a half long years the negotiations lasted; during which time Khiva had been over-run, Sher Ali and the whole of Afghanistan driven wild with combined fright at Russian prowess and astonishment at British timidity, and, in a word, our prestige in Central Asia and on the Indian frontier almost irretrievably ruined. There was, however, according to the Duke of Argyll, one great consolation amidst all this: His Grace declares ("Eastern Question" p. 286) that "the discussion was conducted in a most friendly spirit." And the end of it all was, in the Duke's own language, "In the discussions which followed, the last of our two proposals *came* to be abandoned; that proposal, namely the extension of the proposed "zone" beyond the Afghan kingdom to some point farther westward upon the Oxus as yet undefined, was a proposal which was completely overshadowed by the paramount importance of a clear and definite understanding as to the extent of territory which was included in Afghanistan!" So we gave up our proposal (one which Lord Clarendon had carefully explained to Prince Gortchakoff was founded on "the decided opinion of the Secretary of State for India after consultation with those members of Council who were best acquainted with the country"*); and the Czar was good enough to come to "a clear and definite understanding" with us on our other proposal regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan, *at the same time that Lord Granville agreed to accept the intimation of the Russian conquests in Khiva without being so rude as to say anything about previous Russian assurances on the subject.* The fun —sorry fun for *us*, in all conscience—of this Khivan business will be best shown by two quotations from the Duke of Argyll's own book:—

"On the 8th January 1873 . . . Count Schouvalow declared that 'not only was it far from the intentions of the Emperor to

take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva."—"Eastern Question," p. 309.

"Accordingly, when in January 1874, Lord Granville had to acknowledge the receipt of the Treaty with the Khan of Khiva, which recorded the results of the Russian conquest, he very wisely declared that he saw no advantage in comparing those results with 'the assurances of intentions' which had been given by Count Schouvalow. Lord Granville carefully avoided calling them promises."—"Eastern Question," p. 310.

And well he might! I believe that every honourable Englishman would believe the Duke of Argyll to be joking when he draws an elaborate distinction between Russian "assurances" and Russian "promises," were it not for the explanation which he gives of his reasons; he says (p. 302)—"The mere intimation of an intention by one Government to another *does not in itself amount to or even imply an engagement*"! And, again, speaking of Count Schouvalow's "assurances" about Khiva given above, he says (p. 310)—"These words, even if they were to be strictly construed as the record of a definite international engagement, *which they certainly were not, would not prevent the subjugation of Khiva to the condition of a dependent state, nor would they prevent the annexation of* SOME *Khivan territory to the Russian Empire*"! In other words, if the Czar solemly promised England not to annex Khiva, he would be keeping his pledge (in the opinion of the Duke of Argyll) if he allowed the Khan of Khiva to retain one acre of territory as a dependent state!! Can sophistry go further than this?

And, *àpropos* of the Duke of Argyll's estimate of the value of Russian "assurances" which are not "promises," I should like to direct the reader's attention to Mr. Grant Duff's contemptuous astonishment at the "barbarians" of Cabul, who actually attached more importance to the Russian conquest of their neighbours the Khivans, than to the Russian "assurance" noted above. Mr. Grant Duff says, in the lofty style which so well becomes him ("Afghan Policy," p. 12):—

"A military fact, however, always seems more important to barbarians, whether in turbans or round hats, than does a diplomatic one, and so it is quite possible that the advance against Khiva, which did not affect him at all, though it occurred in his neighbourhood, frightened the Amir more than our arrangement with Russia reassurred him, though this last was the very Magna Charta of his independence."

Foolish barbarian, not to appreciate his own good-fortune in being

blessed with a "Magna Charta" secured by one of the Duke of Argyll's Russian "assurances"!

"The *promises* he received" (adds Mr. Grant Duff, p. 13, in a burst of indignation, and forgetful of the saving grace of the term *assurances*)—

> "Would have been enough and more than enough, for any reasonable man; but Shere Ali was not a reasonable man—he was a moody barbarian, subject to occasional fits of insanity, and with a good deal of the cunning which often accompanies unsoundness of mind."

So poor Sher Ali's cunning, that made him suspicious of the Duke of Argyll's Russian assurances, induced him to make a frantic effort to obtain, from the Government of India, a British guarantee of protection from Russian aggression.

6. The Afghan Mission to Lord Northbrook in 1873.

With this view, the Afghan Prime Minister, Nur Muhammad, came down to Simla in 1873. The Amir had sarcastically said, with reference to the Duke of Argyll's three-and-a-half-years negotiations with Russia, "I am at a loss to surmise what great difficulty has given rise to the deliberations which have taken place the second time between the British and Russian Governments about the northern boundary of Afghanistan. It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance. . . . It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in the matter before anything happens. . . . Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporising for a few days, it is their own affair: but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation." *

The first conference which Lord Northbrook had with the Afghan Envoy was on 12th July 1873; and from the following extracts from the report of the conversation ("Afghan Correspondence," p. 112), it will be seen that, *until subsequently snubbed by the Duke of Argyll and the Home Government*, Lord Northbrook and the Government of India were fully prepared to assure the Amir that, under certain conditions, we would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression.

The Envoy said that—

> "The rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia had aroused the gravest misapprehensions in the minds of the

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 110.

people of Afghanistan. Whatever specific assurances the Russians might give, and however often these might be repeated, the people of Afghanistan could place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British Government. The Envoy continued that he fully appreciated the nature of the communications that had been made to him at the present conference, but he wished to reserve any further discussion of the subject to a future occasion."

And in the course of the conversation Lord Northbrook had said that—

> "If, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was *probable* that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would, of course, be conditional on the Amir following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression."

At, or immediately after, this conversation, Lord Northbrook appears to have discovered that the Envoy was not satisfied with this *vague and general* assurance. His Excellency had already, on 1st July, received from the Duke of Argyll a gentle telegraphic check, in the following words—"Great caution is necessary in assuring Amir of material assistance, which may raise undue and unfounded expectations, he already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give"; but the affair was one of such great importance that Lord Northbrook determined to give the Duke another chance. On the 24th of July he telegraphed home to Her Majesty's Government*:—

> "'"Amir of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with *general* assurance, and anxious to know *definitely* how far he may rely on our help if invaded?' I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly."

But the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Gladstone were not to be warned; on the 26th of July the Duke telegraphed back to Lord Northbrook†:—

> "'"Cabinet thinks you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it?' but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."

* "Afghan Correspondence" p. 108.
† *Ibid.*

It was, of course, difficult for the Indian Government, and impossible for the Afghan Envoy, to understand what maintaining "our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan" could possibly mean, as a reply to the definite request of the Amir for a *new* policy. The telegram was, however, clearly regarded by Lord Northbrook as an intimation—which it undoubtedly was—that the Gladstone Ministry were determined to reject the advances of the Amir; for, in the course of the interview that followed the receipt of this telegram, on the 30th of July 1873, Lord Northbrook repeated his statement, *but declined to give the definite reply asked for by the Envoy.* I shall here quote at some length the report of this interview, that the reader may see clearly how the Afghan returned again and again to the charge, in the vain hope of pinning the Viceroy to something less vague and shadowy, something that the Amir could feel to bear some meaning and be really tangible. Lord Northbrook, with a wholesome regard for the Duke of Argyll's susceptibilities, was inexorable; and politely baffled all the Envoy's attempts to find out what the British Government really meant :—

> "His Excellency the Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Amir's apprehensions, but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Amir, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and by every means in their power to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Amir as an independent Ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories; but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event, should these endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government are prepared to assure the Amir that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, aid him with troops. The British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent; moreover, the assistance will be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. The Envoy said that both in conversation with the Foreign Secretary and at the present interview he had explained his views on the subject, and his objections on certain points, and the matter would now be laid before the Amir for his consideration. Two points in connection with the promised assurance were then brought forward by the

Envoy. He requested in the first place that, in the event of any aggression on the Amir's territories, the British Government would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor as an *enemy*. His Excellency said that in diplomatic correspondence such expressions were *always avoided* as causing needless irritation. In His Excellency's opinion the assurance above given should be sufficient to satisfy the Amir as to the light in which any aggression would be considered by the British Government. Next the Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by *Russia* should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Amir. To this His Excellency replied that, setting aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that *could not be adopted,* inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability of such a contingency arising, which the British Government are not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances given by Russia. The Envoy then asked what reply should be given by the Amir to the request which the Turkomans had preferred for advice as to the attitude they should assume to the Russians, who had demanded a passage for their troops through the Turkoman territory. His Excellency replied that the advice given by the Foreign Secretary was correct. The Turkomans were robbers and kidnappers, and the cause of a large portion of the mischief in Central Asia. The Amir would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible for such people in any way whatever. Of course friendly answers should be returned to friendly letters from them, but the Amir should in no way make himself responsible for them, or countenance their lawless proceedings, or any opposition on their part to the march of Russian troops. The Envoy, concurring in the wisdom of this course, said he would let the Foreign Secretary see the letter he proposed to send to the Amir."

In the Memorandum given to the Envoy for communication to the Amir (printed at p. 115, "Afghan Correspondence") the demand for a more definite policy was skilfully avoided; and in the letter from Lord Northbrook to the Amir it was directly postponed in the following words*:—

"I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 116. Mr. Grant Duff, in his pamphlet on "The Afghan Policy of the Beaconsfield Government," quotes this letter of Lord Northbrook to the Amir, to prove that "the Ameer, in short, received every assurance of protection against external foes that he could receive short of an unconditional guarantee"! My readers will ask, "How does he prove it by this letter"? My reply is—and to those who do not believe it possible for a Liberal party-leader to descend to the shift of mutilating quotations, I only say "buy Mr. Grant Duff's pam-

subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is, in my opinion, one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity. I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Highness' territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency."

And so ended the Simla Conference, from which the Afghan Ruler had hoped so much! Well might Yakub Khan say, as he did to General Roberts on the 22nd of November 1879,*—"The diaries received from Nur Muhammad Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended."

Gentle reader, I ask you to judge—at *whose* door, according to the unimpeachable and impartial testimony of the Amir Yakub Khan, and according to the indisputable evidence of the records, lies the blame for all the miseries of the Afghan War? The Duke of Argyll himself ("Eastern Question," p. 518) has answered the question:—"*The policy which brought the Russian army to the gates of Constantinople is the same policy which brought the Russian Mission to Cabul.*"

7. Afghan Alienation completed by the Gladstone Ministry.

No better summary, of the history of the completion of the unfortunate work begun at Simla in 1873, can be given than that which was spoken by the same Nur Muhammad† (again acting as Afghan Envoy) to Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur, in January 1877. As I did in the case of Yakub Khan, and with the former speeches of Nur Muhammad, so, now, I will quote the translation of the Afghan's *own words*:—

"Now, I will tell you what has turned the Amir's confidence from your Government (Sarkar). In Lord Mayo's

phlet and look at the end of the first paragraph on page 13"—my reply is, HE ENDS HIS QUOTATION WITH THE SENTENCE, "A COPY OF THE RECORD OF THESE CONVERSATIONS IS ATTACHED TO THIS LETTER"! The sentences which follow, and which clearly reverse the effect of all that has gone before, are entirely omitted by Mr. Grant Duff! These be thy gods, O Israel!

* "Afghanistan (1880)," p. 170.

† "Afghan Correspondence," p. 181.

time his confidence was perfect, and he agreed to refer all overtures and correspondence received from the Russians to Lord Mayo, and to send back such replies as the British Government might desire, and he did so in perfect good faith. *But what came to pass in the time of Lord Northbrook?* I will now tell you. Lord Northbrook wrote to the Amir on behalf of Yakub Khan, who was in prison at Cabul, to send him back to Herat, and said that if he were reinstated there the friendship between the Ameer's and the British Government would remain intact. Now, the Ameer was angry and resented this interference with his home Government, and, since he has not sent Yakub Khan back to Herat, he considers the friendship between the two Governments is no longer intact. Then, again, after the mission to Yarkand returned, Lord Northbrook sent a man called Ibrahim Khan with presents to the Mir of Wakhan, by way of acknowledging his attention to the British Officers who visited that part of the country. But no reference was made to the Ameer, nor was his permission asked before dealing direct with one of his responsible Governors.

I will now quote Lord Northbrook's own words* (from a Despatch dated the 7th of June 1875), to show that that nobleman fully felt and acknowledged that his assurances to Nur Muhammad in 1873 had not been "specific" or definite:

"Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turkoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give *additional and more specific assurances* to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier."

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 134.

And I will next quote Lord Northbrook's own words to show that he also reluctantly acknowledged at the beginning of 1876 *that the Amir had become cold.* In a Despatch dated the 28th of January 1876, His Excellency wrote* :—

> "The Amir's not unnatural dread of our interference in his internal affairs, and the difficulties of his position as described in our Despatch of the 7th of June last, combined, perhaps, with the conviction that if ever a struggle for the independence of Afghanistan should come we must in our own interest help him, may have induced him to assume *a colder attitude towards us than we should desire.* But we have no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other powers."

Lord Northbrook does not here mention the fact, *well-known to him,* that the Amir was at this very time in constant and most friendly communication with the Russian authorities at Tashkend. As far back as May 1874,† Lord Northbrook had reported to the Home Government that Sher Ali had received "another letter" from the Russian officer then in command at Tashkend; and further that in this letter allusion was made to some unknown "request" that the Amir had made to Russia. "In the autumn of 1875," the Duke of Argyll says ‖("Eastern Question," p. 293), "matters went still further; not only was another letter sent from the Russian Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, but it was sent by a messenger who is called an 'Envoy'—it was a letter informing the Amir of the return to Tashkend of General Kaufmann after his absence for half-a-year at St. Petersburg." And so on.

And at the same time, the Amir had been behaving towards the British Government in a way, that is described by Lord Northbrook as "cold" ‡; by the Duke of Argyll as "sulky" §; and by Mr. Grant Duff as "cross."|| And yet Lord Northbrook had "no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other powers"! But after all, Lord Northbrook was right; the Amir had no *desire* to prefer the friendship of other powers—but he had scarcely any option, for we had virtually refused him ours.

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 155.

† "Central Asian Blue Book," 1878, No. 15, Enclos. 1, p. 16.

‡ "A colder attitude towards us than we should desire."—"Afghan Correspondence," p. 155.

§ "It is undoubtedly rather a sulky letter; but much allowance ought to be made for the position of the Ameer."—"Eastern Question," p. 341.

|| "Lord Northbrook held to the views contained in the paragraphs which I have just quoted, and Shere Ali shewed his disappointment at not having obtained all he wished, exactly as might have been expected. He behaved well enough in essential

It will be seen, then, that the account of Sher Ali's estrangement from us "in Lord Northbrook's time," given by Nur Muhammad as quoted above, is virtually confirmed by Lord Northbrook, the Duke of Argyll, and Mr. Grant Duff. It is further confirmed by the report of the British Native Agent at Cabul, who came specially to Simla in 1876 to represent the Amir's grievances; and who stated*—

> "That the results of the mission of Syud Noor Mahomed in 1873 *had offended the Amir;* while the treatment which the Syud pretends to have received at our hands, as well on the occasion of that mission as during the period of his being associated with us in the Seistan Boundary Commission, had annoyed the Syud, who, on further finding that both his missions had proved failures, ceased any longer to counsel the Amir to friendly and close alliance with the British, and used all his influence in an opposite direction. The Syud is still embittered against us.
>
> "Upon being asked what were the specific grounds of the Syud's complaint in respect to the treatment he had received, the Agent explained that among those causes were the disregard of the Syud's requests, the pressure put upon him to accede to our views, and the scant courtesy shown to him at Simla. . . . That the principal object of Syud Noor Mahomed's mission to Simla in 1873 was to secure a definite Treaty of Alliance with the British Government; and that, this treaty signed, the Ameer would have been prepared to aid us with a contingent in the event of war; but that our proceedings on that occasion showed that, while we desired to depute Political Agents into Afghanistan, and induce the Ameer to guide his policy by our advice, we were unprepared to bind ourselves to any future course in regard to him. *Under these circumstances,* His Highness had been unwilling to bind himself by our wishes, and had consequently declined to accept our proffered subsidy. He looked for something more valuable than money."

The first evidence of the Amir's being "sulky" (or, as Mr. Grant Duff prefers to call it, "cross") was this contemptuous refusal to touch any of the money which Lord Northbrook had sent to the Kohat frontier for him; the rupees lay waiting in vain in the

matters, knowing that the British Government would not be trifled with, but he allowed it to perceive that he was cross by little failures in courtesy."—"Afghan Policy," pp. 13, 14.

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 180.

Kohat treasury, a standing jest for all the tribes on the frontier, until we had to take them away ourselves! *

The next manifestation of this spirit was in the delay made in sending even the "sulky" reply to Lord Northbrook's letter taken to the Amir by the Envoy. In the meantime, a request had been made that Colonel Baker, who was coming to India from Teheran, might be allowed to pass through Afghanistan; and the Amir took the opportunity to answer the request in the following terms—terms which, as addressed to the Viceroy, were simply insulting, as anyone who is at all acquainted with the style of Oriental epistolary communications will see at once† :—

> "Your Excellency! my Envoy, at interviews and conversations with your Excellency, explained the many objections that exist to men like Colonel Baker and others travelling in Afghanistan. I therefore do not think it necessary to allude to the subject further."

The Duke of Argyll praises Lord Northbrook for the "gentle" terms in which he noticed this insult in his reply to the Amir :— "He reproached the Amir gently—not for refusing a passage through his dominions to the British officer for whom the leave had been asked, but—for the want of courtesy with which this refusal had been marked in the absence of any expression of regret." ‡ But Lord Northbrook's gentleness seems to have been lost on the Amir; for soon afterwards, when permission was asked (and really greatly needed) for the return of our Yarkund Envoy to India through Cabul, the Amir positively refused to allow him to enter Afghan territory, and notified the refusal to the Viceroy in the following remarkable terms § :—

> "A letter has recently been received by the hands of Ibrahim Khan, attached to the Yarkund Mission, from Mr. T. D. Forsyth, C.B. An exact copy of that letter and the reply is herewith forwarded. It is certain that Mr. Forsyth has not been informed of the objections of Afghanistan and the conversation which took place between your Excellency and my Envoy. Your Excellency will certainly (now) inform Mr. Forsyth."

The Amir's bitterness was subsequently increased when Lord Northbrook expostulated with him on his breach of faith in throwing

* The Duke of Argyll suspects ("Eastern Question," p. 342) that the Amir was afraid to take the rupees, lest they might be "the price of some renewed proposal to send British officers into his country"! The idea about "sending British officers" is, to the Duke, very much what King Charles's head was to Mr. Dick; he cannot keep it out of his pages, and it crops up again and again in the queerest places.

† "Afghan Correspondence," p. 120. ‡ "Eastern Question," p. 343.

§ *See* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 123.

his son Yakub Khan into prison; and still more so when Lord Northbrook's Government committed the extraordinary blunder of sending a direct mission to the Mir of Wakhan, one of the Amir's feudatory chiefs.* And, in fact, during all these years of Lord Northbrook's rule, the Viceroy and the Amir were always and in every way at cross purposes.

Mr. Grant Duff, with characteristic levity, makes light of all these insults and bickerings. He says:—

> "All this, however, was not very important. Diplomacy exists for the purpose of smoothing away difficulties of this kind, and if the Duke of Argyll had remained at the India Office, and Lord Northbrook at Calcutta, Shere Ali would gradually have been won back into perfect good humour."

He chooses to ignore the fact that, for nearly three long years after the unfortunate break at Simla in 1873, Lord Northbrook remained in India, and still Sher Ali was further than ever from being "won back"—on the contrary, he was literally forced into the arms of Russia. In June 1874 General Llamakin, Governor of the Russian provinces on the Caspian, issued a circular, which intimated that he claimed for Russia sovereignty over the Turkoman tribes between the Caspian and Merv. The Russian advance became more daring and rapid than ever; and during the last years of Lord Northbrook's viceroyalty, envoys and messages of friendship were continually passing between Tashkend and Cabul,† whilst the Amir was treating with insult any British officer who showed his nose on the frontier!

* Mr. Grant Duff disposes of this blunder ("Afghan Policy," p. 16) by calling it "a little slip, for which the Government of India apologised."

† Later on, at the time of his repulsing the Chamberlain Mission, the Amir boldly wrote to the Viceroy, "The Russian Envoy has come, *and has come with my permission.*" The Duke of Argyll, of course, blames Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton for objecting to these close and intimate relations between Russia and Cabul—forgetful that Russia had solemnly promised that Afghanistan should be regarded as "outside the sphere of her influence." The Duke allows that Lord Northbrook himself had on one occasion complained of the tone of one of the Russian letters to the Ameer; but, he adds ("Eastern Question," p. 444), "With this exception, it was entirely untrue that the Government of India had viewed the correspondence with alarm—on the contrary, as I have shown, both Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook had encouraged the Ameer to welcome (!) those letters, and to answer them with corresponding courtesy." As far as this allegation concerns Lord Mayo, it is sufficient to remember that the Russo-Afghan correspondence had hardly begun in his time, and that Shere Ali loyally consulted him about every communication that was received. I have shown how different affairs were in Lord Northbrook's time; and I imagine most readers will think that, if the Duke's allegation be true that Lord Northbrook "encouraged the Ameer to welcome those letters," it was only another instance of that nobleman's remarkable meekness under insults offered to the Viceroy of India.

8. Lord Lytton's Attempts to win back the Amir.

Before Lord Northbrook left India, Lord Salisbury had succeeded the Duke of Argyll at the India Office, and had resolutely set himself to repair, as far as possible, the mischief caused by the mistakes of his predecessor. He directed Lord Northbrook's serious attention to the subject, and suggested that advances should be made to the Amir, with the view of placing a British Agent at Herat, who might let us know something of what was going on in the Central Asian border-lands. Nothing, however, was done until Lord Lytton's arrival; and it should be noticed (in reply to those who, imbued with the Duke of Argyll's mania, suggest that this intention of Lord Salisbury's may have further alarmed the Amir) *that no intimation of this idea reached the Amir until the end of* 1876, *and long after he had refused to receive a messenger from the Viceroy, though at the very time two Russian Agents were at his Court.*

From the Despatch of the Government of India, dated 10th May 1877 (see "Afghan Correspondence," pp. 161–172), it will be seen that from the first Lord Lytton treated the Amir with the utmost courtesy and delicacy. As soon as he arrived in Calcutta, he sent his own Native aide-de-camp, Resaldar Khanan Khan, with most friendly messages and a cordial letter to Sher Ali; wherein he informed His Highness of his intention to depute a British Envoy of rank, *temporarily*, to Cabul, *or to any other place convenient to the Amir*, to confer on "matters of common interest to the two Governments." Not even the Duke of Argyll's imagination can find in these messages or this letter any reference to, or suggestion of, British Agents; and everything was said that could be thought of as likely to reassure the mind of Sher Ali. But to us, who now know fully the state of the Amir's feelings at the time of Lord Northbrook's retirement, it will hardly be surprising that even the most courteous and considerate treatment could not avail to win him back to the feelings with which he had regarded Lord Mayo's Government. Moreover, he had at the very time two Russian Agents at his Court, he was engaged in constant correspondence with General Kaufmann, and he was actually making preparations for the preaching of a *Jihad* or holy war against us throughout Afghanistan. He stubbornly declined to receive Lord Lytton's Envoy, and requested the Viceroy to *write* what he wanted to say—of course, with the intention of taking General Kaufmann's opinion and advice on the British communication.

Lord Lytton replied with firmness, but with the greatest patience and consideration, urging the Amir to "consider seriously, before

he rejected our proposals, the consequences to himself of obliging the British Government to look upon him henceforth as a prince who had voluntarily isolated his personal interests from its proffered alliance and support."* Sher Ali did not answer this letter for nearly two months, and then repeated his refusal to receive the Viceroy's messenger; but proposed that the British *Vakil* (or Native Agent) at Cabul should be summoned to Simla to hear what the British Government wished to say. This *Vakil's* communications (according to Sir R. Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur †; Mr. Thornton, the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab‡; and every other official concerned with them) had always been most unsatisfactory, and he was evidently particularly anxious to avoid any risk of being superseded in Afghanistan by either temporary or permanent European Agents. Still, Lord Lytton was so determined to give the Amir every chance for a reconciliation, that he consented to summon the *Vakil;* and entrusted to his hands a written document, to be communicated to Sher Ali, dated the 13th of October 1876. It is impossible to conceive of any language more friendly, more dignified, more worthy of a British Viceroy, than the language of this document; and the policy which it disclosed, identical with that which had been vainly hoped for by Lord Mayo and suppressed by the Duke of Argyll, was as generous as it was wise. I give it in full for the judgment of my readers §:—

"I authorise the Agent to tell the Amir that I am glad to find it in my power to relieve his mind from many apprehensions as to my intentions, which appear to have been caused by circumstances previous to my assumption of the Government of India.

"2. I authorise the Agent to tell the Amir that, if His Highness wishes to make me his friend, I will be a warm and true, a fast and firm, friend to him, doing all that is practically in my power to stand by him in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to confirm the succession in the person of his son Sirdar Abdullah Jan.

"3. I am, therefore, willing to give him a Treaty of friendship and alliance, and also to afford him assistance in arms, men, and money, for the defence of his territory against unprovoked foreign invasion. I am further willing to give him immediate pecuniary assistance, and to give to his son, Abdullah Jan, the public recognition and support of the British Government.

"4. But I cannot do any one of these things unless the Amir is, on his part, equally willing to afford me the practical means

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 167.
† *Ibid.*, p. 137. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 143. § *Ibid.*, p. 185.

of assisting his Highness in the protection of his frontier, by the residence of a British Agent at Herat, and at such other parts of that frontier, most exposed to danger from without, as may be hereafter agreed upon.

"I do not even wish to embarrass the Amir, whose present difficulties I fully sympathise with, by carrying out this arrangement until after the signature of a Treaty of Alliance between us, on terms which ought to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our friendship; nor until after the Amir shall have had the means of making known to his people that the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan signifies that he is there *without interfering in internal State matters*, as the firm supporter of the Amir and of the heir-apparent, to aid them with all the influence and power of the British Government in defending their country against foreign aggression, and to discourage attempts on the part of the disaffected to disturb its internal tranquillity or weaken the throne of His Highness.

5. "It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the external affairs of the frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled.

6. "I have no wish to disturb the existing Native Agency at Cabul, or to urge upon the Ameer the reception of a permanent British Envoy at his Court, *if His Highness thinks the presence of such an Envoy would be a source of embarrassment to him.* But, in that case, I should, of course, expect that no obstacle be placed in the way of confidential communications between myself and His Highness, by means of special Envoys, whenever the interests of the two Governments may require them.

7. "In short, it is my object and desire that the Treaty of friendship and alliance, as well as the presence of British Agents on the Afghan frontier, should be a great strength and support to the Ameer, both at home as well as abroad, and not a source of weakness or embarrassment to him.

8. "I am quite ready to consult with the Ameer, in a friendly and confidential way, through our respective Representatives, as to the best means of placing our relations on the permanent footing of a Treaty engagement by which his independence and dignity will be assured in a manner satisfactory to himself as well as to the British Government. But, unless the Ameer agrees to the arrangement indicated in paragraph 4 of this Note, and cordially enters into it, it will not be practically

in my power to undertake any obligations on his behalf, or to do anything for his assistance, whatever may be the dangers or difficulties of his future position."

When the *Vakil* returned to Cabul, the Amir refused to see him for some weeks, under the pretence of sickness; and the interview, when tardily accorded, was an unfriendly one. There was a further delay of three months; and when at last (January 28th, 1877) the Afghan Minister, Nur Muhammad, came down to Peshawur to discuss matters with Sir Lewis Pelly, it was soon evident that his one object was to befool the British Government. Nur Muhammad's illness and death put an end to the fruitless conference; and Lord Lytton had no choice but to refuse to sanction its renewal. For, by this time, Sher Ali was openly preaching "holy war" against us throughout Cabul.* He issued, to the whole of the tribes down to the frontier, the *sanads*—obtained from the Akhoond of Swat, the great high-priest of the fanatical party in that country—proclaiming *Jihad* against the British Government. This fanatical outbreak might have occurred at any moment. Within our own territories, the Vernacular Press was teeming with articles which indicated the wildest political excitement amongst the dangerous classes, and a general feeling of anxiety and unrest even amongst the usually peaceable subjects of the Empire. Ever since the rejection of the Afghan overtures by Lord Northbrook in 1873, the complicity of the Amir with Russian aggression and the warm intimacy of the relations between the Russian and Afghan Governments had been the common topics of every bazaar in Northern India; and the native papers now began to talk openly and confidently of an impending Russian advance on Hindostan.† Affairs,

* "Afghan Correspondence," p. 171.

† How far these Indian rumours of hostile designs on the part of the enemies of India were well-founded, may be to some extent gathered from the following extract from the report of General Roberts on the occupation of Cabul ("Afghanistan," 1880, p. 171):—"I think the closeness of the connexion between Russia and Kabul, and the extent of the Amir's hostility towards ourselves, has not hitherto been fully recognised. Yakub Khan's statements throw some light upon this question, and they are confirmed by various circumstances which have lately come to my knowledge. The prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul, and the extensive military preparations made by Sher Ali of late years, appear to me to afford an instructive comment upon Yakub Khan's assertions. Our recent rupture with Sher Ali has, in fact, been the means of unmasking and checking *a very serious conspiracy* against the peace and security of our Indian Empire. The magnitude of Sher Ali's military preparations is, in my opinion, a fact of peculiar significance. I have already touched upon this point in a former letter, but I shall perhaps be excused for noticing it again. Before the outbreak of hostilities last year the Amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision 68 regiments of infantry and 16 of cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to near 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artizans were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and breech-loading small arms. More than a million pounds of powder, and, I believe, several million rounds of home-made Snider ammunition were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other articles of military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities. Finally,

too, in Europe were (as we all know) most critical. This was the time, these were the British difficulties and dangers, which called forth the *patriotic* exultation of the Duke of Argyll. He says: ("Eastern Question," pp. 446, 447)—"At this very time the firmness of the Emperor of Russia at Livadia was confounding all the feeble and dilatory pleas of the English Cabinet."

The state of affairs in Europe rendered it necessary for the Government of India to remain passive, so long as it could do so with dignity, and so long as the Amir did not actually commence hostilities. But it was obviously useless to attempt any further, for the present, to put our relations with him on a proper footing; and all immediate intercourse between the two Governments ceased. No kindness or long-suffering could efface from the mind of a man, so naturally suspicious and morose as the Amir, the remembrance of his treatment during the disastrous *régime* of the Duke of Argyll.

Conclusion.

I have said that Lord Lytton's Government, firm in the consciousness of right, desired to abstain from active interference in Afghanistan, so long as it was possible to do so with dignity. But the time soon came when this was no longer possible. A grand Russian Mission, headed by a Russian Governor, a General in the Russian Army, and escorted by Cossacks and Uzbegs, made its way to Cabul with all the military pomp of a great Power.* At Mazar-i-sharif and at other places on its route, it was received by the Afghan troops with full military honours; at Cabul the Amir welcomed it in a magnificent Durbar, and celebrated its advent with a grand review of his army. Its advance was regarded with a mixture of awe and admiration throughout Asia, and sent a thrill of intense

Sher Ali had expended upon the construction of the Sherpur cantonments an astonishing amount of labour and money. The extent and cost of this work may be judged of from the fact that the whole of the troops under my command will find cover during the winter within the cantonment and its outlying buildings, and the bulk of them in the main line of rampart itself, which extends to a length of nearly two miles under the southern and western slopes of the Bemaru hills. Sher Ali's original design was apparently to carry the wall entirely round the hills, a distance of five miles, and the foundations were already laid for a considerable portion of this length. All these military preparations were quite unnecessary except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with ourselves, and *it is difficult to understand how their entire cost could have been met from the Afghan Treasury*, the gross revenue of the country amounting only to about eighty lacs of rupees per annum."

* This is the Mission for which Mr. Grant Duff apologises, on the ground that it was "only a very little one"; he terms it "a very insignificant Mission" (p. 16), and, again, "a little intrigue" (p. 17).

excitement through every city in India. Had the Duke of Argyll been in power, and had he tamely acquiesced in this situation, it is simply no exaggeration to say we might as well have prepared to give up India at once.* Lord Lytton determined that the time had come when we had no choice but to insist that England should not be thus openly humiliated in the face of Asia. Is it too much to say that every true Englishman agreed with the Viceroy?—and yet, because Parliament thought so, and voted accordingly in support of Lord Beaconsfield throughout the Afghan difficulties, Mr. Grant Duff calls the House of Commons of which he is a member, "the Publicans' Parliament"!

Lord Lytton entrusted the British Mission to the leading of Sir Neville Chamberlain, a distinguished frontier officer, and formerly a great friend of Sher Ali's; and he announced its approach by a native gentleman of rank, a trusted Afghan subject of the Queen. The circumstances of the repulse of that Mission with insult and violence,† and the subsequent events, are too recent and too well-known to call for detailed notice here. The policy which has been consistently and successfully followed by Her Majesty's Government has, happily for the dignity of England and the stability of the Indian Empire, been cordially approved by the British Parliament, the British Press, and above all, by the British Public. That policy has removed for ever all cause of anxiety respecting the north-west frontier of India, and for the future we can contemplate the move-

* Even Mr. Grant Duff can appreciate this; and his account of "what the Liberals would have done" is too rich not to be noticed here. He says:—"We should have said at St. Petersburg, 'Although this is not a direct breach of your agreement with Lord Clarendon in 1869, yet under all the circumstances you must see that it is not in accordance with the spirit of that agreement that you should be at Cabul just at this moment, and we must request you to withdraw.' Such requests mean a good deal, and are always complied with by States which do not mean to go to war. . . . The next step would have been to say to the Ameer, of course in the most courteous diplomatic language, 'We have had but to say one word and the Russian Mission disappears from your capital. Don't you think you had better reconsider yourself and get back into good temper?' Very soon he would have been as amenable as he was at Umballa."

Mr. Grant Duff is evidently one of those sanguine persons who "call spirits from the vasty deep" and expect them to come. At any rate, the experiences of Lord Northbrook's viceroyalty are hardly so encouraging as to justify such confident hopes of the Liberals making the Amir "as amenable as he was at Umballa"!

† Mr. Gladstone and some of his more rabid partizans—in that spirit of apology and sympathy for the enemies of England which has, alas, disfigured so many of their speeches during the late crisis—have most absurdly objected to the statement that the Chamberlain Mission was "repulsed *with insult and violence*." As Sir Louis Cavagnari was the officer who was actually repulsed, even Mr. Gladstone will, perhaps, allow that his opinion is entitled to some weight. He states (19th January 1879) that the Commandant of Ali Masjid told him "that if the Mission advanced it would be opposed *by force*"; and Sir Louis concludes: "there was, judging from the hostile preparations made, but slight difference as regards the indignity offered to the friendly British Mission, whether words or bullets conveyed the *insult* intended by the Afghan Government."

ments of Russian armies in those regions with the indifference of absolute security. It has given us a frontier-line that is cheaply and easilyde fensible, in place of the old hap-hazard frontier whereon we could have been disturbed and harassed at the sweet will of any invader*; and by thus strengthening the natural defences of our Indian Empire, it has at once restored confidence to the minds of our peaceful Indian subjects, and rendered possible at no distant date a cheaper military system for that country. It has not only regained for us the respect of the warlike races of Northern India, who were beginning to suspect (and openly to suggest) that our meekness under insults unendurable to a high-spirited nation was due to our timidity; but it has also aroused among them an active spirit of enthusiastic loyalty, engendered of perils shared and triumphs won by gallant Englishmen and brave Indians fiighting shoulder-to-shoulder.†

The English nation and the peoples of India have joined to deplore the untimely fate of the noble Cavagnari and his gallant escort, to punish the miserable assassins who perpetrated the foul deed, and to assert the majesty of the Indian Empire in the wild border-lands of Central Asia. The policy of Her Majesty's Ministers has been the *national* policy alike of England and of India. That policy, resolutely followed in spite of Opposition sneers and predictions of disaster, has overcome all the difficulties and all the dangers of our position in India, and has secured our legitimate ascendancy throughout the approaches of our vast Asiatic Empire. In the words of that

* The Duke of Argyll and Mr. Grant Duff appear to agree with Mr. Gladstone in pooh-poohing the dangers of the old, and the advantages of the new, frontier; and they express much confidence in the accuracy of their military views, though therein they differ from all competent military authorities. I need quote only one opinion, that of Lord Napier of Magdala, formerly Commander-in-Chief in India, who sufficiently closely expresses the opinions of all the rest. His Lordship says ("Afghan Correspondence," p. 226) :—"Our policy of masterly inactivity, or, rather, of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster. It has been frequently asserted, by people with pretensions to speak with authority, that we shall be secure if we remain within our mountain boundary. But this is at variance with all history. A mountain chain that can be pierced in many places is no security if you hide behind it. India has been often entered through her mountain barrier, which was never defended. India waited to fight the battle in her own plains, and invariably lost it. How much Austria lost in not defending the Bohemian mountains! What might have been the position of the Turks had they properly secured the passage of the Balkans?"

† I venture to believe that no other part of the tactics of the extreme Gladstone party has excited so much disgust and indignation in the mind of the fairplay-loving Englishman, as the shameless—and, as they have since been proved, absolutely unfounded—charges of cruel and unsoldierly conduct, brought against our brave troops and their leaders when they were not here to defend themselves.

great statesman, to whose genius and to whose just appreciation of the greatness of England and the glorious birthright of her sons is due so largely this rehabilitation of our national name and fame, "The gates of the Indian Empire are now safe in our keeping, and with the help of God we mean to retain possession of them."

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LECTURE.

Friday, December 13th, 1878.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY C. RAWLINSON, K.C.B., F.R.S., &c., &c., in the Chair.

THE STRATEGICAL CONDITIONS OF OUR INDIAN NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

By Major-General E. B. HAMLEY, C.B., R.A.

I APPEAR here, in compliance with the desire of the Committee, to offer some remarks on our Indian frontier. I should not have ventured to volunteer to do so, and I do it, I will not say with reluctance, for I am happy to comply with any wish of the Committee, but certainly not without misgiving, feeling that among you there are certainly some, perhaps many, Indian officials of the highest distinction. But I am encouraged by the thought that a personal acquaintance with a territory is not indispensable to the formation of strategical opinions about it—if it were, the majority of the most famous campaigns would never have been planned. I am encouraged, too, by feeling how little aid the subject requires from me to render it interesting—never has the interest it has excited been so strong as now, though for nearly thirty years it has been warmly discussed by the best minds in India. These still contest each other's conclusions, from widely divergent points of view, and I may therefore perhaps consider it a point in my favour that I have approached the subject without bias, as I would any other strategical problem, desirous only of arriving at a right conclusion, and uninfluenced by the weight of opinion on the one side or the other.

First, let us look to the Indus—often spoken of as the natural frontier of India. To be a good line of defence a river, besides being difficult to cross, should have protected bridges in the possession of the defender, connected by good communications on the defender's bank, and that bank should, at important points, command the other. The Indus is unbridged by any permanent structure. In its upper half it is a swift, even turbulent, stream flowing mostly in a deep rocky bed—from 100 to 400 yards wide—in its lower, though still swift, it flows between flat banks and frequently changes its channel —insomuch that the bridge of one year might be left on dry ground

the next. When the snows melt the river rises and spreads widely over its banks—thus bridges would at times be swept away or submerged, and roads along the bank would be useless. There is a bridge of boats at Attock which has been frequently carried away, and another was thrown two years ago at Khooshalghur. Nevertheless, I believe that permanent bridges might be thrown—it is merely a question of expense. The left bank is flat throughout and is frequently commanded by the right. These are circumstances to be taken into account when we are told that the Indus is the proper frontier of India.

Beyond the river, at an average distance of some fifty miles, runs the frontier line, which let us define for the present purpose as limited on the right by a point opposite the Khyber, on the left by one opposite the Bolan. The distance measured along the river in rear of this line from Attock to Sukkur is about 500 miles, the frontier line of course being considerably longer. This frontier runs for great part of its length along the foot of a mountain range, penetrated between the Bolan and the Khyber only by a few difficult passes. Now of all barriers, that which gives most security, next perhaps to a great desert, is a range of this kind, and hence a few thousand men to prevent the depredations of the hill tribes, suffice to protect an extent of frontier which, were it of a different kind, with a powerful neighbour on the other side, would demand, in case of a formidable war, vast armies, and even in peace very considerable forces, for its defence. There are several passes between the two I have named, but besides the Khyber, it will only be necessary to speak of two in this part of the frontier, the Kurrum, issuing in our territory at Thull and Kohat, and the Gomal, issuing opposite Dera Ismail Khan. Others exist—there is one that issues in the bed of the Kurrum river near Thull—but besides that we know little of them, except that they are exceedingly difficult, there is another reason why I should not occupy any time in describing any south of the Gomal.

There will be no dispute that the Khyber is, of these three, the fittest for the passage of a column of all arms. It is much the shortest, the easiest, the best supplied with water, and connects directly the most important points, namely, the city of Caubul with a favourable place for bridging the Indus at Attock, whence, by the great road, to Lahore, and thence into the valley of the Ganges.

Of the Kurrum we have learnt a good deal. It is easy of passage all the way from the Indus to the Paiwar Pass, but from thence to the point where it joins the hill road between Caubul and Ghuznee, at Kushi, it is of exceeding difficulty, impassable for any kind of vehicle, and rendering the supply of even a lightly equipped column an arduous task. Whether General Roberts had at first any vehicles in his train I do not know. It is to be inferred that he had not, from the fact that his light guns were carried on mules, his heavier artillery on the backs of elephants—however this may be, we may be certain he has none now. The issue of this pass in our territory at Thull is 100 miles from that of the Khyber. A column so strong and well equipped as to be independent could not pass here; one that

Himalaya Mountains
Herat
Bamiyan
Caubul
Jelalabad
Dhaka
Khyber P.
Peshawur
Attock
Kushi
Kurrum
Ghuznee
Kohat
Rawal Pindi
Thull
Khooshiarghur
Helmund R.
AFGHANISTAN
PERSIA
Ghirishk
Kandahar
Gomal P.
R. Indus
Jhelum
Dera Ismael Khan
Lahore
SEISTAN
Arid plain
Khojak P.
Ghwaja P.
Luni P.
Sanga P.
Sandy Desert
Quetta
Bolan P.
Dadur
Dera Ghazee Khan
Mooltan
INDIA
Kelat
Gundava
Mithun Kote
Mithri
Indus Valley Railway
Shikkur
Larkhana
BALUCHISTAN
Indus Valley Railway
Beila
Sonmeanee
Kurrachee
A SKETCH MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE
GENERAL HAMLEY'S LECTURE
English Miles:
0
50
100
200
300

could not act independently would scarcely venture; and it is not likely, therefore, that any serious attack will be made by way of the Kurrum, or of that other pass which issues near it.

The Gomal, from Ghuznee, does not present the insuperable difficulties of the Kurrum, and could be made practicable, though not easy, for a column of all arms; at the best it would still present much steep broken extent of track, and many narrow passes. It is very circuitous, and about a third longer than the Khyber, from which it is distant 200 miles.

In forming an idea of a march in force through such passes, it may assist us to remember that an English Army Corps, say 24,000 strong with artillery, extends with its combatant forces only, on a European road about 16 miles in length, and with its trains 27 miles. Allowing only a slight increase for the nature of the road, the combatants of a similar force in the pass would stretch 18 miles, the total with trains 30. Thus, when the head of the combatant column issued from the pass, its rear would be nearly two days' march behind; and considering the host of animals required for the necessary supplies on such an expedition, the rear of the trains could then scarcely be less than six days behind the head of the column, that is to say, only about two marches beyond Jellalabad.

Accustomed as we are to see the mountain chains of Europe successfully passed by great armies, we must be careful to remember how different in depth are those ranges from the hills of Afghanistan. In a couple of marches the Prussian armies were through the Bohemian mountains, and presently combined in the attack at Sadowa. But here, the shortest pass through the barrier, that between Caubul and the Indus Valley, is 190 miles long—the Gomal nearly 300 miles—and not days but weeks are occupied in the isolated march.

Now, when we remember what an invading army of India implies—that it shall bear with it the means of passing the Indus—that it shall be prepared to encounter the forces of our Indian Empire—and that, thus formidable in numbers and equipment, it must rely for supplies on the path through which it has issued, we shall form some idea of the difficulties which would encompass an army in its attempt to enter India by these routes; and these difficulties I will ask you to bear in mind when I recur to this part of the subject. Let us next see what conditions another part of the theatre may present. But first let me pause to say what I understand by an invading army. Not all the assembled forces of the Afghans—not such a Russian force as we saw lately assembling on the frontier of Bokhara—not such an army as Persia can at present send forth—any or all of these would fall far short of the requirements of such an enterprise. But I will suppose that Russia has completed those improvements in her communications which we know she persistently contemplates; that she has united the Caspian and the Aral by a railway; or that, combining with Persia, she has made a convenient way from the southern shore of the Caspian to Herat; that the ruler of Afghanistan has thrown in his lot with them; and that within the fortified triangle Herat, Kandahar, Caubul, the dispositions for this great undertaking have been brought

deliberately, with all the aids of military science, to completion. We may be assured that an invading army of India, such as we cannot afford to despise, will be no improvised force, no barbarous horde, but truly formidable in numbers, organization, and leadership. And I will further assume for the moment that, as has been so often recommended, we await the attack in the valley of the Indus.

From Caubul the confederated forces of the enemy, posted as I have suggested, will threaten an advance through the western passes; from Kandahar they will threaten an advance through the Bolan. Let us follow the movements of what we may call the enemy's Army of the Bolan, assembled about Kandahar. As it moves south it will find the character of the country very different from that of the mountain districts of the north. The hills are no longer of impenetrable aspect; manœuvring ground exists almost everywhere; a great part of the country consists of extensive plains; and though there are a few passes, formidable if held, yet they are by no means such obstacles as those of the Suleiman range. Over one of these, the Khojak, the road passes to Quetta. From thence the main road, and that chiefly used by caravans travelling to the Indus valley, is through the Bolan Pass to Dadur. There is another excellent road to Khelat. From Khelat there are two ways into this portion of the Indus valley, one direct but difficult, the other circuitous but practicable, both leading on Gundava. But the best road, one that with a little labour might be called good, is that through the Bolan, the length of which pass is 59 miles.

But when I speak of these roads issuing in the valley of the Indus, I must indicate the circumstances under which they enter it. The mountain barrier which has continued to define our frontier down to a point in advance of Mittree on the Indus, there turns west and forms the frontier of Khelat for a considerable distance, when it resumes its southerly direction. It follows that the right bank of the Indus from about Mittree to far below Larkhana is an immense plain. Travellers passing along the river there, see the horizon extending like that of the ocean. Into this great plain the Army of the Bolan would issue at a hundred miles from our frontier, and, while halting to concentrate its lengthened columns, and to fortify the passes in its rear, it would see before it a space of the valley of at least 150 miles in width, on any part of which to direct its attack; and having formed its plan it could, I am told on the best authority, advance in the dry season nearly everywhere across this plain on a wide formation and accompanied closely by all its trains and baggage. Regular routes lead from Gundava upon Larkhana, while Dadur, besides being in direct communication with Gundava, is the place whence most of the roads diverge leading to points in the specified portion of the Indus valley.

Now, though this plain is poor, and though it requires a little experienced management to obtain a good supply of water from it, I would put it to you whether such an invading army as I have imagined could reasonably hope for more favourable circumstances in which to enter a theatre of war than those in which it would here find itself.

Pausing for a moment here, let us look back to the other side of the theatre, and suppose that an army is also moving from Caubul to the Indus valley. We know that it will advance in long processional order down the Gomal or the Khyber Passes—that it will issue at once through narrow gaps, into the presence of the defender's troops—that it will have, or ought to have, to fight with the heads of its columns even for the power of making its first deployments, and that when deployed the greater part of the army will have at its back, not practicable lines of supply, or of retreat, but impassable mountains. It will not be contested that this is a very different situation from that of the Bolan Army—in the one case we have an army issuing, in the form of columns, close to the enemy—in the other an army advancing on a full front with the enemy still at a distance. I conclude, therefore, that however the enemy may think it proper to distract us by feints or diversions here, the main line of advance will be on the Lower Indus.

Next, as to how we should meet the invasion. The port of Kurrachee is a point where troops and stores from England, from our Mediterranean stations, from Bombay, can easily and conveniently concentrate. It is also the terminus of the Indus Valley Railway, which, if not actually completed, is so near completion that I will take it as an accomplished fact. By rail, and also by the river, navigable for large steamers to beyond Sukkur, the readiest means exist of concentrating from home and elsewhere, as indicated, upon the Lower Indus. From Lahore, by Mooltan, the same part of the Indus is reached by rail—the communication across the river being by steamboat. And from Lahore also a railway now extending to, or beyond Jhelum, and which will shortly reach the Indus, affords a ready means of reinforcing Peshawur. This Indus Valley railway is not to be measured by the capacities of our English railways. It is only a single line, burns wood for fuel, and maintains but a moderate rate of speed. But, as it is, it is invaluable; it enables the Bengal troops to combine easily with those of Bombay, and it gives great facility for reinforcing either extremity of our frontier line. The Quetta column has already profited by it, having been conveyed by rail from Mooltan to a station opposite Mithun Kote; and all troops from Bombay or Kurrachee will also experience its benefits. And in a more momentous crisis than the present, such a one as I have been supposing to exist, we should bring our whole force to bear in this part of the theatre. In fact, there is, I think, no spot in the world where we could make such a military display of strength at short notice as on the Lower Indus. Thus, with the passes suitably guarded, the Army of the Lower Indus assembled beyond the river, the reserves at Lahore and Mooltan ready to reinforce either of our two Armies, we should be in a situation full of promise, and it was the consideration of it which caused me to express elsewhere the opinion that we ought, with good management, to give an excellent account of any foe who should attack us in the valley of the Indus.

But good grounds as there are for taking that view on our side, I

have also just endeavoured to show that the enemy's Army of the Bolan would meet us here under the most favourable circumstances that it could possibly hope for—its rear secured, its front open, its advance easy, and with a wide space of our frontier upon which to direct its operations. Moreover, it is to be observed that the railway so invaluable as our line of communication, and protected in its upper portion by the river, runs from Sukkur to Kurrachee on the right bank, and that we could scarcely hope, before having fought a decisive action, to guard it against the enemy's enterprises throughout the wide extent on which they would menace it. I will, therefore, now pass to the consideration of whether we shall not meet that enemy to much better advantage on a more advanced line.

The argument which is always put forward in support of the plan of remaining on the defensive is, that we should thus await amid our resources an enemy who would have advanced to a great distance from his. The argument thus stated would imply that it is always judicious to await invasion. But this is manifestly not true, for the majority of brilliant campaigns have been those of invasion. It is sometimes a judicious course, sometimes not. It is judicious when adopted by the weaker nation, deficient in the money, material, and organization which an offensive campaign implies, and at the same time possessing a frontier and a country topographically strong. But we certainly should not like to consider ourselves as likely to be the weaker party, either in resources or in organization, in the contest I have contemplated. Again, a defensive war will often combine the parts of an otherwise discordant empire in a patriotic union against the common enemy. But it is, I believe, the concurrent testimony of all Indians, that there is no territory on which it could be more perilous to give an enemy the chance of winning a battle than our Indian Empire.

Let us look, then, towards a more advanced line; and here our task is much simplified by the fact that we have already occupied Quetta. By doing so, it is *we* who are in the position of commanding an avenue into the enemy's country, and of securing the passes in our rear; while we have the further inestimable advantage of having reached the back of the mountain district—that is to say, of holding the issue of the frontier, and of seeing before us a country, not of course without its difficulties, but offering at the same time immensely increased facilities for skilled operations. We are thus, too, carrying forward our theatre of war out of our own territory, which we cover by our advance. And for communications, besides those before enumerated, the construction of the branch railway from the Indus to Dadur, already designed and officially talked of as intended, will annul in great degree the distance of Quetta from the frontier and remove any difficulties attending the march.

Looking next at the avenues *out* of Quetta, we find the high road to Kandahar, which offers no difficulty to the march of any column, except the Khojak Pass, the nature of which as an obstacle has, I believe, been greatly exaggerated. Another road to the left of it passes also over the Khojak range; and there is still another marked on the side of the desert. But, though our troops, in former campaigns,

frequently marched through that country, being in small bodies they moved only on one road, and we know nothing from actual observation of the two I have mentioned. There is another road which, branching north-east from the Kandahar road, a little way out of Quetta, traverses the hill country, and this, though very rugged, we know can be used by troops of all arms, for the Bombay division moved by it in the former war from Ghuznee upon Quetta. And what I would specially call attention to, lest you should think I had dismissed the subject of the passes too briefly, is that by occupying Quetta we practically close all passes to the Indus Valley which issue south of Dera Ismail Khan.

Strategically, then, I hope there remains no doubt of the immense advantage of holding Quetta, whether as a means of controlling Afghanistan or of meeting such a formidable combination of enemies as I have contemplated. Proceeding to inquire what tactical features it may offer, it appears that, on passing the Bolan, the road goes for some twelve miles over a waterless plain, before entering the cultivated district, also a plain, which surrounds the town. Quetta stands round an isolated conical hill which commands the plain behind it, but is itself commanded by high ground in its front. It became, therefore, of importance to know how this might be remedied: and I am informed by the very capable Officer who surveyed the district, that a mile or two in front of the town, and within Khelat territory, there is an excellent position, far out of reach of any other commanding ground, and dominating the valley beyond. This seems to be confirmed by a late telegram from there, which mentions an additional fort just constructed as having rendered Quetta quite impregnable. On the left of Quetta, between it and the desert, the line of hills is only passable at a single gap; and a similar range, not passable at all, exists on the right. Tactically, then, as well as strategically, for defence, as well as offence, against either a powerful or an inferior enemy, it would appear alike advantageous; and while the policy of taking possession of it has for many years been powerfully opposed, and while the measure was carried into effect almost unnoticed in this country, it appears, if the advantages are such as I have stated, that we have here the most valuable possession on which England has laid her hand for many a day.

Having got so far, however, the question is not yet settled of whether we have yet reached our most advantageous frontier. I have considered the confederated forces as within the triangle Herat, Caubul, Kandahar—the richest, most open, and most temperate portion of Afghanistan: and if they meant to attack us, whether in the valley of the Indus, or at Quetta, their position would be strong, and strong also against attack. Caubul would, so long as they might hold it, threaten Peshawur—and Kandahar would form a strong point of concentration for an advance. And the hostile Army so placed might, without imprudence, send an advanced force to occupy the Khojak Pass, the only very difficult or specially defensible part of the road between Quetta and Kandahar, about 90 miles from Kandahar, 60 from

Quetta, thus acquiring the option of receiving battle there, and, in case of its advance, the gaining of so much ground.

I will go on, then, to suppose that the result of our present operations is to give us the power, if we choose to use it, of occupying Kandahar, with a small space beyond it, necessary to complete its strategical value. The obstacle of the Khojak would thus disappear. At Kandahar, the richest district of Afghanistan lies before us. Several practicable roads lead from thence on Ghuznee and Caubul on the one side, on Herat on the other—and others lead from it down the Helmund to the Persian frontier and thence on Meshed, in the rear of Herat. The space beyond should therefore include a portion of the Helmund river, with the command of the passage at Girishk. Of the communications with Quetta I have already spoken.

It is to be noted that between Herat and Caubul, two of the great cities which I have supposed the enemy to occupy, lies the range of the Hazareh mountains, the road through which, between those cities, is so bad that the circuit by Kandahar, or by a route north of the mountains, is generally preferred. Hence another important consequence would follow from our occupation of Kandahar, namely, the rupture of the enemy's front; for if he occupied Caubul we could isolate the forces there from those at Herat—if he did not, we should be free to bring our whole strength to bear on the side of Herat. At Kandahar, too, we should hold such a position towards Persia as would seriously affect her relations with Russia; and finally, our presence there would be almost decisive against any design of the enemy to invade India through the passes. Observe, I do not say annex but occupy Kandahar, by friendly treaty, as we now occupy Quetta.

I think it is impossible to deny that our Army posted here, in a delightful climate, and with such strategical possibilities open to it, could desire no better field in which to contest with Russia and her allies the Empire of India. And perhaps many of you will think with me that the leader of that Army will be, in his opportunities, the most fortunate British soldier whom we have seen since Wellington.

Resting here, it becomes necessary to look at the other side of the strategical theatre, and to consider the question of an advance of our frontier-line from the Indus valley in that quarter also.

The road from the eastern issue of the Khyber to Caubul is marked by two chief difficulties. With those of the Khurd Khyber we are sufficiently familiar. Issuing from it a more open region presents itself, extending beyond Jellabadad.

The idea that some advance of our frontier might be expedient has come to be generally contemplated; this is tantamount in many minds to considering that any step forward must be advantageous; and one step that finds favour is that of pushing the frontier forward on this side to Jellalabad. One reason assigned for this is that we should thus command the valley which ascends from behind Jellalabad to Chitral. This point would never, I confess, have occurred to me had it not been indicated elsewhere; it seems to imply that we may expect the Russians that way. But what does such an expectation mean? It means that Russia, after pushing her forces to the sources of the

Oxus—after forming a secondary base or fresh starting point on the plateau of Pamir—after crossing the Hindu Kush—is to march 250 miles down this valley, and for what? If she desires to reach either Caubul or the Khyber, surely she will possess herself of a more direct and convenient route to those places. If she does, why take this? If she does not, is it to be supposed that she will enter on such an enterprise by such a line? But it will be seen that the case can be provided for in a general plan, and I will pass to the other reason that has been assigned, namely, that we should thus have secured the passage of the Khyber. Now, the permanent occupation of a point beyond that pass must have either a defensive or offensive object. First, as to the defensive. If a point in advance of the Khyber were the knot where a number of roads united which led from thence into the Indus Valley, the policy of occupying it would be obvious. But it covers nothing, and commands nothing, but the pass itself. Now the difficulty of supply by such a road would prevent a very large force from being permanently posted there. On the other hand there is nothing to prevent a powerful enemy who may possess Caubul from bringing any force he pleases to attack the permanent post in advance of the Khyber, which must then be reinforced if possible from the rear. Nor would the difficulty be remedied—on the contrary increased—if our defensive post were pushed further, through the pass beyond, to the Caubul valley; a measure which, I believe, nobody has ventured to propose. On the other hand, if the reason for proposing to take up such a position is that we should thus have accomplished a step towards obtaining entrance into the district beyond the mountains in an offensive campaign, we must remember that between that district and Jellalabad there are many difficult marches and at least one most formidable pass. None but a strong and well-equipped force, in fact an Army, could venture thus to menace such a fortress, with such support beyond it, as Caubul would present under the circumstances I have imagined.

Now it is to be noted that an Army here would be separated from an Army on the Lower Indus by at least 500 miles—from one at Quetta by at least 700 miles—from one at Kandahar by 850 miles. The British armies would, therefore, be under separate commands, and operating with distinct objects; nor could they combine except after important successes gained within the enemy's territory. The enemy, on the other hand, would possess the advantage of operating from a common centre against widely separated bodies advancing towards that centre. In fact, considering the difficulties of supplying this Khyber Army, we should be voluntarily adopting, in its worst form, the double line with all its disadvantages, and without the excuse of necessity, since we could throw our whole weight with full advantage on the other side. I think, therefore, there is much to be said against, nothing for, the occupation of a post beyond the Khyber, and that it would be a source not of strength but of weakness.

In saying what I think should not be done, I am prepared to say what I think should be done on this side; and it is satisfactory to me to think that the alternative plan, while, in my opinion,

the best in the military sense, involves no extension of territory, no expenditure worth mention, and no increase of frontier force. It consists, first, in blocking the mouths of the Khyber on our side of it with an intrenched camp armed with powerful artillery, to be garrisoned by the Peshawur troops, reinforced in case of need. If this were suitably occupied, I cannot conceive how an enemy's force, however superior, advancing, as it must of necessity, in lengthened, even straggling, array to the mouth of the Khyber, could expect ever to issue from it. It seems to be one of those cases where a fortress, often so doubtful an expedient, would be absolutely effectual. By fortress I mean those lines of works about a central work, that combination of fortress and camp, affording space for the manœuvres of its garrison, which modern engineering science considers the best kind of stronghold. And to view the matter by the light of comparison, let us suppose an attempt to secure the other end of the frontier, in Sind, with its 150 miles of flat front, by means of fortresses. It is evident that in that quarter a single fortress would not suffice—a system of fortresses would be needed, such as would swallow up an army. But in front of the Khyber a very moderate force in a single line of works would answer the purpose.

In like manner, an intrenched camp armed with heavy artillery might be placed at the issue of the Gomal Pass and occupied by the garrison of Dera Ismail Khan; and another, though rather to strengthen the feeling of security than from necessity, in front of the Kurrum.

To complete the system of defence, these posts should have in their rear protected passages over the Indus, connected with the railway by branch lines.

It is necessary to notice the plan of sending troops up the different passes and occupying the crests by way of advancing our frontier. Now I scarcely think that those who propose it have considered what it would be to maintain permanent posts on those inclement crests, with only such lines of communication and supply behind them as the valleys afford. And considering them as a preparation for subsequent operations in a campaign, we should, in using these passes for an advance, be operating not by double but by quadruple or quintuple lines of operations. Surely it would be nothing short of criminal thus to fritter away our strength when we can unite our forces, under a single leader, on the side of Quetta or Kandahar.

To leave no alternative untouched, I will now suppose that we have pushed through all the passes, made the mountain territory ours, and placed our posts on the road from Caubul to Kandahar. Let us consider for a moment how an extensive frontier is generally guarded. The line of communication between the posts should pass not through, but behind their front. Any of them when driven back should have secure lines by which to find support from others, and all when retiring should possess, in numerous roads, the means of concentrating upon important points. But what of this do we see in our supposed new frontier? There we have bodies widely apart, isolated by the first advance of the enemy, each with its own narrow pass to retire into—entering which it continues to be isolated from the others for weeks,

till it emerges, still at a great distance from them, in our present territory. I trust we shall not incur the charge of such a vast extent of barren territory, with its savage populations, for such a result as this, and that our notion of a rectified frontier will not include any of these isolated lines and posts thus unmeaningly thrust forward into the mountains. Any good that could possibly be hoped for from them would be much more effectually accomplished by the force at Kandahar.

Apart from the question of a more formidable foe, it appears to be believed that these posts pushed up the passes would lessen the chances of future contests with the unruly hill-tribes. That they are unruly would appear an excellent reason for keeping them in our front rather than in our rear. Posts separated by such distances and such inaccessible country, can exercise no influence on the inhabitants between; on the contrary we should thus be offering them new and potent means of molesting us. I fear that slenderly-escorted convoys would offer irresistible temptations to the half-starved hill-tribes. Such a measure then, in time of war most mischievous, as multiplying chances of disaster, would be in time of peace costly and burthensome, for it would not in the least obviate the necessity of keeping up our present line of frontier guards.

When, in the former war, our forces moved on Kandahar, the tribes of the south were no less hostile and mischievous to us than those of the north, and every march from the Bolan to the Khojak was marked by their depredations on our trains, by the slaughter of their conductors, by the murder of stray soldiers and numbers of defenceless camp followers. But a few years afterwards they were rendered thoroughly peaceable and friendly by vigorous handling and judicious management. At least one most distinguished Officer who took a leading part in the process still lives to tell us what the process was. It might be worth trying on other parts of the frontier; however that may be, the result for us, and one well worth taking into account, is that, to all appearance, our trains march as safely now from the Indus to the Khojak as from London to Aldershot.

The plan, then, to which I arrive at the end of this train of reasoning, has at least the merit of simplicity. The camps in front of the passes become the fixed pivot of operations: the main forces, assembled in the first instance where they can most easily assemble, that is to say, on the Lower Indus, are the active army. As I have said, I should feel confident of the result even in the valley of the Indus; I think our position vastly improved by the occupation of Quetta; but I should think it all we could desire if we occupied Kandahar. And whichever of these two points we select for the advanced post of our line it must be made the site of an intrenched camp powerfully armed, the railway to Dadur must be made, and the roads between it and the camp everywhere improved.

There is one case in which the garrison of the camp watching the Khyber might cease to be merely a defensive force. If, in the course of the campaign, as is likely, the Kandahar Army or part of it should

invest Caubul, the troops might come though the Khyber to join in the siege and probably in subsequent operations.

Thus, then, I have endeavoured to sketch a definite plan upon which to concentrate our resources, and by which to secure a scientific frontier, and a permanent settlement of this large question. Looking at the northern half of this part of our territory, I think we should be thankful for possessing a frontier so easily rendered impregnable. Looking at the southern half, we have no less reason to be thankful for having acquired, in Quetta, such means of vigorous and effective action, and such an opportunity of securing new advantages of the most important and decisive kind. With a garrison strongly posted in its lines at Kandahar, with all the routes and stages by which our forces might be assembled on that point, all sources of supply, and all arrangements for transport, laid down, as our trained Staff Officers are certainly capable of laying them down, we might view calmly any possible complications before us, whether arising from the augmented military power of Russia in the East, from the success of her intrigues, or from her open hostility. The grounds of our assurance would be manifest and easily understood, our native subjects would soon learn to appreciate them, and what would be security for us would be tranquillity for India.

Major-General Sir FREDERIC GOLDSMID: Having been myself on two missions, one connected with Persia and Beloochistan, and another with Persia and Afghanistan, I know much of the western frontier of the latter country from general observation. As regards the eastern frontier of Afghanistan, my acquaintance with the subject is strengthened by long residence among Afghans, Beloochis, and people of the countries in the immediate neighbourhood, especially in Upper Scinde and Kurrachee. I have, moreover, long felt very great interest in the question of our Indian frontiers in the north-west, and have made it, more or less, a study. With this, therefore, and some other claims, however small, to express an opinion on the subject, I venture to state my thorough conviction that what General Hamley has proposed is exactly what we ought to do. I do not, indeed, know of a single objection that can be raised against his scheme, which has been so clearly put forward that it could hardly fail to be intelligible to all hearers. One very important advantage in holding Candahar is that by so doing, we really hold the main line of communication between Cabul and Herat. There may be another route to the north of the mountain chain, by Maimana; but it is rather roundabout, and probably not so secure and frequented as that by Farrah, Candahar, and Ghuzni. The road between Herat and Cabul by the Hazareh country is passable, and I believe troops have proceeded that way. I have been looking only this morning at Conolly on the subject, and have examined it by the light of maps. It is hardly, in my opinion, a direct route. From Herat its course is apparently to the south-east; it then turns up as if it were going to Bokhara, and then inclines towards Cabul, and joins the road which leads from that city to Bamian at a place called *Gardan-i-Diwar*. But I do not think that that road need really be taken into account, because it is a very difficult one—not only physically difficult, but difficult on account of the nature of the tribes through whose country it passes. There are, for instance, two sets of Hazarehs, the Sunni and the Shia divisions. To conciliate the one would not necessarily be to conciliate the other.

Lord WAVENEY: Those who have read the debate which has just taken place in the House of Lords will remember an exceedingly happy illustration, given by the Lord Chancellor, of the topographical circumstances of Afghanistan, in which he drew his parallel from Scotland. He requested his audience to consider that they have before them a large mass of mountains, such as the Highlands of Scotland represent. I derive from that illustration an opportunity of observing how old matters repeat

themselves, and how, when the new is ingrafted into the old, under the circumstances which have been presented by our lecturer, we may infer, from previous success, a success for the plan which he has proposed. Now it will be observed by those who are familiar with the circumstances of the mass of mountains of Scotland that those mountains were inhabited, in the old times, by tribes answering in their warlike character, as distinguished from those inhabiting the low lands, to the mountain tribes of Afghanistan, as distinguished from the dwellers by the Indus; and it will be recollected, that one of the great difficulties of the English Kings in the annexation process going on, was to deal with these tribes; and practically Edward I and his successors adopted the same principle for the permanent and sufficient mode of disposing of the disturbing force from the mountains as is suggested at the present moment by General Hamley, in closing the passes. It will be observed by those who have travelled on the seaboard and the inland great estuaries and rivers of Scotland that, at all points where a *débouché* from the hills might give opportunity for the northern clans to pour into the low lands, there is to be found a castle, not of ancient sea rovers, but a castle of the Norman military system. These castles show, by their position, what they were intended to do, and they had the effect for which they were designed, and in those castles I see the prototype of the fortresses projected by General Hamley. There is one point, I confess, on which I have always had considerable doubt. I suppose no Officer here present will recollect the battles of the Mysore and the irruption of the Mahrattas and Pindarees down the Western Ghauts into the plains of India, but I have heard old men describe the continued terror in which the plain countries were kept in the days when the Pindarees rode up to the gates of Madras. Where you have a mountain range beyond which the eye cannot penetrate, where you have not the means of acquiring satisfactory headquarter information, you will be continually vexed and harassed by the apprehension of what forces of aggression may be coming on its way, and what may be prepared behind that screen. If, therefore, this plan of barring the outlets, which has been adopted particularly in some portions of the Tyrol, be only a barring of the mountain outlets, I say that will be insufficient. It was very well remarked, by a very distinguished statesman in that last debate, when he said that we not only wanted the rectification of frontier, but we wanted to have eyes to see and ears to hear. One of the great troubles and difficulties of late years has been that continual permeation of hostile rumours through the defiles, greater or smaller, of the mountains of Afghanistan. But when the point of observation is projected into the plain, and represented by the intrenched camp at Candahar, we turn the mountain screen and see the glacis of the fortress. I quoted on the last occasion the illustration given by a German writer, that the north-western frontier was a fortress of which the glacis was not in the possession of the garrison. Now, we all know, if our artillery fire is to be worth anything, we must see the foot of the slope. We see along the reverse of the slope, as considered from the Indian frontier, from the outlook or *guérite* of Candahar, and therefore the occupation of Candahar has an especial value. And it has this especial value: it must draw upon it in advance the attack of the enemy. We know what is the objective point of any force coming from the north-west; and it has occurred to me, on looking at the map, that a double advantage may probably be given by a road marked as abutting on the sea to the westward of the line of Kurrachee, that passes through Bela, and gives us a double access to our natural base, for the natural base of British war is the British fortress in communication with the sea, whence must come our stores. Woolwich should always be within reach of Kurrachee. It is at present. I have no doubt that the slopes of these hills within the territory of the Khan of Kelat may be made an additional line of defence; therefore, as a means of keeping the aggressive force within its boundaries, as a means of seeing what is projected beyond our boundaries by a force that may become aggressive, I cannot but believe that in its simplicity this plan deserves most thoroughly the support which I am sure it will receive from those present, and will command the intelligent appreciation of the country.

General Sir GEORGE MALCOLM: I should be glad to know how we should protect our flank if we took up Candahar as an advanced post, and if it is not necessary that we should have positions in Eastern Afghanistan in order to secure moral influence

over its tribes and make them our allies? I fancy that a passive defence is the weakest defence that we can possibly have. What has been said by General Hamley suggests to me that we would have, as it were, half our frontier passively defended and the other half actively defended. It seems to me that the tribes of Eastern Afghanistan could roll down on our communications between the Bolan and Candahar if we did not gain an ascendancy over them, and I do not think that a passive defence would be sufficient either to establish our influence over that part of Afghanistan or to maintain it when it may be established. Perhaps some Officer may throw some light on this point in reply to what I have said.

Major-General Sir HENRY GREEN: I think that with regard to the general question of the strategical conditions of our Indian frontier, General Hamley has left me nothing to say, I entirely concur with him on every point. With reference to the questions asked by Sir G. Malcolm, I should hope that after the conclusion of the present campaign we should find ourselves again on friendly terms with the Afghans, in which case we should not, I consider, require in any way to meddle with Cabul. Holding Candahar, as suggested by General Hamley, and a narrow strip leading from Quetta to that position, I would leave to the Afghans the whole of the rest of their country, interfering with them as little as possible. Under such conditions I should have no fear for our communications with our own territory as far as Quetta. They would pass through an entirely friendly State, and thence to Candahar there are no tribes likely to give trouble under proper arrangements. With regard to the Punjaub frontier we must entirely separate its defence from the raids of the tribes inhabiting the Suleiman range of mountains, from the possibility of an Army of a powerful European State debouching into the plains with a view to attacking India. To meet the latter contingency General Hamley proposes the construction of strong fortresses at certain strategical points; to meet the former I would suggest the formation of a line of outposts along the whole frontier running close under the mountains connected by a broad, bridged road, and that all our own subjects residing within this line should be disarmed with a view to putting an end to the blood feuds which are carried on between the tribes residing in the mountains and those in the plains, and the continuance of which are one of the causes that lead to raids within British territory, and tend to keep the frontier in a constant state of excitement; but in taking away the power of retaliation from our own subjects, we must be prepared to afford them protection, and for this purpose the present strength of the Punjaub Frontier Force is insufficient and ought to be raised from 12,000 to 20,000. I would also suggest that every inducement should be offered in the shape of free gifts of land, &c., to the mountain tribes to settle with their families in British territory. Such a plan as that I have sketched has been tried and found to answer, certainly on a smaller scale, on the Scinde frontier; but no doubt to have to deal with hostile tribes aggregating some 170,000 armed men who acknowledge no central authority, and owe allegiance to no one, not even to their own tribal chiefs, except in a nominal form, is a question extremely difficult to deal with. I however entirely concur with General Hamley that such foes are far better in our front than in our rear, and that to push forward military posts amongst them would only aggravate the present unsatisfactory state of affairs. In conclusion I would add that with a British force stationed at Candahar, the Afghans friendly, and an Afghan garrison holding Herat, assisted by a few selected British Officers, we might contemplate without fear any movements of Russia in Central Asia having for their object an attack upon our Indian Empire.

Major-General FYERS: I think, Sir, that the very interesting lecture and scheme of defence which we have heard from Major-General Hamley covers to a great extent my own feelings and views in this matter, and that this important road from Candahar by Ghuznee to Cabul must always remain, in the eyes of military men, as the chief strategic line of operation in opposing an enemy coming from the north-west. I think there can hardly be a difference of opinion on this point; other approaches and passes there no doubt are, but I feel sure that the approach into Afghan territories by the Bolan and by Quetta is that which will at all times be most suitable and least open to objection of any kind. General Hamley has pointed out the very superior claims which Candahar has over any other position for strategic purposes, principally of a defensive character; and in regard to this, I do not think

I there can be two opinions, for when you are at Candahar you are on the high roads either to Cabul or to Herat. In regard to the grand series of mountains and valleys between the Bolan Pass and the Suffaed-Koh Mountains, and again from that range to the independent territory of the Kafiristan valleys, I do think that a complete change in our policy is desirable. My friend Sir Henry Green, with his large experience, thinks otherwise; he still approves the policy of holding entirely aloof from all the tribes in those mountains, and of regarding them as impracticable barbarians. Now I cannot but regard with suspicion and dislike a policy which proposes for all time to entertain for these people those undying sentiments of suspicion and of armed hostility; I feel compelled to believe that an honest desire for their improvement would command the means of insuring that improvement; and that what may now seem to appal in such an endeavour, would with each succeeding year yield to the strong compulsions of an organization having for its ultimate aim their good, and the well-being of their descendants. Whether this task is difficult or not, I think it ought to be carried out for our own sake, as well as for the people who are our neighbours. At the close of this present war, Afghanistan must of necessity become a protected state of the British Empire—a position which we cannot escape from; and whether we like it or not, Afghanistan must come under our guardianship and our tutelage. The sooner we recognize this to its full extent, the better for us and for them.

Lieutenant-General OLPHERTS, V.C.: I am aware that it may appear presumptuous on my part to address such an assembly as this, particularly if my remarks should seem to differ from those of such an able authority on military strategy as General Hamley; and I am also conscious that everything bearing on the political aspect of the question before us, must in this Institution be avoided as much as possible. Nevertheless, when I say that I am no politician, and am free from all party bias, and considering that I am at any rate an older man than General Hamley, I trust you will grant me your kind indulgence. It is now nearly forty years since I went out to India as a boy—and at that time the first Afghan war was going on, and my relative, Sir William MacNaughten, was the Envoy there; and had he not been killed in time I probably should have been sent up to join, and should have been killed with him—so that the question of Afghanistan was deeply impressed on my mind in my younger days, and that impression has remained ever since. I was also fortunate enough in those days to encounter men of note—among others one whose name should send a thrill of emotion through this meeting, I mean, of course, Eldred Pottinger, of Herat celebrity. Herat was considered then, and it always must be, the key of India from the north-west; without it we have not proper military possession of India. The Hindu Kush is the natural boundary of India; its very name denotes this. No doubt, arrangements, good in themselves, may be made of a temporary nature; but, depend upon it, the proper military boundary of India, if we are to stop short anywhere in that direction, must include Herat and Cabul, by which means we shall control Persia on our western side, and keep Russia at arm's length, and not otherwise. I quite agree with General Fyers in what he says, and I can see he is of the same mind as I am, only, perhaps, he does not care to speak as audaciously as I may be doing. I say that, to admit for a moment that Russia is to be allowed to descend into the plains and valleys of Afghanistan before we meet her, is, to my mind, utterly wrong. We must never dream of such a thing. We may hold back from annexing Afghanistan, but I think the best thing we can do for the Afghans themselves, as for our own political and military supremacy in India, is to annex and incorporate that country with our Indian Empire. I told a brother of Lord Lawrence, who, I regret, has committed himself to a different opinion, when he asked me what we should do, "Take "Afghanistan, and keep it." This I said at the outset of the controversy, before war was declared, and I have never since swerved from that opinion. On the contrary, it grows stronger with me every day I live. Depend upon it, we shall make the Afghans far better friends of ours if we do so; we shall only irritate them by half measures, such as taking Candahar, and blocking them up in the Khyber and other passes (on the wrong side, by the way). Are the tribes around Peshawur friends of ours? I was with Sir Charles Napier in his hill campaign in Beloochistan, also with Sir Neville Chamberlain, in an expedition against the Wuzeerees in the Kurrum Valley, and likewise with Sir Colin Campbell and Sir Sydney Cotton in the

Peshawur Valley, and can therefore speak from experience of the frontier tribes. You cannot put your nose safely out of Peshawur in the most peaceful times. Are we to go on for ever in this state? It is intolerable that we should have to do so; and the only effectual remedy is to "take Afghanistan, and keep it," when India will be perfectly quiet and tranquil, and the Russian boundary, if need be, conterminous with ours. Our true glacis is on the other side of the Hindu Kush down to the Oxus; and anything short of that I consider unworthy of the dignity of the British Empire!

In conclusion, I would beg to disclaim any idea of arguing with or pitting myself against such an able lecturer and strategist as General Hamley, who, if I attempted to do so, would doubtless soon "turn my flank and stop up my passes!" and, not to trespass too much on your kind consideration, I will now sit down.

General Sir EDWIN JOHNSON, R.A.: I have listened with extreme interest to what General Hamley has said, and I can only regret that his observations were not more extended, and that he did not go further into details. I do not know whether General Hamley is aware that we have occupied Peshawur for nearly thirty years, and that we are yet debating what description of fort we ought to erect there. I should like to hear a description of the nature of the forts and works with which he proposes to defend the entrance to the passes, whether they are simply to be considered with reference to the frontier tribes, or whether he anticipates a more formidable foe. It would be advantageous if General Hamley would inform us whether his strategical arrangements are designed for the purpose of meeting the aggressions of our old tribal frontier foes, or whether he has in view a new and more formidable enemy. The financial question of our frontier defence is a very serious one, and our chairman, Sir Henry Rawlinson, will bear me out when I say that, mainly on financial, though partly on sanitary grounds, we have been nearly thirty years deciding whether we shall have a fortified post at Peshawur or not. I should be very sorry to think that another thirty years will be spent in debating what works shall be erected for the security of our rectified frontier. I put forward those remarks in hopes that we may have a little further information on this point, which, however, I am quite aware is a tactical rather than a strategical one.

Major-General HAMLEY: I thought I had made it quite clear that the works I had proposed to establish in that place were against the most formidable enemy we could expect, and that if those works were such as to provide against that enemy they would so much the more provide against any incursions of the hill tribes. I quite concur with all that the different speakers have said about the policy of improving the condition of those tribes. It seems to me a positive duty on the part of a country like ours that, when we come in contact with uncivilised people, we should leave them better than we find them. But, while strongly of that opinion, I do not myself in the present case want to see the Afghans converted by sending military missionaries up the passes. I dare say General Olpherts will excuse me at this advanced stage of the discussion from following him into the recesses of the Hindu Kush. I will only observe, in reply to him, that the plan I proposed for placing those works in front of Peshawur at the issue of the path would close all the passes of the mountains, whether in the Hindu Kush or elsewhere, inasmuch as those passes debouch into the one of which I spoke. As to the nature of the works to be placed there, which formed the subject of Sir Edwin Johnson's question, of course, he knows, as well as I do, that it is impossible for anybody not on the spot to tell precisely what description of works would suit the ground; but we all know what an intrenched camp is, and I have not the least doubt that there are a hundred engineer Officers now in that country who would in a week provide a plan which would sufficiently answer the purpose. In conclusion, I have only to say that deeply impressed as I am with the truth of the views I have expressed, it has been the greatest gratification to me to find them receive the sanction and authority of so many distinguished Officers.

The CHAIRMAN: With my very limited practical experience of the art of war, the former Afghan campaign being the only occasion on which I have seen any active service in the field, I feel it would be unbecoming in me to examine in any detail the professional views which have been put forward by General Hamley, and which have been generally approved in the course of the very instructive discussion

which has followed. But perhaps I may be allowed to state that approaching the subject from an entirely different point of view—that is, not exactly from a political, but from a general common-sense point of view—I concur, and always have concurred, with the views which General Hamley has expressed. It has, indeed, always been my opinion, since I first turned my attention to the subject, that it was our true policy to look to western Afghanistan, that is to Candahar and Herat, rather than to Cabul, and if I may be allowed to read a very short extract from what I wrote fourteen years ago, you will see that I then put on record opinions identical with those that have now been presented to you by General Hamley. I then said, "If Russia should take possession of the Oxus as she has already taken "possession of the Jaxartes, then as her outposts would be in contact with Afghan "outposts it would become a question for serious consideration whether, leaving "Cabul and Ghuznee, the scene of our old disasters, to struggle on in isolated "anarchy, it may not be incumbent on us to secure a strong flanking position by "the occupation of the open country of Quetta and Candahar, and even of Herat." I further said, "The time may come when it will be our duty to remember that "outworks are as necessary to the defence of Empires as of fortresses, and that "in this view Herat and Candahar are the Malakoff and Mamelon of our position "in the East." Now, without troubling you with details, perhaps I may be allowed briefly to state the reasons which led me to that conclusion. Cabul is, probably, as awkward a place to hold and to govern as any city in all Asia. In the first place, the capital and its neighbourhood are inhabited by a fanatical and disorderly population, incensed against us by the memories of the former war, who yield a very doubtful obedience even to Shere Ali himself, and who would, of course, be still more unmanageable under any attempt at coercion on our part. I always felt, therefore, that it was desirable, if possible, to give such a place a wide berth, and General Hamley has now, I think, very satisfactorily pointed out that such a course is possible, since Cabul, if left to itself, can do us no harm, provided that we are strong at Candahar; and that we also shut up the Khyber Pass so as to close all outlet for the discontented and hostile spirits at Cabul to emerge upon the plains of India. "At Candahar on the other hand, I desire to impress upon the meeting that everything is in our favour. The people in the town and country around are in very few instances real Afghans—they are Parsiwans opposed to the Afghans in race, in language, and in religion, and they have always been most friendly to us. The climate again is healthy and agreeable, supplies are abundant, and there would be no more difficulty, in a military point of view, in our holding Candahar than in holding any ordinary cantonment in the Punjaub or in Scinde. The military position of Candahar is, moreover, admirable." General Hamley has already drawn attention to the fact that it intercepts the line of communication between Herat and Cabul, but it does much more: in the first place it supports Herat in a very effective manner; for, supposing us to be in possession of Candahar, with a railroad laid down as far as Dadar (and possibly to be continued through the Bolan Pass and on to the Afghan plateau), we should be in a far more efficient position to succour Herat than Russia would be in to threaten it from her remote base on the Caspian or Aral. Again, the possession of Candahar would render any attack on India from the Hindu Kush almost impossible, either by Cabul and the Khyber, or by Ghuznee and Kurrum, since our position at Candahar would flank both lines. Another point to be considered is that Candahar is in the direct line of attack; for if an army ever should invade India from the west or north-west, it would certainly march by the line of Candahar, where there are no mountains to be crossed, and no physical difficulties worth speaking of to be encountered, the great line of the Hindu Kush being turned, and the country being so flat and open that a carriage may be driven with comfort from the Helmund river to Teheran. There is hardly in fact a hill of 100 to 200 feet in height on the entire line, and if an invasion of India is ever to be attempted, it would certainly therefore be conducted by that route. I fully agree also with General Hamley that strong entrenched camps, not of course of the size of Metz, but of that description—not only fortresses, but large intrenched camps in addition, capable of holding a force of 10,000 or 20,000 men; such camps, I say, at the mouths of the passes would render our position in India perfectly impregnable. There are two or three smaller questions on which I am not prepared, perhaps, to

give in my adhesion as completely as General Hamley would wish. I think, for instance, it is still a question whether, putting aside the idea of going as far into the interior as Jellalabad or Ghuznee, it still might not be desirable to hold the passes by a small post at the upper end, as well as the intrenched camp at the lower end. This is a minor point, I know, but it is one in which my mind is not entirely satisfied with General Hamley's scheme. The holding the Khyber, for instance, by a small post at Dacca, as well as by the large camp at the southern entrance, would give us a command of the whole length of the pass, which would be invaluable for the protection of trade and for general passage; whereas, if we only held the lower mouth of the pass, we might be perfectly safe and strong strategically, but we should be neglecting those legitimate calls on our protection which the position would seem to require. In the same way, I should be very loth to restore the Kurrum Valley to the Afghans. How far the Peiwar Pass can be held by outposts at the upper end of the valley I cannot attempt to say, but the valley itself is certainly a very desirable position, since the inhabitants are friendly and the soil is fertile, and the geographical situation is certainly of value in enabling us to locate a force within a very convenient distance both of Cabul and Ghuznee. Although I may disagree with General Hamley on small points of this sort, I am bound to say that, in regard to the great general question, we should not attempt to occupy the whole country of Afghanistan, but should rather block up the eastern defiles by intrenched camps and merely hold the western part of the country in military strength; on that broad question I am entirely in accord with him. I think it is hardly worth while to go into the still larger question which has been put forward by General Fyers and General Olpherts. To step at once from the plains of India to Kaffristan and the line of the Hindu Kush is such an enormous stride in advance that it almost takes away one's breath to think of it. We certainly could not take up that line of frontier and defend it without an enormous increase to our military strength, which would entail extra expense of a million or two millions a year, and in the present state of the finances of India, I really do not see where the money is to come from. I would beg, gentlemen, to remember that in all matters, military as well as political, we have to regulate our proceedings according to the old maxim of "cutting your coat according to your cloth." With an impoverished exchequer we cannot branch out into theoretical or sentimental lines of frontier. We cannot occupy the line of the Hindu Kush, although upon the map such a frontier may appear very symmetrical and very desirable, with any ordinary regard for the resources of India. India cannot afford it, and I am obliged, therefore, to confine my line of vision to something less ambitious, but more practical, to measures of defence less expensive, but, as I believe, thoroughly sound and scientific, such as have been treated of by General Hamley. I will only further say that, whatever our military action may be, either in the passes adjoining our frontier or at a distance in the plains of Candahar, I feel satisfied that our influence and our presence may be made most beneficial, not to ourselves only, but to the people of the country. Wherever we have already established posts along the frontier of the Afghan hills, we have exerted a most civilizing influence on the tribes of the neighbourhood; and it has often occurred to me, arguing from this experience of recent years, that if we had only continued to have held Afghanistan from the year 1842, when we needlessly abandoned the country, and to have exerted the same kindly beneficent influence that we have exerted in the districts below the hills, I believe the greater part of Afghanistan at the present day would be as orderly, as quiet, and as flourishing as the happy provinces of the Punjaub and Sinde. Remembering what might have occurred in the past, it is a pleasing prospect to look forward to something of the same sort in the future. I will, in conclusion, ask you to pass a vote of thanks to General Hamley.

Lord ELCHO: Before we close, I should like to put a question. The question of Herat has been alluded to in the discussion upon the very able paper to which we have listened. General Hamley proposes that the extreme point we should occupy in this so-called rectification of frontier should be Candahar. General Olpherts said that Herat was the key to India, and I believe Russian opinion is the same. I have a correspondent in the East who is in frequent communication with the Russians, and he informs me that they speak extremely freely to him upon various points, and

that they are unanimous as to the value of Herat. They further laugh at those English who are deluded into the belief that they (the Russians) eventually have no designs upon India. He further says that they look upon it that it must turn upon who can get first to Herat. Now we have heard, from our Chairman, whose most able paper upon the political aspect of the question, which is published in the Parliamentary papers, contains all the law and the prophets on this subject, that about the time when that paper was written, he considered Herat and Candahar as the Malakoff and Mamelon of India. Now the Malakoff, we all know, was more important than the Mamelon, and I should like, as General Hamley has only occupied the Mamelon, which is Candahar, to hear from General Rawlinson that he is still of the opinion which he expressed, ten or twelve years ago, that it is as essential, with a view to our safety, that we should occupy Herat as that we should occupy Candahar.

The CHAIRMAN: I purposely avoided touching on the question of Herat, except in general terms, on account of the extreme difficulty of discussing it. I think that General Hamley proposed, or foreshadowed the possibility of, our supporting Herat from Candahar. Candahar is necessarily the first stage of our proceedings, and I should be almost inclined to say "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." At any rate, we must occupy Candahar in the first instance. If the necessity arises, and it may arise, I then would venture on a further advance from Candahar to Herat, but I must be allowed to repeat the qualifying clause "if the necessity arises." So long as Herat is not threatened, I think it would be very rash, and in fact needlessly offensive, to thrust a force nearly 400 miles in advance of Candahar, an advance which would cause great additional expense in keeping up the communications. It would, moreover, keep us more or less in hot water with all our neighbours. "But I have no hesitation in saying that rather than Russia should occupy Herat, I would imperil the safety of India, in order to gain possession of it. I would give up all the rest of Afghanistan rather than that Herat should be in the hands of Russia," but so long as it remains in its present condition in the hands of the Afghans, independent of Persia and independent of Russia, so long I would not in any way interfere with it further than by giving it our moral support from our advanced position at Candahar.

NOTE BY COLONEL SIR WILLIAM MEREWETHER.—General Hamley's estimation of the value of Candahar to the holders of India is certainly most sound. Candahar is *the* strategic point. It not only forms the best position from which to advance to Herat when necessary, and to afford support to the occupiers thereof; but no hostile force could dare to venture on attempting an approach to India by Kabool and the Khyber while we hold Candahar in strength. Candahar thus held would do away with the necessity of the proposed large fort at the mouth (eastern end) of the Khyber Pass. Candahar has other great advantages, viz., in facility of communication with its bases. Between it and Quettah the country is easy of transit. There is but one pass, the Khojek, which sappers would soon make practicable for wheel traffic. The inhabitants have always shown themselves most friendly towards us, and, we hear, are doing so now. Quettah commands *all* the good roads from Afghanistan to the sea—not merely that by the Bolan, but the others by Kelat and the Moola Pass to Gundava, and by the hill route through Beloochistan to Soonmeanee and Kurrachee. Our influence in Beloochistan being now secured, all these roads are perfectly safe. From Quettah to Dadur is but 84 miles, of which some 60 are through the defile of the Bolan, a good road for a mountain pass. Beyond Dadur to the sea, a distance of nearly 450 miles, mainly through British territory, is all dead plain. Railway communication already exists for more than 300 miles of this distance, from Sukkur on the Indus to Kurrachee, and a few months more should see this extended to Dadur. The immediate base for Candahar is unquestionably Kurrachee. It is the nearest and most quickly reached. The connection is complete and safe. All the resources of the Bombay Presidency, with which it is in easy (two and a half days) communication by sea, can there be readily availed of. And at the same time every facility exists for extending the

NOTE.—The following Paper, reprinted from *The Colonies and India*, was read by Mr. JAMES R. SAUNDERS, M.L.C. of Natal, before the Fellows and Friends of the ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE, on January 24, 1882, and formed one of the Sessional Series of the Society. The discussion that followed is appended.

NATAL IN ITS RELATION TO SOUTH AFRICA.

To avoid complicating my subject, I do not propose referring to the early history of Natal, or to its advantages as a field for emigration, nor need I trouble you with many statistical details. A few of a very general character will suffice, and may be disposed of by stating that the revenue of the Colony has increased so rapidly that in 1880 it had nearly equalled that of the Cape Colony ten years before. Its railways, though undeveloped and crippled by the refusal of the Colonial Office to sanction their extension and the purchase of rolling stock, are already estimated to be paying interest on the loan. Its loans are quoted high on the Exchange, showing that the moneyed world has a good opinion of it. Its harbour admits of improvement; but, even as it is, it has proved itself capable of supplying the sudden requirements of an army of 20,000 men, and horses in proportion.

This Paper will show that the wars which spread all round Natal after 1874 were wars with which the Colony had nothing to do, though it had continually warned the Home authorities of the result of yielding to the influences which were directing its policy. In truth, Natal was the only Colony whose natives remained loyal, and it only became exposed from the accident of its position, which made it the base of those military operations which commenced before Sir Bartle Frere reached South Africa. During these years the few Colonists of Natal contributed from the revenue so large a sum for war and defence that, if a similar expenditure were incurred by the British nation in proportion to its population, it would exceed its National Debt. The loss of life of Colonists, in similar ratio, was such that the destruction of the entire British army would not be larger; whilst its volunteer levies will bear a fair comparison with any forced conscription in Europe, as is shown by the large number of war medals distributed—for which, by-the-bye, the Colony was made to pay.

My subject, "Natal in its Relation to South Africa," takes us back to the great migration of Dutch farmers from the Cape in 1835, to their wanderings through the wild lands of the Free State till they reached Natal; for though Lieutenant Farewell settled near Durban in 1822, and, after his murder, Fynn and others assumed the chieftainship for a few years—though it was only proclaimed a British Colony in 1843—the first real practical settlement was that made in 1838 by Retief and the Dutch farmers.

In the varied details I shall refer to, my main object will be to make them bear on the question of broad policy which directs events; and to the proper understanding of what those influences were which controlled their rulers during the last half-century of war, so as to discover a guide for the future by the exposure of the past.

Before doing so, I must dispose of the question of union in a few words. Union has been the aim of many men, whether honest enthusiasts or ambitious despots.

History shows nothing has led to so much war as the search after universal peace through the agency of united dominion. Union of British Colonies—union of all English-speaking people, in the opinion of some practical men—is within measurable distance; but any union between varying interests requires knowledge, gentle handling, and to be left to work out its ends by gradual development. Look at the map of South Africa, with its confused mixture of peoples and races, most of them varying in type, language, laws, and customs, and in all except their common barbarism; and then let me ask you not to try over your snug fireplaces in London to build up a Utopia in Africa; trust rather to Englishmen there who are no less English, humane, and practical than yourselves, even though they have crossed the Line, and are now Colonists.

It is now thirty-five years since an old Colonist wrote of the Cape, saying that "the great evil under which this Colony has laboured has been the profound ignorance, both of the British public and governors, of the actual character, situation, and circumstances of its inhabitants. Had these been fully known, the disasters which have overcome this settlement never could have happened; but, ruled as its affairs have been, the most extravagant fictions have been believed and acted upon. Partisanship has had in this country a wide field for its operations; the British public has been deluded; numbers of the Colonists ruined or destroyed."

So wrote Mr. Godlington in 1847; and as these remarks are equally applicable to 1881, I felt myself called upon to accept Mr. Young's invitation, and make some remarks on "Natal in its Relation to South Africa," in the hope that the discussion which any paper on this subject may evoke will of itself do good, irrespective of the merits of the paper itself.

I shall have to refer to many cases which show how strong is the belief in the Colony respecting this ignorance. Addresses of Colonists, records of their Legislative Council, as well as official reports of men who, though sent out to condemn, ended by defending the Colony, prove this; not forgetting that most remarkable letter to the *Times*, in which nearly every clergyman and missionary in Natal (seventy-one) joined, irrespective of their difference in creed, in denouncing the misstatements circulated in England about the Langalibalele revolt as "being untrue, unfair, calculated to involve danger to the future." Here was seen the most unusual circumstance—clergy belonging to the Church, both those opposed to Bishop Colenso as well as those serving under him, Wesleyan, Presbyterian, American missionaries, Roman Catholic, Congregational, Swede, German, Dutch, all uniting to condemn "the statements of the Peace Society as based on an untrue misapprehension of the facts in England;" they regarding such misstatements with regret and indignation, and, further, supporting the "action of the Natal Government as throughout humane, lenient, just, and urgently necessary."

Were this ignorance and these misstatements not so serious in their results, many amusing instances might be related. It was only last year that the commander of a man-of-war was instructed to anchor as near as he could to Potchefstroom, a town in the Transvaal about 400 miles inland, but not to bombard it without further orders. Incredible as this may seem to some present, others on the spot know that instances of similar character are so numerous and well authenticated that this statement, when it was publicly made and not contradicted, became fully believed in; and this belief in so strange a tale of itself points a moral (though, I admit, without proof). I fully believe it myself. It occasioned one more shrug of the shoulders, as further exemplification of what was to be expected if matters of peace, war, and negotiation were to be directed from England through the cable by men who had not learnt the very first lesson of their own ignorance, whilst information on which action had to be taken was costing 8*s.* 9*d.* per word.

The settlement of Natal is so directly connected with the events which took place after 1835, and the migration of the Dutch which led to the foundation of

that Colony, that I may fitly take that as my starting-point; from which a close parallel is to be drawn between the more recent events which followed after 1873 and culminated at Majuba Hill, and that policy which controlled those periods. In both we saw the Colonial Governors putting down Kafir war or native rising successfully; and whilst Sir Benjamin Durban, in 1835, received all but unanimous approval from the Colonists, who saw in his acts a promise of long future peace, so was it with Sir Benjamin Pine in 1873. In both cases they were censured and dismissed, and their policy was reversed in consequence of an agitation got up in England under precisely similar circumstances. In the one case Sir G. Napier, who superseded Sir B. Durban some years after, stated:—"So far as the Colonial Government and the Colonists are concerned, never were treaties more strictly and pertinaciously adhered to; but not so with the Kafirs, for they began from the first to plunder the Colonists, and, notwithstanding every exertion, it was found impossible to prevent their depredations." In the other Sir Garnet Wolseley, who was sent to replace Sir B. Pine in 1875, wrote on May 12, 1875:—"I have no wish to attribute to those who adopt this policy any interested motive . . . . yet I must say that, from the manner in which they refuse to believe all evidence that does not coincide with their own peculiar views, and from the fact of their regarding the condition of affairs in Natal from one standpoint alone, I am forced to consider them impracticable; and not to be relied on, as advisers, by those who are responsible for the good government of all classes. It is scarcely necessary for me to remind your lordship how easy it is to get up sensational accounts of events in countries like Natal. . . . Such sensational narratives, often based upon unsifted evidence, find credence too easily by the people of England." Later, he adds: "I have thought it advisable to enter into the subject at length, because I consider it essential to correct opinions formed in England upon one-sided, highly-coloured, and, in some instances, incorrect statements, that have been made public in a sensational manner;" and Sir Garnet adds that "Kafirs had become a happy, wealthy, and prosperous community. . . . that, to retain Natal as an European Colony, it is essential to rule the Kafirs, not only with justice, but with the utmost firmness, and to make them believe in our strength."

I must add to the parallel between the two periods by stating that all this Colonial evidence was in both periods refused credence; and a long succession of wars followed each other (to which I may shortly refer in the train of events), whilst misrepresentation and ignorance, so strongly complained of, ruled supreme in the formation of public opinion and direction of the Imperial policy.

Let us now go back to the earlier period I have referred to, which led to the Dutch migration. It was on the night of December 21 and 22, 1834, just before Christmas, along thirty miles of frontier, that the Kafirs had burst into the Colony; and, in less than fourteen days, forty-four persons were murdered, 369 dwellings consumed, 261 pillaged, 172,000 head of cattle and stock carried off by the savages, who had no cause of quarrel against the peaceful inhabitants, but made this their reply to Sir Benjamin Durban's invitation that they should meet and enter into arrangements with the Colonial Government which should be advantageous to them. "I cannot," wrote Sir Benjamin, on January 21, 1835, "adequately point out the devastation and terror these merciless barbarians have committed." "Already," wrote Sir H. Smith a few days after, "are 7,000 persons dependent on Government for the necessaries of life; the land is filled with the lamentation of the widow and fatherless. The indelible impressions made upon myself by the horrors of an irruption of savages upon a scattered population . . . are such as make me look on those I have witnessed, in a service of thirty years, ten of them in the most eventful period of war, as trifles to what I have now witnessed."

Even after this, so anxious was the Colonial Government to avoid extremities, that it was only four months later that war was formally declared. Then, by a rapid series of military operations, this unprovoked invasion was driven back, the

Kafirs brought to pray for peace, and the war concluded on terms almost universally viewed as a new era of peace. Addresses were sent to England praying the Government to confirm the Treaty.

But what followed? Already had rumours begun to circulate from the Mission House in Cape Town that the Governor's policy would be reversed, when, ere very long, out came the fatal predicted despatch, dated December 28, 1835, in which Lord Glenelg cast the blame of the recent inroad on the Colonists, writing:—"In the conduct which was pursued towards the Kafir nation by the Colonists and the public authorities of the Colony through a long series of years, the Kafirs had ample justification for the late war. They had perfect right to regard the experiment, however hopeless, of extorting by force that redress which they could not expect otherwise to obtain," adding, "as far as I am at present enabled to judge, the original justice is on the side of the conquered, not of the victorious party."

And what, may be asked, had happened before the inroad described? Even had there been wrong, was no sympathy to be extended to the Colonists in their terrible condition? But there are facts which show that so pampered and protected were Kafirs from punishment for their offences, so weak had the British policy been, that during a period of ten years preceding the Kafir depredations on the frontier Colonists averaged 74 horses and 1,464 cattle per annum. It is not necessary to lengthen the tale. Sir B. Durban was recalled. That march of the wanderers into the desert began to which Mr. Froude refers when, writing of these Dutch, he says:—"They have long memories. . . . Every family can tell of some or other of its members massacred, or of gallant achievements for the protection of their wives and children, or their properties; and, as a reward, they point to a despatch of Lord Glenelg which laid on them the blame of every drop of blood which had been shed. Doubtless they, in many instances, had been to blame as well as the natives, but exaggerated censure was known to be undeserved. They relate, with special pride, how, worn out at last with calumny and indignation, 5,000 of their noblest and bravest farmers loaded their waggons with all that belonged to them, threw up their farms, and taking with them their flocks and herds, rifles and their family Bible, travelled away, forty years ago, into the wilderness beyond the Orange River."

Alas, none so blind as those whose interest it is not to see! Already had the Government of England received frequent warning of what was pending. On February 26 the Governor had written that among the evils that would arise from a serious change of policy would be "a great migration of the Dutch farmers from the Colony into the interior, who would be afraid to remain longer upon the Eastern frontier." Whilst leaving no doubt as to the causes which led to their migration, their leader, Retief (who was subsequently treacherously murdered in the Zulu country with every man of his party) left a manifesto, giving among their reasons—"the wholesale plunder by Kafirs and Hottentots desolating and ruining the frontier division . . . the unjustifiable odium cast upon the inhabitants by interested persons, whose testimony is believed in England, to the exclusion of all evidence in their favour."

It is not difficult to explain what was meant by "the unjustifiable odium cast upon the inhabitants by interested persons." The doings of Dr. Philip, in 1838, then form a remarkably close parallel to Dr. Colenso's in 1874. Both were aided by organised agencies of men, who, seeking to protect aborigines, were in truth real authors of their destruction. In the earlier period "Dr. J. Philip went to England, taking with him a Hottentot and a small Kafir chief, Jan Tzatzoe. On their arrival they became lions, and were paraded through the length and breadth of the land, prompted to make speeches exciting indignation against the Colonists, who were overwhelmed by calamity, their houses burned, fields desolated, families reduced to penury and wretchedness; and Sir Benjamin Durban was denounced as false and inhuman."

What wonder need there be if, by adopting such a course, men hope to get, as those did, "entrance into royal palaces, shaken hands with by royal children, and money," and even end, as Tzatzoe did, by joining the Kafirs in their later wars, leaving behind him in his hut the pseudo-philanthropic pamphlets which had worked on his imagination—what wonder if we find imitators in 1874? Strange indeed would it be, where dupes are to be so easily and profitably made, if it were not so.

The Dutch started on their migratory journey and reached Natal. I must pass over their sufferings, of which there were enough, during the succeeding fifteen years, to satisfy any atrocity-mongers without inventing; and such there will be so long as public opinion encourages them in seeing nothing but wrong and stifling defence. How it was that from 1853 to 1873 there seemed a lull in this agitation, I will not say. During this period insubordination was promptly suppressed by the Colonial authorities, offending chiefs were kept in prison till outside agitation led to their release, and they were again found in rebellion some years after, and then came a comparatively peaceable period of nearly twenty years. Whether it was that the Peace Society had found occupation elsewhere—in the Crimea, Indian Mutiny, American Civil War, or in Austria, France, Turkey—I will not discuss; but the fact is there, that till 1874, when, under the guidance of the Bishop of Natal, they again woke up and began their professed work of protecting natives, from that day the blood of natives and whites has flowed more plentifully than ever; whilst disasters which the British nation had not learned to be accustomed to had befallen it, and seem to stare it in the face for the future.

Nor were these results brought about for want of warnings from all classes of Colonial society; but the organisation had already become so complete and powerful, that every statement coming through that channel was received with favour, believed, and acted on in England, whatever everyone else might say to the contrary.

Let me now direct your attention to the changes that had taken place on the map since 1834, and the position Natal occupied when the later agitation commenced.

Natal holds a central position from which great civilising influences have spread. Its climate is good for Europeans, whilst it is evidently situated at no great distance from that unhealthy border-line which will for a time check European colonisation. Already has it become a centre for trade and manufactures, with its workshops, foundries, and numerous mills; and for many years past has been the goal to which natives come for work by thousands from distances of four to six hundred miles, and then return home again with their earnings to speak of the advantages of the white man's rule and his love of justice.

North of Natal is Zulu country, from which the native population of Natal has come, being almost exclusively made up of fugitives, who fled to it for refuge from the tyranny of the Zulu kings, till the population now exceeds that of the country they fled from. Since Ketchwayo became practically supreme, the native population of Natal is three times what it was on that terrible day of December 1856, when it was threatened with his invasion through the flight of 7,000 people under his brother Umbulaze; when all the men, women, and children who failed to escape the flooded river or the alligators were ruthlessly slaughtered in such numbers that for years after the hill and line of flight were white with their bones.

Of that day I speak from personal knowledge, not only as having witnessed the alarm of our natives, and the confidence they showed in Colonists who offered to lead them; but having been a member of a Commission of Inquiry on these events, which sat several days at my house, I had good opportunities of learning the facts. It was on this occasion that John Dunn's name first came into note for the gallant way he and forty-five native elephant hunters, who had crossed the Tugela on a mission of peace, had, when three times attacked, thrown back Ketchwayo's advance, and then protected the fugitives in their flight. It was due to this defence that

any natives escaped the slaughter, and that the Colony of Natal was then spared from invasion. Further results followed. This desperate defence of these few, aided by a chief named Jantie, with only 100 men, produced a profound impression on the natives of the white man's skill and power, and did much to secure future peace. This led to Ketchwayo's friendship for Dunn; for, a few months after, he admitted to an Englishman in my employ, who visited him, that one more such repulse as his advance had received, and his entire army would have been defeated. "Dunn," said he, "is a great man, and I must make a friend of him." This he did; and that friendship continued till some months before Sir Bartle Frere came into Natal in 1877. When the question of war with England was being discussed by Ketchwayo's chiefs, John Dunn was called before them to have the point distinctly put and answered as to which side he would take in the event of war. He replied strongly urging the hopelessness of resistance to the inexhaustible power of England; but ended by saying, if, notwithstanding his advice to the contrary, war should take place, he would take the side of his countrymen against Ketchwayo. "There," said the king, turning to his chiefs, "did I not tell you he would not betray me? Had he told me he would have joined us against his countrymen, I would not have believed him, but had him instantly killed." This was related by the highest authority before Sir Bartle Frere's arrival, and was fully confirmed through other channels, and is referred to now only as tending to throw light on several points, as well as that very false but generally accepted belief that there was no idea of war till Sir Bartle Frere came to Natal, and that he was the author of it.

Before passing on to describe other tribes, I shall remark on the long continuance of peace with the Zulu country. I have little faith in that diplomacy which pleads generosity, and takes credit for what is really letting "the dare not wait upon the would," but find, even amongst savages, there are such things as balances of power. Ketchwayo knew the strength the Zulu refugees would give to the Colonial Government. However much his men "loved to wash their spears" (driving them into men's bodies), and make raids for cattle, this could not be done safely into Natal, where our natives understood the art of war just as well as his warriors did, and might, if provoked, help themselves from his side of the border instead. Another strong influence which was at work in favour of peace was the fact that cattle stolen from Natal would introduce the dread disease of lung sickness into the Zulu country, from which it had been so far free; whilst, though practically supreme ruler during his father's lifetime, Panda still formed a centre round which peaceable influences of the older men, who had experienced crushing defeats from the Dutch, still helped to balance the hotheadedness of the younger; and so long as he was able to find cattle-hunting pasture for them, and to indulge their love of stealing and fighting, he was comparatively able to check their turbulence.

This field he had, till very late years, on his northern border, for scarcely do I remember a year that we had not heard of his impis or regiments being out against Amatonga on the coast, Swazis in the interior, or some people of his own. And this brings us to a very material element which caused much irritation among the Zulus at the annexation of the Transvaal, which had the effect of placing the Swazis, the only tribe they could before that levy black mail on with safety, under British protection. As I shall presently explain, the Amatonga had some years before been practically exempted from these attacks, and it was the loss of this, the last field left him for his warriors to prey on, that led him to speak so imploringly to Mr. Fynney, the Government agent, on July 4, 1877, saying, "I wish you to ask Somtseu (Shepstone) to allow me to make one little raid, only one small swoop; it will not be asking much; why will he not listen to me? He knows where I want to go, and so do you too, only you won't admit it. It is the custom of our country when a new king is placed over the nation, to 'wash their spears,' and it has been done in the case of all former kings of Zululand. I am not king, but set

in a heap. I cannot be a king until I have washed my assegais." Whether all the annual raids made on the Swazis counted for nothing, as compared to his kingly massacre in 1856 and the "spear washing" of late years, I won't say; but indignation is justly aroused that men, who know how this message was treated, persist in their slanders against Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and accuse him of having sought to ally the savage against the Dutch at the Transvaal annexation—a charge which has had no little to do with increasing that ill-feeling of the Boers against the English Government which has been fomented by means of outside agitation, whilst even sermons were printed to stir up discontent; and there are now some who occupy the inconsistent position of disapproving the recent peace, not for the reasons others advance, but because it brings the natives back under the control of the Dutch, from which they had been freed by the very annexation they once condemned themselves.

The sufferings the Amatonga and other tribes had been exposed to in their endeavour to reach Natal led the Colonists to make arrangements to secure their protection. In 1873 terms were come to with Ketchwayo for securing them a safe passage through his country, which, indirectly, had the effect of gradually placing them outside the field of Zulu raids. This cost the Colony some thousands a year, and so it happened that Ketchwayo's warriors, by the Transvaal annexation, found their little game of spear-washing spoilt.

Farther north there are numberless other tribes out of which streams of men found their way in search of money into Natal, and as a rule have to keep back a monthly portion of the wages they earn—generally about 5*s.* a month—to pay, on their return, to their chiefs. To the south of Natal there are many tribes, all of which have gone on the war-path against British authority since 1875; whilst Natal—the best abused of all Colonies—and Natal only, has, with its natives, remained loyal.

Adjoining the Free State is the Basuto country; here, in 1852, General Cathcart met a severe check, with the natural result that Basuto prestige increased all over South Africa, and became a menace till after the war with the Free State in 1861, which arose from these Basuto raids and thefts, during the continuance of which British subjects were prohibited from rendering their assistance. Whether the proclamation calling on them to leave their fellow-Colonists in their distress was a mere sop to shut the mouths of English agitators at home, I don't know; but I am glad to record that Englishmen were still true to their instincts, and gave their aid in the desperate struggle to which these Dutch farmers were engaged in during three years till the end; and it was only when the Basutos, beaten and humbled by them, must have submitted to their conquerors, that our own Government took Basutoland under its protection. It has been under the protection of the Crown that the Basutos have grown rich and powerful, and were permitted to keep up their military power and organisation, and acquire arms and strength.

It is not two years ago that the Cape found to its cost, in the loss of lives of its people and millions of money, how formidable under England's fostering rule had this force become. Branded as Colonists had been with seeking wars for England's money, all scouted the idea of having the aid of a single British soldier. The Cape did their best, and though they perhaps failed in effectually conquering in six months the tribe which had checked General Cathcart, they did succeed in defeating many frontier tribes which had simultaneously risen in that combined movement.

Mr. Sprigg referred to this a few weeks ago; and well may anyone ask if it is consistent for a nation, which rightly refuses to some of its subjects ne rer home the right to arm, to denounce the Colonial Government as it did; or if there is any civilised State which would sanction armed clans within its borders or could justly blame Colonists who saw the danger near them and sought to correct it. It is lamentable to see how pandering to a false cry is alienating the affection of Colo-

nists who claim, at the least, sympathy. The Transvaal Dutch have proved by their acts that, great as may be England's power to protect if it will, they will do without it rather than have it on the terms offered; and, rely on this, a similar course of action on the part of other territories not far off, is only to be measured by the time when they feel strong enough to resist the sordid meddling of irresponsible advisers at home.

Between the tribes I have thus referred to, and dwelling all round the borders of the two Dutch states and Griqualand West (Kimberley) there are wide tracts of native territory, which have been the scenes of hard fighting since 1875, when all natives began to believe there was a power behind the Colonial Government which would come to their aid.

With that tract on the map which shows the Dutch interior state I must deal rapidly. Look at the map of 1835, and contrast it with that of to-day. Then Natal was far removed from civilised borders; all that large tract in the interior was blank; through what torrents of blood the change was made, in which white and black suffered, would be impossible for me to narrate in the time allowed.

It was soon after the Langalibalele revolt and the agitation raised in England by Bishop Colenso, which resulted in Sir Benjamin Pine's recall in June 1875, when Sir Garnet Wolseley was administering the government of Natal, that the Legislative Council resolved without a dissentient voice that "The interference of any private individual, having no civil or legal right or position qualifying him to do so, is calculated, as experience had proved in this case, to cause serious misunderstanding as to the real facts, to weaken the authority of the Government over the natives, and, indirectly, to endanger the safety of the country, as well as to prejudice harmonious relations between the white and black races." The Council further justified the action of the Governor as being "lenient, and the only humane course open," and expressed regret "that privately circulated documents, which had been permitted to guide the Home Government and public opinion of England to the harsh conclusions that had been formed, had not been placed within the reach of the Council or Colony."

Only a short time before this, the clergy had protested in the letter I have referred to, and addresses had been coming in to the same effect from Grey Town and all parts of the Colony, all protesting "against deliberate garbling of facts." Some from farmers living among the tribes, one from Biggersberg "deprecating the action and writing of the Bishop of Natal, . . . as having no foundation in fact, . . . the manifesto of the so-called Peace Society as palpably untrue;" whilst one of April 1874, with 1,683 signatures, "gives denial to such wholesale and reckless slander."

Already had the Cape Government, sometime before the outbreak, received intelligence showing that arrangements were being made between Langalibalele and Basuto chiefs for his retreat in case of his rupture with the Natal Government, and though this rising had been so promptly suppressed that the proclamation of martial law, dated November 11, which announced the treacherous and unprovoked slaughter of three volunteers and two natives, was revoked eleven days after, and the rebel chief was a prisoner within a month, the agitation had been started from Natal so energetically that we find the Anti-Slavery Society in London corresponding with the Government on January 20, 1874, and the *European Mail* of the 26th, publishing the sensational article before referred to, entitled "Atrocities in Natal;" and among the many letters that poured in from these societies, in the face of the universal denial of their truth, one of May 4 speaks of documents from the Bishop of Natal as "therefore to be considered authentic," and another asks for their "early insertion in the Blue Book," where no doubt they would leave their indelible mark long before the accused could be heard.

Sir Benjamin Pine well describes the position, when on June 1, 1874, he writes: "We were, in fact, blamed by our opponents for not waiting till the natives had

carried fire and bloodshed into the Colony." But, fortunately for the Colony, Sir B. Pine and Sir B. Frere were men who had the horrors of the Christmas of 1834, which you have heard of, before them, and dared to risk their position and reputation to save their fellow-countrymen from similar calamities. What may be in store in the future, unless opinion in England wakes up to a knowledge of those who delude them, or Colonists arm to protect their lives as the Transvaal Boers seem determined to do, is a prospect saddening to all who by circumstances are Colonists, and wish, above all, to continue loyal and "British."

Soon after these warnings other events began to thicken. Wars of races commenced on the border of the Transvaal, soon to be followed by war on the Cape frontier, war within the Colony, beyond and around Kimberley, even to the very borders of Natal at Kokstadt, which would take too much time to refer to further than to say thousands of natives fell, and many white men too. Meanwhile Government had information of negotiations passing between the various tribes. Langalibalele, the great wizard, had, in 1873, communication with the Basutos. Ketchwayo had sent an embassy to Natal about him; his messengers, too, had been reported in every direction—in one case offering 2,000*l.* to Sekukuni—some were sent to tribes between the Colony and the Cape. Yet, whilst all this was discredited by those who "refuse to believe all evidence that does not coincide with their own peculiar views," the mischievous influence was bearing its fruit fast.

To what extent this interference continued, when Sir Henry Bulwer was Governor, will appear from the narrative of facts, some of which cannot fail to supply material by which to estimate at its value the information coming from the Bishop's station, and to this I shall at once refer. Already, before Sir Garnet Wolseley left Natal, a petition of grievances, of an insolent character, had been presented to him, professing to bear about 300 signatures of natives from the various mission-stations of the Colony; but which, when repudiated from all quarters, was discovered to have been concocted by a leading native of Bishop Colenso's station, who admitted to have signed most of the names himself without any authority, even to including those of fifty or sixty dead men, who, he said, though dead, he knew were with him in spirit. When this petition was applied for by the Legislative Council, to verify the truth of the report that a page of signatures was in a female hand, a copy, instead of the original, was supplied by Sir Henry Bulwer, and inquiry thus stifled.

It is important to proceed with what bears on this man's evidence. It was this same leading native who, two years after, paid a visit to Ketchwayo, soon after the Transvaal annexation. The account of his visit was published in *Macmillan* in March 1878, with the Bishop's testimony to this man's reliability; whilst it was he, the concocter of this forged petition, who has ever been prominently referred to in the many cases brought against Sir B. Pine and the Colony, and probably still misleads the British public and stray visitors to Natal.

A short time before that, Major Brackenbury, writing by command of Sir Garnet Wolseley, communicated to Dr. Colenso that "it was reported through the Klip River country that he, the Bishop of Natal, had sent messengers into that country stirring up the natives with the hope that the late chief Langalibalele would return to Natal, and applying to them for money to effect that return;" that deposition had been taken, and one of the messengers sent further stated, "You are to send your children with money to him, and he will teach them to read." It was also about this period that natives of one of the rebel tribes (Putili), employed on public works under Colonel Durnford, had their wages doubled, and the increase (it was said with their consent) paid to the Bishop to form a fund to purchase land for them. All these matters were a little later referred to in the Legislative Council without result or contradiction.

It is impossible from all this to avoid the plain conclusion, that the information which reaches England from this source is either not to be relied on, worthless, or

worse, and that there can be no honest inquiry without sifting it. After all, the grievance in South Africa is this day very much that stated by Retief in the manifesto he left behind him in 1835, when he became a wanderer, viz., "unjustifiable odium cast upon the inhabitants by interested persons, whose testimony is believed in England to the exclusion of all evidence in their favour." There is no lack of proof that this interference was constantly complained of, even by Sir Henry Bulwer.

To proceed. It was soon after the Transvaal annexation that Magema, in June 1877, paid that visit to Ketchwayo during which he says he told the king that Bishop Colenso's son had arrived in Natal "to take in hand in the law courts all matters concerning natives;" and, in connection with this, the Blue Book tells us of important events which I must refer to, being the key to the future Zulu war and the confirmed hostility of the Dutch to that annexation which had been effected with twenty-five policemen in the previous April. We first hear then of Zulu messengers stopping at the Bishop's station, and sent on in December of the same year to his son, or, using the Bishop's own words, "who naturally went to him." On the 11th, Messrs. Smith and Colenso claim to have been appointed Ketchwayo's diplomatic agents to treat with the British Government on the boundary dispute, by virtue of a document signed by those same messengers that day. On the 14th the Colonial Secretary refused to acknowledge them. On December 28, Sir H. Bulwer reported to England, that Magema, a confidential native of the Bishop's, had been in communication with Ketchwayo; that he had gone to the King's kraal, and received cattle from him. He also referred in that despatch to the strange behaviour of the messengers who were said to have given this authority to Messrs. Smith and Colenso, and pointed out how seriously this interference affected the public service. On February 11, 1878, Sir H. Bulwer further reverted to the discrepancies between the statements made by the Bishop and those of his son, together with Ketchwayo's repudiation of the transaction, Ketchwayo stating that he had told the Bishop's son, when he was at his kraal, "the Zulus don't want you or your father to interfere in their matters." And the Governor further reported that the messengers themselves denied having been authorised to sign such authority as that claimed.

Let us now note what was occurring during this brief and most eventful period, for though it was one little noticed, it was that in which the germ of the future war was planted. To deal with that period between Magema's visit in June, the claims of the Bishop's son, Mr. Colenso, and his partner, to be diplomatic agents on December 11, 1877, and the Governor's report of February 11, 1878, it is a noteworthy fact that, but a few weeks after Smith and Colenso's claim was put in and rejected by the Governor, Ketchwayo sends, and that for the first time, an insulting message, in which Sir T. Shepstone is called a "firebrand," and Sir H. Bulwer asked to deal with the question in dispute instead of him. About the same period, on November 16, we hear of the menace; on the 22nd of the aggression of the Zulu army, 2,000 strong, on our border; on the 27th of the loss and damage to the Dutch farmers and their crops, that twenty farms were abandoned to the cupidity of the Zulus." On December 11 Sir H. Bulwer writes that "the king is claiming new territory far beyond that ever known as being in dispute;" on December 6, 1877, that "the whole country watered by the Pongolo, and that between the Blood and Buffalo rivers, has been abandoned, one cause being the farmers see no support;" whilst on December 18, all in the same year, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Messrs. Smith and Colenso that "the unauthorised meddling from Natal in the matter now pending between the Government of the Transvaal and the Zulu king, had already caused the evacuation of scores of farms and loss of much property, and would contribute more towards shedding of blood than peace." And whilst this was going on, as a record to contradict those who call Sir B. Frere the sole author of the war, we find, on December 12, 1877, a year before the war broke out,

Smith and Colenso themselves writing of hostilities as more imminent than was yesterday supposed; and on January 12, 1878, of Mr. Chesson, for his society, expressing "deep regret at prospect of hostilities between this country and Ketchwayo," whilst there is a dispatch from the Colonial Office early in 1878, urging on local organisation in Natal, whilst that of December 4, 1877, admits "the critical position so created for Natal by any collision there" (*i.e.* on the border).

Such were some of the events which occurred immediately after this visit in June of the now notorious Magema. Whatever real sanction he might or might not have had from Dr. Colenso, in black and white or otherwise, no one can doubt the effect which his visit must have produced on the natives in spreading the seeds of future war; for they knew well of the Bishop's personal hostility to Sir T. Shepstone, the Transvaal Administrator. Unfortunately even in this case, although Sir H. Bulwer condemned this interference, he continued to be guided by it; for it was at Dr. Colenso's instigation that the Governor of Natal interfered between Ketchwayo and Sir T. Shepstone, and that at the worst possible time—just after the receipt of the king's insolent message about the Queen's representative in the Transvaal. On this followed the unfortunate Boundary Commission, which practically gave the final blow to the last hope for peace. As to its composition, it was at once everywhere generally condemned in the Colony as packed, and a weak yielding to the Bishop's influence. Its proceedings were watched and denounced freely whilst it was sitting for the unfair way in which it dealt with the Dutch and Colonial evidence, to such an extent that Mr. H. Shepstone, the Secretary of Native Affairs, reported on it, whilst, as he said, Zulus were treated with every tenderness. All this time their arrogant manner was tolerated by the Commission, and was widely spoken of as a sign that the natives believed all that was being done was through fear—an idea which is the straight road to war. A gentleman was present, who, five years before, had been appointed, jointly by Ketchwayo and Sir T. Shepstone, to mark that very boundary-line, and could, therefore, give the best evidence of all; but he was not called. In truth, the foregone conclusion seemed arrived at to pacify the Zulus at all costs, regardless of the Dutch and their long-established homesteads.

In the meantime acts of native aggression continued; regiments kept coming into Natal, and being moved up, Sir A. Cunningham applying for cavalry and artillery—all contradicting the assertion that no one thought of war until Sir Bartle Frere's arrival. Why, the Dutch farmers on that border were urging that, if we would not defend them, at least we would permit them to arm and call on their friends for aid. Later, in May 1878, there appears a petition signed by them stating: "Your Excellency told us, in your proclamation of April 12, 1876 (at the annexation), 'your property will be protected, and all change you will find will be in the direction of increased security.' . . . As your Excellency spoke of the weakness of our former Government, we had reason to expect the stronger power would help us after twelve months' patience, instead of holding conference with thieves. . . . As we see the weakness of the strong Power, we repeat the offer made in the petition of February last to supply us with ammunition, and not prevent us from seeking help from our friends and countrymen, who might help us to resist these marauders."

The reply refuses, as the demand is "impossible for a civilised government to sanction."

Even then, and for some time after, the Dutch discontent did not culminate, for before the Zulu war Sir Evelyn Wood was reported to have met the Dutch, and to have had a promise of large support from them; but when the award of the Commission appeared, the injustice of which was denounced in every official document, except a weak defence of it from Sir H. Bulwer, from that moment the Dutch, who had not forgotten their wrongs and the Christmas of 1834, saw similar influences at work in the deliberate proposal to hand over those farms, which had

been long held by them, to the natives—from that moment European revolutionary agencies and outside agitators found in them resolute men, determined to resist that Power which refused them the right to defend themselves, and seemed resolved to sacrifice them all to the black.

The rest is shortly told: Sir Bartle Frere's ultimatum, accompanied by Sir Henry Bulwer's written and detailed approval of it, even though its issue might lead to hostilities—the Zulu war—the Zulu settlement, and continued influences exercised by the same parties ever able to get the English ear and sympathy—all this confirmed the work, and those able men who were seeking their opportunity in England's difficulty found their field ripe, and have worked it well. And let there be no delusion, they are trying to work it still further; and in this they cannot fail to succeed, unless England's common sense awakes from its delusions, and learns to lean trustfully on the wisdom and humanity of her sons, even though they be far away in Africa.

It would be idle for me to deny the conviction that the position has never been more critical. Even now, whilst Rome is burning, Nero is fiddling and creating further causes of discontent, playing the tune of Ketchwayo's release, which will most certainly be resisted; and let it be borne in mind, as a feature of native feeling, that there has ever been a looking up to someone among natives as supreme—at one time Hintza, at another Kerêli. After Sir George Cathcart's repulse, it was Moshesh, then Ketchwayo, and now it is the Basutos who have shown an unexpected strength and are a formidable organised military power, which has been assisted by expressions of sympathy within the British Parliament in its resistance to the Cape Government.

If natives and Colonists, whether English or Dutch, can ever be got to believe in England's restored prestige, and its firm determination to check or assist in the repression of native revolt, and would look sympathetically on the troubles of the white settlers, even the Dutch would be loyal to her government and a strength to the Empire. If not, and the English and Dutch Colonists unite, as they certainly will be forced to do, for their own protection, it will be in a union which no one who values the integrity of the British Empire could view without alarm.

I have dealt with Natal in its relation to South Africa so exclusively that little time is left to refer to its early difficulties, and to certain peculiar Zulu ideas which deserve to be reflected upon.

The risks arising from the rush of fugitives which I have alluded to were embarrassing, the Colony being young and its revenue not 50,000*l*. To send them back would have been helping at their massacre, and, though I shame to say it, done in late years by the local government, this idea was scouted by early Colonists. The fugitives were received, protected, and supplied with land. Next, how were they to be managed? We had neither men nor money even to create a police, and England refused a penny. It was easy to destroy their system, but how build up another? Hence they were left under their chiefs, the noted Langalibalele being one. The abolition of polygamy and chieftainship was doubtless discussed, but how substitute anything practical? Better some law than none, and the native laws of inheritance and polygamy therefore remained; whilst if the unforeseen numbers in which they poured in made matters difficult and dangerous then, how much more must they do so now? As to land tenure, it was evident, under tribal holdings, as the tribes increased in population and civilisation pressed on, so the people would feel closed in upon, and land troubles arise. To meet this the Legislative Council in 1861 wished gradually to substitute land titles to individuals in lieu of to tribes, but this was strenuously objected to by the Colonial Office. That system which enables a chief to rise with his tribe against the authority of government as Langalibalele did, is undoubtedly bad, but so far it has supplied the Government with allies. Then, among other questions, is one which is based on the idea that a large native population within the Colony is more dangerous than

one beyond the border. Those who hold to this opinion have perhaps not reflected on the fact that every Kafir war has had its origin in thefts and raids from beyond the borders, where tribes are outside the control of the Government.

With a few words about Zulu peculiarities I shall close. It is frequently said that it was due to Ketchwayo's forbearance that Natal was not overrun after Isandhlwana. This is a very great mistake, for not only did the Zulus suffer at that very time three severe defeats, at Inyazane from Colonel Pearson, where they lost 500 men, another defeat two days after from Colonel Wood at Slobane, and in the smaller affair at Rorke's Drift; but the rivers were liable to flood, and, more than all, nothing could be more opposed to their military system than to make such an inroad. The late Mr. Fynn, who came to Natal in 1822, was often taken on by Chaka and Dingaan in their wars, and understood their system better perhaps than any white man did, said distinctly: "The Zulus never fight for an idea, but only for plunder; it will never serve their purpose to carry their raids any distance beyond retreat within a day, unless they kill and destroy everything that can assist a hostile party to intercept them with their booty. When Chaka went far he killed and destroyed everything on his path." So correct is this, that I remember a native, speaking of a panic among some neighbours of ours, saying, "What are they afraid of? The Zulus cannot finish killing everyone on the way without giving ample time to them to escape." Another feature in their system (speaking on the same authority) explains how it is the Zulus never attacked our long columns on the march. Though admirably organised for concentration of their regiments, and skilful in throwing out and drawing in and skirmishing with their "horns" with the object of first surrounding the smaller force, once their great rush is made, and they break into the attack, whether in victory they plunder or in defeat they fly, their organisation is for the time completely at an end. Hence as they could not surround our long columns they waited for them to collect. The battle of Inyazane is no exception, for the Zulus were hiding and waiting for our waggons to get together for breakfast, but they were literally trodden upon by some of our natives, which precipitated the fight in the open, and they were completely defeated by our advance before the column could close up.

It is because I like the Zulus, with all their faults, that I seek to expose the evils which threaten us. I have lived among them for years, and know it is to their interest that they should be ruled with firmness, and that they wish it too. The Zulus are fine jovial grown-up children, have no such a thing as revenge in their nature; cruel in war as savages they are, but the staunch way they stood by our young Colonists shows they appreciate their position, and deserve protection from mistaken kindnesses of unwise friends.

I said the Zulu is a jovial fellow—happy and wealthy too is the Zulu of Natal. Who has ever seen a pauper among them? I never have. Who has seen a Kafir accept a copper, or "debilish" as they call it? In truth I see more coppers in London in a week than I have during twenty-seven years in Natal; and I have seen the broad grin on his face when offered even a threepenny-piece, asking if it would *grow?*—whilst another would refuse 5*s.* to carry a message, and almost immediately start to the same place to recover 1*s.* 6*d.* due to him. Yet they are shrewd fellows. Who is more able to measure his man and detect the gentleman than the Zulu? Who quicker to give characteristic names? And who calls the florin Scotchman, because the canny Scot won't give half-a-crown if the florin will do? Why, the Kafir!

Another feature, and I have nearly done. When a discussion arose as to the probability of Ketchwayo being assassinated as his uncles were, "How can that be," said a native, "if it be true, as you say that his brothers have all deserted him? for no one can kill a king who is not of his family."

To all this may be applied more than one instructive moral, for the relations of civilized men with savages are full of complications.

And with the following suggestive questions I conclude:—

Why do the tribes farther north make prisoners of their enemies, whilst the Zulu kills all on his path? Simply I think because the one can sell men and the other cannot; and if we only show the native chiefs how they can make more by industry, and aid them in opening out fields for the employment of their free labour, we shall assist materially in checking slavery and slaughter at far less cost than by the exclusive use of gunpowder and cruisers. Why, after centuries of occupation, was it that the Portuguese could not leave their lines in safety, whereas from the first British settlement young Colonists, either for sport or trade, could cast themselves boldly and alone among native tribes, and return unhurt? I believe it was because the natives very soon appreciated the qualities of courageous firmness and self-reliance, mixed with the spirit of justice; and therein as Englishmen rests our strength, if it is not weakened by the distrust of our fellow-countrymen at home.

The following Discussion took place after the reading of the Paper.

Mr. J. BERGTHEIL: If my grey hairs did not remind me that I am getting an old man, the interesting paper read by my friend Mr. Saunders, and the history which he has brought before us to-night, could leave no doubt of the fact upon my mind. For many times have I heard him, in the Legislative Council of Natal, debating on questions affecting the Colony and the natives in the same forcible and eloquent language which he has used here to-night. Sometimes we agreed, sometimes I had cause to differ from him. To-night he refers to Sir Benjamin Durban, after whom the seaport town of Durban was called; to Peter Retief and Solomon Maritz, the founders and, so to speak, godfathers of Pietermaritzburg; and to other prominent men from 1835 to the present day. I have known personally most of these men, and have been an actor, to a greater or less extent, in the whole history. When I look back on this history I must confess, with feelings of shame, that, as far as the natives are concerned, it is a sad history, and one of which neither the Government nor the people of England have any cause to be proud. When Sir Benjamin Durban came to the Cape, the Frontier Kafirs, as they were then called, had been so mismanaged by former governors that nothing was left for him but with a strong hand and with the assistance of the English to enforce law and order, and make such arrangements as, in his judgment, were best calculated to produce the future well-being of the Colony. On his arrival in the Colony, depredations, inroads, plundering, robbing, and murdering of white men by natives were the order of the day. Quite different, however, was it when a few years later I arrived in Natal. At that time there was, comparatively speaking, no Government—only a few Boers occupied the place subsequently called Pietermaritzburg, and a few English (eight or ten in number) had settled at the spot now called Durban. The surrounding country was occupied by thousands of natives, mostly Zulus, whose number was daily increased by Zulu refugees. I lived in Durban and was engaged in trade. The small house, or rather hut, which I used both as a dwelling and a storehouse was literally without lock or key. Now, although surrounded by hundreds of natives, I frequently left the place in that condition in the charge of one Zulu for days and weeks together, and I never remember having missed even the value of a penny. White men and women lived and moved about amongst the natives, and even travelled the length and breadth of the Colony, without even the fear of being in any way molested by them. The natives were always civil and hospitable, and always had a laugh, or rather grin, on their faces. During the half-century that has passed since then I do not remember a single murder committed by a native on a white man, either in Natal or in the Zulu country, until within the last seven or eight years. (Cheers.) All of you here are acquainted with the Colony, and from your own knowledge, as well as from the able speech of Mr. Saunders, you must see that matters have changed very much for the worse. Now we hear of nothing but wars and rumours of wars, and discontent prevails on every side, both on the Cape frontier and in Natal. I ask myself, Who is to blame for this state of things? I have seen nearly every Governor of the Cape arrive and depart; I have seen nearly every Governor of Natal arrive and depart; and am I to be told that not one of these men, all able and well-intentioned, could foresee that a native, uneducated as he is, when he comes in contact with white men, must deteriorate and ultimately become dangerous, owing to his facility of acquiring the vices

without the good qualities of a civilised nation. It *was* foreseen, but I am sorry to say that Downing Street refused to do anything, or allow anything to be done, trusting in the adage, "Let well alone." I remember being in England during the Government of Lord John Russell, at a time when thousands of Zulus were swarming into Natal for refuge. I called upon the Colonial Minister for the time being, and urged upon him to establish schools in the native locations, and to make it one of the conditions of the natives being allowed to enter the Colony that they should send their children to school. I pointed out to him that the natives were perfectly docile, and willing to do what they were told; and that if the children were compelled to go to school they would, in fifteen or twenty years' time, be prepared to come in contact with white men without danger either to themselves or to him. I was met by the reply that England had no money to spend for that purpose, and that the system which I recommended would virtually amount to compulsory education, which would do very well for Prussia but not for England or her Colonies. Now, we have been using gunpowder and buckshot against the Zulus, but we have compulsory education in England. I do not hesitate to say that I love the Zulu race; they are a fine race of men, and deserve a far better fate than that with which they have met—(cheers)—and I unhesitatingly affirm that the system of governing the Colonies from Downing Street is alone responsible for the present state of affairs in Zululand. (Hear, hear.) I do not specially blame either the Liberal or the Conservative Government. It is the system of which I complain. Every Governor takes his instructions from Downing Street, but he also has his own idea of how to manage the natives. With regard to his instructions, the ignorance of Colonial affairs that existed, nay does exist at the present moment, in Downing Street, has been forcibly exemplified by Mr. Saunders, and no governor was allowed time to carry out his idea of government before he was replaced by some one who undid all his work and laid the foundation of another system of government, which would no doubt have been successful had it not been overthrown by the next governor. (Cheers.) Until the system of constant interference from Downing Street is changed, you may depend upon it that the natives will continue to deteriorate. The Colonists can very well take care of themselves, and in their own interests they will look after the natives and see that they are safely governed and improve, and I do not hesitate to say that the majority of the Colonists love the natives as much as, and more than, the people at Home. I repeat again, the fault lies with England in that you will not trust your children in the Colonies; that you listen to any tale-bearer from the Colonies, so long as he reviles the Colonists and praises up the natives; that you will persist in believing that you can govern the people of Natal from Downing Street better than they can who live in the Colony. (Cheers.) Mr. Saunders has told an anecdote showing the ignorance that existed in England of the condition of the Colony. I can furnish another. I remember on one occasion the officer in command of the troops in Pietermaritzburg asked for a veterinary surgeon to be sent from England. The reply was, "That the horses, if they were ill, could be taken to the veterinary surgeon at Grahamstown;" this place was between 500 and 600 miles distant. (Laughter and cheers.)

Mr. Morton Green: It affords me great pleasure to bear testimony as an old Colonist to the value of the Paper read this evening; and I know of no one in the Colony more competent from experience and long residence to have mirrored forth such an accurate statement of the facts that have existed than Mr. Saunders this evening. He has so exhausted the subject that I feel incapable of following him. I endorse what the last speaker said in reference to the natives. I bear ready testimony to the value of the natives if properly treated, and I am sure that in the future government of Natal, if they are properly handled, we shall have a very valuable adjunct always to our hands. (Hear, hear.)

Sir BENJAMIN PINE: My Lord Duke, ladies, and gentlemen,—I feel great reluctance to speak this evening, because my name has been more than once mentioned in the course of Mr. Saunders' most able address. Nevertheless, I think it only due to that gentleman to say that I believe this Institute and the country generally are under great obligations to him for having for once told them the truth about South Africa. (Hear, hear.) I believe the facts brought to your notice to-night are exceedingly important, and that if they are well weighed, and, if they enter into the minds and consciences of Englishmen, will do a great deal to stop that meddling interference with the affairs of the Colonies which has led to so much blood-spilling. (Hear, hear.) I do not hesitate to say that the first interference with the policy of Sir Benjamin Durban in 1835, to use the words of a Wesleyan missionary, deluged South Africa. (Hear, hear.) His immediate successor, Sir George Napier, a man selected from the opinion that he was favourably inclined to the natives—that he was, in fact, a philanthropist—did not hesitate to say that Sir Benjamin Durban's policy was right. He said that those treaties entered into by Sir Benjamin Durban, although strictly observed by the white man, were thrown to the winds by the Kafir, and that the blame of the subsequent hostilities did not rest with the white man, but with the people who had been made to think that the prestige and power of England had waned. (Hear, hear.) I wish to go on to Natal. If ever there was a Colony that deserved the protection at one time, and now the forbearance of England, it is the Colony of Natal. (Hear, hear.) It was not a Colony in which Englishmen settled of their own accord, like in New Zealand, and then were followed by the Government. It was a Colony wrested from the Dutch, I think very unwisely, and then held out as a field for emigration to Englishmen. (Hear, hear.) If there was a case in which England was bound to protect the few people who went and settled there with their families at the risk of their lives, it was this Colony. Instead of which, what was done during the whole time? Why, a wing of a regiment, only 400 strong at the very outside, and a small number of Cape Mounted Rifles, was the only force sent there. Afterwards that small detachment of cavalry was taken away, and the 400 infantry, which everybody knows are utterly useless in Kafir wars, were left. These, with 1,700 white men, women, and children, were left in the midst of an overwhelming native population within and without the Colony. (Hear.) Well, I shall pass over the matter to which Mr. Saunders has referred in which I acted as my conscience told me was right. There was a rebellion, and I put it down. I come now to the case of the last war, the war with the Zulus, in which Sir Bartle Frere bore a very great part. I have only the honour of a very slight acquaintance with Sir Bartle Frere, but I must say a few words in his defence. It is clear from what Mr. Saunders has said that the war was brewing long before Sir Bartle Frere ever arrived in the Colony, and that he could not help himself—(loud cheers and hear, hear)—and what made the war imminent, which precipitated the Zulu war, was the annexation of the Transvaal. Not only were "the germs of the war," as Mr. Saunders has said, planted long before Sir Bartle Frere came to the Colony, but another thing which occurred after he arrived showed the utter unfairness of casting the war upon that distinguished man. (Cheers.) Why, Sir Henry Bulwer, whose authority has been held so highly, completely approved of Sir Bartle Frere's memorandum. (Hear, hear.) I hold in my hand the memorandum of Sir Henry Bulwer, in which he gives his entire approval to Sir Bartle Frere's memorandum, in which he (Sir Bartle) demanded of Cetywayo to lay down his arms and disband his army. Sir H. Bulwer says:—"I beg to express my concurrence generally in the conclusion of the High Commissioner, and in the terms which His Excellency proposes to lay down." And again, "The terms here mentioned are terms which I think the British Government has a right to make, and if they are rejected a right to insist upon." And again he says, "We must not conceal from ourselves that the issue may result in hostilities." (Hear, hear.) Sir H.

Bulwer could scarcely more strongly have expressed his approval of that war, and yet the attempt is made to throw the whole of the odium—such as it is—of that war upon Sir Bartle Frere. Nothing is more unjust. (Cheers.) I will say a word about the annexation of the Transvaal. In that policy I differ from a great many of my friends, and I believe from Sir Bartle Frere himself. I look upon that act as a crime and a blunder. It seems to me that the statesmen of that day managed to combine the crime and the blunder together. It was a political crime; it was a crime, because the Transvaal people were a free people, and were given freedom by us under the Treaty of the Sand River; they had been released from their allegiance to the Crown, and they had done nothing which would justify us taking away their freedom. True, their treasury was empty, but was that a good reason for going to war? because, if so, we might go to war with Spain for the same reason. Another reason alleged was that they could not defend themselves against the Zulus. Alas! the Majuba Hill disaster was a grim reply to that. The Dutch could have defended themselves, and would have fought Cetywayo instead of us, if we had let them alone. A great many in England are indignant at Mr. Gladstone's Government for having relinquished the Transvaal, and giving it up at the time he did. It is a sad thing that we suffered that defeat; it is a very mournful thing to think that so many brave men died on that occasion. (Hear, hear.) But we had done wrong; we had committed a crime, and Mr. Gladstone showed great pluck in opposing the so-called "public opinion." (Oh, oh, and Hear, hear.) It was more honourable than a hundred victories, showing, as it did, the moral courage of this Christian country. (Hisses.) I am quite prepared for the Jingoes. (Laughter.) I think this is as much as I need say on this occasion, for I think Mr. Saunders has so completely exhausted the subject, and so forcibly and clearly shown the evils of the system of government by which the Colonies are ruled, that I need say no more. I can only hope that the policy which was established by Lord Kimberley at the Cape in giving the people responsible government will be carried out at Natal. I believe that to be entirely necessary; I advocated it long ago, when Mr. Saunders opposed it. I believe there are evils connected with responsible government, as there are with everything else; but I still think you ought to let the people manage their own affairs. (Loud cheers.)

The Right Hon. Sir BARTLE FRERE, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I. (who on rising was received with repeated rounds of applause), said: My Lord Duke, ladies and gentlemen,—I can assure you that it is with very great reluctance that I obey the call of the President to address you on this subject. The fact is, I came here expecting to hear from such an experienced Colonist as Mr. Saunders a dissertation on the relative position of Natal as compared with the other Colonies and countries of South Africa; and Mr. Saunders will forgive me when I say that, in place of that, I have listened to a very able and very full sketch of the history of Natal, in which very little is said regarding its position as compared with other parts of South Africa—(hear, hear)—though there is much of great interest and importance in other respects. The reason which Sir Benjamin Pine has given for restricting his remarks on the historical question affects me quite as much as it does him, and I should not dream of venturing to address to you any observations regarding my share in the history of the past, which I am well content to leave to the verdict of the future. (Cheers.) But Mr. Saunders has touched, and touched with great ability, and I think with great truth, upon some points which are of great importance to the future; and I think, in the very short time that is allowed us, it would be more to the purpose if we consider the future rather than the past. (Hear, hear.) There are one or two observations which I should like to make on what has fallen from Mr. Saunders; and I would ask you to ponder well whether he is right in saying, "Trust rather to Englishmen there" (that is, in South Africa), who are no less "English, humane, and practical than yourselves, even though

they have crossed the Line, and are now Colonists?" Has he good grounds for this opinion? This is a question of the greatest possible importance; and it is one on which I had many opportunities of forming a judgment, and on which I must say my opinions are very decided; and I will tell you, if you will bear with me, why I think he is perfectly correct in what he has said. (Hear.) You all know that Natal is a very young Colony, and it differs from most other Colonies in the Europeans there being mixed up with large numbers of natives, and you may be very much puzzled, as all who have not been in the country would naturally be, to account for the very different stories you hear of the conduct and disposition of your own countrymen out in that Colony towards the natives. By one party they are painted as fiends, by another party as suffering angels—(laughter)—and I will tell you why I think, and when I think, both parties may have some element of truth in the descriptions they give. The fact is that Englishmen, brought up in England and accustomed to English methods of thought, have naturally a great disposition to feel sympathy with the oppressed and the weaker party? (Hear, hear.) I would ask you whether in any street in England, if you ever saw a man maltreating a boy or a woman, whether there were not a dozen Englishmen who came forward at once, without asking who was right or who was wrong, and without considering whether they would dirty their hands or not, to take the part of the weaker party? (Hear, hear.) This is the feeling which grows up with our youth at school, and which is taught us in every discussion which we have amongst ourselves as boys, and remains with us as men till old age; and it is this disposition which the average Englishmen carry with them out to the Colonies. (Hear, hear.) Now, I speak in the presence of a great many men who have been in the Colonies of South Africa longer than I have, and I would ask any of them to set me right if they think I have overstated the case. (No.) The first impulse of every average Englishman when he goes out to South Africa is to believe that the native is always oppressed, and that the Englishman is always the aggressor; and, with very rare exceptions, this is the belief which, consciously or unconsciously, guides the feelings of an Englishman when he first arrives in South Africa. After a time he finds the natives—(and here let me say I entirely agree with what has been said by Mr. Saunders and those who followed him as to the excellent position and capabilities of the natives, and especially of the Zulus)—but after a time any Englishman, especially if he does not care or is not able to make himself understood in their own language, becomes intensely irritated by a number of peculiarities of the natives around him, who are utterly unlike the labouring classes to which he has been accustomed in England, and the natural result is that he conceives an unreasonable prejudice against the natives. These new-comers are generally to be found among the large populations at the seaport towns, and it is natural that the people who go out there should often be struck, at first landing, with what they think the unreasonable prejudice on the part of people who have been a short time in the Colony. (Hear, hear.) Well, after a time the *average* Englishman (remember, I am speaking now only of the *average*, and what is usual, and there are exceptions in every case), but the *average* Englishman, after a while, being, like most of his countrymen, an uncommonly practical sort of fellow, begins to think he will make the best of a bad bargain, and when he finds he cannot get away from the inconvenience of the angularities and singularities of the natives amongst whom he is placed, he is brought round to the opinion which most old Colonists like Mr. Saunders and his friend Mr. Bergtheil have expressed to you, that, after all, there is an immense deal of good, and great capabilities for good, in the natives with whom they have to deal; and they become, as far as I have seen, better judges and more sound friends of the natives than any Englishmen here who have not been in the country can possibly be. (Hear, hear.) I would state, as the result of what experience I have, that I very rarely met a

man who had been long in the Colony who did not both speak and act kindly to the natives. (Hear, hear.) They generally told me—and in this I think they were quite correct—that kindness, firmness, and steadiness of purpose are the qualities which impressed the natives most. (Hear, hear.) After all, as one of the speakers has said, the natives are extremely like good-humoured and thoughtless children; and, like children, they must be firmly dealt with. This does not mean that they are to be harshly dealt with, but you must be firm and steady, and tell them at once what you mean, and you must not be capricious; you must be reasonable with them, and they will always respond to such treatment. They are extremely sensible, just as children are, of the slightest kindness and sympathy. It is because a feeling of sympathy with the poor and oppressed and inferior is ingrained in most Englishmen that the average Englishman gradually becomes extremely popular with the natives. (Hear, hear.) As a general rule, I have observed that all the English Colonists who have been long in the Colonies like the natives, and are well served by them; and let me say in passing, that, notwithstanding what you hear of the atrocities committed by some people who live far away from civilisation, I have observed that the Dutch farmers have servants generally who have been so long with them, and are quite as fond of them, and even more attached to them and more difficult to detach from them by the offer of higher wages, than most of our own countrymen. (Hear, hear.) Every Englishman on his arrival goes through a sort of acclimatising process as regards his opinion of the natives. He starts by expecting them to be better than it would be reasonable to suppose they could be; then, disappointed at what he finds them to be, he fancies the natives to be much worse than they really are; and finally, after a few years he settles down into the belief that the natives are much like other mortals, possessed of many imperfections, but also of very many good qualities, which are capable of being developed and increased by good treatment. (Hear, hear.) The mental process I have described will I think account for some of the inconsistencies in the opinions we hear regarding the natives, and the feeling of the Colonists towards natives. However that may be, I entirely concur in what Mr. Saunders has said about "there being Englishmen in the Colonies who are no less English, humane, and practical, than we are here in this country." (Applause.) Then let me say one word further about what he has said, and what was said by the gentleman who followed him, about the best way of dealing with the Colonists. They have said, and said very emphatically, that the best way is to let them manage their own affairs. Now, I think we Englishmen are all agreed on this point; but there are a large number amongst us who think that if you let the European have his own way in managing his own affairs for himself in a Colony like Natal, he is very apt, whether a Colonist or an Englishman, to oppress the natives. Now, this I think is at the root of a great deal of that distrust which you hear of the Colonists in this country. (Hear, hear.) People in England are prepared to believe that the Colonists can manage their own affairs for themselves, but they cannot believe that the Colonists would do justice to their native neighbours. Now, let me say that all my experience goes to contradict this impression. I speak in the presence of my predecessor in the Cape Government, and he will correct me if I am not stating accurately what is our experience at the Cape. The Cape, you know, has a more developed constitution, being an older Colony, than Natal; and how are the natives treated? Why, I believe it is the only Colony of England where the natives have the vote in every franchise that could be conceded to them if they were Europeans. (The Duke of Manchester here made a remark to Sir Bartle Frere, who continued.) His Grace reminds me that it is the same in New Zealand, where the Maoris have the franchise, and I am very much obliged to him for correcting me; for there in New Zealand I believe the resnlts have been quite as satisfactory as in the Cape. (Hear, hear.) Now, I ask you to bear in mind that all the relations between the

natives and European Colonists in the Cape have been settled by the Colonists themselves, and entirely in accordance with their views; and the result is that any native who acquires property for himself, and can come and say, "I have a house, or I have an employment of a certain annual value," is entitled to the franchise. (Hear, hear.) Now, I ask you, is it possible, when this is the case, that the natives can long continue in any disadvantageous social or political position? At the Cape every man can rise, and does rise, according to his intrinsic merits as a man. When he has made his stake in the country he is by law entitled to a municipal vote, or a vote for the legislature; and there is nothing whatever in the nature of the franchise to prevent his being either a member of the Colonial Parliament or a member of the Ministry. Now, this is the result of trusting the Colonists. (Cheers.) And I ask you whether it would not be much better to extend that system of trusting our countrymen, rather than to keep the white Colonists in the position of people who are distrusted? (Hear, hear.) I think all our experience is that if you do not trust Englishmen, they will not show themselves as worthy of trust as they would if you trusted to them implicitly. (Hear, hear.) And I believe that everywhere in South Africa you will find the same results follow which have followed in the Cape Colony, and that you will find, if you give the power to the Colonists to deal with all these questions as they think best, you will have no reason to be ashamed of their treatment of their native fellow-subjects. (Hear, hear.) For remember that in Natal especially —and I am speaking more particularly of Natal now—the Colonists are, as a rule, men very superior in position and education to the average Englishman, for this very simple reason: there is absolutely hardly any labouring class in Natal of white men. Owing to the large numbers of natives and of Indian coolies, almost all manual labour is done by others than European Colonists. (Hear, hear.) There is no field there for the uneducated Englishman, who has nothing but his own hands to trust to; unless he has some quality which will enable him to ascend into the class of employers of labour he had much better go to some other Colony, where he can work and make good wages, as he can in this country. (Hear, hear.) For this very simple reason the population of Natal consists principally, as far as the white population goes, of men who are employers of labour, and a great proportion of them are English gentlemen. If you were to take any portion of the non-manufacturing rural districts of England containing one or two small cathedral or country towns, and weed out the great landed proprietors, and the men who belong to what we call the landed aristocracy, and weed out also the actual labouring class, the residuum would be, as regards its composition, very much like the white Colonists in Natal; and I can only say that were I among them I should be always very glad to hear their opinions in a Legislative Assembly—a Volksraad or Parliament, or whatever you choose to call it. I should always be very glad to have their opinions upon all topics connected with the Colony, and I should feel assured that the collective opinion would be that of high-minded Englishmen. (Cheers.) I must apologise for saying so much, your Grace, but there is a great deal more that could be said if time did not press so. (Sir Bartle Frere resumed his seat amid repeated cheers.)

Sir T. Fowell Buxton: I am very far from making any kind of complaint, but I think I may observe, as has already been said, that the title of the very interesting Paper to which we have listened hardly led us to expect exactly the statement which we have heard. My time here is very short, having to catch a train; but I should like to speak shortly on one or two points. First of all, I will touch upon one on which most of us heartily agree. I am one of those who hold that the responsibility of the Zulu war does not rest on Sir Bartle Frere. I do not express it for the first time; I have expressed it publicly and privately, and for that matter on the hustings. I think that those who hold the contrary opinion have either

omitted to attend to, or were not well informed as to, the events of the years immediately preceding the war. But I think the more we look into the events that preceded it, the more we see that the responsibility rests upon the officials in those parts, especially in reference to their action with regard to their Boundary Commission, and upon the apparently very sudden change of opinion which came over the mind of Sir Theophilus Shepstone after the annexation of the Transvaal. Now, I do not say that the one fact had anything to do with the other, but the interval between them was very short, and this must have made it difficult for the Zulus to feel that there was not some connection between the two. Now, Mr. Saunders has expressed considerable jealousy of opinion in England. I do not for a moment question his right to feel some doubt about English opinion. It is, perhaps, not expedient that we, so many thousands of miles away, should hold any opinion at all; and if so, it is not expedient that we should have any information at all; and then, my lord duke, I venture to ask you and others, my fellow-colleagues in this society, whether this society has any business to exist at all? (Hear, hear.) Is it not our business and *raison d'être* to collect information so as to form opinions? (Hear, hear.) If you do not want to form opinions, you do not want to collect information; but if you are expecting gentlemen in England to collect information, you must expect the inevitable result, that they will form opinions, some on one side and some on the other. (Hear, hear.) Now, some of the South Africans tell us, and Mr. Saunders and others will tell us perhaps, that we have no business to form an opinion because sometimes we change our minds. Well, no doubt information does drop upon us rather like water from a watering-pot; it comes in driblets, and it is rather hard to get. (Laughter.) But I would ask you whether you think that public opinion in Natal is always so perfectly steady and free from change? (Hear, hear.) It appears to me that it has not always borne that character. As to the Zulu war itself, I followed the events of that war, and watched with care the opinions in the newspapers and the speeches made at Natal upon that subject. I remember the day when the Zulu war at its beginning was extremely popular; people in the country were holding up their hands in favour of it, except the gentleman at Bishopstowe. But a few months after came the question of expense, and the, perhaps ill-judged, suggestion was made that the Colony might contribute something towards the expense of the war. I think the amount asked was about sixpence in the pound. But what was the cry then? Why we read all through the newspapers paragraphs saying that the Zulu war was altogether forced upon Natal; that it was not desired by the Colony; that it was a matter of Imperial policy, and let England pay for it. (Hear, hear.) Perfectly true. A friend says "hear, hear," but he represents the opinion of that time, and others represent the opinion of another time. (Laughter.) Well, again, as to the matter of the sale of arms which has been alluded to, there is not a question as to difference of policy at one place and another. What could the natives expect? You go to war with the Basutos because they have arms. When they went to the diggings they earned their wages, with which they bought their guns; but it did not end there. They afterwards went to the magistrate and bought licences, and, having got those licences and their guns, they then go elsewhere, and they are told that if they have guns at all they are rebels, and if they do not give them up immediately they will be made to do so. (Hear.) Well, you know, that is not perfectly steady policy. (Laughter.) Take a recent case. We have heard something about the change in the appointment of Mr. Sendall. That occurs to one as a striking instance. The Natal newspapers, for some reason or the other, were furious against the appointment of Mr. Sendall. I never heard of Mr. Sendall I confess before as a Colonial Governor. (Laughter.) Well, now, in the last batch of papers I saw from Natal their tone was this—"Why, what fools they are in Downing Street to make any change at all. We did make a shindy, but we never meant it." (Laughter.)

That seems the sort of opinion which we are told is the opinion that "must be right," as those who express it are on the spot. Really it would help us very much to the forming an opinion if the Colonists would tell us when in their own opinion they think themselves right. (Laughter.) I do not wish to take any kind of advantage by mentioning names; but I cannot help saying that Dr. Phillips and Bishop Colenso's names have been drawn into this controversy, and that the opinions expressed by the one half a century ago, and by the other in the present day, were said to be given from "interested motives." That may mean that those gentlemen take a sentimental interest in the subject on which they express their opinions, and in that sense that they may be interested parties. But we know that, in common parlance, the expression means that those persons have a private, personal, and perhaps a pocket interest. Now, I think that every one will agree with me in feeling that if charges of that kind are brought against those who are gone and those who are living, some facts to give a sort of justifiable ground for believing them ought to be given us. (Hear, hear.) I cannot accept a statement made unless it is borne out by further evidence than has yet reached myself. (Hear, hear.) A few facts about the case of Zululand. These are the facts about which there is no doubt at all. We have sent out troops acting under her Majesty's flag. We have filled that country with famine. We found it governed strongly, and we have destroyed that Government, and have filled the country with anarchy. We have left it in the position in which Central Africa is, where every tribe is at war with its neighbour. That is the position we have set up in Zululand, and I feel we have thrown that country back a very long time in its civilisation. (No, no.) Well, I am giving you my opinion, and I am pointing it to you as a fact that the government is destroyed, and the merest semblance of government is set up in its place. We have anarchy and slaughter; we have not much stealing of cattle, for there is very little left to steal. We have burnt the people's granaries and destroyed their crops; and I say that, having created anarchy there, we are bound to replace it by some form of good government. You say you will not hear of the annexation of the country by the British Government, and that would be right if annexation means the cutting up of the land amongst those who wish to buy it cheap. If you cannot have it in any other way, I, for my part, should like to try the experiment of reinstating Cetywayo on his throne. (Hisses, "No, no," and interruption.) You are told he was a bloodthirsty governor and a cruel ruler; but the facts on which that opinion was based were the facts of 1856, when there was what is called a war of succession, and a great deal of brutality went on, just as it would go on in Europe. You have had that kind of brutality going on; but when you find you have, in order to prove it, to go back all those years, I think it is fair proof that there is not much evidence to be got in very recent times. At all events, I hold most strongly that this country has brought frightful calamities upon Zululand. (No, no.) You have done it, I say, and therefore you are bound, in duty to your God and to man, to do your best to set up some form of good government. (Hear, hear.)

The Rev. G. BLENCOWE: My Lord Duke, I shall be greatly obliged if your Grace will permit me to reply to Sir Fowell Buxton's statement about the annexation of the Transvaal. The statement was more fully made than to-night by him in the *Times*. I replied to his letter, and showed him that he had no authority whatever for his imputation upon Sir Theophilus Shepstone. I told him my authority; and I also pointed out the character of the documents on which the Zulu claim was based; and I also informed him that that document was deposited in the Utrecht Landdrost Court, and that Sir Theophilus, so far as I knew—and I have had a good many conversations with him on this question—did not know that that document was there. The writer of that document gave me an account of its contents. When Sir Theophilus got to Utrecht he saw, for the first time,

that document which occasioned his change of opinion, and I stated these facts in reply to Sir Fowell Buxton's letter in the *Times*. We had two letters on both sides. Then Sir Fowell Buxton has stated that we have produced a condition of confusion in the Zulu country. Let it be remembered that the Natal people and Government had nothing to do with that. The English Government sent out, fully complete, that plan of government for Sir Garnet Wolseley to enforce. (Hear, hear.) They sent a copy of that document to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, at that time in this country, and asked his opinion about it, which was that it could not possibly work, and he gave his reasons for that opinion. They asked him if he would object to a copy of his letter being sent to Sir Garnet Wolseley, and he said, "No, by no means; I very much wish that he should see it;" and the reply Sir Garnet sent back was this:—"I agree with every word Sir Theophilus says; but what about my instructions?" (Hear, hear.) As to our having made the Zulus murderers—it amounts to that—that we have set them fighting one against the other, Sir Fowell Buxton ought to know before he brings an accusation of that sort against us, that ever since the English Government was established in Natal, ever since Cetywayo had any kind of influence, long before he was made king—the English Government in Natal kept them from fighting. (Hear, hear.) What does it mean that he wished to wash his spears? It was the restraint put on him that prevented it. I was on the Zulu border at the time of the annexation; I know that Cetywayo had at that time his *impi* up, and that at the very time that the messenger came informing them that the Transvaal was annexed he had his indunas discussing the plan of the invasion of the Transvaal. (Hear, hear.) As soon as he heard that this messenger had come he commanded him to be killed, so that he might not receive the message. His indunas said, "No, he must not be killed; he is only a messenger; he only speaks the word of his chief—they are not his words." The induna who made this reply then was ordered by Cetywayo to be killed, and to be taken out there and then, and the rest of them said, "No, he *shall not* be killed; he has given his chief the best advice he could, and it is good advice. The English are our friends, and he has advised what is right with respect to the English." And next morning Cetywayo said, "Tell Somtseu it is well you came to-day; if you had not not come to-day, in less than a week I should have made a clean sweep from the Drakensburg to Buffalo." I had repeated reports from the Zulu country to this effect, and there was a universal feeling of indignation, even amongst the old men, that had not been felt before, and they said, "It is too bad of the English. They have kept us from paying the Boers all this time, and now they have gone and taken the country themselves, and we cannot touch it." (Hear, hear.) And, with a good deal of braggadocio, they said, "We will drive the English out of the country." We have not done this to the Zulus. (Hear, hear.) Then, as to bringing famine upon them, there was a great deal of sentimental nonsense in this country a few months ago, and subscriptions were called for to supply the Zulus with food. My old friend Bergtheil or Mr. Saunders knows very well that the normal condition of the Zulu country through the whole of Panda's and Cetywayo's reign was two months' starvation in every twelve. They will not till the ground sufficiently to supply their men. I was in the Zulu country in 1861, at the time that there was a fear of the invasion of Natal, and at that time, just at the middle of winter, I saw them sweeping out their mealie pits, and picking out rotten mealies for food such as no Englishmen would give to his pigs, and they were then five months before the harvest. Then, as to this accusation against Bishop Colenso, Mr. Saunders has presented proofs to-night, and I know they are true. (Hear, hear, and No, no.) And further I would say, that with all his swagger about his kindness for the natives and deep interest in them, he has never done a thing for the natives without being paid first. (Oh, oh, and Hear.) Mr. Saunders knows that that is true

so far as he knows his action. He first began to interfere in the Zulu country with respect to Maituan, an outlawed rebel, and he has never taken the side of a loyal man. (Hear.) He began his action in the Zulu country with Maituan. These are facts. Maituan first of all applied to my son, and offered him cattle in payment; he was correspondent to two of the Natal papers at the time, and he wished him to bring the matter before the English Colonists first, and then to attempt to take it if possible before the Queen. My son refused to have anything to do with it, and told him he deserved all that he got, and might be thankful for being permitted to live in quietness in Zululand; and he then applied to Colenso, and instead of sending to Bishop Colenso the cattle he had offered to my son, he sent them to Miss Colenso. And all the efforts he has put forth avowedly for the native have been of the same character. (Hear, and No.) Yes, I say. Gentlemen who do not know the facts may say it is not so, but I know that everything Mr. Saunders has said to-night is true; and I know that my statement is true; and I am not saying it for the first time. Colenso is a failure; and I am not at all sorry that he has become a *protégé* of the Aborigines Protection Society. Laughter, and cries of "Time" and "Hear, hear.")

Sir T. Fowell Buxton: I feel it certainly due to the Rev. G. Glencowe, who has just spoken, to say a word or two. It is true we each wrote two letters to the *Times*, and the point of those letters, as far as I remember, was in reference to the time at which the war might be brought to an end. I think I wrote urging that the war might be brought to an end at Easter 1879, and Mr. Glencowe wrote in opposition to that proposition of mine. In reference to the Boundary Commission, I confess I hardly remember our referring to it. I believe there never was any question but that the Boundary Commissioners were perfectly able to get any evidence that might be receivable, and were ready to receive any evidence which either party might wish to bring forward; but they did not receive it, and it must have been that the Boer party did not think it worth while to produce it. That is the fair inference, and they may have had some good reason for not considering it until after the Commission was over. I do not know why they did not bring forward good evidence, but after receiving all their evidence there was no reason for upsetting an important decision. As to the fighting of Zulus against each other, I was alluding to the war going on at this day in consequence of the settlement of the country by Sir Garnet Wolseley. I am sorry I left a wrong impression on Mr. Glencowe's mind, and I must apologise to him for so unintentionally producing that impression. With regard to the charge brought against Bishop Colenso, that has now assumed a more definite form, and therefore needs no further defence from myself. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. Stephen Bourne:—I have no special fitness for speaking about Natal from any knowledge of the Colony itself, but the Paper before us recalls to my recollection events which occurred in the island of Jamaica forty-eight years ago, which brought out the same principles that Mr. Saunders has elaborated in his Paper. They bore, I think, upon the wide question which he has raised, as to the expediency and the degree of Home Government interference in the management of Colonial affairs. I think that, without casting any censure upon my own countrymen in the Colonies, of whom I have seen much and whom I admire much, it must be recollected that going thither they are placed under different circumstances, and oftentimes in a very different position, for forming a correct judgment to that which we at Home occupy. We have had two instances given us in the speeches made this evening. One gentleman spoke with regard to the original characteristics of the Zulus, and of the deterioration which they had experienced since the time when he first knew them. I would say that it is utterly impossible

that such deterioration could have arisen from any fault of the Home Government, because it is quite clear that the Home Government never sent out emissaries to teach them to become murderers or robbers; and those are the changes which are stated to have taken place in their character. I cannot help thinking that if such deterioration in the natives has arisen, that it must be due either to those with whom they have been brought into contact—or rather to the previously undeveloped forces of their own natures, which had failed to produce such changes until brought out by the contact which they have had with some of the worst species of our own countrymen. Far be it from me, however, to say that that is the character of most of those who go out from Home to the Colonies. Then, again, we have had allusion from Sir Bartle Frere to the fact that in the Cape Colony the franchise is accorded to any native who possesses the qualification for it. I would ask you all whether the state of things has not been this, that the settlers in those Colonies having found the inhabitants useful to their purposes, have endeavoured to increase that usefulness, but very much by means of keeping them in their normal condition. Their feeling has been this, that the Englishman was to be the lord and they were to be the servants; that the Englishman was always to be right and that the natives always to be wrong—(No, no)—that the desire has been very much to keep them in a state of primitive existence such as they had when first discovered, and not to advance them in the scale of humanity. (No, no.) Whatever may be the result to them of the conduct of the British Government, I think we cannot but hold to this, that the tendency of the British Government's procedure in the Colonies throughout has been consonant with a desire to raise the natives in the social scale—to confer upon them the blessings of education and of religion. I will not say that such intentions have always been rightly carried out. I am an old Government servant myself, and I know too much of the dealings of the inside of Government departments to say that they are always right; but I do say this, that the grand object which the British Government has always had in view has been to protect the rights, the liberty, the life, and the property of the individuals who come under British survey, and to strive to educate them up to the position of British citizens. (Hear, hear.) That too often has conflicted with the interests of some of the inhabitants, and although the mass of the people who go out to settle in those Colonies may be, and are, desirous of doing what is right, it does not always happen that their dispositions or their interests are coincident with the promotion of the welfare of the natives. (Hear, hear.) I do think this, that, much as we desire to trust the government to those who are residing there; much as we would propose to educate them, and guide and keep them in the right way, it would be the most dangerous precedent possible if the British Government were to renounce its paternal care of the subjects coming under its control, and throw them altogether into the hands of those whose interests are not always identical with theirs. (Hear, hear.) I think the principle on which our relations are founded is one which ought to endure. No doubt its application is susceptible of great improvement, and requires the greatest care. We are bound to see the growing importance of our Colonial Empire, and that the office of Colonial Secretary in this country should always be held by men of the highest possible fitness for the post they have to fill. (Hear, hear.) One word more: I rather regret that in our Institution we have had a Paper which has been so decidedly an attack upon one political party. I had hoped that our Papers, generally speaking, were such as to deal more with matters of information, history, and general policy than an attack upon any particular party; but I look upon it as one of the benefits of this Institution's existence that we have been enabled to meet together to-night to hear a Paper so decidedly antagonistic to the views of many, and so calculated to provoke opposition, and that we have had such a comfortable and quiet debate on the subject. (Hear, hear, and laughter.)

Mr. LABILLIERE: I should like to say a few words in reply to Mr. Stephen Bourne. He has gone upon the assumption that the Colonists wish to keep the native races in a state of subjection, and that it is necessary for the paternal Government to exercise their power and influence from Downing Street in order to protect the rights of the aborigines. Well, is that necessary in New Zealand? (No.) Who has conferred upon the natives in New Zealand those rights and privileges which they enjoy quite as much as British Colonists? Why, the Colonial Government. They have a free constitution in New Zealand. The white men who have gone out there—the men who Mr. Bourne would lead us to suppose would like to establish a system of serfdom over the natives—those are the men who have in New Zealand raised the natives to positions which they at present enjoy; and in the same way, as Mr. Saunders has told us, have they been treated in the Cape. What has conferred upon the natives of the Cape Colony those privileges which they possess with regard to the suffrages? Why, the free constitution of the Cape Colony itself. (Hear, hear.) I think those two instances are a complete and conclusive refutation of what Mr. Stephen Bourne has said upon the subject. All I would like to add with regard to the other points is that I have not gathered from the Paper of Mr. Saunders, or from the speeches made this evening, that, as suggested by Mr. Bourne, this is a party discussion. (Hear, hear.) We have had both views brought fully and fairly before the meeting; we have had Sir Benjamin Pine standing up for the policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government with regard to giving up the Transvaal—(hear, hear)—we have had Sir Fowell Buxton, who is well known in this country as the advocate of one side of this question—(hear, hear)—we have had the opportunity of hearing his views upon the subject; and I think, although the speeches made have differed very widely, it is a most satisfactory thing that gentlemen so decidedly differing on important questions of Colonial policy—questions which I admit to a certain extent, if pushed too far, may involve party considerations and may arouse party passions—should have an opportunity of expressing their opinions. I think it is of great advantage that gentlemen holding opposite views on these questions should come here and state those views as they have been stated this evening. (Hear, hear.) As a member of the Papers Committee of this Institute, I do think we should be guilty of undue timidity were we to attempt to put any impediment in the way of the reading of such a Paper as we have had this evening, or the delivery of such speeches as we have had from Sir T. Fowell Buxton and others. (Hear, hear.)

The noble CHAIRMAN: I think at this late hour I may venture to close the debate. I took the liberty of interrupting Sir Bartle Frere in that most dignified, interesting, and statesmanlike speech with which he favoured us—(loud cheers)—to suggest the word New Zealand while he was alluding to the franchise given to the natives of South Africa. I did not wish to interrupt him more, but I wish to correct Mr. Labilliere by saying that in New Zealand the Maoris have greater electoral franchises than the Englishmen. The Maori votes for the English members; but there are also Maori members who are only elected by Maoris, for whom the English cannot vote. With regard to Mr. Saunders' most interesting and slightly exciting Paper—(laughter)—I would say just this, that the very first time that I underwent the ordeal of trying to address the House of Commons was in the defence of the Cape Colony. (Hear, hear.) I then felt, when very young—for I had been to the Cape before I was of age—that they were hardly used and ungenerously treated by England. I do not think that sufficient allowance is made in England for Colonists by people who sit comfortably at home and criticise—I say it in no unmannerly sense—ignorantly criticise the circumstances and the conduct of the Colonists. (Hear, hear.) It is impossible for people in a well-governed country, with an old civilisation, to appreciate the position of Englishmen going with their wives and families, with their worldly

goods, into a wild country where there is nothing but unmitigated savages —(hear, hear)—with no police or neighbours to protect them against sudden depredations, which may fall upon them without the slightest warning. When those atrocities are committed the only redress is a violent one, and must be a violent one; and therefore my sympathies entirely go with Mr. Saunders' Paper, and I am quite sure that every Colonist who heard him will sympathise with him, and will understand him. I hope that a good effect will have been produced among all their countrymen in favour of the Colonists from England, who really have done a very great work, who have conquered mighty territories and magnificent countries. (Hear, hear.) People who live in England have no idea of the splendour and richness of the territories of England abroad, far beyond anything we have in England; and I am myself grateful to those men who have gone out and conquered them for the Empire, and I hope that Englishmen who stay at home will always appreciate their exertions and support them in what they have done. In conclusion, I beg to tender on your behalf our best thanks to Mr. Saunders for his able and valuable Paper. (Cheers.)

Mr. SAUNDERS: I have to thank your Grace, and at this late hour say but a very few words in reply. Mr. Stephen Bourne has mistaken Mr. Bergtheil's remarks about the deterioration of the natives—he meant that this arose from the weakness of the Government. We at Home need not go far to see how crime will spread if unsuppressed and evil-doers escape punishment; it is mistaken leniency that has done the evil Mr. Bergtheil referred to. I must now thank Sir Fowell Buxton for giving me an opportunity of meeting some points which he has raised. I have not touched on the great party politics of England—though I have distinctly done so with those of Natal, where a small party charges the Colony with all sorts of atrocities; and when Sir Fowell Buxton speaks of vague charges being made unsupported by facts, what does he call the extracts and authorities I have referred to? This Paper is full of facts. Is the petition I have alluded to no fact? and the Bishop of Natal's testimony to the reliability of its main author not a fact—raising the question as to what extent that man is to be depended upon himself who has such ideas of what is reliable in others? If there are no late Governors here who are aware of these cases, I would pledge myself to prove all I have said; and that the very man who forged those signatures is a prominent authority in all the charges preferred, and the information sent to England from that source. I assert I have not in this trenched on the great Liberal and Conservative party politics. In real truth, sir, we believe that both these parties wish us well, but that both equally know nothing about us. (Laughter.) I most certainly did not consider the Bishop of Natal, and those who support him in England, in any way to be considered one of the political parties in the State; yet Sir Fowell Buxton insinuated blame to us that we did not pass more war expenses. In one year (1880) votes were taken for above 400,000*l.*, which, for rather more than 20,000 Colonists, is nearly 20*l.* a head. (Hear, hear.) Apply this rate to the British population of 36 millions, and say what that comes to, and if we have not paid a fair proportion. (Hear, hear.) Will he calculate the loss of one life in two hundred of Colonists, killed and buried there (to say nothing of those who died of sickness and other causes connected with that war), and apply the same proportion at home, and then say if I have not the right to defend the Colonists from blame and misrepresentation in the false position they have been placed? (Hear, hear.) Sir Fowell Buxton further kindly proposes to make use of us, and wishes to make the experiment of sending Cetywayo back. If he will be good enough to come and live on the exposed border—(loud cheers)—then he may talk of experiments, and I shall not say a word to him. I have lived in Natal when panic was all round; natives sleeping at night out of their huts, and settlers flying to get nearer the towns. And I have seen ladies refuse to follow

the flight, believing that by remaining quietly at home they would inspire confidence in the minds of our alarmed natives, and I have witnessed the good effect this had on them too. Let Sir Fowell Buxton and his friends do this, and earn then the right of proposing such experiments. (Hear, hear.) He also implied Cetywayo had done nothing noteworthy since the great slaughter many years ago (1856). Why, I have pointed that, to my knowledge, his armies were constantly out year after year somewhere. And though he further refers so strongly to the burning of Kafirs' huts (which are of straw, and can be rebuilt in a day or so), he treats very slightingly the destruction by the Kafirs of the white men's homestead, orchards, &c., which they and their families had occupied for years before.

Sir F. BUXTON: I referred to all the forces; not to the Natal forces, but all the troops employed.

Mr. SAUNDERS: But you did not refer to the fact that the year before the war seventy to eighty homesteads and orchards, &c., were burned or pillaged by Kafirs, or abandoned by the Dutch, owing to the inroads of these savages who lost the huts you allude to. But this could not be helped; these men rob, plunder, and steal cattle whenever they can do so safely, and unfortunately the weakness of Government encouraged them. My object has been to draw attention to these facts, hoping that when deliberated upon they would work out some good in the end. (Cheers.)

A vote of thanks to his Grace the DUKE OF MANCHESTER, K.P., the Chairman, closed the proceedings.

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PAMPHLET No. 3.

POLITICAL ADDRESS,

BY

E. ASHMEAD BARTLETT, Esq., M.P.,

IN CONNECTION WITH THE

HELENSBURGH AND GARELOCH

Conservative Association,

IN

KING STREET HALL, HELENSBURGH,

ON

11TH JANUARY, 1883.

J. M. MARTIN, Esq., of Auchindennan, Honorary President of the Association, Presiding.

1883.

POLITICAL ADDRESS.

On Thursday evening, 11th January, 1883, Mr E. Ashmead-Bartlett, M.P., delivered a political address under the auspices of the Helensburgh and Gareloch Conservative Association in King Street Hall, which was completely filled. In the absence of Mr William Kidston of Ferniegair, from indisposition, Mr J. M. Martin of Auchindennan, one of the honorary presidents of the Association, occupied the chair; and amongst those on the platform were — the Rev. D. M'Alister Donald, Pitlochry; Bailie Bryson, Admiral Edye, R.N.; Major Dennistoun, 64th Regiment; Captain J. P. Dick, Lansdowne Park; Provost Babtie, Dumbarton; Messrs Charles Kidston, Glenoran; John M'Gregor, Bonnyton; John M'Intyre, Cawdor Lodge; L. M'Lachlan, Dalnabruaich; Robert Walker, Eskville; Thomas Watson of Inchalloch, Row; John Brown, Brandon Grove; L. J. M. Campbell, Clarkfield; J. T. Costigane, Thornden; Hugh Gray, Moorlands; George Harvie, Killin Cottage; A. B. Law, Seabank; Wm. Lunan, Clunie House; Peter M'Duff, Hayfield Cottage; James M'Gregor, Albert Terrace; Donald Macleod, Blythswood Terrace; R. M'Nicol, Allan Bank; Robert Neilson, Benvenue; James Spalding, Argyle Park; William Tait, Netherlee; James Taylor, jun., Rowanbrae; Duncan Turnbull, Woodville; W. C. Maughan, Kilarden, Rosneath; Alexander Hannay, Westburn; W. B. Thomson, Albert Terrace; William Dunn Black, Torwoodhill, Row; Wm. Craig, Dumbarton; J. P. Davidson, Matakanui; Thomas Smith, Artarman, Row; Thomas Wetheral, Glasgow; Gilbert Heron, Glasgow; A. W. Hamilton, Laggary, Row; Moses Buchanan, Aberdale; Martin M'Kay, Glasgow; and V. Hamilton, Laggary, Row.

Letters of apology for absence were received from Mr Archibald

Orr Ewing, M.P.; Mr P. B. Smollet of Bonhill, Mr William Kidston of Ferniegair, Colonel Findlay, Woodbank; Col. Currie, Ingress House; Mr James Aiken, Dalmoak; ex-Bailie Muir, Commander Liardet, R.N.; Dr Dunbar, Garelochhead; Messrs James Duncan, Duncraggan; A. P. Reid, Rosneath; W. J. Walker, Garemount; Francis Reid, Cragmore; James Keyden, Torwood; W. Orr Ewing, Rhu Lodge; G. W. Hamilton, View Park; John Macredie, Dalarne; D. E. Johnstone, Auchenlea; R. W. Leadbetter, Glasgow; John B. Aiken, Dalmoak; Walter Maclellan of Blairvaddick, A. M. Stewart, Garth Grange, and others.

The CHAIRMAN, who was received with cheers, said—I have no doubt it is a great disappointment to all of you that our friend the President of this Association cannot be present with us here to-night to occupy the chair, as he is accustomed to do, and as he is so well fitted to do. I assure you it is no more astonishing to you than it is to myself to find me occupying this place. In my early days I was resident in this parish and intimately connected with it, but circumstances have during the past few years led me to other parts of the county, and I have not had the pleasure of meeting you in this hall as often as otherwise I would have done. Why I have been made chairman I do not know further than it was the will of Mr Kidston—(laughter)—and as you all know the will of Mr Kidston is supreme in a good many things. (Laughter and cheers.) And even in his bed he can will me into this chair whether I am willing or not. If you suffer by it you must blame him the first opportunity you have and not blame me. (Laughter and cheers.) On an occasion of this kind you do not expect to hear an exposition of my political views. I daresay you know pretty well what my views are, and I hope you approve of them. I would only, before introducing the hon. gentleman who is to address us, say that I have heard it rumoured that political opinion in Helensburgh is not entirely unanimous. I have heard it stated that there are people in Helensburgh who do not agree with me—(laughter)—and it may be possible that some of them may have found their way into this meeting. If so, I can only hope that if they have come to curse they will remain to bless—(cheers)—and that if they have come here unenlightened they will have their eyes opened in a way that will not only astonish them, but be for their benefit before they go away. But supposing that those things do not happen, and that some of you go away not entirely agreeing with me, I hope you will give a fair hearing, and keep up the honour of the burgh and county in which we are assembled, by giving a fair field and no favour to the hon. gentleman who at so much trouble and inconvenience to himself has come so long a distance to address us to-night. (Cheers.) I am sure, whether we agree with him or not, that what he says will

be worth hearing. (Cheers.) I shall not trespass further on your time but will introduce Mr Bartlett who is to address you on subjects to which he has given great attention and in connection with which he has made his mark in the House of Commons and attained a position that is given to few to make in that august assembly. (Cheers.)

Mr ASHMEAD-BARTLETT was very loudly cheered on rising to address the meeting. He said — Let me join with the chairman in expressing, my sincere regret at the absence of Mr Kidston from this meeting to-night. I am bound to confess that Mr Kidston's kind pressure was the principal reason of my coming here, and I feel how much you, who know him far better than I do, must regret the absence of so well-tried and sincere an advocate of Conservatism as Mr Kidston has been. (Cheers.)

MR HERBERT GLADSTONE'S CHALLENGE.

I must begin what I have to say to you with a reference to the condition of Ireland. Mr Herbert Gladstone has lately given the people of Peebles the advantage of his own views of practical statesmanship, and he attributed to myself the intention of writing a history. Now I regret that my occupations will not allow me the time to write a history of the past three years, but it will be a pity not to do what may be in my power to render the statement of the infant Hercules in some degree at least prophetic, and so with your indulgence it will be my endeavour to-night to give a review of the history of Mr Gladstone's present administration. Brief it must be, and many of its choicest episodes will have to be compressed, and deprived of their proper effect, in order to keep my narrative within the bounds of a reasonable speech. It would require the resources of a Midlothian campaign to do full justice to the portentous eccentricities and matchless inconsistencies of that administration. Every page, ay, almost every sentence, of the voluminous utterances of Mr Gladstone before and during the last general election would afford a text to the political philosopher for a telling essay upon foresight, consistency, and honour. Mr Gladstone in his speeches in 1879-80 was utterly improvident before the events which have so discredited his political wisdom and so disproved his dogmatic prophecies. The son has, however, surpassed the father. Untaught by the terrible lessons of the past two years, which are, like the writing upon the wall, patent even to those who would fain reject them, he repeats, and, if possible, improves upon the monstrous errors which have caused the country so much misery and shame. (Cheers.) In that interesting speech which Herbert Gladstone—— (Cheers.) It is very well some of our Liberal friends can find relief. (Laughter.) I rather pity the good people of Peebles, and I wonder what they

have done that such extraordinary statements should be offered them. There are very few parts of Scotland benighted. (Laughter.) It is very difficult to get to the windward of Scotchmen, but at the same time in politics there is a large section whose acumen might be somewhat developed. (Laughter.) Let me repeat the words used by Mr Herbert Gladstone on the 30th of December—words so extraordinary and showing a mental obtuseness so astounding that but for the concurrence of various authentic reports, I confess that I should have doubted their accuracy. This is the sentence: "The key-note of the policy of the present government is to be found in its Irish policy and legislation." This is a memorable confession. It expresses a great truth, though perhaps it was hardly meant in the sense in which we understand it.

A CONTRAST.

What have been the results of their policy in Ireland? Out of the mouth of Mr Gladstone himself shall his Government be judged. Speaking at the Mansion House in the metropolis of these realms in December 1880, after he had held office for nine months, the Prime Minister said—"The state of Ireland is a shame and a disgrace to England in the eyes of the civilised world." Words of terrible import and fatal truth! This has been the outcome of his Irish policy—lawlessness, confiscation, and terror, ruin, anarchy and demoralisation—not only in unhappy Ireland, but wherever the incapable and disastrous touch of the Liberal Government has destroyed security and peace, and blasted the interests of Britain and her ancient renown. It is the same in Egypt, where anarchy was brought about and the national movement crushed by the sword, through the blundering of the British Cabinet It is the same in South Africa, where confusion and disorganisation prevail from end to end of the country, where British Colonists, Boers, Basutos, and Zulus are all struggling, slaughtering, or being slaughtered. It is the same in Central Asia, where the freedom of a valiant race has been quenched in the blood of its people—where Afghanistan has been handed over to its ancient barbarism, and the people of Candahar abandoned to the mercy of their hereditary oppressor—where Russia has advanced 500 miles in a single year towards our Indian frontier, and is sweeping into her net the commerce of those regions which Mr Gladstone's Government so foolishly and so unnecessarily cast, without a protest, to her insatiable aggression. But the charge with regard to Ireland cannot be dodged, it cannot be evaded. The words of Mr Gladstone with regard to this same Ireland used in your capital county in March 1880, just before his victory at the election, stand as an irrefutable witness. "There is," said he, "an absence of crime and outrage,

and a general sense of prosperity and satisfaction unknown in the previous history of that country." Contrast these two statements made in the year by the same man, and you will have the judgment and the condemnation of Mr Gladstone's Irish policy, which we are told is the key-note of the policy of his Government. The words I have just quoted were spoken in reply to that famous letter of our late illustrious chief, Lord Beaconsfield. (Cheers, hissing, and counter cheering).

REBUKING THE RADICALS.

I am sorry for the credit of human nature that the name of a statesman who has gone to his rest should be greeted in that way. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) I, for one, am extremely sorry that the present Prime Minister, whom some of you will join with me in thinking a most distinguished man, has, from a cause which we all deplore, been compelled to abandon his projected tour in Scotland. I regret it, gentlemen, for the cause, and I am sure most of the Conservatives present feel the same regret. There is sufficient chivalry in the Conservative party that if any thing grave were to happen to Mr Gladstone no Conservative in these realms would be found to hiss at his name. (Cheers.) I regret his illness from another cause. I think it would have been one of the most interesting and entertaining studies that could have been put before this country—the efforts of an able and ingenious man to reconcile his statements of 1879 and 1880 with his conduct in political affairs since. I should like to have seen some attempt on the part of Mr Gladstone to explain those utterances which have done so much to place the country in difficulty and to cause trouble at home and abroad, and those prophecies and prognostications which have been falsified by the course of events since. (Cheers.) For that reason, as well as for the cause of his illness, I regret that he has been unable to fulfil his engagements. But, gentlemen, if the Liberal Committee of Midlothian are very anxious to find a speaker, far inferior to Mr Gladstone, but quite willing undertake the task—if they write me a letter, I should be very glad—(prolonged laughter, cheers and hisses)—to go through the different portions of that county. Taking my text from the Midlothian speeches of 1880, I should endeavour to preach a a sermon from them, and I have no doubt I could have the use of some of those pulpits that were always placed at his disposal. My sermon would deal principally with political prophecy, honour, and consistency, and I should find plenty of texts from which to preach rather long sermons. (Laughter and cheers.)

FACTS AS TO IRELAND.

Mr Herbert Gladstone ingeniously begins his reference to Ireland

with December, 1880, when the number of agrarian crimes amounted to the appalling total of 866, and he claims it as a wonderful triumph for the Government, that in last December they had been reduced to a comparatively low figure. He was, however, conveniently silent about such awkward facts as, that the number of outrages in April, 1880, the last month when Lord Beaconsfield was in office, were only 63, or the fact that since the present Government have been in power 10,087 agrarian crimes have disgraced Ireland and the Government which has allowed them to prevail. (Cheers.) He judiciously held his peace about the desperate remedies to which Mr Gladstone has had recourse in order to undo the disastrous consequences of his own neglect and incapacity, and to atone for his grievous misgovernment of Ireland. He said nothing about the abortive Coercion Bill of 1881, the unjust and futile Land Act of the same year, which, as Mr Parnell stated the other day, has remitted only £70,000 of rent at a cost of £400,000 in lawyers' fees, and which will take twenty years to complete its operations. Nor did he mention that brilliant Arrears Bill, by which the loyal and honest and long-suffering people of England and Scotland are made to pay for the sedition and dishonesty of Mr Parnell's followers; nor about that second Coercion Bill—the most stringent Ireland has ever known—which, however necessary, suspends almost every constitutional privilege throughout that country, and which would do no discredit to the savage repression of a Russian despot. It may be true that the desperate disease of Ireland is being slowly cured by an equally desperate remedy. But will you allow the political quack doctor who has caused the complaint to spread and all but prove fatal, to claim credit for himself because he has made up for his own ignorance and incapacity by an amputation which has permanently maimed his patient? (Laughter and cheers.)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Let me pass on to speak of foreign affairs. I hope not to trouble you at any great length on these questions, because I am accused, perhaps justly, of paying too much attention to questions of foreign policy. The greater part of the time I have been able to devote to public matters has been given to the consideration of these foreign questions. Well, gentlemen, they are not really foreign questions, though they appear to be so; they are called so, but it is a misnomer. Lord Beaconsfield once said that the foreign relations of England were the interests of Englishmen in other countries. This is perfectly true. What are those interests? The empire of England is greater, more wide spread, more powerful, and beyond doubt more beneficent, than any of the great empires of the world which have preceded it. Nearly 300,000,000 of people hold the sway of

our Queen, and if we look at the condition of those peoples who were unhappy and oppressed in past generations, but who now accept the sway of the British Crown, you will find that their condition has been enormously improved by the ascendancy and rule of England. You will also find that these benefits are not confined to those myriads of people who are now only too glad to acknowledge the supremacy of the British flag, not merely to the 250,000,000 alien races, for instance, in the British possessions in India, who enjoy the blessings of peace and good government to an extent to which they have been strangers during the whole of their past history. These benefits act and react upon your own country and upon yourselves at home. Internal prosperity, employment, the wealth, the busy manufactures, the carrying trade, which all go to make England so happy and prosperous a country, are to a great extent dependent upon the foreign relations of our wide and wealthy empire, Therefore, I claim that the man who to the best of his ability endeavours to uphold the security, the influence, and the greatness of the British empire abroad, is doing as much for the benefit of his countrymen at home, as the man or the party who occupy their time in introducing reforms at home—especially such reforms as we have just considered with regard to Ireland, or as to the destruction of liberty of speech in Parliament. (Cheers.) I say by my references to these matters —though they may sometimes appear to be unreasonable—I am discharging what I feel, from the bottom of my heart, the greatest public duty which can be discharged towards this empire. (Cheers.) What will become of these 250,000,000 of people in India if you neglect this Russian advance. If you give up the bulwarks of your empire, if you allow your great rival to come close upon your borders, and it may be intrigue in that country, and perhaps, at a moment when you are surrounded with difficulties, when your army is locked up in Ireland, or in the Transvaal, or even in Egypt to pour her hundreds of thousands of soldiers down through the mountain passes, which she will soon control, upon the fertile and unprotected plains of India. Who then will call me an alarmist, or unreasonably cautious in these vital matters ?

RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA.

It is because I wish that stitch which saves nine to be taken in time that I have ventured to bring this subject as often as I have before the attention of the country. I merely wish those natural precautions, which would be taken by any other Power in the world, to be taken by the British Government. (Cheers.) There is no need for any threat or menace towards any people. I do not wish for panic. Precaution is the way to avoid panic, to avoid ex-

pense, and to avoid war. By ordinary precaution we should have avoided the Crimean war and the Egyptian war. (Cheers.) You ought to secure your frontier in time, and to retain possession of those natural positions, which the least accomplished strategist in the world would tell you is necessary for the security of your country. Secure that, and then, in the position of the strong man armed in Scripture, you can hold your house in safety, and, if you like, you can laugh at the menaces even of the millions of the Russian Army. But until this is done, I shall continue to bring this question forward, whatever may be said of me, in season or out of season, fearless of the consequences. I am not afraid of what the verdict of the people will be ten years hence, nor of the consequences of the attacks that may be made upon me. (Cheers.) As an illustration of factious opposition, the way in which the Afghan question was discussed and is still treated surpasses belief. The Liberal party ignored, and still ignore, all their past dealings with Indian and Central Asian affairs. They say nothing about the fact that the first interference with Afghanistan was by a Liberal Government; that Lord Palmerston actually went to war with Persia because, under Russian instigation, was threatening Herat, although the Russian armies were then nearly as many thousands of miles from Afghanistan as they are now hundreds; they forget that everyone of their statesmen had stated that Afghanistan must be free from Russian influence or intrigue. Above all they suppress the important fact — the key of all our recent Afghan troubles—that it was they themselves who fatuously repulsed the pressing overtures of Shere Ali, in 1873, when he asked to be "the friend of our friends, and the foe of our foes," and so drove him into the arms of the Czar. Omitting all reference to this, as well as to that most perfidious and diabolical plotting, proved by the Kabul correspondence — and to the presence of a Russian envoy at the Ameer's capital, — to the discovery of lakhs of Russian rupees and of vast cantonments for the reception of Russian troops at Kabul, they accuse the late Conservative Ministry of uncalled-for and wicked aggression upon Afghanistan. Note how silent Mr Gladstone is upon every important fact of the whole Afghan question. There were worse things said and done during that war. Charges were brought against our brave soldiers and their brilliant General, who were battling amid the snows and hardships of Afghanistan for the power and safety of Great Britain. Charges as foul as they were incredible — charges which nothing but the meanest party rancour could have invented! The Liberal ministry have given up, in opposition to the all but unanimous opinion of military judges, and to the great preponderance of political

authorities, an almost impregnable position, commercial and strategic, which they received from their worthier predecessors.

THE KEY TO BRITISH INDIA.

The fortress of Candahar, which was won by the valour and the treasure of England, they gave over to a weak ruler, and to civil war and oppression. It is the outwork and the key to British India; it bars the road by which all great conquerors have advanced to the invasion of Hindostan. It has long been the great mart of Central Asia, and it might have become a great feeder for British commerce. While we have abandoned our railway to Candahar, Russia is hurrying on hers from the Caspian to Herat, both for commercial and military purposes, with lightning speed. The railway to Candahar would have enabled us to pour the products of British industry, as well as British troops, in four or five weeks after leaving these shores, into the heart of Central Asia. That is all now gone. Russia dominates Herat, while we have scuttled out of Candahar. She is sweeping into her net all the wealth of that fertile region which she has just conquered. And all this has come about for what reason? Because the policy of Lord Beaconsfield had to be reversed. (Hear, hear.) I will not say more about Central Asia. I am accused of saying too much upon that topic. Gentlemen, had you seen, as I have seen, the military power of Russia; if you had seen her thousands, and hundreds of thousands of her troops, full of ardour, animated by a martial spirit, of which we in the quiet West have little conception; if you had thought of the millions that stand behind those thousands; if you know that all these are directed by the will of a single ambitious man, or of one or two ambitious statesmen; if you count the steps they have advanced across the mountains and rivers of Asia and Europe towards that which is the goal of their conquest, as it has been of all the great conquerors of the past; if you look, above all, at the fact that within twelve months, and twelve months of Gladstonian administration, Russia has sprung a distance of 500 miles — greater than the distance from London to Edinburgh—nearer your splendid dependency of India, that she has crossed great deserts and plains, that she has conquered the last valiant race that remained intact between her and the key to India; if you realise that she is hurrying her railway with lightning speed towards the borders of Afghanistan, both for her commerce and for her soldiers, while we have abandoned ours to ruin and decay; if you contrast her 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 men with the scanty army of Great Britain, damaged very much by Liberal tinkering—if, I say, you reflect upon all these things, you would pardon me for doing what little I can as a

humble individual to bring these most important and pregnant facts to the notice and knowledge of my countrymen. (Cheers).

EGYPT.

The Egyptian war was a cruel and needless war, and the results which most of us had hoped to have seen as the outcome of the war—for there had been no results achieved as yet, beyond bloodshed and the stamping out of the national movement in Egypt—might have been secured by an honest, straightforward, and courageous statesman without the loss of life. I look upon the Egyptian war as very similar to the war of the Crimea, which was caused by the Government of which Mr Gladstone was a prominent member, and which had cost this country a vast amount of treasure and a deal of bloodshed. But I hope similar consequences will not follow from this war. I trust that a needless and cruel war—needless, so far as the interests of England and good government in Egypt are concerned—may not prove, like the Crimean war a fruitless one. But what are we told? After this blood has been spent, after lives in Egypt have been in thousands sacrificed, and after hundreds of our brave men have fallen, we are told by sapient Liberal leaders that Egypt is to stew in her own juice. (Laughter.)

A RENEGADE EARL.

We find that renegade Earl, Lord Derby. (Hisses and prolonged cheers.) Gentlemen, I wish the Liberal party much joy of Lord Derby. (Cheers and hisses.) He never did us any good, and will never do you any good. (Loud cheers and hisses.) He has no courage, no heart, no statesmanship. (Cries of "Oh," cheers, and hisses.) Let me advise you, gentlemen, to read the *Daily News*—(laughter)—of 1876 and 1877 upon the subject of Lord Derby, and you will find some interesting revelations there. You will find him described as "a man stained with blood, and smirched with the lusts of Batak." You will find him attacked in the great organ of the Liberal party as a character of that description. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) Now, gentlemen, I am not going to accuse Lord Derby of being stained with the blood of Batak——

Mr J. PHILIPS—Sour grapes. (Laughter.)

Mr BARTLETT—Sour grapes! You may have them twice over, and if our grapes were sour, my friend's grapes will be extremely more bitter and acrid than ours. (Laughter and cheers.) We are told by Lord Derby that the best thing to do in Egypt is to get out of it as soon as possible. What did we go to war for then? Why have we opposed the national party in Egypt, and slain thousands of patriotic Egyptians? Is it in order to give the Government military glory, the transitory triumph of Tel-

el-Kebir? Is this the policy of a party who denounced us as advocates of a feverish militaryism, bastard Imperialism, and Jingoism only four years ago? If there is one thing worse than the cruelty and needlessness of this war, it would be for the Government to follow the advice of Lord Derby and retire from Egypt without securing the fruits of their victory. (Cheers.) We of the Conservative party are determined about two things, so far as we can direct in the progress of public affairs. The Government have gone to work in the wrong way. They have gone to war when it was unnecessary, they have conquered Egypt when they might have secured the ends by peaceful diplomacy, and by wise and just statesmanship. We are determined that this unfortunate Egypt shall not be left "to stew in its own juice;" we shall not abandon Egypt, the gateway to India, where so much of the energy, enterprise and money of this country are now employed, either to the cruel despotism of Russia or the restless democracy of France. (Loud cheers.) We will as patriotic supporters of the Queen's Government, to whatever party ministers belong, support them consistently and honourably in any measures which they find it necessary to take to secure the interests and to support the permanence of British influence in that ancient and important country. (Loud cheers.)

CAUSES OF THE WAR.

The causes of this war are before us. We have watched the whole course of the proceedings. We saw how the Government was going steadily down the path which most of us thought was sure to lead to war. Some of us ventured to warn them, but we were only scoffed at for our pains. I am sometimes accused of finding mares' nests—(laughter)—and of discovering difficulties which no one else can see. I am going to trouble you with a short extract from a speech which I made in Parliament five months before this war began, and six or seven months before the crowning victory of Tel-el-Kebir. I do this to show that in this one case at least, and a very important case my prognostications did prove to be true. In February last, in speaking upon the Egyptian question, I said: "This intrigue with France has caused England the greatest injury. It has cost her the alliance of Austria and Germany, valuable and serviceable as such an alliance is, and has given her nothing in return. For the very man (M. Gambetta) whose action was the keystone of the whole business, has himself, in three short months, fallen from power and left the guidance of the shifting and shiftless Republic of France to other hands that will not follow his dangerous paths. It has brought you twice to the brink of a great European struggle, in which you would have been on the wrong and the losing side? It has left you stranded

and isolated in Europe, without a single ally, without even one of those 'friends' to whom even Mr Bright attaches some importance. It has now brought you, in this miserable Egyptian imbroglio, to a position where you cannot advance without incurring certain war, and from which you cannot retreat without the most painful and disastrous humiliation before Europe." I was told at the time my ideas were absolutely without foundation. I was told that the alliance with France was complete and the best thing in the world. "The two Governments," said Sir Charles Dilke on May 15th, are prepared for all eventualities," and there was no danger of war. However, every word I said in that paragraph came true. (Cheers.) In alluding to the blunders of the Government, Mr Bartlett referred to the Joint-Note——

Mr MALCOLM M'PHERSON—Who made it?

Mr BARTLETT—Who made the Joint Note? I am speaking of the Joint Note of January 1882, which was drawn up by M. Gambetta, and sent to Lord Granville for his signature, and which was then sent to the Khedive. (Loud cheers.) That Joint Note is now called by all the Liberal papers "a fatal note." (Loud laughter.) They now speak of the act of their own Ministers that determined the whole course of our action in Egypt during 1882 as "a fatal act." (Loud cheers.) I ask you to bear with me while I very briefly go over the causes which involved this country in the Egyptian war, namely, the blunders made by the Government. In the first place, there was their old engrained vice of delay and neglect. They were too late with regard to their action in Ireland, they were too late in the Transvaal, too late as to Tunis, too late with the commercial treaty, too late in dealing with the Russian advance in Asia, they are too late in every quarter of the globe. Their policy has been confined not to precautionary measures, not to averting difficulties, which anyone could see coming upon them; but to frantic efforts to get out of the messes in which they have involved their country. Neglect and delay are the first cause. The second cause was their contempt for the just aspirations and claims of the Egyptian people. It is an extraordinary thing, but if any man had ventured to predict three years ago, when Mr Gladstone came into office, that he would make a war to put down the national aspirations and claims of the Egyptian people, would introduce two coercion bills, and would strangle freedom of speech by the *Cloture*, the man venturing to make such a prophecy would have been set down as mad. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) But Mr Gladstone has done these things, and the neglect of the just demand of the Egyptian people was one of the causes of the war. My friends, especially my Liberal friends in this room, will hardly believe how

simple and just these demands were. The Egyptian national party and the military party demanded three things. They demanded, first, a Legislative Assembly, not one which should have the full powers of our Parliament, but merely certain constitutional rights which we are accustomed to consider as the inherent privileges of every free people. The second demand they made was the right of voting their budget, not the whole of it, but less than one-half. They agreed to forego the control of that portion which deals with the matter of the public debt. The third demand was that the army should be raised to 18,000 men, not a number in any way out of proportion to the size of Egypt. It is hardly credible that, making the professions Mr Gladstone's Government has made, of interest in and devotion to the cause of rising and oppressed nationalities, for that Goverment to go to war, because they denied the Egyptian people those very natural, and one might have said inalienable privileges—(cheers)—yet so it was.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.

The third cause of the war was their alliance with France, the joint political intervention with France. It was to that point that I mainly directed the speech quoted from to-night. The merest tyro in politics knew perfectly well that political intervention with France in Egypt was impracticable, and would not produce any satisfactory results. If it were carried out it would only lead eventually to a war between England and France. The interests of England and France are divergent in the East and in Egypt France has all along hankered after that ancient and wealthy country. The interest of the two countries are divergent. Let us boldly and frankly say so : that is the best way of keeping the peace, for we shall not then drift into impossible positions which only excite the jealousy of our so-called allies, and would ultimately lead to war. There is another reason why we should not base our policy upon the French alliance. and that is the instability of French Governments. You must have a lasting and permanent Government if you wish to have any secure or valuable alliance. A Government whose ministers change twenty times in ten years cannot be a trustworthy or stable friend. Yet that is what has happened in France. There have been nearly, if not quite, twenty changes of ministry. I won't say there have been twenty changes of policy, but there have been twenty phases of policy during that time. The result is that no country can depend upon her for a moment, and her friendship and her alliance are a broken reed. Sir Charles Dilke, who built up that alliance, thought he could depend upon the continuance in office of M. Gambetta, his great friend ; but in two months M. Gambetta fell from power, and with him the policy based upon that friend-

ship. We might have found ourselves now with a French army in Egypt alongside of our own. Sir Garnet Wolseley would then have needed double the troops; he would have had to have one army to watch the French and another to defeat Arabi. (Cheers.) At this moment the French papers are attacking and reviling not only England, but this precious Ministry of which they and Sir Charles Dilke were sworn friends twelve months ago. What chance would there be of peace being maintained if French bayonets and swords were face to face with ours at Cairo and Alexandria? We should be at war to-morrow! Mr Gladstone's Cabinet did their best to get the French troops into Egypt, and it was only a lucky accident, in the refusal of the French Assembly to vote supplies, that saved us from this embarrassing measure. To the divergency of our interests and the instability of the French Government, I would add another reason against the French alliance — the extreme dislike which was felt for France by the whole Mussulman population of the East. France had committed an act of gross injustice towards Tunis. I will quote Lord Derby, the distinguished apostate of the Liberal party, to prove that. He speaks in strongly condemnatory language of the action of the French with regard to Tunis. Now the Mussulman population of the East are the people of that country. They live there as we live in England, and have a right to be consulted as much as we, or any Christian population. Professed Liberals and Radicals seem to believe that these unfortunate Mohammedans, because of a different creed and race, have not the ordinary rights of humanity. I am not ashamed to say that they have as much right as you or I to be considered in any political matter affecting their country. Their interests were neglected, their views were scorned, and England, which had been looked upon as their friend and protector, was found allying herself to the greedy and grasping Government of France. Therefore, naturally, the sovereign and people of Egypt and Turkey, supposing us to be acting as their enemy, refused any longer to take our advice, which in the time of Lord Beaconsfield or Lord Palmerston, who had a fixed and consistent policy, they would only have been too glad to accept and to follow. The Sultan of Turkey is the ruler of Egypt, and he is accepted and acknowledged as such by all the countries in the world, just as much as the Queen is of Ireland, and it must strike anyone that it was the rankest folly to begin to reform Egypt by setting against them the governing and ruling authority in Egypt. Through the Sultan, and by means of his influence, which he was only too anxious to use, but for the hostility of Mr Gladstone, you might have put down the revolutionary movement in Egypt, if it was so desired, in a single month. It was for the

interests of the Turks that it should be put down, because they viewed the movement of Arabi as being a national and a separatist movement against Turkey, with the greatest jealousy from the first. It was only the gross injustice and hostility of the British Government that prevented the just authority of the Sultan from being invoked to put down the revolutionary movement. I could develop this matter more fully upon this point, but I will ask you to remember the four points I have referred to—first, the delay in dealing with the difficulties of the question ; secondly, the gross injustice towards the national demands of the Egyptian people ; thirdly, this foolish and reckless co-intervention with France ; and, lastly, the constant and persistent injustice towards the Sultan and Sovereign of the people, any one of which causes could have been avoided with the greatest ease by any competent statesman. (Loud cheers.)

THE FUTURE.

There are other questions which are now for the moment questions of the past, but which will again become important questions for the interest of this country, such as the government of South Africa, the advance of the Russians in Central Asia, the aggressions of France in North Africa. These questions have not been settled to any advantage, or, indeed, have not been settled at all by the Government. (Hear, hear.) Look one moment at South Africa. You see there disturbance and war reaching all round the frontiers of the Transvaal. You see these unfortunate natives whom we promised should never fall again under Dutch rule, being persecuted and robbed of their farms, their cattle being carried off by hundreds and thousands by the arms of precision possessed by their Boer oppressors. Numbers of natives have been blown up in caves by dynamite, and the natives of South Africa are being treated at this moment with the most gross and absolute injustice by their Dutch tyrants. Our old friend, Cetewayo, is being restored. We have heard a great deal as to the desire of his people to have him back, and as to the advisability of making him monarch of his country once more, which a commissioner sent out by Mr Gladstone, had settled upon a different basis, dividing the country into 15 little kinglets, with the idea that it would prove a successful arrange ment. It was Sir Garnet Wolseley who made that unfortunate attempted settlement of Zululand, which has just been upset and entirely re-arranged by the Government. How is Cetewayo going back ? Is he being received with open arms by a rejoicing people ? He is going back under an escort of British cavalry, infantry, and artillery—(laughter and cheers)—and his return will only lead to unsettlement and war. We have yet to see the result of that restoration. Nobody will trust or rely on a Gladstonian administra-

tion, for not only does our new-fangled foreign policy reverse the engagements of its predecessors, but offers no consistent guiding principle of its own. Russia finds an understanding with the statesmen who govern Austria and Germany safer than the effusive affection of a variable rhetorician. France even remains with her growing hatred of religion and her swelling Jacobinism, is now our avowed enemy.

MR GLADSTONE'S PARTISAN SPIRIT.

There is one central cause to which all these troubles can be clearly traced. That cause is faction: the blind and partisan spirit with which Mr Gladstone and his section of the Liberal party—for I am glad to say there were some patriotic exceptions—opposed any and every act or policy of Lord Beaconsfield's administration. It is the Nemesis of their conduct that is now pursuing them. Sometimes it appeared in awkward pledges which fetter and hamper their better judgment, more often in the necessary continuance of a policy which they undertook with ignorant and factious levity. That the policies they espoused with such slight consideration and advocated with such bitterness and rancour had no other guiding principle than this which I venture with reluctance to ascribe to them, will be made clear the moment they are investigated. British statesmen have sometimes followed their own past history. No one can say that the Gladstonian party, since 1876, have done this. At the defence of some great principle of English and of European statesmanship, as for example, the balance of power among nations, the restraint of over-reaching ambition, the defeat of triumphant tyranny—have been the keynote of British ministers in the past. Thus they helped to check the ambition of Louis XIV. Thus, under Pitt and Wellingon, they hurled the universal oppressor of Europe from his pinnicle of power. And thus, even under Liberal statesmen of an inferior type, they overthrew the pride and treachery of the autocrat of all the Russians. Neither of these objects had Mr Gladstone in view in 1876 or 1877. He aided his old enemy of the Crimea to destroy the balance of power of Europe, as well as the Ottoman empire for which he had fought. He assisted to the uttermost the plots, not of a decaying despotism, but of the most aggressive, most cruel tyranny of modern times. Nor, gentlemen, were those British interests, which statesmen and patriots of the olden time were not ashamed nor afraid to champion, any more the guiding principle of Mr Gladstone's policy. They gloried in the fact that, casting those great interests of their country to the winds—interests which a Pitt and a Palmerston had not shrunk from spending their lives in upholding—they were the friends of every country but their own. The Bulgarian, the Zulu, and the Boer, were the object of

their tender solicitude. British security, British colonists, the British empire were unworthy of the regard of such moral and Christian philanthropists. What, then, was their guiding principle? It was faction, pure and simple. They desired to pull down the Government, happen what might to their country, to discredit the Ministry, even if the dominions of their Queen were shattered in the attempt. The key-note of this policy is to be found in Mr Gladstone's unhesitating confession at Oxford in 1877—"Day by day, and month by month, and year by year, have I laboured to counteract the purpose of the Prime Minister." This was avowed faction. You may see the antithesis in a speech of Lord Beaconsfield's in 1856. Russia was already, with characteristic perfidy, trying to wriggle out of her obligations. At the close of the war caused by the weakness of his opponents and mismanaged by their incapacity, when criticism could find on every side points for attack and exposure, what did the leader of the Opposition, then Mr Disraeli, say in the House of Commons? "There was no sacrifice which Parliament would not make, or which the nation would not cheerfully undergo, to maintain the treaty, and vindicate the authority of the Sovereign." These were the words of a statesman and a patriot. With regard to the policy of the Government in the East, they were troubled with no scruples. They were as oblivious of their own history as of the interests of their country. The prospect of provoking a strife of creeds and races, sanguinary and destructive even beyond the terrible precedents of Eastern struggles, withheld them not. With a gay heart they pursued a course of action, which but for the wisdom and statesmanship of the great man whom they were factiously opposing, must have brought on a general war in Europe. The Englishmen of the future will read with astonishment that the party, and in many cases the very men, who were in 1876 and 1877 doing all in their power for the encouragement of Russia, and for the ruin of Turkey, was the same who but five-and-twenty years ago had plunged their country into a protracted and costly war for objects entirely antagonistic. They will read with amazement that Mr Gladstone, the Duke of Argyle. and Lord Granville, were members of the Cabinet whose weakness caused the Crimean war, and whose incapacity mismanaged it. Their surprise will be still greater when they note that these statesmen were in power for the greater portion of the period that elapsed between the war and the events of 1876, yet they took no measures to carry out the policy they then preached with such fury, nor for the advantage of those Christian populations in which they discovered so sudden and so absorbing an interest; yet that interval of a quarter of a century was when reforms in the Ottoman Empire might have been easily accomplished. It was a period of peace and compara-

tive absence of intrigue, when the Russian was still staggering under the blows of the Crimean war, when the old bitterness between races and religions was dying out, when British influence was supreme at Constantinople, and England was regarded as the oldest and most honest friend of the Ottoman people. Had Mr Gladstone and his followers on this question had their way, the Russian Empire would now have reached from the mountains of Armenia to the shores of Syria. Constantinople, the queen of cities, would now have been an impregnable stronghold of her power, an arsenal for her fleets and armies, a source of untold wealth and commerce to its possessor. There are occasions on which statesmen may retrace their steps and reverse their policy with dignity and honour. But it appears to me that the action of the Gladstonian party towards Turkey during the last four years must revolt the common conscience of mankind. To allow twenty years of indifference and silence to pass away, to maintain in every outward relation an appearance of the greatest friendship and alliance with the Porte, to wait until the Ottoman people were in their hour of the deadliest peril—when they were harassed with rebellion at home and menaced with overwhelming danger from abroad, when they were surrounded with perils on every side —for Mr Gladstone and his faction to have chosen that supreme moment for their unsparing attack upon their old allies and companions in arms, to have clamoured for their unsparing destruction, and all in favour of a power so barbarous and so oppressive as the despotism of St Petersburg, must be abhorrent to—I will not say a high honourable feeling—but to the ordinary instincts of universal nature. I pass over the terrible and heartrending misery which that cruel war involved; the utter ruin of a peaceful, industrious, and manly population, the all but utter extermination of a gallant race; the sacrifice of close on two millions of innocent lives; the nameless horrors and the unspeakable agony inflicted upon thousands of thousands of those whose age and helplessness should have been their protection. The sufferings of poor Mussulmans are unworthy of the consideration of sentimental philanthropists, whose morality is as strange as their Christianity is fresh-blown. The consequences of that war between Russia and Turkey have only begun to be felt. The mischiefs and perils to England are not yet realised. The redistribution of power in these regions is far from completion. Let the origin and source of her peril never be forgotten. Let the penalty be visited upon the heads of the guilty, upon those whose want of patriotism and of foresight led them to prefer the advancement of their party to the welfare of their country. In summing up the indictment I am tempted to say in the words of the greatest living poet—

'Ah God. for a man with heart, head, hand,
Like some of the simple great ones gone
For ever and ever by,
One still strong man in a blatant land,
Whatever they call him, what care I,
Aristocrat, democrat, autocrat—one
Who can rule and dare not lie."

(Great cheering.)

Mr MAUGHAN, who was received with cheers, said—The very pleasing duty devolves upon me of proposing a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr Ashmead Bartlett for the valuable, able, and statesmanlike address to which we have all so delightedly listened. (Loud cheers.) We owe our thanks to the Helensburgh and Gareloch Conservative Association for affording us addresses on political subjects in the past, but I am sure we acknowledge special gratitude for this opportunity of hearing so talented and so distinguished a man as Mr Bartlett. (Loud cheers.) He has come here to-night at great inconvenience, and even in opposition to medical advice; for I may tell you, what he has not mentioned himself, that his great labours during the recent session of Parliament, and in addressing numerous large audiences throughout the country since, have made such inroads on his strength that he has been ordered entire rest, and recommended to go abroad for a time to recruit in order that when he comes back we may have the advantage of his services. (Cheers.) His address to-night, after a long journey, is a valuable addition to the literature of politics, and deserves the most earnest study. I beg to move a hearty vote of thanks to Mr Bartlett for his able, eloquent, and clear address. (Loud cheers.)

Mr HANNAY seconded, and the resolution was carried with renewed cheering.

Mr BARTLETT, in acknowledging the compliment, apologised for the length of his address, and hoped his Liberal friends would pardon him if he had said anything to annoy them; but he urged that all alike should fairly and carefully weigh what he had advanced, especially on the Central Asian and foreign questions. (Cheers.)

Admiral EDYE moved a vote of thanks to Mr Martin for having so ably occupied the chair. (Loud cheers.)

The CHAIRMAN acknowledged the compliment and thanked them for the fair way in which they had listened to Mr Bartlett. (Cheers.)

The following are extracts from a recent speech delivered by Mr Bartlett, to his constituents at Eye, upon Progress and Conservative Legislation:—

THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY.

We are accused of having no policy, and are told that our criticisms of the Government are barren and useless, and that we must have a progamme of measures with which to appeal for public support before we can hope to overthrow the present Government. I pass over the manifest absurdity of demanding of a defeated minority that has only been in opposition two years and a half, a cut and dried Ministerial programme. It would be reversing all the traditions and practice of Parliamentary government to expect this. Nor can anyone who is even remotely familiar with the constant—I might say monotonous—succession of blunders that have marked the policy, or the want of policy, of Mr Gladstone's Government on every subject and in every quarter of the Empire, complain if the Opposition devoted all their time to criticising and endeavouring to neutralise the mischiefs caused by the portentious mismanagement of the Ministry. But it is untrue to state that we have no policy. I will state it first in general terms, then in detail. The policy of the Conservative party is to maintain the unity and greatness of the Empire, not to abandon its bulwarks nor to sacrifice its honour from a spirit of pure faction. It is to maintain the time-honoured and beneficent throne of the United Kingdom, not to philander with Republicanism in order to obtain notoriety, nor to pander to treason to catch the Irish vote. (Cheers.) It is to jealously defend the just and well-balanced Constitution of these realms, not to revolutionise our institutions in order to secure place by gratifying ignorance and prejudice. It is the respect for, and the public recognition of religion by the State, not the attempt to smuggle a public Atheist, by backstairs into Parliament, and then the open advocacy of horrible and revolting blasphemy. It is progress with stability, and order with freedom. It is the welfare and security of the people of all classes and all creeds. (Cheers.)

MISLEADING PHRASES.

We have no sympathy with that tyrannical Radicalism which sacrifices the rights and liberties of all who do not bend the knee to

the prejudices of the dominant faction, which despoils churches, persecutes religion, plunders the ancient and loyal families of the country, while it enriches its own leaders out of the labour of the people, We abhor that new-fangled progress which destroys all freedom and spontaneity of political action by means of mechanical organisation and adroit wire-pulling; which dictates through its machinery and unscrupulous agents not merely policy and broad political action but opinions, votes, and individual conduct on every occasion which would turn the free representatives of the nation into slavish delegates, not indeed of the constituences that elect them but of the self-seeking and narrow-minded clique that pull the wires from Birmingham. (Cheers.) Do not be misled by phrases, however specious, or by the false application of popular titles. Let me give an instance: "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform!" This is a taking and a popular programme, one that has frequently tickled the ears of the too credulous public, and wafted those who never shrink from saying what they do not mean on the breeze of popular favour to political victory. (Cheers.) These are cries which were freely used during the last general election, and which considerably moved those who heard them. Yet, like the apples of the desert, they have turned to bitterness and gall in the mouths of those who speculated on their promises. The fair Goddess of Peace has been transformed into the demon of a cruel and most needless war. The national blessings of retrenchment have assumed the horrid shape of the largest budget ever voted by a British Parliament, and an addition of five millions to the public debt. Reform? As for reform the reality must appal the stoutest believers in the genuineness of Radical shibboleths. It is written in characters of blood and ruin, upon what was, less than three short years ago, a peaceful and prosperous country. It is displayed, for the wonder, and we may well add the shame of all succeeding generations of our countrymen, in the destruction of the most hardly won, the most precious of their liberties, freedom of speech in Parliament. (Cheers.

INCONSISTENCY OF THE RADICALS.

What endless themes will be written by the political philosophers of the future. on the astounding discrepancy of views and expressed opinion, between the pre-Ministerial and the post Ministerial policy of the Gladstonian epoch. What interesting disquisitions will the essayist of the future indite as he compares 1877-78 with 1881-82, upon such subjects as "Military Aggressiveness," "Bastard Imperialism," "National Extravagance," "Peace and Righteousness," "Rising and Oppressed Nationalities," the "Inherent Rights of all Peoples to arrange their own Destinies," the security of the Empire,

the maintenance of order and peace in Ireland; not to mention such minor points as the Suez Canal shares and Egypt, the value of Cyprus, sanitary and political; the employment of Indian troops, "blood-guiltiness;" and, above all, that most interesting and extraordinary subject, pregnant with many a reflection and with many a lesson for the student of honour, consistency, and patriotism—the use and abuse of the word "jingoism" in political life. (Cheers.)

TWO KINDS OF PROGRESS.

And when we are told that the sole object of political action is, what the Radical party are pleased to term progress, and that we Conservatives are opposed to progress, I ask you not to be led away by the speciousness of the phrase, nor to believe the truth of the statement. For what is progress? It is not as our opponents assume, and as some of us, perhaps, thoughtlessly assent to, an end in itself. It is but a means to an end, and that end should be the true and lasting benefit of the nation; not the placing in office of a clique of ambitious politicians, not the benefit of one faction or one class at the expense of another, not the violation of the eternal principles of honesty and justice for partizan ends, but the benefit of all classes of the community. There are indeed, two kinds of progress. There is that, down the broad path, that leads to national destruction; and there is a rarer and more difficult way, less rapid, but more sure, less popular, but more stable, less self-seeking, but more patriotic, which leads to national greatness and security. Contrast the history of France and of Great Britain for the past two hundred years, and you will see the difference between the progress which we Conservatives believe in, and the false progress which the demagogues of Birmingham, modelling their actions on the worst precedents of French revolution and of French tyranny, are now striving to impose upon the British people in order to make an ancient and a free country pass under the Caudine Forks of ambitious Radicalism. Progress! Their progress as much resembles real national development as the base, but glittering, shams of Birmingham resemble the true gold which they counterfeit. Yes, gentlemen, we are for progress, but it is the progress which is consistent with honesty, with fairness, with liberty for all, with the greatness of our common country, and with that self-respect which even politicians should maintain.

FALSE PROGRESS.

We confess that we have no belief in the progress which in a brief space has turned the peace and prosperity of Ireland into a scene of terror, assassination, of brutal crime, and of social demoralisation, for the shame of which it is not easy to find a parallel. (Cheers.) We disown the progress which, fourteen years ago, disestablished a loyal

and civilising church; the progress which promised us success and finality, for its abortive Land Bill of 1870, as it again promised us, untaught by its own failures, peace and finality for its still more unjust, and still more futile, land agitation of 1881. We repudiate the progress which, for political gain, tampers with sedition and lawlessness; which in one breath prates about force being no remedy and boasts of its weakness in the face of a criminal and disloyal agitation, because, forsooth, to have checked that agitation would have been to stifle mischievous and fruitless "reform;" the progress which in its next breath avows its inability to put down the revolution that its own weakness, and worse, has promoted, without coercion and force, more violent and more drastic than any employed by its predecessors. We have no part and parcel in the progress whose motive force is the murder of policemen, and the blowing-up of goals; whose refresher is the chapel bell; whose object is, for its English advocates, the securing of seats on the Treasury benches even at the price of a disloyal agitation; and, for its Irish promoters, personal aggrandisement and the disruption of the Empire; and whose outcome is wide-spread social degeneracy, terrorism that baffles description, treason that corrodes social and political life, and crimes so frequent and so monstrous that they horrify and disgrace humanity itself. No; our idea of progress was the wise and foreseeing statesmanship by which our late illustrious chief maintained by an administration at once resolute and kindly, respect for law and social peace during six trying and eventful years. It was no French pseudo-humanitarian or fantastic crotchet which enabled Lord Beaconsfield to govern, as he did, a difficult and a suffering people; it was sound, manly, sensible British statesmanship; a great deal better both for Ireland and for Great Britain, I venture to assert, than that miserable, confounding, disastrous medley of weakness, fussy interference and criminal collusion with disloyalty which the Radical party misname progress. (Cheers.) We do not believe in the progress that sent the forces of Britain to three discreditable defeats, and then prated about "bloodguiltiness," when the task of vindicating the honour and the influence of the British name was to be undertaken and finally abandoned, in spite of the solemn promises of British colonists and friendly natives to their triumphant enemies. The progress that denounces as a "silly transaction" the purchase of the Suez Canal shares which has added over five millions to the property of the nation, and that a few years later brings on, by its own folly, a troublesome war in order to maintain British interests in that canal and in Egypt is not the progress that Conservatives will ever accept. Nor does the progress which denounced with unmeasured invective the acquisition of Cyprus—that "pestilential island"—and which now uses it as a depôt

and sanatorium for British troops commend itself to us. Nor shall we copy the progress which can talk of the importance of the peace and security of our great Indian Empire, and of the value of our commerce, and yet abandon the splendid stronghold and centre of trade which Lord Beaconsfield won for his country in Central Asia, suffer his railway to remain unfinished and to perish from neglect, while our Russian rivals are hurrying their railroad onward towards India in the track of their armies, and are gathering under their control the commerce of vast regions which should have been our customers. (Cheers.) That is a curious kind of progress which affronts and alienates the valuable and stable allies which their predecessors have gained for Britain, and which tries, and—as the blindest might have predicted—tries in vain, to form combinations with those powers that are the natural rivals and enemies of Britain. France, indeed, has made progress under the Gladstonian *regime*. She has seized Tunis, and refused us the Commercial Treaty, the bait of so many misplaced hopes on the part of our unskilful negotiators. All this may be progress indeed; but it is progress for the enemies of our country, but not the progress of the country itself.

THE MATERIAL BENEFITS OF THE PEOPLE.

Lord Beaconsfield, with that prescience which marked all his political actions, and his political utterances as well, said that questions affecting the health and comfort of the people were of greater importance than questions of political reform so-called. This is a profound truth, and if you examine the legislature of the past eight years it will be found that the Conservative party have introduced and carried many most important measures of social and economic improvement, vitally touching the health and happiness of the masses of the people; whereas the Liberal party have confined their efforts to measures of political change and revolution, which are not only of no benefit to the people, but which have actually proved injurious in the highest degree to their social and moral condition. Look, for example, at the disestablishment of the Irish Church, at the Irish Land Act of 1870, at the Coercion Act of 1871, at the Land Act of 1881, and the Coercion Act of 1881, at the Arrears Bill of this year, the most monstrous and unprincipled of all their measures. You will see in these a list of measures of political revolution which have been brought on for purely partizan purposes, that is to obtain votes for the Liberal party. All of them, as reforms and remedial legislation, have signally failed, and have only produced disorder, mischief, and a widespread discontent and anarchy. The Land Bill of 1881 has been as futile and useless as the Land Bill of 1870, and the Irish leaders speak of it as a miserable measure. Contrast with these the series of really beneficent measures less

showy and perhaps less violent and less bragged about, which Lord Beaconsfield's Government passed for the material improvement of the British people.

CONSERVATIVE LEGISLATION FOR THE PEOPLE.

The Factories Act limited the employment of women and young children to fifty-six hours a week, and to four and a half hours without an interval. The age of children so employed was also raised from eight to ten. This was opposed by a number of Liberals. The Artizans' Dwellings Act gave the authorities of our towns power to remove old and unhealthy buildings, and to replace them with properly constructed houses for the benefit of the working classes. The Public Health Act consolidated and improved previous measures, and carried out Lord Beaconsfield's motto—"Sanitas sanitatum omnia sanitas." The Friendly Societies Act gave the millions of the working classes who have insured their lives in these beneficial associations security, that the societies in which they had invested their savings were sound and solvent, and thus conferred an immense boon upon the poor. Two measures passed in 1875—the Employers' and Workmen's Act and the Conspiracy Act—made employers and workmen, as regards labour and contracts, absolutely equal before the law. These measures received the warm encomiums of the late Mr Macdonald, M.P., of Mr George Howell, and other leaders of the Trades Unions. Even the Settled Estates Bill which became law this session, and which has introduced so great an improvement into the tenure of land, was a bill of the late Government and was drafted by Lord Cairns. The Enclosure of Commons Act obtained for the people the right of using the commons for recreation and amusement; and the Pollution of Rivers Act checked the contamination of the waters of our rivers by sewage and the refuse of the manufactories. No measure could be more important than this for the health of the people, yet it was violently opposed by that professed champion of the people, Sir Charles Dilke. The Canal Boats Act secured the proper inspection and sanitary regulation of these neglected dens of disease and crime. With regard to the Factories and Workshops Act which amended and consolidated the various and confused laws relating to factories and workshops, Lord Shaftesbury said in the House of Lords that two millions of the people of this country will bless the day when Mr Cross was invited to become Secretary of State for the Home Department. Lastly, an Employers Liability Bill, which the Act passed in 1881 closely copied, was introduced in 1879, but was prevented by the obstruction of the Irish members, aided by Mr Chamberlain, Sir C. Dilke, and other Radicals, from becoming law. This is a list of wise, fair, and beneficial measures passed by a Conservative Administration, at

an epoch, too, of great trial and danger abroad, when the time of Parliament and of statesmen was of necessity greatly occupied with the gravest Imperial questions. (Cheers.) If we look back over the social legislation of the past sixty years, it will be found that many of those measures which most vitally affected the material condition and health of the working classes have been proposed and carried by Conservatives, and opposed by prominent Radicals for selfish reasons. Thus the early Factories and Mines Act were introduced by the Earl of Shaftesbury, then Lord Ashley, and vehemently opposed by Mr Bright, Mr Hume, and other Radical capitalists. Mr Bright denounced the Ten Hours Bill "as one of the worst measures ever passed." Mr Bright declared that he "should oppose the Bill at every step," and he did so in the most "vexatious and unfair way," thus proving himself the parent of obstruction. Among the Conservatives who voted for this most beneficient measure were Mr Disraeli, Lord John Manners, and many others. Mr Bright, Mr Cardwell, and Mr Milner Gibson of course opposed it. In 1877, by the Workshop Regulation Act, the advantages of previous protective measures were extended to the smaller trades. Nor need I remind you before leaving this subject that it was a Conservative Government, led by Mr Disraeli, ever foremost in promoting happiness of the working classes of this kingdom, which conferred upon them the political franchise which they now enjoy. By freely granting household suffrage to the people he showed a generous confidence in the masses of his countrymen which the grudging, crude, and illogical offers of Mr Gladstone of an £8 or £7 franchise refused, It is necessary to recall the memory of these facts at some length, in view of the misrepresentations of our opponents, and of their preposterous claims to be considered as the sole friends of the working classes. The Radical capitalist is only the friend of the labouring population so long as it suits his interest to be so, and so long as he can obtain political power by pandering to popular prejudices. He has no objection to plundering the Irish landowner by the most iniquitous measures ever passed in a free country, because his "own withers are unwrung" by the ruin inflicted upon an honest and loyal class. But once touch his pocket, once threaten to deprive him of the power of extorting the last farthing of labour out of his employées and you will find him crying out against the so-called injustice like a whipped child, as so many of our pseudo-humanitarians cried out against the Factories, the Collieries, and the Ten Hours Acts. Scratch a new-fangled Radical and *you will find a humbug and frequently a tyrant.* Lord Beaconsfield's action in this respect was ridiculed as a policy of sewage. Yet now the Radical press is beginning to assert that questions of social and material condition of the people are the important questions of the day. They are, as usual, copying, without even the

grace of an acknowledgment, the advice and the lead of the illustrious statesman whom they used to calumniate and vilify. The Chamberlains and the Dilkes are masquerading in the garb of social reformers as they have been of late masquerading in the garb of Imperialists. Their efforts to pose as the protectors of the Empire and their vain-glorious vauntings over their cheap successes against the most unwarlike people in the world were as ridiculous as their new assumption of the cause which he denounced a few years back as a policy of sewage. It is said that we are not progressive, and that our opponents are. I believe that the Conservative party is the true party of progress. I, for one, and there are many others—hundreds—in the House of Commons, shall be always ready to support any measure which is fair and just, and which really tends to the material improvement of the masses of the people. (Hear, hear.) This is the object of our policy at home; and the greatness, the credit, and security of the Empire, is our policy abroad. We can show by facts that we have carried out this policy in the past, and we ask you to believe that we are the party most likely to carry it out in the future.

THE

WAR IN EGYPT.

WHY ARE WE FIGHTING ?

AN EPITOME OF EVENTS,

CULMINATING IN THE

BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

Compiled from Parliamentary Blue Books and other authentic sources.

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THE WAR IN EGYPT;

AN EPITOME OF EVENTS,

CULMINATING IN THE

BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

These words are written, not for the few who have closely studied the Egyptian Question, but for the many who ask—Why are we fighting? We propose to consider the present crisis from an Egyptian as well as an English stand-point. Let the reader endeavour to look at the facts as though he had been born on the banks of the Nile, and felt an ardent desire for the elevation of his countrymen. National discontent is almost always provoked by national wrongs. Let us, instead of joining in the outcry against Egypt, consider rather the causes of the disturbance. We are convinced that the root of the evil is that the interests of the population of Egypt have been entirely subordinated to the interests of foreigners. It is necessary first of all to ask

HOW HAVE THE WESTERN POWERS TREATED EGYPT IN THE PAST?

Both France and England earned Egyptian distrust in the earlier half of the present century. The Directory of the first French Republic, in order to strike at British rule in India, despatched a filibustering expedition to Egypt under Napoleon Bonaparte, although the Sultan, who was Sovereign lord of Egypt, was at peace with France at the time. The country was invaded and its defenders slaughtered for no other reason than that France and England had quarrelled. Among the Turkish soldiers who assisted the English in driving the French troops out of the country was Mehemet Ali, the son of an Albanian peasant, upon whom the Sultan afterwards bestowed the Government of Egypt. Mehemet Ali was a born ruler of men, who took advantage of the increasing weakness of the Turkish Empire to extend his authority and assert his independence. A quarrel with a neighbouring Pasha gave him the opportunity, about half a century ago, of extending his sway over Syria, with such beneficial results that Miss Martineau says that Mehemet's son, Ibrahim, who commanded the Egyptian forces, "was soon seen in every part of Syria, building hospitals, repairing mosques, promoting agriculture, encouraging manufactures, and everywhere securing with the whole force of his authority

toleration and good treatment of the Christians." The Turks were compelled to call in the Russians to prevent Mehemet Ali from pushing his conquest to Constantinople. After two years of hollow peace, war broke out again between Mehemet Ali and a new Sultan, France encouraging the former and England supporting the latter. Once more Syria became the theatre of Egyptian conquest, but the English fleet blockaded the ports in the Levant, bombarded Beyrout, and stormed Acre. In the end Mehemet Ali was forced to abandon Syria and to satisfy himself with the Sultan's concession that the Government of Egypt should be hereditary in his family. Miss Martineau says that "to the day of his death he was wont to taunt European travellers with the state of Syria, and ask them if they did not wish it back in his hands; and it is quite true that under his rule the roads were as safe for travellers as he had made his great highway of the Nile; while in Syria there was nothing that could be called government; and the roads were infested with marauders." Thus for a second time Egyptian progress and the welfare of Eastern populations were sacrificed to the arbitrary political arrangements of a Western nation.

HOW DID EGYPTIAN INDEBTEDNESS GROW UP?

Had England not prevented Mehemet Ali from winning his independence he would have rid his people of the payment of the annual tribute of £400,000 to the Sultan. In 1861 one of Mehemet Ali's successors obtained from the Sultan a change in the succession and other advantages to himself, not to his people, for an increase of £350,000 in the annual tribute; the money, of course, only passing through the hands of the Sultan into those of Turkish bondholders. Nine years later Ismail the ruler of Egypt, who had acquired the title of Khedive obtained from his nominal master unlimited borrowing powers of which he took full advantage. It was during the sixteen years' rule of Ismail that nearly the whole of the debt of a hundred millions was piled up. A poor and patient people, less than six millions in number, despotically governed were loaded with this vast liability in sixteen years. What shall we say of the conduct of the financiers who knowingly thrust their costly favours on this unhappy people?—the most heavily taxed in the world! Our Indian fellow-subjects complain of the crushing weight of a taxation of 4s. per head, but 40s. a head was exacted from the Egyptians. The extravagance of Ismail was only equalled by his cruel extortions, made under pain of torture. On the testimony of Sir W. H. Gregory we are assured that the Egyptian National Party "connect much of the financial embarrassment of their country, with the pernicious encouragement by the French, of the insane extravagance of the last Khedive in building and decorating his many tasteless palaces at a ruinous expense, the greater part of which went into the pockets of French *fournisseurs* and contractors." Mr. McCoan, M.P., who is well acquainted with Egypt, declares that out of five loans of the nominal value of £55,000,000 the Egyptian Treasury only received £35,000,000 in cash or its equivalent.

DID ISMAIL GET VALUE FOR HIS MONEY?

IT must not be supposed that Ismail squandered the many millions he borrowed entirely upon himself, his wives, and courtiers. A great part of the debt was run up in much the same manner as a bill-discounting Shylock multiplies the liabilities of a spendthrift heir. Take, for example, the transactions of the Suez Canal Company. The shares which Ismail sold to England for four millions, cost him over five millions and a quarter, principal and interest included. He granted the Company certain concessions for nothing, and Napoleon III. made him pay the Company £3,360,000 for taking them back again. He also granted the Company a concession for the Fresh Water Canal, from Cairo to Ouady, and had to buy it back for £400,000 when the Company had not the means to finish the work. He bought back the right of navigating and levying tolls on the Fresh Water Canal, the right of fishing in the Suez Canal, and other concessions for £800,000, and all the establishments the Company possessed on the Isthmus for £400,000 more, agreeing to pay 10 per cent. interest on the money till it was actually found. To raise the money, the Khedive had to cut off twenty-five years' coupons from his shares, which represented a capital sum not of £1,200,000, but of £1,600,000. Let the reader consider these facts, which are taken from the *Times* and from the *Annual Register* of 1875, and reflect that these transactions took place in a heavily taxed country, with a population of less than six millions, and a revenue of barely nine millions. It is abundantly evident that, for the benefit of European commerce and European capitalists, the people of Egypt have been grossly plundered by means of a series of financial operations which could lead to nothing but national bankruptcy.

HOW WERE ISMAIL'S DIFFICULTIES MET?

In 1875 Ismail was almost at his wit's end for money. Four years before, when the Suez Canal was in difficulties, and Paris was in the throes of revolution, Sir Daniel Lange had vainly suggested to Lord Granville the purchase of the Canal outright. In 1875 the purchase of the shares held by the Khedive was suggested to Mr. Disraeli, who seized the opportunity. The world was startled by what a witty French journalist described as "conquest by Mortgage." At the expense of rather over four millions, England acquired nearly half the shares in the Canal, whose dividends for the next twenty years had been sold; Mr. Disraeli's friends, the Rothschilds, clearing nearly a hundred thousand pounds by the transaction, exclusive of what they made by speculating in Egyptian securities. By this purchase we largely increased our responsibilities, and endangered the Canal itself. Ismail's difficulties still pressed upon him, and at the close of the year he invited an English financier to examine his accounts. Mr. Stephen Cave, who went over, reported that most of the money Ismail had borrowed, had gone to help the Suez Canal; in other words, that the interests of the Egyptian peasantry had once more been subordinated to those of Western nations.

Thirty millions had indeed been spent on other public works, but Mr. Cave

was compelled to declare that Egypt suffered "from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste, and extravagance of the East, such as have brought her ruler to the verge of ruin, and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilisation of the West." Mr. Cave, however, reported that though the debt was then about 75 millions, there was a reasonable prospect of the Egyptians being able to pay seven per cent, interest thereon—seven per cent., when an English landlord thinks five per cent. burdensome. At the price at which some of the loans were taken up, the rate of interest was really between 11 and 12 per cent. The arrangement made afterwards by Mr. Goschen, however, considerably reduced these exorbitant claims. Mr. Cave recommended, as an essential condition of success, that the English Government should send out a financial agent "to take employment under the Khedive as the head of a central department, which should have a general supervision of the incidence and the levying of the taxes," a proposition to which Mr. Disraeli was favourable. Lord Derby, however, disapproved of it; and Mr. Gladstone, with that foresight which characterises him when untrammelled by office, warned the House of Commons of the difficulties and the hopeless impotence in which such an official would sooner or later be placed.

AT WHOSE RISK IS MONEY LENT TO GOVERNMENTS?

Capitalists lend money to foreign States on their own responsibility. If a country like England were to accept the responsibility of collecting the debts of its wealthy citizens, it would be almost incessantly engaged in war. Spain, Greece, Turkey, Honduras, Costa Rica, the Confederate States of America, and some of the Northern States also, have at different times become defaulters; but no one ever had the audacity to demand that they should be compelled to fulfil their engagements. Egypt is the only country upon which strong and continual pressure has been brought, in order to compel it to pay regularly the interest upon its debt. Mr. Cave, and afterwards Mr. Goschen, who went out to Egypt in the interests of the bondholders, recommended the appointment of an English and a French Controller of Egyptian Finances, to be nominated by their respective Governments. The French Government, as usual, only too susceptible to Bourse influences, was quite willing to take this step. It is said, indeed, that one member of the French Government interested in a great Financial Corporation which held large quantities of Egyptian bonds, strongly urged this course; but Lord Derby, who was then in office, cautiously declined the responsibility, Lord Salisbury, however, was more compliant, and in 1879 assented to the plan. It will be seen here after that the complications that have since arisen grew out of the Dual Control, and that, apart from the Control, it is not at all likely that we should have drifted into war. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that the Control was first suggested by the representatives of the bondholders, and that it was established in their interest.

WHAT WAS THE DUAL CONTROL?

By the Decree issued in November, 1879, it was determined that the two Controllers should have the rank of Ministers at the Council, and a seat and a consultative voice therein; that they should be only removed with the consent of their respective Governments; that they should not only be regularly paid monthly from the Egyptian Exchequer, but that they should have the right of naming their officials and fixing their salaries; that they should have the most complete powers of investigation into all the public services; that they should have the right of examining all documents, and of claiming a weekly return of receipts and expenditure from the Egyptian Ministry of Finance. The following year a Commission of Liquidation set aside a certain proportion of the Revenue to pay the interest on the Debt, and another to pay the charges incident to the government of the country. The Controllers-General afterwards gave place to two European Ministers, and, subsequently, these gave place in turn to Controllers-General whose position was somewhat modified. Into these refinements we need not enter; suffice it that since 1879 the English and French Governments have exercised a continuous and preponderating influence in the Government of Egypt.

HOW DID THE DUAL CONTROL WORK?

The peculiar position occupied by European Ministers or Controllers generally has enabled them to sweep out the natives from the Civil Service and to substitute for them a whole army of highly paid foreign officials, leaving to the Egyptians themselves only the Army as a public career. A Parliamentary paper recently issued shows that there were no less than 1,300 European officials, with annual salaries amounting to £373,000, engaged in collecting interest amounting to an annual sum of four millions and a half. Is there any country in which the monopoly of its Civil Service by foreigners would not be fiercely resented, more especially if the inhabitants knew that these strangers, though paid by them, held office in the interest of their creditors, and were practically irremovable? But this is not the only way in which the spoiling of the Egyptians has been accomplished.

WHO ARE THE PRIVILEGED CLASSES IN EGYPT?

In any other independent country the rights and privileges of Natives are superior to those of aliens; in Egypt it is exactly the reverse. What should we say if there existed in England a body of aliens who were exempted from taxation, and from the ordinary operation of the Courts of Justice, and whose most powerful members had the privilege of conferring such advantages upon others? If the reader believes that such a state of things is impossible in Egypt, let him read the following extract from a letter by Sir W. H. Gregory, published on March 16th, 1882—"The stately palaces built by Europeans, and by those who have obtained European nationality, in many instances by very questionable means, are untaxed. The humble dwelling of the Egyptian by the side of these mansions is taxed at the rate of twelve per

cent. on the valuation. . . . Let a Maltese, or a Greek, or an Italian, practise a trade or mount the box of a hackney carriage as a driver, he is exempt from the tax on professions as being under European protection; but an Egyptian, striving to earn his bread in the same way, is taxed in doing so. . . With some slight preliminaries a Consul-General can convert an Egyptian into an Englishman, or a Dane, or a Dutchman *ad libitum*; and on this conversion all his liability to his own country ceases, though he dwells in it, and enjoys all its advantages." The introduction of European Judges into the country, though a natural cause of irritation, is not objected to by the Egyptian National Party; that which they object to is that hardly any of these men are conversant with the language, and that, having to depend upon interpreters, they are consequently incompetent. Yet another abuse has grown out of the Dual Control; the Controllers have the power of granting concessions, equivalent to the powers of our Parliament to pass Railway, Water, and Gas Bills. Imagine the effect if such powers in England were exercised, not by Parliament, but by the Ambassadors of France and Germany.

HAS THE CONTROL BENEFITED THE EGYPTIANS?

Lord Granville, in a recent despatch, affirms that it has; Colonel Gordon, a high and impartial authority, well acquainted with the country, affirms that it has not. Writing to the *Times* at the commencement of the present year, Colonel Gordon says:—"It is reiterated over and over again that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think that it has altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit of the Bondholders. The Army may be paid regularly (?), but the lot of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the Soudan is the same oppressed lot as before."

HAVE THE CONTROLLERS INTERFERED IN THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT?

Under the circumstances of their position, they could hardly fail to do this constantly. After the military demonstration in February, 1881, which resulted in the appointment of a new Ministry, the Controllers interposed objections to an increased demand of £50,000 for the Army; in November they opposed a second proposition in the same direction, and the Budget was partially framed upon their alternative suggestions. In January, the Chamber, having been convoked, demanded the control of all the revenues not especially assignable to the Public Debt; the Controllers objected that by such an arrangement they would lose their control of the finances. Although military operations in the Soudan and on the Abyssinian frontier furnished some reason for an increase in the Army Estimates, we may admit that the Controllers were to some extent anxious that the burdens of the Egyptians should not be increased; but it is evident that their first thought was for the bondholders, in whose interest they held their offices. In April a number of arrests were made of officers who were said to be implicated in a conspiracy to murder Arabi Pasha. After a trial by court-martial forty officers were

condemned to banishment for life to the Soudan; but on May 9th the sentences were commuted to simple exile from Egypt, "in accordance with the advice given to the Khedive by the English and French Agents." A few days later, in accordance with the advice of their Agents, the French and English Governments resolved to send ironclads to Alexandria; a little later yet it was reported that the Khedive had, in accordance with the advice of the English and French Agents, restored his Ministry to office. A few days afterwards the English and French Agents were instructed to take advantage of the arrival of the ironclads to dismiss his Ministers, and to require the temporary withdrawal from Egypt of Arabi and other military leaders. We are not oblivious of the distinction between Controllers and Agents, and it may be fairly conceded that the English and French Governments honestly desired to offer the Khedive the best advice; but their interference in the internal affairs of Egypt, (subsequently followed in the case of England by the bombardment of Alexandria), grew out of that Dual Control, which was established and maintained in the interests of the bondholders.

IS THERE A NATIONAL PARTY IN EGYPT?

The population of Egypt is so mixed that it would have been very difficult to weld it into an homogeneous whole had not European injustice and extortion come into operation; but the position of the Country, as a broad highway of civilization has so permeated it with western influences that it stands out as the one Mohammedan State which aspires to representative institutions, and cultivates a broad tolerance of all creeds. The existence of a National Party has been derided in some quarters, but the evidence of its activity is overwhelming. As long ago as 1876, when Mr. Goschen's visit to Egypt resulted in the banishment of Sadyk Pasha the Prime Minister to the White Nile, there were signs of gathering discontent. According to the *Annual Register* "reports came in from the country districts that a mischievous agitation was being promoted among the village fellaheen, unheard of in Egypt. The Viceroy (Khedive) was accused of betraying the interests of the country to foreigners, as evidenced by his recent employment of Europeans in prominent posts in nearly all the administrations, and by his personal disposition to accept Messrs. Goschen and Joubert's projects." This agitation, stifled for a time, later on became far more formidable. At the beginning of this year the Egyptian Correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, a ministerial journal, wrote—"No greater mistake can be made than to accept the assertion that the (National) movement is confined to the towns of Cairo and Alexandria. I have had occasion during the last eighteen months to visit many of the villages, and I may say with absolute certainty that all the leading men, in fact all the people who have influence, are warm supporters of the National Party." The correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, too, declared that before he went to Cairo he thought Arabi's influence was entirely confined to the military; but, writing from Cairo he said, "I find his party is actually the entire nation."

WHAT IS THE PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONAL PARTY?

In December last, Arabi gave the Cairo correspondent of the *Times* an exposition of its objects, which may be briefly summarised as follows. They accept the over lordship of the Sultan, but object to his interference with Egypt's administrative independence. They are ready to obey Tewfik the present Khedive as long as he governs with a Council of Deputies, and does not return to the despotic methods of his father. They acknowledge that they owe freedom and justice to the action of England and France; accept the foreign debt as a matter of honour, though it was not incurred for Egypts' benefit; they even admit that the European financial contract is a temporary necessity. At the same time they protest against the abuses that have grown up under the control—the absorption of offices by strangers, the extravagant salaries, and the exemption of Europeans from taxation, and from obedience to the general law. They regard the army as for the present the armed guardians of the interests of the people, but look forward to the cessation of interference in political affairs by the troops as soon as the authority of a representative Government is established. They disown any idea of financial repudiation, or of hostility to Europeans engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits; the end to which they work is comprised in the phrase "Egypt for the Egyptians." We apprehend that Englishmen whose minds are not warped by prejudice or personal interest will see much in this programme with which they can sympathize, and nothing to which they can fairly take exception.

IS THE NATIONAL PARTY HOSTILE TO EUROPEAN INDUSTRY.

The War party in England constantly insists that the Egyptian National Party would destroy all that has been done by the efforts of European Capitalists in developing Egyptian industry and agriculture. English Capitalists have sunk 35 millions in Egyptian soil, apart from the Canal, and it is asked whether we should allow their property to be confiscated. We reply that it never was in danger from the National Party. The Cairo correspondent of the *Globe* writing last December says:—"Arabi is not fanatical, and does not wish every European to be bundled neck and crop out of the land on pain of being massacred, as is generally supposed." In proof of this he cites a speech made by Arabi—"Look at the Caisse Publique administered by five Commissioners each with a salary of £3,000; £15,000 a year to administer a beggarly revenue of a few millions, it is preposterous, and out of all proportion to the resourses of the country. The foreigners come here and grow fat, and their sons, brothers and cousins get fat places too, without the knowledge requisite to qualify them for their posts. Dragomen and interpreters have to be kept by the hundred, and all this Egypt must pay for, whilst half her population are at starving point. Let the foreigners come and give fair work for fair wages, and they shall be welcome, but let them not look upon our country as a money bag into which they have only to plunge their hands to grow rich." It is no answer to this to reply that Arabi's recent conduct has

proved him to be a liar. There is evidence already to show that the story of the massacre at Alexandria has been greatly exaggerated, but were it not so, it must be remembered that the bombardment has wholly changed the conditions. Weak but determined people when attacked by superior force frequently resort to cruel methods of retaliation. There is no proof whatever that the lives of Europeans were in danger until the Egyptians were driven to extremities by the appearance of a fleet of European ironclads in their chief harbour.

CAN ENGLISHMEN FAIRLY BLAME THE EGYPTIAN OFFICERS?

The national party has given the best proof of its honesty by its repeated efforts to establish representative government. The adoption of representative institutions has always evoked English sympathy; even when Midhat Pasha sought to checkmate the Constantinople Conference by a sham Turkish Parliament, many Englishmen were misled by the specious device. Yet the very same men scoff at the Egyptian Chamber of Notables. That body may not be exactly representative of the Egyptian peasantry, who are perhaps too ignorant to form intelligent opinions; but the English House of Commons in the days of the Stuarts was not a representation of the English peasantry who were also too ignorant to form intelligent opinions; yet the victories won by Pym, Hampden and other representatives of the freeholders of England were of priceless value to the whole nation. When Cherif Pasha met the Chamber of Notables he proposed a constitution providing for an Assembly elected every four years, meeting annually, with freedom of speech and vote and immunity from arrest, and the right of expressing an opinion on the budget apart from the tribute, the public debt, and international contracts. To these proposals the Chamber returned counter-propositions, the most important of which was the right of discussing and voting the budget—a right which the ancient champions of English freedom considered essential. Gordon Pasha has affirmed that "it is against all reason to expect any straightforward dealings in any Sultan, Khedive or Ameer; the only hope is in the people they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object." We believe that he is right, and that we may fully rely upon the good faith of the representatives of the people of Egypt. Sir E. Malet himself wrote on September 23, 1881, that the discontent of the officers "sprang from comparative, or rather, total neglect of necessary reforms in the army, while other branches of the administration were being cared for."

BUT WERE NOT THE DISTURBANCES MERE MILITARY REVOLTS?

The military revolts were the only possible expression of the national desire. It is true that the demonstration of the troops in February, 1879, was caused by Nubar Pasha and Mr. Rivers Wilson in making reductions in the army, and placing a large number of officers on half pay without discharging the arrears due to them, but it must be remembered that as Europeans crowd the Civil Service, the only career open to natives in the

public service is to be found in the army. Mr. Vivian's telegram to Lord Salisbury, itself bears witness to the fact that behind the military revolt was civil disaffection, for he says:—"An uneasy feeling of discontent no doubt prevails among the natives, who are jealous of the large influx of highly-paid European officials." European ministers had replaced the European control of the finances as originally established; the result of the military demonstration of February, 1879, was the dismissal of the European ministers and the convocation of the Chamber of Notables by Ismail, proceedings which were so distasteful to the Western Powers that they procured Ismail's deposition from the Sultan. Let the reader note that the action of the soldiery brought about the meeting of the rudimentary representative assembly. Tewfik succeeded Ismail, and in September last, he had to face a military demonstration. What did the officers demand? That Cherif Pasha, who was in favour of an Egyptian constitution, should be placed in office, and that the Chamber of Notables should be convened. The National Party assert that the political action of the army is only resorted to as a temporary necessity in the national interest, and an attempt is made to show that this is untrue, by pointing to the demands of the military leaders for increased army expenditure, and to Arabi's disregard of the authority of the Chamber when it presumed to differ from him. We are not concerned to defend the conduct of Arabi and his colleagues. Let it be admitted that they formed an extreme wing of Egyptian Nationalists. All the more necessary was it that England should not play into their hands. Yet, what did we do? Lord Granville's dispatch of November 4th, assures the Khedive of the desire of the English Government to give the Egyptian people full control of their affairs; but in January, Lord Granville refuses even to consider the claim of the Notables to have a voice in the financial administration of the country, notwithstanding Sir Edward Malet's statement, that if this concession was refused, the National Party would be thrown into the arms of Arabi. Thus by protecting the bondholders, England made Arabi for the moment master of the situation.

HOW CAME THE FLEET TO BE SENT?

As before stated, the claim of the Egyptian Chamber to vote the Budget was objected to by Sir E. Malet as interfering with the Dual Control of English and French officials over the finances, but soon after (February 6, 1882) Lord Granville expressed an opinion that a case for intervention had not yet arisen, "since on the part of the Notables and the new Government the intention is avowed to maintain international engagements." It was not till May that the English and French representatives took up an attitude of decided hostility to the Egyptian Government, when the Khedive commuted the sentences passed on the officers who had conspired against Arabi "in accordance with the advice given him by the English and French agents." Three days after, the Prime Minister of France, M. de Freycinet, proposed that England and France should send war vessels into Egyptian waters, and in an evil hour Lord Granville consented, waiving in deference to France his

preference for a European fleet. The demonstration was made in spite of the protest of Turkey.

WAS THE FLEET SENT SIMPLY TO PROTECT EUROPEANS?

There was no proof before the arrival of the Fleet that Europeans were in danger. On the contrary, we have Sir E. Malet's own testimony that its arrival might place Europeans in jeopardy. On May 14th Sir E. Malet telegraphed to Earl Granville that "the political advantage of the arrival of vessels at Alexandria would be so great as to outweigh in consideration the dangers which might possibly accrue therefrom to Europeans in Cairo." Three months before (Feb. 1, 1882) Sir E. Malet had telegraphed to Earl Granville that one of the Khedive's Ministers had told him that "armed intervention on our part could neither be threatened nor effected without the most serious damage to the European population, and a resistance which would lead to prolonged bloodshed." Subsequent events have demonstrated in the most lamentable manner that this warning was well-founded.

WHAT THEN WAS THE OBJECT OF THE NAVAL DEMONSTRATION?

On Sir E. Malet's own showing it was the "political advantage" that he had in view, and that political advantage was the removal of an administration whose prolonged existence was supposed to threaten the interests of the bondholders. The English and French Governments shared the opinions of their agents, for they at once sent instructions to them that they should "take advantage of the favourable moment to call for the resignation of the Khedive's Ministers." Even this step in advance was not sufficient for Sir E. Malet and his colleague. They telegraphed that it would be better to make "an official demand" for the temporary exile of Arabi and his colleagues, and to this course the consent of their respective Governments was given. Not to protect Europeans but to compel Arabi to go into exile were the ironclads of England and France sent into Egyptian waters.

DID THE FLEET PROTECT EUROPEANS?

On the contrary, it drove Arabi to the wall. In September last Mr. Cookson wrote to Earl Granville declaring that "others were associated with Arabi who are more violent and ignorant, and who may push him to desperate measures against his will." It was England and France in the end that did most to drive him to desperate measures. The naval demonstration rallied Egyptian patriotism to Arabi's support, and was quickly followed by fresh military demonstrations in his favour at Cairo and Alexandria. On June 11th, in the very sight of the Fleet, the mob at Alexandria made a desperate attack upon Europeans, sixty of whom were murdered, including half-a-dozen Englishmen and as many Frenchmen.

WHY DID THE FLEET BOMBARD ALEXANDRIA?

We have seen that the presence of the Fleet was the approximate cause of

the Alexandria riots. In England the news of these riots was received with an outburst of anger. The English Government was angrily reproached for not ordering its Fleet to inflict summary and condign punishment on the city. With commendable forbearance it resisted the demand for the moment, but another cause for action soon arose. The men whose exile had been demanded as a measure of self-defence ordered the completion of the forts of Alexandria. Warning was given that these works should be discontinued. It was denied in answer that the works were proceeding, but the electric light showed that during the hours of night the defences were being strengthened, and the temporary surrender of the forts was demanded. As the surrender was refused, the bombardment followed. Although the French Fleet deemed it compatible with national honour to steam away before decisive action was taken, we may admit that the English Government would have been fiercely denounced in certain quarters if it had permitted the continuance of works which were likely to cause a great loss of life among their own sailors; but when they plead that the bombardment was only a measure of self-defence, they must admit the validity of the same plea on the part of Arabi, and they ought to have foreseen that a hostile demonstration in Egyptian waters would probably lead to a hostile demonstration on the other side.

BUT COULD THE GOVERNMENT FORSEE CONSEQUENCES?

Yes. The most remarkable feature in the whole correspondence is Earl Granville's clear foresight of the dangers before him. Writing to Lord Lyons on January 30, 1882, he says:—"Her Majesty's Government have a strong objection to the occupation by themselves of Egypt. It would create opposition in Egypt and in Turkey; it would excite the suspicion and jealousy of other European Powers, who would, Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe, make counter-demonstrations on their own part, which might possibly lead to very serious complications, and it would throw upon them the responsibility of governing a country inhabited by Orientals under very adverse circumstances. They believe that such an occupation would be as distasteful to the French nation as the sole occupation of Egypt by the French would be to this country." As to a joint occupation, Lord Granville expressed the opinion that, "although some obligations might be lessened, others would be very seriously aggravated by such a course." Could a statesman have made a more exact forecast than this? When statesmen place it upon record that they have such a full apprehension of danger, they deprive themselves of any excuse for placing their country in a position from which it is extremely difficult to recede.

SUMMARY.

Our sole object has been to answer the all important question—Why are we fighting? Otherwise we should proceed to summarise the terrible events that followed the bombardment, and to show that they were simply its natural consequences. The reader may be left to judge for himself of the wisdom of

a course which has isolated England from the sympathy of Europe, and has placed her in a position of antagonism to the head of the Mohammedan faith. It is quite within the range of probability that the events of the last few months may not only threaten the continuance of British rule in India, but involve us in a conflict with one or more of the Great Powers of Europe. Already it is generally admitted that the present position of England is one of almost unprecedented gravity. We have clearly demonstrated that the Egyptians have suffered from wrongs so grievous that they are amply justified in making a determined struggle for their redress; that there is a National Party in Egypt, which has undertaken the task of National deliverance; that the very opposition which we have raised has tended to make Arabi the chosen representative of National aspirations; that the interference of England and France has been mainly in the interest of the Egyptian bondholders; that the naval demonstration was not caused by anxiety for the safety of Europeans, but by the desire to force Arabi into exile; that the result of armed intervention was massacre, anarchy, and the intervention of England. Was the present war inevitable, and therefore justifiable? The verdict of Europe has already been pronounced: we are confident that when Englishmen have fully examined the question they too will answer—No.

[*Persons desiring to become Members can obtain forms of which the following is a copy.*]

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INDIAN FINANCE.

FALLACIES

AND

FACTS.

THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE'S STATEMENT ABOUT INDIAN FINANCE.	THE FACTS.
1. "Financial confusion in India."	1. The financial results recently announced are as follows:— In 1878-79, a *Surplus* of over two million pounds sterling. In 1879-80, a *Surplus* of £119,000. In 1880-81, a *Surplus* is estimated of £417,000. In all these cases after paying the whole cost of famine, *of the war*, and of the new frontier railways.—*(Budget statement of* 1880-81.)
2. "Down to the disappearance of the late Government, the surpluses of an Administration in India, after deducting a year of deficit which was due to famine, have amounted to £4,682,000." But Lord Northbrook was allowed to remain as Governor-General for two years more (under a Tory Government), and though he had many difficulties to encounter, he had two more surpluses, "and left office with another sum of £1,988,000 to the good." But "the present Government have accumulated an aggregate deficit in the last four years of £5,831,000, or in round numbers six millions of money." —*(Edinburgh Corn Exchange, November 29th,* 1879.)	2. Mr. Gladstone laid some stress upon Lord Northbrook's difficulties with the Bengal famine, &c. *He never mentioned the fact that Lord Lytton had to contend with a famine of threefold greater extent.* He never mentioned the fact that the income tax which existed in his time in India, and produced almost the exact amount of the surplus of which he was so proud, was repealed before the present Government came into office. Now let us make a fair comparison between the 6 years of Indian finance in the time of Mr. Gladstone, and the now nearly completed 6 years under Lord Beaconsfield. "We have had to find 11 *millions for the relief of famine as against* 4 *millions which had to be provided in the former period. We have had to provide* 10 *millions for loss on exchange arising from the depreciation of silver as against* 2 *millions in the former period.*" Both these causes are entirely beyond the control of any Government whether Whig or Tory. Therefore they may be excluded from the amount in both cases. I do not exclude the the expenditure on the war or the frontier railways, because though it was necessary, the policy which brought it about is the subject of dispute.

Making then these deductions of items which are entirely beyond the control of any Government, the results would show that in the 6 years of Lord Beaconsfield's reign we should have accumulated *surpluses of* $17\frac{1}{2}$ *millions as against* $7\frac{1}{2}$ *millions* in the time of Mr. Gladstone. If I had excluded the war expenditure you would have found that the Conservative Government had the advantage of the Liberal Government by no less than 16 *millions sterling.* (Mr. E. Stanhope, at Hackney, January 19th, 1880, and Parliamentary Paper, No. 96 of Session, 1880.

3. "The expenditure of India during our time was £50,400,000 on the average; it was £49,600,000 in our last year of office, and I know that it has now risen to £58,970,000 or very nearly 60 millions of money."—*(Glasgow Corn Exchange, November 29th,* 1879.)

3. It is not known where Mr. Gladstone got these figures. He understates the expenditure of his last year of office by one million, but that is a small matter. The facts of the whole case are as follows:—If Mr. Gladstone had looked at the other side of the account he would have seen that the receipts are increased almost in a corresponding proportion: and he would have found also, if he chosen to do so, that almost the whole of the increase of expenditure, with the exception of about quarter of a million is due first of all to changes in the form of the account, and secondly to the depreciation in the value of silver.

4. "At this time there is a belief, and a widespread belief, that the cost charged against India, and made known to us on account of the Afghan war is not the true cost: that a great deal more has been incurred, while very little has been paid: that of these large amounts have been kept back as unsettled accounts, and not made known to us in any way.—(*Edinburgh Corn Exchange, November 29th,* 1879.)

4. This belief is quite mistaken. Every item of cost, direct or indirect is included: and the estimates provide for the payment *out of surplus revenues* of a net sum of $5\frac{3}{4}$ millions for the war, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions for the new frontier railways. More than half of this has been already paid.

THE

LIBERAL LEADERS AND GENERAL ROBERTS.

TOWARDS the end of 1879 many sensational stories of alleged British atrocities in Afghanistan appeared in the *Daily News* and other Liberal papers.

At Liberal meetings in all parts of the country these charges were at once taken up and repeated, General Roberts, but more especially the Home Government, being held up to public obloquy as having committed and countenanced the worst of crimes.

Following on these, in February last a memorial was presented to the late Prime Minister, signed by many influential Liberals, some of whom are now members of Her Majesty's Government, reiterating these charges, and demanding enquiry. As soon as General Roberts could be communicated with, the Home Government asked for an explanation of the alleged severities, and as they might have expected, and did expect, received an indignant denial of the whole.

Now that General Roberts has returned to England, and is welcomed with all the distinction due to his splendid successes, it is thought not altogether inopportune to recall to recollection some of the slanderous statements made against him by Liberal statesmen, without enquiry as to their truth, or consideration for the feelings of a gallant British General and the soldiers under his command, but solely for the purpose of casting discredit on the Conservative Government, and so hastening their own return to power. It need only be added that no retractation or apology was ever publicly made, after the falsehood of the charges had been conclusively proved.

November, 1880.

SIR CHARLES DILKE, BART., M.P.

In acknowledging a resolution passed at a meeting held in Chelsea, to protest against the execution of prisoners of war at Cabul, and forwarded to him by the Chairman, Sir Charles Dilke wrote as follows:—

"13th January, 1880.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I am amazed at the reported action of our authorities at Cabul in hanging Afghan private soldiers for fighting against us under the orders of their regimental officers at the battle of Char-Asiab, and if no one else does so I will call the attention of Parliament to the matter. A denial which appeared in the Reuter's telegram of Saturday's paper is so worded as to seem to cover the whole ground, but I fear that it will be found that it does not apply to the executions of some 80 prisoners reported in the month of November.—Very truly yours, "CHARLES W. DILKE."

"He feared that our proceedings at Cabul in November would demand enquiry, and he should certainly express his opinion in the House upon the hanging of Afghan private soldiers for having, by the orders of their regimental officers, fought against us at Char-Asiab." (Cheers.)—*Extract from Speech, February* 2, 1880.

THE RIGHT HON. W. E. FORSTER, M.P.

"We must have some defence and some explanation from the Government—for none has yet been made by any of the Ministers—of the manner in which they have carried on the war in Afghanistan. (Loud cheers.) This question demands an answer. (Hear, hear.) Why have prisoners of war been hanged? (Cheers.) Why was one of the principal Mussulman priests hanged? Is it true that villages have been burned because the villagers gave refuge to fugitive soldiers? Now, it concerns not merely

the cause of humanity, but the good name of England, that there should be answers to these questions. (Hear hear, and cheers.) There has been no self-defence or explanation by any member of the Government; indeed, there has been hardly any attempt at defence by any of their supporters in the press. Some explanation was given, or attempted to be given, with regard to some 14 or 15 men who were hanged a few weeks ago—passing over the fact that 40 or 50 men had been hanged, about whom no explanation or defence had been given. (Hear, hear.) So far as we see at present, they were hanged not because they had broken the rules of war, but because they were rebels. Rebels to whom? Not to the British Government; but rebels to the man whom we are now treating as a traitor, and regarding whom those soldiers who are left, who were companions of these people, are now saying they will go on fighting us unless he is restored to power. (A laugh.) But supposing that they were rebels to this man, what right has our General or our Viceroy, or our Government, to make English officers the Ameer's hangmen? (Hear, hear, and cheers.) Now, I dare say some of you remember when the Russians helped the Austrians to put down the Hungarians, many of us were indignant, and public opinion throughout Europe was indignant, but at any rate these Russians—bad though they may be—left the Austrians to do the hanging for themselves. (Hear, hear.) It may turn out after all that there is an answer to these charges. It may turn out that the facts have been misstated or exaggerated; but if not—notwithstanding our sympathy with our troops—notwithstanding our admiration for the gallantry of Sir Frederick Roberts—that General cannot be acquitted from blame if he ordered these executions. (Hear, hear.) But let us be quite sure that he, after all, is the only person to blame or the most to blame. His position was a very difficult one—a most hard task to perform. No doubt the soldiers he had to lead and keep in order were naturally enraged at the atrocities that had been committed, and

at the murder of our Envoy. But the Government at home and the Government in India had no such excuse. This also may admit of explanation, but, so far as I can see at present, the Government had plenty of time to warn Sir Frederick Roberts that these men ought not to be treated as rebels. His despatch calling them rebels came here one day, and the execution was not for many days afterwards; and more than that, so far as I can see the first batch of men were hanged, and news came to England of their being hanged in plenty of time to stop that large number of 40 being hanged afterwards." (Cheers.)—*Extract from a Speech at Otley, Jan.* 30, 1880.

THE RIGHT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

"We have shivered the country into fragments; we have hanged men ignominiously as rebels—how many has not yet been told—for no other crime than that of defending their country. We have burned villages and driven women and children out to starve in the cold and snows of winter."—*Extract from a letter to Mr. W. Rathbone, Feb.* 2, 1880, *written for the purpose of influencing the pending election for Liverpool, which resulted in the triumphant return of the Conservative candidate.*

MEMORIAL TO LORD BEACONSFIELD.

The following memorial was forwarded to the late Prime Minister by Sir Arthur Hobhouse on behalf of the signatories:—

"My Lord,—We have heard with surprise and grief the account of certain acts committed by the British authorities in Afghanistan, which we believe to be con-

trary to the practices of civilized warfare, and certain to be followed by disaster and dishonour. In proclaiming that all who opposed the British forces would be treated as rebels, that those who had instigated the resistance would be punished without mercy, and in offering rewards for any person who had fought against his troops, the General in command took a course which cannot be justified either by public law or by the customs of civilized armies in the field. A national resistance to invasion cannot with justice be converted into mutiny and insurrection by a proclamation of the invaders; much more so when the invaders have themselves destroyed such government and organization as previously existed in the country. We make no reference to anything that has been done during actual operations in the field, or to the execution of those who were fairly convicted of murder; but we desire to point out how grave a thing it is that soldiers on a campaign should deliberately put their prisoners to death on political grounds, and on a technical charge of rebellion. It appears that the General in command, having obtained possession of Cabul and the territory round it, instituted a systematic search, not only for those who had been accomplices in the attack on the British Envoy, but for those who had taken an active part in the defence of their country. The accounts published under a strict military censorship inform us that in a series of public executions a considerable number of Afghans have been hung by the orders of British officers, with no military object, but as a measure of political vengeance. Against some of these, we are told, there was evidence that they had a share in the attack on the Envoy; others, and among them a chief priest, were put to death on the general ground of having fought in the enemy's ranks, or having been prominent in the defence. These executions took place at a time when there was no actual resistance in arms; those executed were prisoners, either previously taken in fight, or arrested in their homes. In some cases at least, men were hung on the spot on the

sole evidence that their names were found on the lists of particular regiments. We are told that after the bloody combats of December, the General, on retaking Cabul, returned to the system of hanging prisoners on political, as distinct from military, grounds. A pardon has now been proclaimed; but this pardon rests on the principle that those who defend their country from invasion are committing a crime. And it reserves the leaders of that defence for special punishment. Such proceedings are in violation of the practices of civilized warfare. They treat the invasion of an independent nation as if it were the sanguinary repression of a domestic insurrection. They have inflamed the hostility of the Afghan people, and they must make it permanent. We ask Her Majesty's Government to institute an enquiry into acts which affect the honour of the nation, of the army, and of the Sovereign."

Among the signatories are the DUKE OF WESTMINSTER, the Bishops of Oxford and Exeter, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, K.C.S.I., Sir T. Fowell Buxton, Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, Mr. S. Morley, M.P., the Hon. and Rev. W. H. Fremantle, Mr. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN M.P., Mr. Frederic Harrison, Sir John F. Clark, Mr. J. A. Froude, Mr. E. S. Beesly, Mr. G. Howard, M.P., Mr. John Morley, Mr. L. H. Courtney, M.P., Mr. Ashton W. Dilke, Mr. Frederick Pennington, M.P., and others.—*Times*, Feb. 3, 1880.

EARL GRANVILLE.

". . . A memorial has been presented to the Prime Minister, in calm and almost judicial language, denouncing certain acts committed by the British authorities in Afghanistan contrary to the laws of civilized warfare, and certain to be followed by disgrace and dishonour, and asking for an enquiry." —*Extract from Speech in the House of Lords, Feb.* 5, 1880.

THE ANSWER.

GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS.

"Cabul, Wednesday.

"No one executed unless convicted of attack on Residency. No soldiers shot for fighting against us. Full explanation submitted to Government, which I am confident will be considered satisfactory."—*Copy of Telegram, Feb.* 4, 1880.

"With regard to the burning of Afghan bodies at the battle of Char-Asiab * * * * the act was committed in the rear of the troops engaged by two or three Ghoorkas * * * no blame for the act in question can be attached to any officer of the force under my command. * * * Every consideration has been shown to the wounded and dead, inasmuch as they have been treated as if they were our own soldiers, and after Char-Asiab some of the wounded Afghans were taken into hospital and placed alongside of our own wounded men. * * * As to men being hanged for the simple fact of their having fought against us, such was not the case. * * * * As to prisoners taken in fight being shot, such is totally devoid of truth. (Cheers.) * * * Our rule from the first has been extraordinarily mild and lenient. No harsh measures of any kind have been adopted. * * * Since our arrival there had not been a single complaint against a European soldier. —*Extracts from letter read by Lord Cranbrook in the House of Lords, Feb.* 13, 1880.

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD.

"My answer to the Afghan memorial, imputing the most criminal and cruel conduct to the British soldiers engaged out there, was a request that the memorialists would furnish me with the documents on which they founded their allegations. (Hear, hear.) In no instance have I been supplied with any such documents. There is not, in short, the slightest documentary evidence in support of this charge of cruelty.

"One person accused of having acted with unnecessary cruelty is Sir F. Roberts. Now, I do not know Sir F. Roberts except by his public conduct; but no one can, I believe, deny his great skill and bravery as an officer, and as a rule you will not find that those who are brave are cruel. (Hear, hear.) I may add that I mentioned the subject to a person who has a very accurate knowledge of Sir F. Roberts's character, and asked him what sort of a man he was, and whether he was a man who would be likely to act in his position with extreme harshness. The reply was, 'He is one of the most merciful men I ever met.' (Hear, hear.) Yet this is the manner in which an officer of great skill in his profession, and with a tremendous military responsibility resting upon his shoulders, is treated by some of his countrymen, without the slightest information to justify a single statement made by those who signed the Afghan memorial. (Hear, hear.) The Government have, of course, taken steps to ascertain the truth in this matter; but it is a very disagreeable thing to institute such enquiries with regard to such a man as Sir F. Roberts. (Hear, hear.) In making the enquiry I, however, expressed my disbelief in those allegations, and they will, I have no doubt before long, be stigmatized and forgotten." (Hear, hear.)—*Extracts from Speech in the House of Lords, Feb.* 5, 1880.