Abstract

Why does one of the world's poorest countries outperform one of its wealthiest on women's legal empowerment? Across 199 countries, a regression of Women, Business and the Law (WBL) scores on log GDP per capita explains only 41% of cross-country variance (R² = 0.411). Rwanda, with GDP per capita of $1,027, scores 66.1 — 25.2 points above its income-predicted level. Qatar, with GDP per capita of $81,817, scores 27.2 — 47.0 points below. The combined residual gap of 72.2 points is the widest in the dataset. We develop a Revenue-Institution-Capability (RIC) framework, anchored in gender economic governance theory, that identifies three institutional mechanisms explaining this divergence: revenue structure, political inclusion, and capability conversion infrastructure. The framework generates three testable institutional equilibria predicting WBL residual direction. An extended OLS regression confirms this: adding oil rents (β = −0.636, p < 0.001) and female parliamentary representation (β = 0.419, p < 0.001) raises R² from 0.405 to 0.662 on the same sample. Internet penetration does not explain cross-country variation once income is controlled (p = 0.983). Qatar's persistent residual of −27.9 after institutional controls is explained through strategic ignorance — formal equality commitments maintained without enforcement infrastructure. These findings challenge income-led convergence narratives and carry direct implications for institutional approaches to gender empowerment policy.